Re: [civilwarwest] A "Proper" Defense in the West
- In a message dated 2/3/2003 6:50:48 PM Central Standard Time, dmsmith001@... writes:
Given what we know about the rivers running in the West, and given
the need, from a political perspective, of maintaining some form of
cohesion with all of the seceded states - was there a proper line, or
strategy, for the South in the west?
Just curious, of course.
Good question, Dave. It has always appeared to me that CSA strategy was reactionary waiting for each event to unfold and their responses were always piecemeal. Like VB - seems to me their only strategy was to sit pat counting on the location and surrounding terrain to keep VB safe. Once it was in danger for real every move was in response to Grant and too late to make any difference. They tried to cobble it together as they went along.
So what strategy did they have and what should they have had in place.
Sustaining your army off enemy resources while preserving you own is very useful to your moral.
"Will <wh_keene@...>" <wh_keene@...> wrote:
Two thoughts in reaction to Madelon's question:
1) Offensive campaigns 'liberate' areas theoretically disposed to
join the Confederacy (ie: Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri) or lost
through previous advances of the enemy.
2) Offensives campaign create opportunities to engage the enemy on
your terms in his territory. Victories in this situation could have
much greater impact on the will of the enemy populace and thus
greater political impact than defensive victories within one's own
--- In email@example.com, meheatherington@j... wrote:
> In light of Hank Clark's recent notion about the 'offensive' North
> the 'defensive' South, I have another question.
> If, with Hank, we stipulate that "all CSA successes were strictly
> offensive" (whilst acknowledging that this is a mere stipulation,
> the Hunley, torpedos, etc.), then what, really, did the South
> gain by taking the offensive?
> My understanding is that the Confederacy's oft-repeated political
> (failing either European recognition or one grand knock-out Cannae
> would bring the North militarily to its knees) was simply to
> Union, keep up the fighting for so long that squeamish Northern
> (apparently assumed to be less stout of heart than their Southern
> counterparts) would sue for a cessation of hostilities, after which
> South would stagger away, content to be let alone. Winning by
> not-losing, so to speak; victory by endurance.
> So how does a flair for the offensive, with its glamor *and* its
> attrition rate, advance that rather low-keyed wait-'em-out grand
> Or does anybody in the Southern high command think that far ahead?
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