Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.
 

Re: Bragg's order to Stewart at Chickamauga September 19, 1863

Expand Messages
  • Dave Smith
    *Bragg* didn t find anything at Chickamauga, hole or otherwise. Longstreet found it and exploited it, contrary to Bragg s orders. As a matter of fact, Bragg
    Message 1 of 14 , Dec 3, 2002
      *Bragg* didn't find anything at Chickamauga, hole or otherwise.

      Longstreet found it and exploited it, contrary to Bragg's orders. As
      a matter of fact, Bragg was extremely pissed because the battle
      turned from north to south to south to north - contrary to
      his "expectations."

      If Longstreet had followed Bragg's order to the letter of the attack
      plan, he'd have fared no better than Polk did.

      Dave

      --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
      > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Dave Smith" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
      > > Oops, my bad, then. As a first day discussion, I have no problem
      > > with the "meeting engagement" description. I've described that
      > first
      > > day as a division-sized "up the ante" game of poker, myself.
      > >
      > > My problem with the en echelon order was severalfold: 1) They
      were
      > > awfully difficult to execute, on any given day with any army.
      > > Witness the ANV's efforts on the second day of Gettysburg, and
      they
      > > were a good army, 2) Success hinged on the efforts of the intial
      > > attacking group, which meant that failure there literally doomed
      the
      > > effort, and 3) Bragg had tried an en echelon attack at Stones
      River
      > > and Perryville with this army, without success. Was he so
      > > unimaginiative as an army commander that he couldn't try
      something
      > > else.
      > >
      >
      > But didn't the attack succeed?
      >
      > Rosecrans confusedly shifted Wood's division to the left and left a
      > hole that Longstreet exploited.
      >
      > En echelon attacks are successful when you find a breach in the
      > defense before running out of attacking forces. Lee at Gettysburg
      > found a hole, but with his last brigade. Bragg at Chickamauga,
      found a
      > gap and had an entire corps to pour through.
      >
      > HankC
    • hank9174
      ... As ... So Longstreet s attack was separate from the initial effort and after it had *peter*ed out? One of the features of an en echelon attack is it s
      Message 2 of 14 , Dec 3, 2002
        --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Dave Smith" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
        > *Bragg* didn't find anything at Chickamauga, hole or otherwise.
        >
        > Longstreet found it and exploited it, contrary to Bragg's orders.
        As
        > a matter of fact, Bragg was extremely pissed because the battle
        > turned from north to south to south to north - contrary to
        > his "expectations."
        >
        > If Longstreet had followed Bragg's order to the letter of the attack
        > plan, he'd have fared no better than Polk did.

        So Longstreet's attack was separate from the initial effort and after
        it had *peter*ed out?

        One of the 'features' of an en echelon attack is it's
        unpredictability. Not knowing where, or if, a breakthrough occurs it's
        necessary to have the reserves and mobility to exploit any gap at any
        spot in the attack. Hence, an en echelon attack succeeds if a greater
        force is brought to bear along the line of attack.

        I certainly agree that Bragg should have moved en echelon himself,
        from right to left as the fight developed...


        HankC
      • Dave Smith
        ... Nice play on words. :-) It s not so much that it was separte, but that it wasn t certainly en echelon. Some had to do with more correctly understanding
        Message 3 of 14 , Dec 3, 2002
          --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
          > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Dave Smith" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
          >
          > So Longstreet's attack was separate from the initial effort and
          > after it had *peter*ed out?

          Nice play on words. :-)

          It's not so much that it was separte, but that it wasn't
          certainly "en echelon." Some had to do with more correctly
          understanding the situation, and some had to do with not enough time
          given by Bragg to order such a rascal.

          Dave
        • hank9174
          ... The disposition of old Peter s troops certainly indicate he was neither contemplating nor prepared for an attack en echelon. His wing was 2 divisions deep,
          Message 4 of 14 , Dec 3, 2002
            --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Dave Smith" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
            > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
            > > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Dave Smith" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
            > >
            > > So Longstreet's attack was separate from the initial effort and
            > > after it had *peter*ed out?
            >
            > Nice play on words. :-)
            >
            > It's not so much that it was separte, but that it wasn't
            > certainly "en echelon." Some had to do with more correctly
            > understanding the situation, and some had to do with not enough time
            > given by Bragg to order such a rascal.

            The disposition of old Peter's troops certainly indicate he was
            neither contemplating nor prepared for an attack en echelon. His wing
            was 2 divisions deep, maybe 3?

            So what was he thinking? Pickett's Charge with depth? Did he know the
            weakness of the blue line on his front prior to initial contact? Why
            do I have the feeling these answers and more can be found in the group
            archives?


            HankC
          • Dave Smith
            ... snips ... My simple question is, given the fact that Longstreet arrived on the field sometime around midnight, met with Bragg (actually woke him up),
            Message 5 of 14 , Dec 3, 2002
              --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
              snips

              > The disposition of old Peter's troops certainly indicate he was
              > neither contemplating nor prepared for an attack en echelon. His
              > wing was 2 divisions deep, maybe 3?

              My simple question is, given the fact that Longstreet arrived on the
              field sometime around midnight, met with Bragg (actually woke him
              up), learned of the plans, and had, perhaps five or six hours
              (without sleep) to find, locate, arrange, and organize a complicated
              attack - what should anyone expect of him?

              That he took a complicated situation, simplified it, and achieved a
              breakthrough, seems to speak volumes to me.
              >
              > So what was he thinking? Pickett's Charge with depth? Did he know
              > the weakness of the blue line on his front prior to initial
              > contact? Why do I have the feeling these answers and more can be
              > found in the group archives?

              Doubtless, given the charter of this group, this issue has been
              argued before, perhaps ad nauseum. If so, I apologize - but I'm not
              changing my interpretation of a complicated battle.

              What was Old Pete thinking? Hard to say, other than what he wrote 30
              years after the war, when under attack from all sides.

              Did he understand, somehow, that covering 150 yards from the woods to
              the far side of the Brotherton Cabin was best served as an attack in
              depth? Makes good sense to me.

              Dave
            Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.