Re: First Invasion of Kentucky
Gosh darn. I guess this shows that the only things I should take off
the top of my head are hats.
Anyway thanks for the very flattering intro.
--- In civilwarwest@y..., Jfepperson@a... wrote:
> In a message dated 11/25/2002 2:09:35 PM Eastern Standard Time,
> wh_keene@y... writes:
> > --- In civilwarwest@y..., Jfepperson@a... wrote:
> > > What is your source for the higher casualty figure?
> > Two sources off the top of my head:
> > The National Park Service
> > http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/battles/bycampgn.htm
> > And the book From Fort Henry to Corinth" by Gen. Manning F.
> I rarely find anything to correct in Will Keene's posts, but I have
> out that Force gives the figure of 641 total CS casualties on page
> James F. Epperson
- --- In civilwarwest@y..., Jfepperson@a... wrote:
> In a previous life I designed a regimental-level wargame on Belmont.Cool! Paper or computer?
> It was never published, but in doing the work I saw thatinterdicting
> the crossing would have subjected the gunboats --- which were nottowards the
> ironclads --- to severe fire from the heavy guns on the bluff.
> The river is roughly a backwards L at Belmont. Grant landed
> top of the vertical line, and the Confederates crossed the river atFor an illustration of this see
> the end of the horizontal line.
Though this doesn't show where the Confederate reinforcements went in.
From my understanding they landed around the field that is close to
the river north of the camp.
> ...To even bring their guns to bear onthemselves
> the crossing steamers, the gunboats would have had to position
> at the bend in the L, and this would have put them at close rangeto
> a lot of firepower. I don't think they could have stood up to itfor
> very long.As it was, the gunboats made sorties around the bend in the river to
fire on the batteries and then withdraw. Little damage was suffered
and little was inflicted. I don't think that the gunboats could have
survived extended exposure to the shore guns, but their mobility
might have allowed them a more useful role.
> Having said this, I have a dim memory of reading an account whichYes it was Hughes. I confess to being heavily influenced by his book.
> criticized the gunboat captains for not doing as much as they could
> have. (Is this in Hughes's book?)
> ...Part of the issue may have beenWhat if the gunboats had been held in reserve until transports were
> one of perception and expectation: Maybe the boats could have stood
> the fire, but the officers didn't think so and so didn't try. Also,
> if the gunboats had even lobbed a few inaccurate shells into the
> crossing steamers it might have intimidated the Confederates into
> not sending more men across.
seen? They could have stayed away from the shore batteries until
transports were seen pulling away from the opposite shore and then
they could attempt to close fast on the transports. However,
achieving that result would require a coordination of action and
communication that may be asking too much of those involved. So I am
unsure if what I am suggesting is realistic or not.
> And, finally, the act of composing this reminded me that some of theThat is what I had in mind when composing this idea. Apparenty one
> CS troops did cross a little further upstream --- more towards the
> crook of the L --- and this could indeed have been interfered with
> by more energetic use of the gunboats.
transport did try to land at the camp, but union fire led it to away
and go up stream. The rest all went upstream. However, the obvious
flaw in my counter-factual is that if Polk was concerned about the
gunboats, then he could have selected a downstream landing, though
this would not have afforded the opportunity to get between Grant and