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Was attacking Beull an option? [was Shiloh]

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  • Carl Williams
    -As far as isolating and attacking Beull, I believe you are entertaining an overly optimistic notion of what was acceptable risk. Referring to the map at
    Message 1 of 21 , Oct 25, 2002
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      -As far as isolating and attacking Beull, I
      believe you are entertaining an overly optimistic
      notion of what was acceptable risk. Referring to
      the map at
      http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm
      it would seem that Beull was to hang tight at
      Nashville as long as AS Johnston had any notions
      to try and re-take that area. The map text
      indicates that ASJ left first, freeing Beull to
      move to Pittsburg Landing to help concentrate
      with Grant for the move to take Corinth. Beull
      must have gotten Intel that Nashville was not
      threatened, and that he would have had plenty of
      time to react to any reversal of this
      CS-vacating-the-area trend to one of
      re-concentration in the area [I am assuming some
      of this, correct me if it is inaccurate.] So it
      would seem that your opportunity to attack Beull
      would be a successfully secret one while he was
      in transit from Nashville to Savannah TN. The
      problem that I have with this is the likelihood
      that in this area such an attempt would risk
      entrapment of the CS forces in an area dominated
      by Union control of the rivers; this poses itself
      as a viable reaction even if the surprise is
      pulled off. It allows the Feds to use amphibious
      landings [or just a stolen march] and gunboats to
      threaten to cut off the Rebs attempting such,
      with panicked reaction to avoid entrapment
      between a Union force and an uncrossable river
      [due to gunboats]sure to follow. So I think we
      have plenty of examples of Secesh knowledge that
      this situation was to be avoided, and I would say
      we need to be dis-abused of the notion that this
      attack on Beull was really an option. All who
      disagree may weigh in!

      Carl






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      Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
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    • Will
      ... I haven t thought it out completely, but I do think there was an option to threaten Buell s flank via the Decautar-Nashville line or the
      Message 2 of 21 , Oct 25, 2002
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        --- In civilwarwest@y..., Carl Williams <carlw4514@y...> wrote:
        >
        > -As far as isolating and attacking Beull, I
        > believe you are entertaining an overly optimistic
        > notion of what was acceptable risk....



        I haven't thought it out completely, but I do think there was an
        option to threaten Buell's flank via the Decautar-Nashville line or
        the Huntsville-Murfreesboro line. I think it could have successfully
        kept Buell from joining Grant. As Carl points out, when Johnston left
        the area it freed Buell to move to the Tennessee. But the problem is
        that I don't see how Johnston could have expected to eliminate
        Buell.

        There was a side expedition sent out from Buell's army that is not
        shown on the map. Mitchell Ormsby with smallish force went due south
        from Nasvhille to cover Buell's flank and to capture Decatur and
        Huntsville. I think Johnston could have focused on Ormsby and
        eliminated him. I think this would have panicked Buell and led him
        to fall back on Nashville. Would Halleck have allowed Grant to
        continue towards Corinth without Buell? or would Halleck have become
        panicky about Nashville?

        If Johnston had remained north of the Tennessee, Muscle Shoals would
        have restricted the union ability to use the rivers to cut him off.
        As the counter argument to Carl's concern that he would have been cut
        off, consider that a few months later Bragg moved across the same
        territory and invaded Kentucky. Union control of the rivers was the
        same and he was not cut off.


        The way he did plan it, Johnston expected he could eliminate Grant at
        Pittsbug Landing, which I think plays into the idea of 'acceptable
        risk'. I think Johnston's best chance at success would have been to
        have attacked Grant earlier, when GRant had fewer men and Buell was
        still far away. Best of all for Johston would have been to hit
        Pittsburg Landing when Grant still had a good portion of his force at
        Savannah. But to do that Johnston needed to be able to advance two
        weeks earlier than he did and I'm not sure he was able to do so.


        >
        http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm
        > it would seem that Beull was to hang tight at
        > Nashville as long as AS Johnston had any notions
        > to try and re-take that area. The map text
        > indicates that ASJ left first, freeing Beull to
        > move to Pittsburg Landing to help concentrate
        > with Grant for the move to take Corinth. Beull
        > must have gotten Intel that Nashville was not
        > threatened, and that he would have had plenty of
        > time to react to any reversal of this
        > CS-vacating-the-area trend to one of
        > re-concentration in the area [I am assuming some
        > of this, correct me if it is inaccurate.] So it
        > would seem that your opportunity to attack Beull
        > would be a successfully secret one while he was
        > in transit from Nashville to Savannah TN. The
        > problem that I have with this is the likelihood
        > that in this area such an attempt would risk
        > entrapment of the CS forces in an area dominated
        > by Union control of the rivers; this poses itself
        > as a viable reaction even if the surprise is
        > pulled off. It allows the Feds to use amphibious
        > landings [or just a stolen march] and gunboats to
        > threaten to cut off the Rebs attempting such,
        > with panicked reaction to avoid entrapment
        > between a Union force and an uncrossable river
        > [due to gunboats]sure to follow. So I think we
        > have plenty of examples of Secesh knowledge that
        > this situation was to be avoided, and I would say
        > we need to be dis-abused of the notion that this
        > attack on Beull was really an option. All who
        > disagree may weigh in!
        >
        > Carl
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > __________________________________________________
        > Do you Yahoo!?
        > Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
        > http://webhosting.yahoo.com/
      • melchizedek22
        1 I m sure attacking Grant came first,he kept kicking their Butt! The idea of attacking Beull is Monday morning Quarterbacking ! The Baron
        Message 3 of 21 , Oct 25, 2002
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          1 I'm sure attacking Grant came first,he kept kicking
          their Butt! The idea of attacking Beull is Monday morning
          Quarterbacking ! The Baron

          -- In civilwarwest@y..., Carl Williams <carlw4514@y...> wrote:
          >
          > -As far as isolating and attacking Beull, I
          > believe you are entertaining an overly optimistic
          > notion of what was acceptable risk. Referring to
          > the map at
          > http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm
          > it would seem that Beull was to hang tight at
          > Nashville as long as AS Johnston had any notions
          > to try and re-take that area. The map text
          > indicates that ASJ left first, freeing Beull to
          > move to Pittsburg Landing to help concentrate
          > with Grant for the move to take Corinth. Beull
          > must have gotten Intel that Nashville was not
          > threatened, and that he would have had plenty of
          > time to react to any reversal of this
          > CS-vacating-the-area trend to one of
          > re-concentration in the area [I am assuming some
          > of this, correct me if it is inaccurate.] So it
          > would seem that your opportunity to attack Beull
          > would be a successfully secret one while he was
          > in transit from Nashville to Savannah TN. The
          > problem that I have with this is the likelihood
          > that in this area such an attempt would risk
          > entrapment of the CS forces in an area dominated
          > by Union control of the rivers; this poses itself
          > as a viable reaction even if the surprise is
          > pulled off. It allows the Feds to use amphibious
          > landings [or just a stolen march] and gunboats to
          > threaten to cut off the Rebs attempting such,
          > with panicked reaction to avoid entrapment
          > between a Union force and an uncrossable river
          > [due to gunboats]sure to follow. So I think we
          > have plenty of examples of Secesh knowledge that
          > this situation was to be avoided, and I would say
          > we need to be dis-abused of the notion that this
          > attack on Beull was really an option. All who
          > disagree may weigh in!
          >
          > Carl
          >
          >
          >
          >
          >
          >
          > __________________________________________________
          > Do you Yahoo!?
          > Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
          > http://webhosting.yahoo.com/
        • theme_music
          ... A couple points to consider. Johnston had decided on Corinth as the gathering point in early March, I m not sure off hand the exact date, but it was prior
          Message 4 of 21 , Oct 25, 2002
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            --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
            > --- In civilwarwest@y..., Carl Williams <carlw4514@y...> wrote:
            > >
            > > -As far as isolating and attacking Beull, I
            > > believe you are entertaining an overly optimistic
            > > notion of what was acceptable risk....
            >

            A couple points to consider. Johnston had decided on Corinth as the
            gathering point in early March, I'm not sure off hand the exact date,
            but it was prior to Buell's setting off from Nashville circa 3/15.
            Corinth was the central point for bringing in Polk's forces from
            Columbus, Bragg's from the Gulf, Johnston from Nashville and Van Dorn
            from Arkansas. At the time ASJ made this decision the federal plans
            were not known, even to the federals.

            Buell and Halleck could not agree on operations in TN. Halleck's
            plan won out when he was placed in overall command on 3/15 and
            ordered Buell over to the TN. Buell proposed that the Union
            concentration point be moved further East, and I think some of his
            foot draggin' (and he was definitely very slow in getting there) on
            the way to Savannah was to give him time to win over Halleck to his
            plans. In early April, Buell was proposing Waynesborough, 20 miles
            east of Savannah, as the concentration point.

            To move on Buell, Johnston would have to march east, and then cross
            the Tennessee at some point above Muscle Shoals. Grant and Sherman,
            complacent as they were, could not have failed to miss this. They
            then can use their interior lines to concentrate with Buell.

            Another issue happening at that time is that Andrew Johnson was using
            his political weight to complain that not enough troops were left
            behind to defend Nashville. Any reports of Johnston moving back in
            that direction would have been used by him in furthering his already
            vociferous argument for more forces in middle Tennessee.

            Eric
          • slippymississippi
            ... the ... date, ... Dorn ... plans ... Well, I ve never really considered the option, and only threw it out to generate discussion. But marching 20 miles
            Message 5 of 21 , Oct 25, 2002
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              --- In civilwarwest@y..., "theme_music" <theme_music@y...> wrote:
              > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
              > > --- In civilwarwest@y..., Carl Williams <carlw4514@y...> wrote:
              > > >
              > > > -As far as isolating and attacking Beull, I
              > > > believe you are entertaining an overly optimistic
              > > > notion of what was acceptable risk....
              > >
              >
              > A couple points to consider. Johnston had decided on Corinth as
              the
              > gathering point in early March, I'm not sure off hand the exact
              date,
              > but it was prior to Buell's setting off from Nashville circa 3/15.
              > Corinth was the central point for bringing in Polk's forces from
              > Columbus, Bragg's from the Gulf, Johnston from Nashville and Van
              Dorn
              > from Arkansas. At the time ASJ made this decision the federal
              plans
              > were not known, even to the federals.
              >
              > Buell and Halleck could not agree on operations in TN. Halleck's
              > plan won out when he was placed in overall command on 3/15 and
              > ordered Buell over to the TN. Buell proposed that the Union
              > concentration point be moved further East, and I think some of his
              > foot draggin' (and he was definitely very slow in getting there) on
              > the way to Savannah was to give him time to win over Halleck to his
              > plans. In early April, Buell was proposing Waynesborough, 20 miles
              > east of Savannah, as the concentration point.

              Well, I've never really considered the option, and only threw it out
              to generate discussion. But marching 20 miles and using pontoon
              trains to strike at an enemy in motion definitely sounds like it
              would be above the heads of Beauregard and Johnston. That sounds
              more like something Grant would dream up.

              >
              > To move on Buell, Johnston would have to march east, and then
              > cross the Tennessee at some point above Muscle Shoals. Grant
              > and Sherman, complacent as they were, could not have failed
              > to miss this. They then can use their interior lines to
              > concentrate with Buell.

              What interior lines would these be? The Tenneessee River runs east-
              west there, so the distances would be the same, and Corinth gives the
              Confederates a little bit of a head start. Depending on how well
              they can disguise the fact that they've abandoned Corinth (remember,
              there was very little information leaking through the Confederate
              cavalry screen), they may have a large head start. And the end game
              for the Union in this scenario is the capture of Corinth. Wouldn't
              it play into the Confederate hand if the Union army concentrated
              *north* of the Tennessee River?

              Just some random musings...
            • carlw4514
              Even if we have to stop Federal use of the river at Muscle Shoals, any attack of Beull anywhere near Savannah or on the way to Savannah would have posed that
              Message 6 of 21 , Oct 25, 2002
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                Even if we have to stop Federal use of the river at Muscle Shoals, any
                attack of Beull anywhere near Savannah or on the way to Savannah would
                have posed that portion of Union control as a threat to Reb supply
                lines -- sort of a geographical dagger pointed at the Reb rear. The
                comfort zone IMHO vanishes as you head west of the Nashville
                longitude.
                Joe Hartshorn and I are playing out a scenario [see note below] in
                which a Union army is using a river supply source east of the muscle
                shoals area and is able to thus threaten the CS supply for Nashville.
                I learned from our contributors here that these Tenn. rivers were
                variable in the extent of their navigability, depending on season. Was
                Muscle Shoals the real extent of navigability or was it sometimes
                navigable past this point?
                again see
                http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm

                [anyone interested in what I am calling the Ultimate Civil War Game
                Project may contact me at carlw4514@.... It's been a blast. I
                keep thinking that there must be dozens of people in our group who
                would enjoy this.]

                --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:

                > I haven't thought it out completely, but I do think there was an
                > option to threaten Buell's flank via the Decautar-Nashville line or
                > the Huntsville-Murfreesboro line. I think it could have
                successfully
                > kept Buell from joining Grant. As Carl points out, when Johnston
                left
                > the area it freed Buell to move to the Tennessee. But the problem is
                > that I don't see how Johnston could have expected to eliminate
                > Buell.
                >
                > There was a side expedition sent out from Buell's army that is not
                > shown on the map. Mitchell Ormsby with smallish force went due
                south
                > from Nasvhille to cover Buell's flank and to capture Decatur and
                > Huntsville. I think Johnston could have focused on Ormsby and
                > eliminated him. I think this would have panicked Buell and led him
                > to fall back on Nashville. Would Halleck have allowed Grant to
                > continue towards Corinth without Buell? or would Halleck have become
                > panicky about Nashville?
                >
                > If Johnston had remained north of the Tennessee, Muscle Shoals would
                > have restricted the union ability to use the rivers to cut him off.

                > As the counter argument to Carl's concern that he would have been
                cut
                > off, consider that a few months later Bragg moved across the same
                > territory and invaded Kentucky. Union control of the rivers was
                the
                > same and he was not cut off.
                >
                >
                > The way he did plan it, Johnston expected he could eliminate Grant
                at
                > Pittsbug Landing, which I think plays into the idea of 'acceptable
                > risk'. I think Johnston's best chance at success would have been to
                > have attacked Grant earlier, when GRant had fewer men and Buell was
                > still far away. Best of all for Johston would have been to hit
                > Pittsburg Landing when Grant still had a good portion of his force
                at
                > Savannah. But to do that Johnston needed to be able to advance two
                > weeks earlier than he did and I'm not sure he was able to do so.
                >
                >
                > >
                >
                http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm
                > > it would seem that Beull was to hang tight at
                > > Nashville as long as AS Johnston had any notions
                > > to try and re-take that area. The map text
                > > indicates that ASJ left first, freeing Beull to
                > > move to Pittsburg Landing to help concentrate
                > > with Grant for the move to take Corinth. Beull
                > > must have gotten Intel that Nashville was not
                > > threatened, and that he would have had plenty of
                > > time to react to any reversal of this
                > > CS-vacating-the-area trend to one of
                > > re-concentration in the area [I am assuming some
                > > of this, correct me if it is inaccurate.] So it
                > > would seem that your opportunity to attack Beull
                > > would be a successfully secret one while he was
                > > in transit from Nashville to Savannah TN. The
                > > problem that I have with this is the likelihood
                > > that in this area such an attempt would risk
                > > entrapment of the CS forces in an area dominated
                > > by Union control of the rivers; this poses itself
                > > as a viable reaction even if the surprise is
                > > pulled off. It allows the Feds to use amphibious
                > > landings [or just a stolen march] and gunboats to
                > > threaten to cut off the Rebs attempting such,
                > > with panicked reaction to avoid entrapment
                > > between a Union force and an uncrossable river
                > > [due to gunboats]sure to follow. So I think we
                > > have plenty of examples of Secesh knowledge that
                > > this situation was to be avoided, and I would say
                > > we need to be dis-abused of the notion that this
                > > attack on Beull was really an option. All who
                > > disagree may weigh in!
                > >
                > > Carl
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > > __________________________________________________
                > > Do you Yahoo!?
                > > Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
                > > http://webhosting.yahoo.com/
              • Will
                I think muscle shoals was a seasonal barrier, but I am not positive. But I am pretty sure it was a barrier to riverboat and gunboat navigation in the spring
                Message 7 of 21 , Oct 25, 2002
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                  I think muscle shoals was a seasonal barrier, but I am not positive.
                  But I am pretty sure it was a barrier to riverboat and gunboat
                  navigation in the spring of 1862.

                  I agree that the comfort zone for Johnston north of the Tennessee
                  would vanish in the area west of the Nashville longitude. If
                  Johnston was going to pursue a strategy involving a move north of the
                  Tennessee, I feel it would need to be east of a line from Nashiville
                  to Decatur, similar to what did during the 12 months following the
                  fall of Corinth.

                  ~Will

                  --- In civilwarwest@y..., "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...> wrote:
                  > Even if we have to stop Federal use of the river at Muscle Shoals,
                  any
                  > attack of Beull anywhere near Savannah or on the way to Savannah
                  would
                  > have posed that portion of Union control as a threat to Reb supply
                  > lines -- sort of a geographical dagger pointed at the Reb rear. The
                  > comfort zone IMHO vanishes as you head west of the Nashville
                  > longitude.
                  > Joe Hartshorn and I are playing out a scenario [see note below] in
                  > which a Union army is using a river supply source east of the
                  muscle
                  > shoals area and is able to thus threaten the CS supply for
                  Nashville.
                  > I learned from our contributors here that these Tenn. rivers were
                  > variable in the extent of their navigability, depending on season.
                  Was
                  > Muscle Shoals the real extent of navigability or was it sometimes
                  > navigable past this point?
                  > again see
                  >
                  http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm
                  >
                  > [anyone interested in what I am calling the Ultimate Civil War Game
                  > Project may contact me at carlw4514@y... It's been a blast. I
                  > keep thinking that there must be dozens of people in our group who
                  > would enjoy this.]
                  >
                  > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                  >
                  > > I haven't thought it out completely, but I do think there was an
                  > > option to threaten Buell's flank via the Decautar-Nashville line
                  or
                  > > the Huntsville-Murfreesboro line. I think it could have
                  > successfully
                  > > kept Buell from joining Grant. As Carl points out, when Johnston
                  > left
                  > > the area it freed Buell to move to the Tennessee. But the problem
                  is
                  > > that I don't see how Johnston could have expected to eliminate
                  > > Buell.
                  > >
                  > > There was a side expedition sent out from Buell's army that is
                  not
                  > > shown on the map. Mitchell Ormsby with smallish force went due
                  > south
                  > > from Nasvhille to cover Buell's flank and to capture Decatur and
                  > > Huntsville. I think Johnston could have focused on Ormsby and
                  > > eliminated him. I think this would have panicked Buell and led
                  him
                  > > to fall back on Nashville. Would Halleck have allowed Grant to
                  > > continue towards Corinth without Buell? or would Halleck have
                  become
                  > > panicky about Nashville?
                  > >
                  > > If Johnston had remained north of the Tennessee, Muscle Shoals
                  would
                  > > have restricted the union ability to use the rivers to cut him
                  off.
                  >
                  > > As the counter argument to Carl's concern that he would have been
                  > cut
                  > > off, consider that a few months later Bragg moved across the same
                  > > territory and invaded Kentucky. Union control of the rivers was
                  > the
                  > > same and he was not cut off.
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > The way he did plan it, Johnston expected he could eliminate
                  Grant
                  > at
                  > > Pittsbug Landing, which I think plays into the idea
                  of 'acceptable
                  > > risk'. I think Johnston's best chance at success would have been
                  to
                  > > have attacked Grant earlier, when GRant had fewer men and Buell
                  was
                  > > still far away. Best of all for Johston would have been to hit
                  > > Pittsburg Landing when Grant still had a good portion of his
                  force
                  > at
                  > > Savannah. But to do that Johnston needed to be able to advance
                  two
                  > > weeks earlier than he did and I'm not sure he was able to do so.
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > >
                  > >
                  >
                  http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm
                  > > > it would seem that Beull was to hang tight at
                  > > > Nashville as long as AS Johnston had any notions
                  > > > to try and re-take that area. The map text
                  > > > indicates that ASJ left first, freeing Beull to
                  > > > move to Pittsburg Landing to help concentrate
                  > > > with Grant for the move to take Corinth. Beull
                  > > > must have gotten Intel that Nashville was not
                  > > > threatened, and that he would have had plenty of
                  > > > time to react to any reversal of this
                  > > > CS-vacating-the-area trend to one of
                  > > > re-concentration in the area [I am assuming some
                  > > > of this, correct me if it is inaccurate.] So it
                  > > > would seem that your opportunity to attack Beull
                  > > > would be a successfully secret one while he was
                  > > > in transit from Nashville to Savannah TN. The
                  > > > problem that I have with this is the likelihood
                  > > > that in this area such an attempt would risk
                  > > > entrapment of the CS forces in an area dominated
                  > > > by Union control of the rivers; this poses itself
                  > > > as a viable reaction even if the surprise is
                  > > > pulled off. It allows the Feds to use amphibious
                  > > > landings [or just a stolen march] and gunboats to
                  > > > threaten to cut off the Rebs attempting such,
                  > > > with panicked reaction to avoid entrapment
                  > > > between a Union force and an uncrossable river
                  > > > [due to gunboats]sure to follow. So I think we
                  > > > have plenty of examples of Secesh knowledge that
                  > > > this situation was to be avoided, and I would say
                  > > > we need to be dis-abused of the notion that this
                  > > > attack on Beull was really an option. All who
                  > > > disagree may weigh in!
                  > > >
                  > > > Carl
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > > __________________________________________________
                  > > > Do you Yahoo!?
                  > > > Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
                  > > > http://webhosting.yahoo.com/
                • Will
                  the last I wrote sentance should have the name BRagg in it: simialr to what Bragg did ... positive. ... the ... Nashiville ... Shoals, ... supply ... The ...
                  Message 8 of 21 , Oct 25, 2002
                  • 0 Attachment
                    the last I wrote sentance should have the name BRagg in it:
                    "simialr to what Bragg did"


                    --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                    > I think muscle shoals was a seasonal barrier, but I am not
                    positive.
                    > But I am pretty sure it was a barrier to riverboat and gunboat
                    > navigation in the spring of 1862.
                    >
                    > I agree that the comfort zone for Johnston north of the Tennessee
                    > would vanish in the area west of the Nashville longitude. If
                    > Johnston was going to pursue a strategy involving a move north of
                    the
                    > Tennessee, I feel it would need to be east of a line from
                    Nashiville
                    > to Decatur, similar to what did during the 12 months following the
                    > fall of Corinth.
                    >
                    > ~Will
                    >
                    > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...> wrote:
                    > > Even if we have to stop Federal use of the river at Muscle
                    Shoals,
                    > any
                    > > attack of Beull anywhere near Savannah or on the way to Savannah
                    > would
                    > > have posed that portion of Union control as a threat to Reb
                    supply
                    > > lines -- sort of a geographical dagger pointed at the Reb rear.
                    The
                    > > comfort zone IMHO vanishes as you head west of the Nashville
                    > > longitude.
                    > > Joe Hartshorn and I are playing out a scenario [see note below]
                    in
                    > > which a Union army is using a river supply source east of the
                    > muscle
                    > > shoals area and is able to thus threaten the CS supply for
                    > Nashville.
                    > > I learned from our contributors here that these Tenn. rivers were
                    > > variable in the extent of their navigability, depending on
                    season.
                    > Was
                    > > Muscle Shoals the real extent of navigability or was it sometimes
                    > > navigable past this point?
                    > > again see
                    > >
                    >
                    http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm
                    > >
                    > > [anyone interested in what I am calling the Ultimate Civil War
                    Game
                    > > Project may contact me at carlw4514@y... It's been a blast. I
                    > > keep thinking that there must be dozens of people in our group
                    who
                    > > would enjoy this.]
                    > >
                    > > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                    > >
                    > > > I haven't thought it out completely, but I do think there was
                    an
                    > > > option to threaten Buell's flank via the Decautar-Nashville
                    line
                    > or
                    > > > the Huntsville-Murfreesboro line. I think it could have
                    > > successfully
                    > > > kept Buell from joining Grant. As Carl points out, when
                    Johnston
                    > > left
                    > > > the area it freed Buell to move to the Tennessee. But the
                    problem
                    > is
                    > > > that I don't see how Johnston could have expected to eliminate
                    > > > Buell.
                    > > >
                    > > > There was a side expedition sent out from Buell's army that is
                    > not
                    > > > shown on the map. Mitchell Ormsby with smallish force went due
                    > > south
                    > > > from Nasvhille to cover Buell's flank and to capture Decatur
                    and
                    > > > Huntsville. I think Johnston could have focused on Ormsby and
                    > > > eliminated him. I think this would have panicked Buell and led
                    > him
                    > > > to fall back on Nashville. Would Halleck have allowed Grant
                    to
                    > > > continue towards Corinth without Buell? or would Halleck have
                    > become
                    > > > panicky about Nashville?
                    > > >
                    > > > If Johnston had remained north of the Tennessee, Muscle Shoals
                    > would
                    > > > have restricted the union ability to use the rivers to cut him
                    > off.
                    > >
                    > > > As the counter argument to Carl's concern that he would have
                    been
                    > > cut
                    > > > off, consider that a few months later Bragg moved across the
                    same
                    > > > territory and invaded Kentucky. Union control of the rivers
                    was
                    > > the
                    > > > same and he was not cut off.
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > > The way he did plan it, Johnston expected he could eliminate
                    > Grant
                    > > at
                    > > > Pittsbug Landing, which I think plays into the idea
                    > of 'acceptable
                    > > > risk'. I think Johnston's best chance at success would have
                    been
                    > to
                    > > > have attacked Grant earlier, when GRant had fewer men and Buell
                    > was
                    > > > still far away. Best of all for Johston would have been to hit
                    > > > Pittsburg Landing when Grant still had a good portion of his
                    > force
                    > > at
                    > > > Savannah. But to do that Johnston needed to be able to advance
                    > two
                    > > > weeks earlier than he did and I'm not sure he was able to do so.
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > >
                    > >
                    >
                    http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm
                    > > > > it would seem that Beull was to hang tight at
                    > > > > Nashville as long as AS Johnston had any notions
                    > > > > to try and re-take that area. The map text
                    > > > > indicates that ASJ left first, freeing Beull to
                    > > > > move to Pittsburg Landing to help concentrate
                    > > > > with Grant for the move to take Corinth. Beull
                    > > > > must have gotten Intel that Nashville was not
                    > > > > threatened, and that he would have had plenty of
                    > > > > time to react to any reversal of this
                    > > > > CS-vacating-the-area trend to one of
                    > > > > re-concentration in the area [I am assuming some
                    > > > > of this, correct me if it is inaccurate.] So it
                    > > > > would seem that your opportunity to attack Beull
                    > > > > would be a successfully secret one while he was
                    > > > > in transit from Nashville to Savannah TN. The
                    > > > > problem that I have with this is the likelihood
                    > > > > that in this area such an attempt would risk
                    > > > > entrapment of the CS forces in an area dominated
                    > > > > by Union control of the rivers; this poses itself
                    > > > > as a viable reaction even if the surprise is
                    > > > > pulled off. It allows the Feds to use amphibious
                    > > > > landings [or just a stolen march] and gunboats to
                    > > > > threaten to cut off the Rebs attempting such,
                    > > > > with panicked reaction to avoid entrapment
                    > > > > between a Union force and an uncrossable river
                    > > > > [due to gunboats]sure to follow. So I think we
                    > > > > have plenty of examples of Secesh knowledge that
                    > > > > this situation was to be avoided, and I would say
                    > > > > we need to be dis-abused of the notion that this
                    > > > > attack on Beull was really an option. All who
                    > > > > disagree may weigh in!
                    > > > >
                    > > > > Carl
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > > __________________________________________________
                    > > > > Do you Yahoo!?
                    > > > > Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
                    > > > > http://webhosting.yahoo.com/
                  • melchizedek22
                    If the South had chose to attack Beull,what would be the plan to keep Grant in check while they tried this? The Baron
                    Message 9 of 21 , Oct 25, 2002
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                      If the South had chose to attack Beull,what would
                      be the plan to keep Grant in check while they tried this?
                      The Baron

                      -- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                      > I think muscle shoals was a seasonal barrier, but I am not positive.
                      > But I am pretty sure it was a barrier to riverboat and gunboat
                      > navigation in the spring of 1862.
                      >
                      > I agree that the comfort zone for Johnston north of the Tennessee
                      > would vanish in the area west of the Nashville longitude. If
                      > Johnston was going to pursue a strategy involving a move north of the
                      > Tennessee, I feel it would need to be east of a line from Nashiville
                      > to Decatur, similar to what did during the 12 months following the
                      > fall of Corinth.
                      >
                      > ~Will
                      >
                      > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...> wrote:
                      > > Even if we have to stop Federal use of the river at Muscle Shoals,
                      > any
                      > > attack of Beull anywhere near Savannah or on the way to Savannah
                      > would
                      > > have posed that portion of Union control as a threat to Reb supply
                      > > lines -- sort of a geographical dagger pointed at the Reb rear. The
                      > > comfort zone IMHO vanishes as you head west of the Nashville
                      > > longitude.
                      > > Joe Hartshorn and I are playing out a scenario [see note below] in
                      > > which a Union army is using a river supply source east of the
                      > muscle
                      > > shoals area and is able to thus threaten the CS supply for
                      > Nashville.
                      > > I learned from our contributors here that these Tenn. rivers were
                      > > variable in the extent of their navigability, depending on season.
                      > Was
                      > > Muscle Shoals the real extent of navigability or was it sometimes
                      > > navigable past this point?
                      > > again see
                      > >
                      > http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm
                      > >
                      > > [anyone interested in what I am calling the Ultimate Civil War Game
                      > > Project may contact me at carlw4514@y... It's been a blast. I
                      > > keep thinking that there must be dozens of people in our group who
                      > > would enjoy this.]
                      > >
                      > > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                      > >
                      > > > I haven't thought it out completely, but I do think there was an
                      > > > option to threaten Buell's flank via the Decautar-Nashville line
                      > or
                      > > > the Huntsville-Murfreesboro line. I think it could have
                      > > successfully
                      > > > kept Buell from joining Grant. As Carl points out, when Johnston
                      > > left
                      > > > the area it freed Buell to move to the Tennessee. But the problem
                      > is
                      > > > that I don't see how Johnston could have expected to eliminate
                      > > > Buell.
                      > > >
                      > > > There was a side expedition sent out from Buell's army that is
                      > not
                      > > > shown on the map. Mitchell Ormsby with smallish force went due
                      > > south
                      > > > from Nasvhille to cover Buell's flank and to capture Decatur and
                      > > > Huntsville. I think Johnston could have focused on Ormsby and
                      > > > eliminated him. I think this would have panicked Buell and led
                      > him
                      > > > to fall back on Nashville. Would Halleck have allowed Grant to
                      > > > continue towards Corinth without Buell? or would Halleck have
                      > become
                      > > > panicky about Nashville?
                      > > >
                      > > > If Johnston had remained north of the Tennessee, Muscle Shoals
                      > would
                      > > > have restricted the union ability to use the rivers to cut him
                      > off.
                      > >
                      > > > As the counter argument to Carl's concern that he would have been
                      > > cut
                      > > > off, consider that a few months later Bragg moved across the same
                      > > > territory and invaded Kentucky. Union control of the rivers was
                      > > the
                      > > > same and he was not cut off.
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > The way he did plan it, Johnston expected he could eliminate
                      > Grant
                      > > at
                      > > > Pittsbug Landing, which I think plays into the idea
                      > of 'acceptable
                      > > > risk'. I think Johnston's best chance at success would have been
                      > to
                      > > > have attacked Grant earlier, when GRant had fewer men and Buell
                      > was
                      > > > still far away. Best of all for Johston would have been to hit
                      > > > Pittsburg Landing when Grant still had a good portion of his
                      > force
                      > > at
                      > > > Savannah. But to do that Johnston needed to be able to advance
                      > two
                      > > > weeks earlier than he did and I'm not sure he was able to do so.
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > >
                      > > >
                      > >
                      > http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL7.htm
                      > > > > it would seem that Beull was to hang tight at
                      > > > > Nashville as long as AS Johnston had any notions
                      > > > > to try and re-take that area. The map text
                      > > > > indicates that ASJ left first, freeing Beull to
                      > > > > move to Pittsburg Landing to help concentrate
                      > > > > with Grant for the move to take Corinth. Beull
                      > > > > must have gotten Intel that Nashville was not
                      > > > > threatened, and that he would have had plenty of
                      > > > > time to react to any reversal of this
                      > > > > CS-vacating-the-area trend to one of
                      > > > > re-concentration in the area [I am assuming some
                      > > > > of this, correct me if it is inaccurate.] So it
                      > > > > would seem that your opportunity to attack Beull
                      > > > > would be a successfully secret one while he was
                      > > > > in transit from Nashville to Savannah TN. The
                      > > > > problem that I have with this is the likelihood
                      > > > > that in this area such an attempt would risk
                      > > > > entrapment of the CS forces in an area dominated
                      > > > > by Union control of the rivers; this poses itself
                      > > > > as a viable reaction even if the surprise is
                      > > > > pulled off. It allows the Feds to use amphibious
                      > > > > landings [or just a stolen march] and gunboats to
                      > > > > threaten to cut off the Rebs attempting such,
                      > > > > with panicked reaction to avoid entrapment
                      > > > > between a Union force and an uncrossable river
                      > > > > [due to gunboats]sure to follow. So I think we
                      > > > > have plenty of examples of Secesh knowledge that
                      > > > > this situation was to be avoided, and I would say
                      > > > > we need to be dis-abused of the notion that this
                      > > > > attack on Beull was really an option. All who
                      > > > > disagree may weigh in!
                      > > > >
                      > > > > Carl
                      > > > >
                      > > > >
                      > > > >
                      > > > >
                      > > > >
                      > > > >
                      > > > > __________________________________________________
                      > > > > Do you Yahoo!?
                      > > > > Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
                      > > > > http://webhosting.yahoo.com/
                    • theme_music
                      ... the ... Savannah to Nashville (overland or by boat) versus Corinth-Decataur- Columbia-Nashville. What other routes are available for Johnston if he moves
                      Message 10 of 21 , Oct 25, 2002
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                        --- In civilwarwest@y..., "slippymississippi"
                        <slippymississippi@y...> wrote:
                        > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "theme_music" <theme_music@y...> wrote:
                        > > To move on Buell, Johnston would have to march east, and then
                        > > cross the Tennessee at some point above Muscle Shoals. Grant
                        > > and Sherman, complacent as they were, could not have failed
                        > > to miss this. They then can use their interior lines to
                        > > concentrate with Buell.
                        >
                        > What interior lines would these be? The Tenneessee River runs east-
                        > west there, so the distances would be the same, and Corinth gives
                        the
                        > Confederates a little bit of a head start.

                        Savannah to Nashville (overland or by boat) versus Corinth-Decataur-
                        Columbia-Nashville. What other routes are available for Johnston if
                        he moves on Buell?


                        > Depending on how well
                        > they can disguise the fact that they've abandoned Corinth
                        (remember,
                        > there was very little information leaking through the Confederate
                        > cavalry screen), they may have a large head start. And the end
                        game
                        > for the Union in this scenario is the capture of Corinth. Wouldn't
                        > it play into the Confederate hand if the Union army concentrated
                        > *north* of the Tennessee River?
                        >
                        > Just some random musings...

                        I think Johnston could have fooled the federals until he was observed
                        crossing the Tennessee. Given Halleck's penchant for concentration
                        of forces and Andrew Johnsons panic in Nashville, my belief is that
                        the federals would respond to such a move by having Buell and Grant
                        meet up in Columbia or Waynesborough or some other intermediate point.
                        I really can't see Halleck approving a move on Corinth under these
                        circumstances. Of course if the news gave him a heart attack and put
                        Grant in command we're looking at a whole new ball game!

                        Eric
                      • slippymississippi
                        ... Point taken, although Stonewall Jackson pulled this type of thing off occasionally. Basically, the Confederates, if they decided to take the risk of
                        Message 11 of 21 , Oct 26, 2002
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                          --- In civilwarwest@y..., "melchizedek22" <richthofen@b...> wrote:
                          > If the South had chose to attack Beull,what would
                          > be the plan to keep Grant in check while they tried this?
                          > The Baron

                          Point taken, although Stonewall Jackson pulled this type of thing off
                          occasionally. Basically, the Confederates, if they decided to take
                          the risk of fighting two armies like this, would hope to hit Buell on
                          the march, overwhelm him quickly, then turn and absorb Grant's
                          attack. I don't think Johnston and Beauregard could have pulled off
                          something like this.

                          *Feinting* an attack on Buell, however, and forcing Grant to move to
                          the north bank of the Tennessee, may have been enough to protect
                          Corinth. Any opinions?
                        • Will
                          ... They would have relied on their secret weapon: Henry Halleck Grant was placed in check by Halleck--Grant had been explicitly told he was not to advance
                          Message 12 of 21 , Oct 27, 2002
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                            --- In civilwarwest@y..., "melchizedek22" <richthofen@b...> wrote:
                            > If the South had chose to attack Beull,what would
                            > be the plan to keep Grant in check while they tried this?
                            > The Baron

                            They would have relied on their secret weapon: Henry Halleck

                            Grant was placed in check by Halleck--Grant had been explicitly told
                            he was not to advance until Buell joined him. If Buell was
                            threatened, I could see Halleck ordering Grant to move all his force
                            to the north/east side of the river and go to Buell's aid.
                            Even if he didn't do that, he still would have kept Grant from
                            advancing as long as Buell felt threatened. That would basically
                            remove any threat to Corinth.
                          • hank9174
                            I doubt that feinting towards Buell would have concerned anyone other than Buell. Buell s was the larger force, 50K to Grant s 35K and Grant s position was
                            Message 13 of 21 , Oct 28, 2002
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                              I doubt that feinting towards Buell would have concerned anyone other
                              than Buell.

                              Buell's was the larger force, 50K to Grant's 35K and Grant's position
                              was more exposed. It is fine strategy to defeat the opposition in
                              detail, but not when both forces are larger than your own.

                              Grant's forces were vulnerable because they had assumed fixed
                              positions. Moving forces with flanking cavalry and advance units and
                              other means of intelligence are difficult to surprise. It would have
                              been difficult to 'sneak up' on Buell on the plains of south central
                              Tennessee...


                              HankC


                              --- In civilwarwest@y..., "slippymississippi" <slippymississippi@y...>
                              wrote:
                              > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "melchizedek22" <richthofen@b...> wrote:
                              > > If the South had chose to attack Beull,what would
                              > > be the plan to keep Grant in check while they tried this?
                              > > The Baron
                              >
                              > Point taken, although Stonewall Jackson pulled this type of thing
                              off
                              > occasionally. Basically, the Confederates, if they decided to take
                              > the risk of fighting two armies like this, would hope to hit Buell
                              on
                              > the march, overwhelm him quickly, then turn and absorb Grant's
                              > attack. I don't think Johnston and Beauregard could have pulled off
                              > something like this.
                              >
                              > *Feinting* an attack on Buell, however, and forcing Grant to move to
                              > the north bank of the Tennessee, may have been enough to protect
                              > Corinth. Any opinions?
                            • hank9174
                              I d always thought that Halleck, while risk-averse, developed his peculiar strain of the slows from Grant s experience at Shiloh. Whereas Grant had not ever
                              Message 14 of 21 , Oct 28, 2002
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                                I'd always thought that Halleck, while risk-averse, developed his
                                peculiar strain of the 'slows' from Grant's experience at Shiloh.

                                Whereas Grant had not ever dug in, Halleck trained himself to dig at
                                every chance: morning, noon and night.

                                Grant had chafed with Halleck in teh saddle back at Cairo and Paducah.
                                Was Halleck now vindicated at Corinth?


                                HankC


                                --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                                > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "melchizedek22" <richthofen@b...> wrote:
                                > > If the South had chose to attack Beull,what would
                                > > be the plan to keep Grant in check while they tried this?
                                > > The Baron
                                >
                                > They would have relied on their secret weapon: Henry Halleck
                                >
                                > Grant was placed in check by Halleck--Grant had been explicitly told
                                > he was not to advance until Buell joined him. If Buell was
                                > threatened, I could see Halleck ordering Grant to move all his force
                                > to the north/east side of the river and go to Buell's aid.
                                > Even if he didn't do that, he still would have kept Grant from
                                > advancing as long as Buell felt threatened. That would basically
                                > remove any threat to Corinth.
                              • Will
                                ... It was my impresion that the command style he displayed in the advane on Corinth was a pre-existing condition. ... at ... Paducah. ... Vindicated? In what
                                Message 15 of 21 , Oct 28, 2002
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                                  --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
                                  >
                                  > I'd always thought that Halleck, while risk-averse, developed his
                                  > peculiar strain of the 'slows' from Grant's experience at Shiloh.

                                  It was my impresion that the command style he displayed in the advane
                                  on Corinth was a pre-existing condition.


                                  > Whereas Grant had not ever dug in, Halleck trained himself to dig
                                  at
                                  > every chance: morning, noon and night.
                                  >
                                  > Grant had chafed with Halleck in teh saddle back at Cairo and
                                  Paducah.
                                  > Was Halleck now vindicated at Corinth?

                                  Vindicated? In what way?
                                • Will
                                  ... other ... Disagree. I think it would have concerned Halleck, Andy Johnson, Lincoln, etc. ... position ... But the idea was to demonstrate at Buell, not
                                  Message 16 of 21 , Oct 28, 2002
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                                    --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
                                    >
                                    > I doubt that feinting towards Buell would have concerned anyone
                                    other
                                    > than Buell.

                                    Disagree. I think it would have concerned Halleck, Andy Johnson,
                                    Lincoln, etc.


                                    > Buell's was the larger force, 50K to Grant's 35K and Grant's
                                    position
                                    > was more exposed. It is fine strategy to defeat the opposition in
                                    > detail, but not when both forces are larger than your own.

                                    But the idea was to demonstrate at Buell, not attempt to defeat him,
                                    thereby keeping Grant exposed for longer.


                                    > Grant's forces were vulnerable because they had assumed fixed
                                    > positions. Moving forces with flanking cavalry and advance units
                                    and
                                    > other means of intelligence are difficult to surprise. It would
                                    have
                                    > been difficult to 'sneak up' on Buell on the plains of south
                                    central
                                    > Tennessee...

                                    Why sneak up? I think the idea is to do the opposite: demonstrate
                                    towards Nashville making as much noise as possible, hoping to create
                                    an exaggerated sense of your strength. The goal would be to get
                                    Johnson in a tizzy and make Buell feel that he needs to cover
                                    Nashville with his 50K.
                                  • slippymississippi
                                    ... other ... Sure, Buell was larger when he was sitting in Nashville. But IIRC, his force had been reduced to 30K (as opposed to Grant s 40K) by the time he
                                    Message 17 of 21 , Oct 28, 2002
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                                      --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
                                      >
                                      > I doubt that feinting towards Buell would have concerned anyone
                                      other
                                      > than Buell.
                                      >
                                      > Buell's was the larger force, 50K to Grant's 35K

                                      Sure, Buell was larger when he was sitting in Nashville. But IIRC,
                                      his force had been reduced to 30K (as opposed to Grant's 40K) by the
                                      time he had garrisonned Nashville and unleashed Ormsby... and his
                                      forces were on the march. Fighting a meeting engagement against 30K
                                      is much preferable to a frontal assault on 40K.
                                    • carlw4514
                                      I m not sure how I missed someone saying that this was the better idea, but if dealing with Beull was to be done, I think this might have the best approach.
                                      Message 18 of 21 , Oct 28, 2002
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                                        I'm not sure how I missed someone saying that this was the better
                                        idea, but if dealing with Beull was to be done, I think this might
                                        have the best approach.
                                        Carl
                                        --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                                        [...] [re attacking Beull]
                                        >
                                        > Why sneak up? I think the idea is to do the opposite: demonstrate
                                        > towards Nashville making as much noise as possible, hoping to create
                                        > an exaggerated sense of your strength. The goal would be to get
                                        > Johnson in a tizzy and make Buell feel that he needs to cover
                                        > Nashville with his 50K.
                                      • theme_music
                                        ... advane ... Probably true, but this was Halleck s first excursion beyond St Louis since taking over from Fremont in November 1861. I guess we could call
                                        Message 19 of 21 , Oct 29, 2002
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                                          --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                                          > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
                                          > >
                                          > > I'd always thought that Halleck, while risk-averse, developed his
                                          > > peculiar strain of the 'slows' from Grant's experience at Shiloh.
                                          >
                                          > It was my impresion that the command style he displayed in the
                                          advane
                                          > on Corinth was a pre-existing condition.

                                          Probably true, but this was Halleck's first excursion beyond St Louis
                                          since taking over from Fremont in November 1861. I guess we could
                                          call that "firmly entrenched" behind his desk.

                                          >
                                          >
                                          > > Whereas Grant had not ever dug in, Halleck trained himself to dig
                                          > at
                                          > > every chance: morning, noon and night.
                                          > >
                                          > > Grant had chafed with Halleck in teh saddle back at Cairo and
                                          > Paducah.
                                          > > Was Halleck now vindicated at Corinth?
                                          >
                                          > Vindicated? In what way?

                                          I would say temporarily vindicated. Shiloh was a bloodbath nearly an
                                          order of magnitude worse than any battle before seen by Americans. A
                                          nearly bloodless campaign to take Corinth probably seemed like a good
                                          thing to the general population, who had not yet experienced a Seven
                                          Days, Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredricksburg etc.

                                          At any rate, it got Old Brains firmly entrenched in Washington.

                                          Eric
                                        • hank9174
                                          In April 1862, Nashville did not have the importance it gained in later years. Louisville was the primary forward depot in the west. Regardless, the CSA AoT
                                          Message 20 of 21 , Oct 29, 2002
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                                            In April 1862, Nashville did not have the importance it gained in
                                            later years. Louisville was the primary forward depot in the west.

                                            Regardless, the CSA AoT had a difficult enough time moving the 15 or
                                            so miles from Corinth to engage Grant. Multiplying this effort times
                                            10 is out of the question...


                                            HankC


                                            --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                                            > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
                                            > >
                                            > > I doubt that feinting towards Buell would have concerned anyone
                                            > other
                                            > > than Buell.
                                            >
                                            > Disagree. I think it would have concerned Halleck, Andy Johnson,
                                            > Lincoln, etc.
                                            >
                                            >
                                            > > Buell's was the larger force, 50K to Grant's 35K and Grant's
                                            > position
                                            > > was more exposed. It is fine strategy to defeat the opposition in
                                            > > detail, but not when both forces are larger than your own.
                                            >
                                            > But the idea was to demonstrate at Buell, not attempt to defeat him,
                                            > thereby keeping Grant exposed for longer.
                                            >
                                            >
                                            > > Grant's forces were vulnerable because they had assumed fixed
                                            > > positions. Moving forces with flanking cavalry and advance units
                                            > and
                                            > > other means of intelligence are difficult to surprise. It would
                                            > have
                                            > > been difficult to 'sneak up' on Buell on the plains of south
                                            > central
                                            > > Tennessee...
                                            >
                                            > Why sneak up? I think the idea is to do the opposite: demonstrate
                                            > towards Nashville making as much noise as possible, hoping to create
                                            > an exaggerated sense of your strength. The goal would be to get
                                            > Johnson in a tizzy and make Buell feel that he needs to cover
                                            > Nashville with his 50K.
                                          • Will
                                            ... I agree that it was not an important supply depot at that time, but it was an important capture. With the attitude of Andy Johnson and the defensive
                                            Message 21 of 21 , Oct 29, 2002
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                                              --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
                                              >
                                              > In April 1862, Nashville did not have the importance it gained in
                                              > later years. Louisville was the primary forward depot in the west.

                                              I agree that it was not an important supply depot at that time, but
                                              it was an important capture. With the attitude of Andy Johnson and
                                              the defensive mindsets of Buell and Halleck, I think that the
                                              existence of a perceived threat would have led to prioritizing the
                                              defense of Nashville over an advance on Corinth.


                                              > Regardless, the CSA AoT had a difficult enough time moving the 15
                                              or
                                              > so miles from Corinth to engage Grant. Multiplying this effort
                                              times
                                              > 10 is out of the question...

                                              The distance to Nashville would be a lot less if Johnson had not
                                              surrendered Middle Tennessee without contest. What I am sugesting is
                                              that instead of abandoning the area in early March, a force should
                                              have remained in the Mufreesboro-Shelbyville-McMinnville region in
                                              order to hold Buell's attention.

                                              The AoT did have a hard time moving the few miles from Corinth to
                                              Shiloh, but a few months later Bragg moved with greater speed
                                              northward from Chattanooga. Bragg's summer move north illustrates
                                              some of what I am envisioning could have been done in the spring.
                                              Buell was closing in on Chattanooga. Bragg, by moving past Buell's
                                              flank, draws Buell back into central Tennessee and then into
                                              Kentucky, postponing the battles for Chattanooga by a year.

                                              http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL16.ht
                                              m

                                              As important as it is to concentrate ones own forces, I think
                                              Cofenderate strategy needed to work at getting the opponent to divide
                                              his forces. I also think one of the goals should have been to play
                                              for time.

                                              ~Will


                                              > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                                              > > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
                                              > > >
                                              > > > I doubt that feinting towards Buell would have concerned anyone
                                              > > other
                                              > > > than Buell.
                                              > >
                                              > > Disagree. I think it would have concerned Halleck, Andy Johnson,
                                              > > Lincoln, etc.
                                              > >
                                              > >
                                              > > > Buell's was the larger force, 50K to Grant's 35K and Grant's
                                              > > position
                                              > > > was more exposed. It is fine strategy to defeat the opposition
                                              in
                                              > > > detail, but not when both forces are larger than your own.
                                              > >
                                              > > But the idea was to demonstrate at Buell, not attempt to defeat
                                              him,
                                              > > thereby keeping Grant exposed for longer.
                                              > >
                                              > >
                                              > > > Grant's forces were vulnerable because they had assumed fixed
                                              > > > positions. Moving forces with flanking cavalry and advance
                                              units
                                              > > and
                                              > > > other means of intelligence are difficult to surprise. It would
                                              > > have
                                              > > > been difficult to 'sneak up' on Buell on the plains of south
                                              > > central
                                              > > > Tennessee...
                                              > >
                                              > > Why sneak up? I think the idea is to do the opposite:
                                              demonstrate
                                              > > towards Nashville making as much noise as possible, hoping to
                                              create
                                              > > an exaggerated sense of your strength. The goal would be to get
                                              > > Johnson in a tizzy and make Buell feel that he needs to cover
                                              > > Nashville with his 50K.
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