Re: The Value of Vicksburg
- If he'd had the Van Dorn / Red Jackson division of cavalry, still -
To me, that's the true effect of no cavalry - inability to deal with
Grant's rear once Grant moved on Raymond.
One could argue that perhaps Grant can't get to Raymond / Jackson,
with an energetic cavalry force operating in his rear.
--- In civilwarwest@y..., "wh_keene" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@y..., "dmsmith001" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
> > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "wh_keene" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> > > Wasn't this tried (and failed) at Milliken's Bend and Helena?
> > I'd suggest it was half-assed, and too late.
> > If we're looking for windows of opportunity, we're talking April
> > May of 1863.
> > Dave
> Agreed. Do you think Pemberton missed an opportunity after Grant
> moved in land to send a force across the Big Black near its mouth
> attempt to retake Grand Gulf and Port Gibson?
- In a message dated 7/16/02 7:39:01 PM Central Daylight Time,
<< I agree. Sometimes it's the back of the scene contributions from
willing men like Hurlbut that make all the difference in a campaign.
To the best of my knowledge, Hurlbut didn't squawk a bit when Grant
called on him for reinforcements.
>>Seems to me the only time Grant and Hurlbut disagreed was in how Dodge was
handling payment to his operatives. IIRC the situation was handled quickly
and with no obviously hard feelings. Working in tandem was the optimum
situation, but too often egos or personal agendas muddied the water to the
detriment of the objective. Grant's talent was to somehow arrange it so that
his subordinates were his men.