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Battle of Vicksburg

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  • acesdugout
    Hi Y all This still allows the passage of time and lack of food, medicine , and rest to the troops in Vicksburg. Also we have Johnston moving this mass of
    Message 1 of 9 , May 25, 2002
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      Hi Y'all
      This still allows the passage of time and lack of food, medicine ,
      and rest to the troops in Vicksburg.
      Also we have Johnston moving this mass of troops without the Union
      knowledge prior to the June 6th report as well as the slipping
      through of detailed plans to Pemberton.
      So far so good right.
      James
    • hartshje
      ... Well James, I did say best case scenario , assuming Johnston would ever act this aggressively again (he did once: at Fair Oaks a year earlier; a rather
      Message 2 of 9 , May 25, 2002
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        --- In civilwarwest@y..., "acesdugout" <acesdugout@c...> wrote:
        > Hi Y'all
        > This still allows the passage of time and lack of food, medicine ,
        > and rest to the troops in Vicksburg.
        > Also we have Johnston moving this mass of troops without the Union
        > knowledge prior to the June 6th report as well as the slipping
        > through of detailed plans to Pemberton.
        > So far so good right.
        > James


        Well James, I did say "best case scenario", assuming Johnston would
        ever act this aggressively again (he did once: at Fair Oaks a year
        earlier; a rather bloody all-out type of attack I portrayed in my
        little flight of fancy).

        Joe
      • acesdugout
        Hi Y all Heres some maps for the question posed in the what if. My ho leaves me with the problem of the movement of such a large body of troops being done
        Message 3 of 9 , May 26, 2002
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          Hi Y'all
          Heres some maps for the question posed in the what if.
          My ho leaves me with the problem of the movement of such a large
          body of troops being done without the Union's knowledge.
          As well as the aggresive actions by Johnston. The history does not
          support the idea that he would act in this manner, but for the what
          if phase it's what should have been done.
          If the corse of actions warrant it, the Union forces were in such a
          defencive posture with the help of the Navy that the mustering of
          Pemberton's forces on the sout side would have lead to a
          concentration of naval gunfire support to break up the concentration.
          The forces north of the city had the high ground as well as interior
          lines for the rapid movement of forces to combat the concentration
          of Confederates to be met by a like force of Union forces as well as
          there large artillery reserve for a greater gun to troop ratio would
          have told.
          Thanks James
        • hartshje
          ... James, I respect your points about the Confederate troop movements being hard to conceal. In Johnston s case, just how far out did Union patrols range
          Message 4 of 9 , May 26, 2002
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            --- In civilwarwest@y..., "acesdugout" <acesdugout@c...> wrote:

            > Heres some maps for the question posed in the what if.
            > My ho leaves me with the problem of the movement of such a large
            > body of troops being done without the Union's knowledge.
            > As well as the aggresive actions by Johnston. The history does not
            > support the idea that he would act in this manner, but for the what
            > if phase it's what should have been done.
            > If the corse of actions warrant it, the Union forces were in such a
            > defencive posture with the help of the Navy that the mustering of
            > Pemberton's forces on the sout side would have lead to a
            > concentration of naval gunfire support to break up the
            > concentration.
            > The forces north of the city had the high ground as well as
            > interior lines for the rapid movement of forces to combat the
            > concentration of Confederates to be met by a like force of Union
            > forces as well as there large artillery reserve for a greater gun
            > to troop ratio would have told.
            > James
            >

            James,

            I respect your points about the Confederate troop movements being
            hard to conceal. In Johnston's case, just how far out did Union
            patrols range into the interior of the state? My assumption was that
            Johnston (coming from Canton) would be discovered once he reached the
            Big Black River and Hayne's Bluff. At least I think that Grant could
            not be sure of where the specific columns were approaching at least
            until they reached those points. In Pemberton's case, I disagree
            with you, because he would moving troops south of the city during the
            night, and therefore unobserved by the Union navy. By the time it
            was discovered in the morning, the concentrated troops would already
            be advancing beyond the hills and out of the gunboats' sight and
            range.

            Joe H.
          • carlw4514
            Chalk up two offensive battles for JEJ, as far as got actually executed, Fair Oaks [or Seven Pines]and also Bentonville. You ll note that both of these
            Message 5 of 9 , May 26, 2002
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              Chalk up two offensive battles for JEJ, as far as got actually
              executed, Fair Oaks [or Seven Pines]and also Bentonville. You'll note
              that both of these [correct me if I am wrong, I'm not "real up" on
              Fair Oaks] represented Johnston's idea of when to attack: waiting
              patiently to pounce when he thinks his opponent has made a mistake.
              Not what I would call frontal assaults, altho I guess we could get
              bogged down in terminology. See:
              http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va014.htm
              http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/battles/nc020.htm
              Carl
              --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hartshje" <Hartshje@a...> wrote:
              [...]
              > Well James, I did say "best case scenario", assuming Johnston would
              > ever act this aggressively again (he did once: at Fair Oaks a year
              > earlier; a rather bloody all-out type of attack I portrayed in my
              > little flight of fancy).
              >
              > Joe
            • Dan Cone
              Make that two dids and an almost done ---the aborted strike at Kingston-Cassville, when Hood (having spent the entire campaign up to that point complaining
              Message 6 of 9 , May 26, 2002
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                Make that two "dids" and an "almost done"---the aborted strike at
                Kingston-Cassville, when Hood (having spent the entire campaign up to that
                point complaining about JEJ's defensive-mindedness) failed to attack because
                of his fears over what turned out to be an inconsequentially small Fed.
                cavalry unit, thus ruining the only
                real chance Johnston ever had to inflict serious damage on Sherman's army
                group in Georgia with an attack.

                It should also be noted that even if he thought his opportunities at Fair
                Oaks and Bentonville were more or less perfect, the forces at his disposal
                were more or less NOT. At Fair Oaks he had to deal with an inefficient
                command structure of divisions, which delayed the attack time and probably
                contributed to the lack of greater success than expected; and at Bentonville
                he was leading a force that was on its last legs, just about ready to drop
                dead.

                - Dan

                >From: "carlw4514" <carlw4514@...>
                >Reply-To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                >To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                >Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Battle of Vicksburg
                >Date: Sun, 26 May 2002 21:22:02 -0000
                >
                >Chalk up two offensive battles for JEJ, as far as got actually
                >executed, Fair Oaks [or Seven Pines]and also Bentonville. You'll note
                >that both of these [correct me if I am wrong, I'm not "real up" on
                >Fair Oaks] represented Johnston's idea of when to attack: waiting
                >patiently to pounce when he thinks his opponent has made a mistake.
                >Not what I would call frontal assaults, altho I guess we could get
                >bogged down in terminology. See:
                >http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va014.htm
                >http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/battles/nc020.htm
                >Carl
                >--- In civilwarwest@y..., "hartshje" <Hartshje@a...> wrote:
                >[...]
                > > Well James, I did say "best case scenario", assuming Johnston would
                > > ever act this aggressively again (he did once: at Fair Oaks a year
                > > earlier; a rather bloody all-out type of attack I portrayed in my
                > > little flight of fancy).
                > >
                > > Joe
                >


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              • hartshje
                ... It has suddenly dawned on me to ask rhetorically: Why didn t Johnston, in that last week of May and first week of June, think that Grant HAD made a
                Message 7 of 9 , May 26, 2002
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                  --- In civilwarwest@y..., "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...> wrote:
                  > Chalk up two offensive battles for JEJ, as far as got actually
                  > executed, Fair Oaks [or Seven Pines]and also Bentonville. You'll
                  > note that both of these [correct me if I am wrong, I'm not "real
                  > up" on Fair Oaks] represented Johnston's idea of when to attack:
                  > waiting patiently to pounce when he thinks his opponent has made a
                  > mistake.
                  >

                  It has suddenly dawned on me to ask rhetorically: Why didn't
                  Johnston, in that last week of May and first week of June, think that
                  Grant HAD made a mistake by inserting an inferior force in between
                  two enemy forces which outnumbered him? Perhaps Johnston just saw
                  too many imperfect variables on the Confederate side. What else is
                  new?

                  Joe H.
                • Carl Williams
                  yes, for a guy who was always looking for these things, geez ... __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! - Official partner of
                  Message 8 of 9 , May 27, 2002
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                    yes, for a guy who was always looking for these
                    things, geez
                    --- hartshje <Hartshje@...> wrote:
                    > It has suddenly dawned on me to ask rhetorically:
                    > Why didn't
                    > Johnston, in that last week of May and first week of
                    > June, think that
                    > Grant HAD made a mistake by inserting an inferior
                    > force in between
                    > two enemy forces which outnumbered him? Perhaps
                    > Johnston just saw
                    > too many imperfect variables on the Confederate
                    > side. What else is
                    > new?
                    >
                    > Joe H.
                    >
                    >
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                  • FLYNSWEDE@AOL.COM
                    In a message dated 5/26/2002 8:09:44 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ... It was at Seven Pines that Longstreet screwed up the battle plan by not taking the route
                    Message 9 of 9 , May 28, 2002
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                      In a message dated 5/26/2002 8:09:44 PM Eastern Daylight Time, carlw4514@... writes:


                      Chalk up two offensive battles for JEJ, as far as got actually
                      executed, Fair Oaks [or Seven Pines]and also Bentonville.


                      It was at Seven Pines that Longstreet screwed up the battle plan by not taking the route that was assigned to him and in doing so, also messed up the assignments of another division.  Luckily for Joe however, things did end up fairly well for him.  The problem was that as a result of being wounded, he was not there to participate in the final results.  He has been criticized for falling back to Richmond on the peninsula, however,  it has been found that it was the wise thing to do in order for the terrain to work for him rather than the Federals.  Enough of the East which is Least

                      Wayne
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