[civilwarwest] Re: The Importance of Rome to Johnston
- At 6:08 PM +0000 3/31/02, wh_keene wrote:
>You said my comment about the obviousness of Snake Creek Gap is myIf it is such an obvious point, and if Johnston had been at Dalton
>most damning of Johnston. Seems to be the same damning point you have
>made all along.
for months fortifying the approaches, and if he thought Snake Creek
Gap might be a direction McPherson's army would come from, then it is
indeed damning of Johnston's generalship to say, in spite of all
these things, five Federal divisions poured out of that gap
>Did Johnston expect McPherson was going to attack his rear? Yes. DidDid Johnston expect McPherson to move an entire army through Snake
>Johnston expect that the target might be Resaca? Yes.
Creek Gap? Apparently not.
>You say that Snake Creek Gap was a hole in Johnston's net. But theAs you have repeatedly said, the forces Johnston placed at Resaca
>net extended along the Oostenaula from Rome to Calhoun to Resaca.
>Snake Creek Gap was outside of the net.
were to watch for McPherson to arrive from that direction. You said
it is obvious if one looks at an 1864 map.
>"Where do you find the part about skirmishing with Martin's forces?"I believe you said Martin was "bothering" McPherson's right, as if
>--See Kilpatrick's message on the evening of the 9th. I referred to
>it in more detail in a previous message.
they had made contact and Martin were pressing McPherson. Kilpatrick
merely says that Martin is operating in the direction, relative to
McPherson (his right being Calhoun, and his rear being the line
stretching off toward Rome).
>Here Sherman is excusing why he was unable to "place myself betweenHe said he "must" do it. But I don't see the excuse for failure at
>Johnston and Resaca" as he told Halleck he would on May 10th (pt4,
Resaca that you're referring to? All he says is that Johnston was
able to move faster on a good road, enabling him to reach sanctuary
in the works at Resaca.
>According to a source you respect (Connelly), Cantey Brigade numberedAs far as I am aware, Breckinridge does not offer a precise head
>1,500 and Grisby had less than 500. What did Breckinridge do with
>the other 2,000+ that are supposed to be in Resaca? The OR
>correspondence refers to Reynolds brigade as having joined Cantey.
>Was Breckinridge aware of their presence?
count for the CSA forces there. He appears to be very close on his
estimation of Union strength (and perhaps underestimates McPherson's
strength). My question remains, is there anything at all in his
account which would lead you to
believe he underestimated Confederate strength? If you wish us to
discount Breckinridge's account based on the notion that he didn't
realize how many Confederates were in the works at Resaca, I think
we'll need something more to go on.
>-- I brought up the fact that Breckinridge has been referred toHow does it cut the other way? I never said Breckinridge got it
>elsewhere as a source of imperfect information. You've been
>questioning McPherson's ability to judge a situation from the start.
>Upset when it cuts the other way?
wrong. His information seems to be the best available intelligence at
the time. In fact, he even produces a prisoner identified as coming
from a unit under Hooker. As I read it, Breckinridge was pretty
accurate about what he saw on the Villanow Road, and pretty accurate
about the size of McPherson's force when the latter was threatening
Resaca. I can think of no reason to question his accuracy with
respect to CS strength at Resaca.
>--Correct, and you were the one that quoted Castel as saying thatIf Johnston got confused about which forces these were out on the
>these reports were a source of confusion for Johnston.
Dalton-Villanow Road, it doesn't appear to be the fault of
Breckinridge. Unless you're seeing some dispatches from him on this
subject that I have overlooked.