8586Re: Understanding Vicksburg
- Nov 24, 2001Dave, you are "the man" when it comes to Vicksburg and you have proved
it again; you get the lion's share of credit for getting me so
interested in Vicksburg. You are undoubtedly correct that a stymied
Grant could have fallen back and functioned at Grand Gulf, not that
there was any real doubt in Grant's mind that he was going to pull
this thing off.
I wonder what sort of situation the Federals would have had, had
they moved back to Grand Gulf. Would it have been similar to
Chattanooga before the "cracker line" was opened? I have to assume
that 1) Porter's warning had some meaning 2) the famous 7 attempts to
crack the Vicksburg nut outlined by Foote and others showed that the
situation of having "some" kind of supply situation through the
Louisiana side was not considered the answer; Grant's last move before
this one was to try another failed canal (IIRC). There must have been
a reason to try these canals etc. Am I all wet?
--- In civilwarwest@y..., "Dave Smith" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
> This is an interesting point. Grant was indeed "living off the
> land," to a fairly large degree. But he wasn't living that way,
> exclusively; he had cut and curderoyed (sp?) roads through Louisiana
> in order to facilitate the movement of supplies down the western
> of the Mississippi. Those transport vessels were unloading at Grand
> Gulf while the campaign was unfolding.
> It was a slow, laborious process - but it was a process.
> When Pemberton attempted his ill-fated move to Dillon's Plantation
> attack Blair's division, it was to attempt to cut that very supply
> line. Not that it would have mattered much, because it wasn't a
> supply line in the more traditional sense . . . [...] But I think
Grant was closer to having to move
> back towards his base at Grand Gulf, or hastily attack Pemberton,
> then we often think, given the known results.
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