46907Re: Retreat and Fall Back
- Jan 3, 2011Thank you Bill, that was very helpful.
--- In email@example.com, William Nolan <sixtxcavrgtcsa@...> wrote:
> There were essentially three units at Holly Springs. One at the supply depot,
> one down town and a lite(not fully manned)Â Cavalry regiment at the fair grounds.
> Roughly half the Cavalry was captured while the other half chrged itself free
> and escaped. A few othersÂ hid and were not captured but about 1500 were rounded
> up, processed and paroled. The union thought 2500 men were there, but some were
> spread out on guard and other postings.
> Grant had left the depot the aÂ day or so earlier and was south of the depot
> between the enemy and Holly Springs. He had ordered the Cavalry regiment in
> Holly Springs to findÂ the Raiding Force,Â and they were up ready to move when the
> raid hit. That is why they were able to fight their way out.Â Van Dorn was
> spoted east of Holly Spring and word was sent to Grant, but neither soldier sent
> made it to Report. Grant had earlier sent another Cavalry to find the raid, but
> that provided another reluctand leader.
> Griffith the acting commander of The Whitfield Brigade, the author of the raid
> had enough intelligence from Cavalry recon that he knew the depot was ripe for
> picking. He was also an excellent cavalry leader having a militia unit in the
> south Dallas area before the warÂ that was always ready to chase the local
> Indians. He had also been involved in the planning of Ross' raid before Pea
> Ridgee and a highly successful charge inÂ the Indian territory. He was the right
> leader at the right time as was Van Dorn, who let Griffith lead the charge into
> Holly Springs.Â Â Â Bill Nolan Kerrville, TX
> Fom: william banbruner@...
> To: firstname.lastname@example.org
> Sent: Sat, January 1, 2011 1:48:43 PM
> Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Retreat and Fall Back
> My question has always been: why was Holly Springs left so vulnerable to a
> Calvary raid, considering its strategic importance?
> Bill Bruner
> --- In email@example.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@> wrote:
> > very good synopsis.
> > In some ways this is similar to Lee's treatment of Pope along the Rappahannock
> >prior to the battle of 2nd Manassas.
> > This time Hood (in the role of Lee) is trying to prevent/destroy Schofield (in
> >the role of Pope) from combining with Thomas (in the role of McClellan) in the
> >Nashville defenses (playing the role of Washington DC).
> > Of course, Lee then split his army (he had that habit) sending Jackson on an
> >end-run and Little Mac was farther away than Thomas.
> > HankC
> > --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, DORR64OVI@ wrote:
> > >
> > > Once Thomas determines that Hoods intention is to fight his army and not
> > > follow Sherman into GA, Old Paps plan is to concentrate his forces. Until
> > > Hood shows his hand about where he intends to move, either toward Knoxville
> > > or northward into Ky, Thomas prepares to check him either at Murfreesboro or
> > > Chattanooga.
> > > Thomas orders Schofield to move gradually back from Pulaski to Columbia
> > > in case Hoods moves this way. When the telegraph lines get cut between
> > > Thomas and Schofield, Thomas believes at this point that Hoods objective is
> > > Nashville and not Chattanooga.
> > > At Columbia Schofield is fooled by the appearance of Hoods artillery.
> > > He fails to see that it is a trick to hold him in place while Hood crosses
> > > the Duck River and move to cut him off at Spring Hill. After delaying for
> > > 12 some hours, Wilsons cavalry patrols reveal Hoods intentions and
> > > Schofield sends the 4th Corps hastily up the Columbia Pike. Only Hoods own
> > > at Spring Hill in failling to attack saves Schofield from capture and the
> > > Federals march past Hoods campfires on the retreat to Franklin and
> > > Nashville.
> > > When Thomas gets the word that Hood has crossed the Duck River and is
> > > moving north, it is at this point that he orders his forces to concentrate
> > > at Nashville. Schofield is slowly retreating to Franklin where he must
> > > cross the Harpeth River. Thomas orders him to defend Franklin while crossing
> > > and hopes Schofield can hold for three days to allow Smiths reeinforcements
> > > to arrive at Nashville. Schofield replies that he cant hold Franklin and
> > > Thomas then orders him to pull his army back to Nashville.
> > > Approaching Franklin, Hood orders a frontal assault which is repulsed
> > > with heavy losses. Schofield continues his retreat to Nashville after dark
> > > and reaches the cities defenses on Dec 1. Hood follows Schofield to
> > > Nashville, but his losses have weakened his force so that it cannot attack
> > > Thomas. Hood has now lost the critical element of initiative and Thomas has
> > > time to strengthen his forces especially his cavalry. Despite fears of Hoods
> > > intentions and ability to move by Washington and Grant, Thomas waits out
> > > the Dec weather and finally attacks Hood, smashing him over the course of
> > > two days.
> > > So it appears that Schofields moves are a retreat which ultimately
> > > reveal Hoods intentions.
> > >
> > > Kent Dorr
> > >
> > > In a message dated 12/27/2010 10:14:01 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
> > > clarkc@ writes:
> > >
> > >
> > > Of course, in Schofield's mind (and his men) there is no withdrawal or
> > > fall back.
> > >
> > > Nashville is his destination from the beginning of the move from Atlanta.
> > >
> > > Thomas considers moving forward to Brentwood but decides to wait for
> > > Smith's divisions and remains concentrated at Nashville - especially with
> > > Forrest's whereabouts unknown.
> > >
> > > A number of garrisons at Chattanooga and northern Alabama are also ordered
> > > to concentrate toward Murfreesboro. These units had been placed to provide
> > > early warning and delay of such a move as Hood's. Once the move is
> > > discovered and well-developed, their mission is over md they are free to be
> > > re-deployed. Whether the new move is backward, forward or sideways is
> > > dependent.
> > >
> > > HankC
> > >
- << Previous post in topic