42805Re: Battle of Raymond Walking Trail Completed, Interpretive Markers Installed
- Jan 5, 2007--- In email@example.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@...> wrote:
>This description is based on the Ed Bearss assertion that the battle
> --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@>
> > I haven't dropped by since the markers have been added, but I did
> > notice on this website that one of the stops is titled "A Soldier's
> > Battle," a description with which I very much disagree.
> Why do you disagree?
lines broke down into individual companies scrambling around in the
woods, and that each soldier's world collapsed into a 10 ft radius
circle of visibility, inside of which each soldier waged his own
There were some gaps in command and control during the battle, most
1) The Confederate left wing and right wing were out of supporting
distance of each other for two hours and consequently were each
defeated in detail.
2) Col. Manning Force of the 20th Ohio panicked, and ordered his men to
charge into the creek bed from which they could neither advance nor
retreat. This left him exposed 100 yards in front of the Union battle
line, and required great sacrifice on the part of the 20th Ill. to
reconnect the battle line.
3) Gen. John Stevenson, commanding the reserve, over-pursued the
Confederate left wing with his two remaining regiments. This exposed
the 7th MO to a route by the 10/30th TN as they attempted to reorganize
after emerging from the woods.
Interestingly enough, Bearss likes to use Raymond as a case study in
the dangers of a Corps commander being overly hesitant, when really all
of the serious gaffes in the battle resulted when regimental and
brigade commanders became overly aggressive.
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