36504Re: AS Johnston: The Right Plan?
- Jan 12, 2006--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "civilwargroups"
>There was good reason to think that. Lew Wallace had, earlier in the
> In an effort to move to newer fields ...
> Grant thought that Crump's Landing, not Pittsburg Landing, was where
> his command was most vulnerable.
month, moved his entire command near to Purdy on a scouting mission
and had encountered some resistance. It wasn't very much, but under
the circumstances, it caused him to write to Grant about how
vulnerable he was. Grant countered by ordering WHL Wallace to be
ready to support Lew Wallace.
> Would it not have been better inSimple answer, No. Johnston couldn't afford to mass his troops
> fact for AS Johnston to strike at Wallace first, cutting off the
> Pittsburg Landing contingent, and then move in for the kill?
towards Purdy, which he would have had to do to have a reasonable
chance of success. Even with a significant force available, Lew
Wallace's position wasn't really that vulnerable. He positioned one
brigade at Adamsville about 5 miles from the landing. His 2nd brigade
was about 2-3 miles away at Stoney Lonesome and his 1st brigade at the
landing itself. In response to an attack both of these brigades could
have quickly marched to support his 3rd brigade. Furthermore, both
WHL Wallace and Sherman were within supporting distance. Ironically,
the Shunpike, which was a poor route to the actual battlefield, would
have been ideal to counter any Confederate attack on Wallace's
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