28945Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign
- Oct 4 5:15 PMIn a message dated 10/4/2004 6:37:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, r_moody@... writes:
General Sherman estimated, with the use of spy's, that
Joe Johnston had forty to sixty thousand men
entrenched at Dalton. Sherman had one hundred
thousand. These numbers do not allow Johnston any
other choice. He must fight a defensive campaign or
risk loosing his supply lines.I agree whole heartily with this assessment Rick.
No, I’m just saying that Joe new of his weaknesses and also knew how to best work around them to gain the most practical and positive results. A full blown offensive against Sherman was probably out of the question but a limited one may have been in order and I believe he did make a few offensive thrusts. But Joe needed to use his army in more of a defensive mode, much as Lee would in 1864-65. Thus preserving his army, rebuilding moral and attempting to “bleed” Sherman.
I also agree with Tom. Take a look at the amount of casualties the Union had between May 5th and when Hood assumed command. Sherman made advancements, but he did so at a great price. As I have said many times, JEJ knew that territory could be regained, but when one of his troops was killed or wounded, the possibility of replacement was very difficult. New Hope Church, Cassville, and Kennesaw did bleed Sherman. If JEJ lost his supply line as a result of Sherman's flanking movements, the AOT would have been lost. JEJ knew that he could not defeat Sherman, but he knew that he could slow him down and have Sherman pay a big price for the territory that he did gain. But once again, my screen name tells of my bias.
"I have realized in our country that one class of
men makes war and leaves another to fight it out."
- William T. Sherman
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