The corporations have been caught rigging a voting machine that is
programmed one way when inspected and can be switched afterward!
Subject: CLG Fwd: Worst Flaw Ever in Diebold Touch Screen Voting Machine
Revealed by Open Voting Foundation
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2006 08:38:17 -0700 (PDT)
OVC Announce <alan@...
From: OVC Announce <alan@...
Subject: Worst Flaw Ever in Diebold Touch Screen Voting Machine Revealed
by Open Voting Foundation
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2006 06:02:57 -0700
Dear Friends of Open Voting:
Open Voting Foundation has released information and pictures concerning
the Diebold TS model touch screen voting machine.
OPEN VOTING FOUNDATION
9560 Windrose Lane
Granite Bay, CA 95746
Phone (916) 295-0415
PRESS RELEASE -- JULY 31, 2006
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Subject: WORST EVER SECURITY FLAW FOUND IN DIEBOLD TS VOTING MACHINE
Contact: Alan Dechert
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA -- “This may be the worst security flaw we have
seen in touch screen voting machines,” says Open Voting Foundation
president, Alan Dechert. Upon examining the inner workings of one of the
most popular paperless touch screen voting machines used in public
elections in the United States, it has been determined that with the
flip of a single switch inside, the machine can behave in a completely
different manner compared to the tested and certified version.
“Diebold has made the testing and certification process practically
irrelevant,” according to Dechert. “If you have access to these
machines and you want to rig an election, anything is possible with the
Diebold TS -- and it could be done without leaving a trace. All you need
is a screwdriver.” This model does not produce a voter verified paper
trail so there is no way to check if the voter’s choices are
accurately reflected in the tabulation.
Open Voting Foundation is releasing 22 high-resolution close up pictures
of the system. This picture
), in particular,
shows a “BOOT AREA CONFIGURATION” chart painted on the system
The most serious issue is the ability to choose between "EPROM" and
"FLASH" boot configurations. Both of these memory sources are present.
All of the switches in question (JP2, JP3, JP8, SW2 and SW4) are
physically present on the board. It is clear that this system can ship
with live boot profiles in two locations, and switching back and forth
could change literally everything regarding how the machine works and
counts votes. This could be done before or after the so-called "Logic
And Accuracy Tests".
A third possible profile could be field-added in minutes and selected in
the "external flash" memory location, the interface for which is present
on the motherboard.
This is not a minor variation from the previously documented attack
point on the newer Diebold TSx. To its credit, the TSx can only contain
one boot profile at a time. Diebold has ensured that it is extremely
difficult to confirm what code is in a TSx (or TS) at any one time but
it is at least theoretically possible to do so. But in the TS, a
completely legal and certified set of files can be instantly overridden
and illegal uncertified code be made dominant in the system, and then
this situation can be reversed leaving the legal code dominant again in
a matter of minutes.
“These findings underscore the need for open testing and
certification. There is no way such a security vulnerability should be
allowed. These systems should be recalled”
OPEN VOTING FOUNDATION is a nonprofit non stock California corporation
dedicated to demonstrating the need for and benefits of voting
technology that can be publicly scrutinized.
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