Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

Re: STRATFOR: Russia: Warnings of Another Chechen War

Expand Messages
  • Norbert Strade
    Re: Stratfor / number of Kadyrovites / civil war : Stratfor has long been unreliable on Chechnya issues. Their analyses are based on superficial reading of
    Message 1 of 4 , Oct 3, 2008
    • 0 Attachment
      Re: Stratfor / number of Kadyrovites / "civil war":

      Stratfor has long been unreliable on Chechnya issues. Their "analyses"
      are based on superficial reading of some media sources, and they are
      taking everything coming from the Russian propaganda kitchens at face
      value. It's easy to check out where they got their wisdom from by
      comparing the mentioned numbers with some news stories.
      Furthermore: Not only is the number of "Kadyrovites" far smaller than
      claimed by Stratfor, but even the authentic numbers create a wrong
      impression. The majority of these people are "regular Chechen militia",
      as already mentioned here, i.e. they are subordinated to the puppet
      interior ministry. Which means that they are formally under the command
      of the the Kadyrov "administration", but like everything else, their
      real bosses are sitting in Moscow. This unit and its "commanders" get
      exactly as much leash as the occupiers find reasonable. The other major
      gangs (Yamadayev, Kakiyev etc.) are subordinated to the Russian GRU
      (military intelligence service), i.e. under the direct command of the
      occupation power.
      The number of real "Kadyrovites", i.e. gunmen who are under the absolute
      command of mini-Kadyrov is probably in the hundreds. They are members of
      his personal guard units, armed gangs consisting of his extended family
      plus a few individual gangsters recruited by these groups. Most of these
      people can be assumed to be personally loyal to Kadyrov.
      It's different with the the "militia". The main reason for joining this
      puppet gang isn't loyalty to either Kadyrov or the Russians, but the
      necessity to make a living in a place with almost total unemployment,
      pressure exerted on the families of former ChRI soldiers, and probably
      to a certain degree the infiltration of the puppet "power organs" by the
      Resistance. I think it's safe to predict that in the case of a major
      confrontation, a majority of these units will not fight for the
      occupation/Kadyrov, and a part of them might even turn their guns
      around, just like it happened with Zavgayev's "interior troops" during
      the first war.
      And btw., I believe that confrontations between Kadyrov and his rival
      gangs will only be allowed to the extent the occupation finds acceptable
      and useful. The Russians are conducting their usual split and rule
      policy also among their quislings. They are keeping all options open by
      having a couple of "blood enemies" ready in case they need to retire
      Kadyrov. As long as mini-Kadyrov delivers - i.e. can be talked up as
      "the almost-independent leader of Chechnya", the embodiment of a
      successful Chechenization - they will contain his rivals, but they
      won't remove them entirely. And if the inter-quisling conflicts get out
      of hand in spite of the careful orchestration, the KGB regime can at any
      time replace all of them with other puppets already waiting in Moscow.
      These gangs won't be able to act independently against the Russians even
      if they were united; nevertheless the occupation regime does everything
      to keep them separated from each other. It isn't a habit of the KGB to
      leave anything to chance.
      Stratfor's "analysis" seems to take place in an empty space, as if there
      was no Chechen Resistance (they actually claim that there is "peace in
      the republic") and as if the petty contradictions among the local
      quislings were at the root of the Russian-Chechen conflict. Stratfor's
      allegation that the battle-readiness of the Russian troops in Chechnya
      is triggered by Russian fears of a "civil war" is almost comical, and it
      proves that Stratfor has swallowed the current Russian propaganda
      version which tries do redefine the Russian-Chechen conflict into an
      "inter-Chechen conflict". I guess the Russian generals know much better
      what they really have to fear.

    Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.