> What is the justification for the

The "ether" is supposed to be the medium which allows light to

> statement: since there are waves,

> there must be an ether? GR has waves but no ether.

propagate. GR doesn't have much to say about light. For example,

even something as basic as the polaroid filters in sunglasses cannot

be described in GR alone. The waves that do occur in GR are gravity

waves, but they've not yet been observed (as far as I know). I'm

not a GR type, and I don't have any guesses as to whether or not

those gravity waves will be seen or not.

> ie, what experiment could tell us

QM uses a "momentum cutoff" (among other things) to make QED

> that there had to be an ether?

calculations work right. If nature has a momentum cutoff, then

there is a maximum momentum. That says that any object (an

electron, for example) has a maximum possible momentum. A test for

this is to accelerate an object to very high momenta. If the

momentum cutoff is there, then you will eventually reach a limit

where it is impossible to accelerate any further. Note that this

would be a violation of Newton's (or Galileo's, I forget which) as

well as Einstein's relativity.

To find the ether, repeat the experiment twice, once in the +x

direction, and once in the -x direction. You are rest with respect

to the ether when the results from those two experiments match.

> What makes you say momentum is not "real"

Momentum in GR is not "real" because it cannot be defined except

> in relativity? In general, for X to

> be a "real" thing (according to the way

> you define real), does X have to be

> invariant? In your mind, is GR tainted

> /tarnished because things that

> classically seem "real" are viewed in

> GR as not "real"?

with respect to a particular rest frame. That means that it cannot

be a fundamental part of a universe made up of "real" things. By

contrast, if one considers the universe to be a mathematical

construct, rather than a "real" thing, then there is no problem with

defining momentum that way.

I am in no way saying that GR is inconsistent with itself, or

incompatible with observations. What I'm saying is that its

consistency is limited to that of a mathematical construct. It does

not possess the consistency that a description of an object in the

world possesses. It's an "as if" theory.

Rather than "tainted or tarnished", I would use the

word "incomplete". It's somewhat ironic that this is the same

complaint that Einstein had of quantum mechanics.

> It seems like what you are doing is to

It's not beauty that distinguishes between a phenomenological and an

> describe what sort of things guide your

> intuition on your search for something new.

> ie, certain things are not strictly

> forbidden, but they are "not beautiful" (?)

> to you, and thus an indication that

> some sort of new ideas are needed. IOW, the

> aspects of a theory that cause

> you "ontological angst" are the aspects

> that you seek to replace. These are

> the rocks that you turn over. Would that

> be fair?

ontological theory. My movement in this direction is not due to an

appreciation of beauty. There is nothing more beautiful than SR and

GR. In fact, I think it is this beauty that has bedazzled the eyes

of physicists for so many years. We'd all like nature to be a

beautiful thing, and we all have a strong tendency to believe

theories that are more beautiful than not. For example, for

centuries astronomers believed that planets moved on circles, rather

than ellipses, because circles are more beautiful (or symmetric).

This is human nature. And it is this human nature that has misled

us. Instead of more beautiful mathematical constructs, I believe

that what we need in physics now is more realistic descriptions.

About a century ago, there was an influential physicist named Ernst

Mach. He believed in "empiriocentrism", which is pretty much the

opposite of my point of view. Let me quote from the book "Nature

Loves to Hide":

<<

Science, according to Mach, is nothing more than a description of

facts. And "facts" involve nothing more than sensations and the

relations among them. Sensations are the only real elements. All

the other concepts are extra; they are merely imputed on the real,

i.e., on the sensations, by us. Concepts like "matter" and "atom"

are merely shorthand for collections of sensations; they do not

denote anything that exists.>>

What it all boils down to is this: "A good theory is no more than a

condensation of observations in accordance with the principle of

thought economy." If you believe this, then there is no reason to

suppose that relativity is explained by a hidden dimension. But

here it is 2004 and the strong and weak forces are still not unified.

Physics has followed Mach's philosophy for 100 years, and now we're

stuck. What I'm saying is that we may need to ditch the philosophy,

and go back and rederive physics without it. And that implies that

we need to have a physics that is more than just logically or

mathematically consistent.

For example, QED is obviously a mathematical construction, not a

real description of what goes on with electrons and photons. This

is clear from the way that infinities have to be cancelled out of

the theory. The great physicists like Feynmann recognize this, as

he notes in his book on QED. Here's what Landau and Lifshitz says

about QED:

<<

There is as yet no logically consistent and complete relativistic

quantum theory. We shall see that the existing theory introduces

new physical features into the nature of the description of particle

states, which acquires some of the features of field theory (see

chapter 10). The theory is, however, largely constructed on the

pattern of ordinary quantum mechanics. This structure of the theory

has yielded good results in quantum electrodynamics. The lack of

complete logical consistency in this theory is shown by the

occurrence of divergent expressions when the mathematical formalism

is directly applied, although there are quite well-defined ways of

eliminating these divergences. Nevertheless, such methods remain,

to a considerable extent, semiempirical rules, and our confidence in

the correctness of the results is ultimately based only on their

excellent agreement with experiment, not on the internal consistency

or logical ordering of the fundamental principles of the theory.>>

The original reason I started delving into these matters was to

repair the above inconsistency. I felt that it had something to do

with the appearance of complex numbers in the theory. But as I

continued to work on it, I was unable to make progress until I gave

up perfect Lorentz symmetry. And by "gave up", I mean exactly

that. Relativity was torn from me only by years of failing efforts

to make QM logically consistent under the assumptions of perfect

relativity. I couldn't do it. Neither could the rest of the

physics community.

The most recent response to these consistency problems in QM are

called "string theories", and these were what got me interested in

physics once again. But when I picked up a few books, it rapidly

became obvious that they had more infinities getting cancelled than

anything dreamed of in QED. So I began working on physics.

> Given a mathematical

To be ontologically correct, a theory need only have its most basic

> formalism of a theory, do you think that

> it is necessary (or required, or perhaps

> merely preferred) that every term of

> every equation correspond to something

> that we can "point our finger to"? (ie,

> to be ontologically palatable).

units be "real", not every term of every equation. Also, I suppose

I should mention that if someone did have a unified field theory,

even one that was only a mathematical construct, I wouldn't be

searching for an ontologically correct unified field theory.

Carl Brannen