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  • Florian Bieber
    1. Serbia and Montenegro (CAP) 2. Potential Trade in Southeast Europe: a Gravity Model Approach (WIIW) ... 1. Serbia and Montenegro For all the talk of
    Message 1 of 15 , Apr 9, 2002
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      1. Serbia and Montenegro (CAP)
      2. Potential Trade in Southeast Europe: a Gravity Model Approach (WIIW)


      1. Serbia and Montenegro

      For all the talk of "history in the making" in first reactions to the agreement between Belgrade and Podgorica, the spotlight is actually on the dustbin of history: Milosevic's "Third Yugoslavia" is dead and there will be no more incarnations. First reactions to the new-born "Serbia and Montenegro" covered a whole spectrum of emotions, ranging from "a freak of a state" or "a rotten compromise" to "a new beginning." Fact is that Javier Solana seems to have found a middle way in-between federation and confederation - at least for the time being. In three years (at the most!), the day of reckoning will come. For the moment, the political deadlock has been broken and a window of opportunity has been created for reform policies and regional co-operation. A comparison between the agreement of 14 March and the two "platforms" that defined the negotiating positions one and a half years ago throws the embedded compromises and innovations into relief. A second comparison with the political realities in Belgrade, Podgorica … and Pristina reveals the agreement's limitations and deficits. Despite all sobering thoughts, however, the symbolic value and regional consequences of this "small step" should not be dismissed too lightly: The dice have been cast and political actors will have to reposition themselves accordingly.


      See: http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/aktuell/positionen/2002_04_meurs.htm

      The appendix to the working paper includes the full text of the Djukanovic platform, the Kostunica/Djindjic reply and the 14 March agreement as well as an issue-by-issue comparison of the three documents.

      P o s i t i o n
      Serbia and Montenegro
      One Small Step for Mankind, One Giant Leap for the Balkans?
      Download (97 KB, PDF-Format): Full Version (with Appendix)
      By Wim van Meurs - 8. April 2002



      2. WIIW: Potential Trade in Southeast Europe: a Gravity Model Approach

      Potential Trade in Southeast Europe: a Gravity Model Approach
      by Edward Christie
      WIIW Working Paper No. 21, March 2002
      35 pages, EUR 8.00 (free PDF download from the WIIW website)

      For summary see http://www.wiiw.ac.at/news.html
    • Florian Bieber
      1. Dutch Report on Srebrenica 2. Bosnian Youth Party ... http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/index.htm ... Summary for the Press The following is an authorized summary
      Message 2 of 15 , Apr 17, 2002
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        1. Dutch Report on Srebrenica
        2. Bosnian Youth Party


        http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/index.htm


        Summary for the Press

        The following is an authorized summary of the conclusions from the Epilogue of the main report "Srebrenica, a 'safe' area - Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a safe area". The numbers in the left-hand margin refer to the numbered main points in the Epilogue.

        (1) The mass slaughter of thousands of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica is a horrifying and probably the most violent excess to take place in the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990. Great-Serbian ambition played a major role in this process. This places a relatively large share of the responsibility with the Serb political leaders, especially former president Milosevic. The very large degree of responsibility for the violent nature of the process of disintegration borne by the Serb leaders should not encourage turning a blind eye to the responsibility of other leaders for the resort to violence. All of the warring factions were guilty of gross violence. The reports and images of this violence met with repugnance throughout Europe and provoked a strong call for intervention by the international community, in which the Netherlands figured prominently.

        (2) International interventions are rarely so preventive that they can be made before excesses occur. If those excesses do occur, the public debate on them often leads governments to intervene on moral and humanitarian grounds. More in-depth analysis of the background of trouble spots and measures based on such analysis rarely play a major role. The actual intervention is more often a matter of trial and error than of the coherent implementation of a well-conceived programme. As a result, many processes of intervention look like 'muddling on'. This was the case in Yugoslavia as it disintegrated. From lack of a better alternative, international intervention right from the right down to the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica was dominated by the 'muddling on' scenario.

        (2) The promise made by UN general Morillon in 1993 to the people of Srebrenica that they were under the protection of the UN and would not be abandoned fits in with this picture of muddling on. He hereby produced a fait accompli, which the Security Council turned into the decision to label Srebrenica as a 'safe area', a new and undefined concept. Nothing was clear about it except that the dominant light option ruled out a mandate for a genuine military defence of the area or its population. The presence of UN troops was intended rather to be a warning by the international community not to attack ("to deter by presence"). The proclamation of the zone as a safe area created an illusion of security for the population.

        (3) The Netherlands was in the forefront of the international call for some form of intervention. In 1993 a combination of humanitarian motivation and political ambitions led the Dutch government, on its own initiative and without prior conditions, to make an Air Battalion available for the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia. The Netherlands could use this to show its worth, and Dutch prestige would be enhanced in the world. This took place amid wide political and media support and without a proper analysis of the far- reaching consequences beforehand. These were among the factors which led to the Netherlands being destined for Srebrenica, which had been turned down by other countries with arguments to back up their refusal.

        (3) In its desire to achieve a consensus, the Dutch parliament closely followed cabinet policy. Parliament and the parliamentary commissions were regularly given detailed information, sometimes behind closed doors. This strengthened the cabinet, but at the same time it seriously undermined the critical and regulatory role of parliament. Criticisms were voiced in politics and in the media - some of them were forcefully expressed by the military - but critics ran the risk of being disqualified by the rest for their lack of moral fibre.

        (3) The decision to become one of the main suppliers of troops for a peace mission moved many at the time. Dutch politics were dominated by the call to intervene on moral grounds. This humanitarian motivation, coupled with the ambition to improve Dutch credibility and prestige in the world, led the Netherlands to offer to dispatch the Air Brigade. By playing down the possible risks of the behaviour of the warring parties so much, a large circle of those involved in this policy, and in particular its advocates, took on a large responsibility for it.
        In practice, Dutchbat was dispatched:

        on a mission with a very unclear mandate
        to a zone described as a 'safe area' although there was no clear definition of what that meant
        to keep the peace where there was no peace
        without obtaining in-depth information from the Canadian predecessors in the enclave (Canbat)
        without adequate training for this specific task in those specific circumstances
        virtually without military and political intelligence work to gauge the political and military intentions of the warring parties
        with misplaced confidence in the readiness to deploy air strikes if problems arose, and
        without any clear strategy for leaving.

        (4) Dutchbat arrived in 1994 in an enclave with extremely complicated relations, and it was badly prepared for the actual situation there. Apart from two exploratory parties, they made little attempt to obtain information from the Canadians, their predecessors, about their experiences. The Canadian government in Ottawa was not asked for information either. The preparation and training were sufficient, generally speaking, for the military aspect, but were inadequate as regards the provision of information and insight into the situation of the population, its cultural background and experiences during the civil war. This meant that stereotypes and prejudices could already take hold during the training. All this did little to ease the relation between Dutchbat and the population. There were relatively frequent contacts during Dutchbat I, but they gradually grew less. That contributed to an introverted mentality and a reinforcement of negatively coloured stereotypes. Dutchbat was often negative about the population in the enclave, but there was no question of a deliberate anti-Muslim attitude. Contrary to what has been suggested, Dutchbat III was not conspicuous for a relatively high level of misbehaviour.

        (4) Minister Voorhoeve, who as director of the Clingendael Institute had been a fervent advocate of intervention in the early 1990s, remarked in the summer of 1994 that it was an impossible assignment. The battalions often had to carry out their work in a spirit of frustration and lack of motivation. Especially in the case of Dutchbat III it became shaken and introverted. But that does not mean that it was dysfunctional. It performed its task, but that came nowhere near the desired effect. This is more the fault of the inadequate resources and the policy of the UN and UNPROFOR. Dutchbat grew less and less able to carry out its task.

        (5) UNPROFOR was caught between two fires. The supposed demilitarisation in the enclave was virtually a dead letter. The Bosnian army (ABiH) followed a deliberate strategy of using limited military actions to tie up a relatively large part of the manpower of the Bosnian Serbian army (VRS) to prevent it from heading in full force for the main area around Sarajevo. This was also done from the Srebrenica enclave. ABiH troops had no qualms about breaking all the rules in skirmishes with the VRS. They provoked fire by the Bosnian Serbs and then sought cover with a Dutchbat unit which then ran the risk of being caught between two fires. On the other hand, the VRS blockade policy was a significant contributor to a frustrating and demotivating situation. As a result, the strength of Dutchbat III had been depleted by one third by the beginning of July 1995 and there was a serious shortage of supplies, from food to diesel oil for the vehicles. The last two battalions in particular became mentally and physically exhausted in the course of their mission.

        (5) With hindsight there are no indications that the increased activity of the VRS in East Bosnia at the beginning of July 1995 was aimed at anything more than a reduction of the safe area Srebrenica and an interception of the main road to Zepa. The plan of campaign was drawn up on 2 July. The attack commenced on 6 July. It was so successful and so little resistance was offered that it was decided late in the evening of 9 July to press on and to see whether it was possible to take over the entire enclave.

        From a military perspective Dutchbat had few grounds for mounting a counterattack on its own initiative because:

        active defence of the enclave by military means was not in accordance with the mandate, the UN policy (the maintenance of impartiality) or the rules of engagement
        the instruction ("to deter by presence") was for military reaction to be above all reticent
        the military balance of power was such that, without outside support, Dutchbat would have been defenceless in a serious confrontation
        as a result of the 'stranglehold strategy' (the blockade policy of the VRS), Dutchbat III was no longer a fully operational battalion in terms of manpower, supplies or morale.
        military means could only be deployed if the safety of the battalion was in danger and if it was the target of direct fire - the 'smoking gun' requirement - which the VRS deliberately avoided
        the circumstances, such as the failure of air support to materialise and the death of the Dutchbat member Van Renssen through an action by a Bosnian Muslim, hardly encouraged the mood for a counterattack on its own initiative.

        (5) The question of whether another battalion (in a different condition, or more heavily armed) would have acted differently is impossible to answer. In terms of political psychology, it was conceivable that, from fear of a negative reputation for the Bosnian Serbs, the commander of the Bosnian Serbian army (VRS), general Mladic, would have held back from armed resistance with the risk of victims on the UNPROFOR side. His decision to press on to Srebrenica was primarily motivated by the lack of any significant armed resistance. This indicates that such considerations did play a role with the VRS. Since action by Dutchbat on its own initiative contrary to the instructions was not an available option, the initiative for that would have had to come from one of the higher UN echelons. But those higher echelons were very reluctant to use close air support, let alone considering serious operations in the form of active fighting back by Dutchbat. Besides, the Bosnian Serbs deliberately avoided the 'smoking gun' by skirting the blocking positions and not giving UNPROFOR any direct pretext to initiate an armed counterattack on the ground. The attack on Srebrenica was characterised on a small scale by what characterised policy on a large scale: muddling on.

        (6) The rapid fall of Srebrenica and the little resistance that was put up have led to questions and allegations about possible secret deals. The most important of these concerns the UN commander-in-chief general Janvier. It has been alleged that he and VRS general Mladic made a secret agreement on 4 June 1995 that no more air strikes (like those at Pale) would be forthcoming, not even in the future, in return for the release of mainly French hostages. This hypothesis does not stand up to criticism. Even without a deal, Mladic could still understand that the general conviction on the UN side was that air strikes were ruled out as long as there were hostages or the possibility of new ones. Attacks from the air had become extremely hazardous as long as the ground forces of UNPROFOR were still in the enclaves. That was why Janvier had already asked the Security Council to abandon the eastern enclaves to facilitate a stronger action.

        (7) The expectation on the part of Dutchbat and the Sector North East in Tuzla that help would come from outside on the morning of 11 July in the form of massive air strikes was misguided. The UNPROFOR command had completely ruled out air strikes, but was also extremely reticent about lighter support from the air in the form of close air support. It hereby crushed the Dutchbat illusion and the enclave became an easy target for the VRS. On the Dutch side, the potential for the deployment of air support was overestimated. It was expected that "robust" action would be taken if necessary. That had been an important argument in the political and military decision-making right from the start. The UN was very reluctant to deploy the air force because it wanted to remain impartial in the conflict and to limit its task to that of peace-keeping, not peace-enforcement. The hostage crisis after the Pale air strikes had further increased doubts about the usefulness of massive air support.

        (6) Fear for the fate of a group of members of Dutchbat held hostage elsewhere whose numbers had grown to 55, as well as for that of the refugees and members of Dutchbat in the enclave, who could also be regarded more or less as hostages, led Minister of Defence Voorhoeve to make an urgent appeal to the highest UN commander in the region, Akashi, to call off the requested air support on 11 July. This appeal had no effect whatsoever because the decision in question had already been taken. Akashi later falsely used Voorhoeve's request in order to get out of having to say that the UN itself had not planned any further action. He appealed to Voorhoeve's request by saying that it left him no alternative.

        (8) The attack on the enclave, and in particular its complete collapse, came as a total surprise to Dutchbat and to all of the other parties involved. This can be explained from the lateness of the decision of the Bosnian Serbs to attack and eventually take over the whole enclave, but it was also due to the weak intelligence position of the UN and the lack of sufficient capacities and the right resources to collect and analyse intelligence. The fall of Srebrenica was thereby partly a failure of military intelligence. The Netherlands also played a part in this. The Cabinet, the Ministry of Defence and the Dutch Parliament adopted an anti-intelligence attitude. The Military Intelligence Service in particular did not receive sufficient extra resources to collect additional intelligence, and this service was not involved enough in the decision-making on Srebrenica. As a result, far fewer observational data were obtained than was technically possible. The United States had the strongest intelligence position in Bosnia. The Netherlands could have benefited from this, but lack of interest and the negative attitude of the military and political leadership stood in the way. The army top repeatedly turned down an offer by the CIA to smuggle a number of so-called Comint cases into the enclave with equipment to tap the communications of the ABiH and the VRS in the region. Defence thereby missed the opportunity to strengthen its own information position in the field of intelligence in return. The result was a weak Dutch information position in the field of intelligence. Tapped messages would at least have given Dutchbat 'ears', and would have put the army in a strong position vis-à-vis the US intelligence and security services to obtain additional intelligence from US sources.

        (10) The tragic nadir of the fall of Srebrenica was the mass killing of thousands of Muslim men by Bosnian Serbian units. A large number of the men were members of the Bosnian Muslim army (ABiH) who had attempted to break out of the enclave to Tuzla with some of the male population during the night of 11 July. The decision to break out and thus to give up further resistance was taken entirely outside the UN and UNPROFOR. The flight to Tuzla and the mass executions which followed took place entirely out of view of Dutchbat. Suggestions that the Muslims were killed "under the eyes of Dutchbat" are unfounded in relation to this mass slaughter.

        (10) The decision on mass executions was most probably made after 11 July when it became clear that the breakout led by the 28th division prevented the handling of affairs that had been planned. No written order has been found. The outbreak was a complete surprise, and it came at a very bad time for the VRS. Along with the already existing hatred, eagerness for revenge and the wish for ethnic cleansing, it was one of the factors that led the Bosnian Serbs to settle accounts harshly with the Muslim population of the enclave. This turned into an organised mass slaughter. It is unlikely that is was planned long in advance with this specific form and scope. It is more plausible to suppose that the Bosnian Serbians had counted on a surrender of the ABiH troops and a deportation of the population from the enclave after 'screening for war criminals' and transfer of the troops to prisoner-of-war camps.

        (10) It was precisely in the treatment of the many prisoners that the Bosnian Serbs lost control of themselves. In some places the Muslims were slaughtered like beasts. They included men who had been separated from the women outside the Dutch compound in Potocari at the transfer of the population to Tuzla. That mass murder was the intention is also clear from the fact that, after the prisoners had been taken, no measures were taken to see whether there were 'war criminals' among them, no prisoner-of-war facilities were found, no food or drink were organised, identity cards were destroyed, and no distinction was made between combatants and non-combatants.

        (10) There are a number of indications that it was a central command from the General Staff of the VRS. There are none pointing to political or military liaison with Belgrado. The involvement of the then president Karadzic (Republik Srpska) is unclear. In any case, the main responsibility for the mass slaughter lay with the military. Mladic's central role was unmistakable and beyond doubt. He was a dominant presence during these days and was clearly in command. That does not alter the responsibility of others in leading positions in the VRS, the Drina Corps and in the special troops and security services.

        (11) After the fall of the enclave, several tens of thousands of the population went to Potocari, some of them to the local Dutch compound. That mass of people stayed there for a few days in terrible and chaotic conditions and suffered from the heat and the lack of food and water. There was a risk of a humanitarian catastrophe and in view of the hygienic conditions the fear of epidemics was justified. There was no doubt about where the priority lay. Evacuation or deportation of the population was the top priority. When all is said and done, that was also what all of the parties wanted. The refugees were also very keen to leave for a variety of reasons, not least fear. There was no way of offering the refugees in Potocari armed protection. This was ruled out not only by the lack of military balance between Dutchbat and the VRS, but also because the presence of an enormous crowd of refugees packed together made effective action impossible. It was essentially a hostage situation in which any violent resistance would have provoked a bloodbath. There was no doubt about the main priority. The top priority was the evacuation of the population, and in the last analysis that was what all of the parties wanted.

        (11) When buses appeared, there was a rush to get a place as quickly as possible. Many had wanted to leave earlier, and now there was very heavy congestion. That was one of the reasons for Dutchbat to perform a regulatory function in this connection. Another was that the refugees were in this way - at least not directly - at the mercy of VRS troops. It was also clear to Dutchbat that the Muslims had only one choice: to leave as soon as possible. It was the natural task of Dutchbat to supervise that and to collaborate with it, even though in the given circumstances it was tantamount to collaborating with ethnic cleansing.

        (11) Deputy Dutchbat commander Franken stated later that he had recognised the danger of excesses. He had not expected mass murder, nor had he expected the VRS to abide by the rules, and he realised that in the worse scenario there might be some killing. From fear of panic and a direct catastrophe, he was silent about these fears and assisted with the evacuation in full awareness that the fate of the men was uncertain and that they, as he put it, "might end up in the most appalling circumstances". His choice was basically to avoid a humanitarian disaster that would affect everyone. That choice had far-reaching consequences for the men among those present. The battalion command realised that the fate of the men among them, who were separated from the women and children, was uncertain, but could not have suspected that this would lead to the mass slaughter of these and many other men who fell into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs during their flight to Tuzla.

        (11) Franken's dilemmas included that of whether or not to admit persons to the compound or to place them on the list of local personnel to whom they did not actually belong. There was a general awareness in UNPROFOR about how strict the VRS checks were and of how important the necessary written permits were in this respect. Franken felt that there was too large a risk that, during the supposedly inevitable inspection, the VRS might come across someone who had no papers or untrustworthy ones. That could endanger the lives of the others. For this reason he also refused to put the brother of an interpreter (Hassan Nuhanovic) on the list of people allowed to leave with Dutchbat. His father was allowed to stay because he had taken part in the discussion between Karremans and general Mladic, but he decided to stay with his family, which cost him his life. In at least one case (the electrician Mustafic) someone who was entitled to be included on the list was refused - a communication failure with fatal consequences.

        (11) A number of Muslim men had already been killed by the Bosnian Serbs in Potocari in a local act of revenge. Their number is estimated at between 100 and 400, with a wide margin. The battalion command received limited information about this, but what was reported was alarming enough: two sightings of nine or ten corpses and indications that assaults were taking place during interrogations in a house near the compound. Much more happened in Potocari than what the members of Dutchbat saw. But not all of what they saw was reported in those days. Communication was a complete failure at the time. One reason for this is the great stress to which the members of Dutchbat were exposed, their narrowing of focus, and their shutting themselves off from the world around them. In some cases too, concern about their own survival in this hell will have meant more to them than the fate of the Muslim men who had made things so difficult for Dutchbat.

        (11) Be that as it may, communication on 12 and 13 July, when these killings of men taken from the crowd were carried out, failed completely. This failure of the internal humanitarian reporting raises the question of why the battalion command itself did not play a more active role. During the week after the evacuation, when the situation had quietened down, Commander Karremans and his deputy Franken did not attempt to issue a call or make inquiries to investigate the serious violation of human rights either. Afterwards they are themselves surprised by this failure to assume responsibility. By the way, they share this responsibility with officers at higher levels who - earlier than Karremans and Franken - had also received the alarming reports from survivors in Tuzla.

        (12) The battalion command, particularly commander Karremans, have been strongly criticised in public, partly due to their very unflattering way of presenting themselves in the media. If we look further than this public image, it can be stated that, under the responsibility of that battalion command, most of the military and humanitarian tasks were properly performed until the hectic days of July. When the VRS opened its attack on the enclave, however, Dutchbat was no longer able to determine the course of events, though it should be borne in mind that military defence of the enclave was explicitly not a part of the task or instruction and that passive action had been enjoined. Nevertheless, there is room for criticism of a number of separate aspects, including the nature and action of the battalion command.

        (13) Reactions to the reports from refugees in Tuzla about massive violations of human rights were varied. Minister Pronk (Development Cooperation) first used the word "genocide" without any qualification in a NOVA broadcast on 18 July. Ministers Van Mierlo (Foreign Affairs) and Voorhoeve (Defence), on the other hand, expressed their concern but usually in cautious terms, partly motivated by concern for the vulnerability of Dutchbat as long as it was still stationed in the former enclave. The commander of the Dutch army, general Couzy, suggested on the basis of Dutchbat reports that it was not as bad as some made out. He barely countenanced the possibility, and certainly any (indirect) complicity by Dutchbat, from uncertainty about what had actually gone on in the enclave and from a desire to protect the image of the battalion and the army. Yet on the basis of everything that he had so vaguely and incompletely learned, he could have also concluded that that was precisely a reason for alertness and further investigation.

        (13) The press conference by Defence in Zagreb marked a fundamental change of direction in the media. Until then the picture had been one of Dutchbat doing its work under difficult conditions. Journalists well understood that, as long as Dutchbat was still in the enclave, reticence was called for because of the risk of being taken hostage. The first press contacts of commander Karremans after the departure from the enclave damaged the image of both Dutchbat and Defence. His attempts to characterise the relation of the warring factions ("no good guys, no bad guys") and his value judgements on general Mladic backfired completely in the light of what many journalists now regarded as the highly probable and serious killings by the Bosnian Serbs. Given the shocking excesses that had taken place, the media were somewhat ashamed of the compliant role they had played so far, and there was now a tendency to go to the opposite extreme. The situation was aggravated by understandable and in some cases well-founded complaints about the lack of information by Defence and the disruption of personal relations between Defence and journalists as a result of the failure to fulfil commitments.

        (13) The negative image that emerged at that time was also fuelled by footage of a party after the arrival of Dutchbat in Zagreb. Shots of members of boisterous Dutchbat drinking beer have become the symbol of the alleged indifference of the Netherlands in general and of Dutchbat in particular to the fate of the Muslims killed in the mass executions. This footage, which has often been shown on television, was taken from a short excerpt from a much longer internal video, the full version of which was deposited in a public film archive by Defence in the autumn of 1995. This selection of images suggests that Dutchbat was partying in full awareness of the mass murders under the eyes of the press. All three suggestions are incorrect. The nature and scale of the mass killings were not yet known, yet alone fully realised; the partying was the spontaneous release of emotions after a very moving memorial service for their dead colleagues Raviv van Renssen and Jeffrey Broere. A few dozen men took part, a small minority of the battalion.

        (13) The public condemnation of the role of Karremans was also affected by video footage, in this case recordings made by the VRS during his talks with general Mladic. It has to be stated that he was the victim of manipulation which led to his being filmed in a way that was fatal for his image. Someone put a glass in his hand in a situation in which he had just managed to meet a number of Dutchbat members who were being held hostage. Mladic's attitude left Karremans no chance at all, but where there were opportunities he seems to have said the minimum and not to have made any promises or concessions which were out of order in the given circumstances.

        (13) From Zagreb on a highly critical view of what had happened predominated. The situation did not improve when it was discovered that the supply of information by Defence left a lot to be desired. Suspicion arose that an unjust attempt was being made to preserve the reputation of Dutchbat untarnished. Minister Voorhoeve was constantly under fire, was uninformed of the facts, and therefore called for a broad, comprehensive inquiry, a continuation of the debriefing on a larger scale. He counted on the loyalty, support and correct political sense of the army. However, the army top had different priorities, such as preserving the image of Dutchbat and of the army, as a result of which the minister was informed relatively late, often inadequately, and on a few occasions was not even informed at all. The debriefing report was inadequate. The army could clearly put its stamp on it. Voorhoeve and his aides knew that. Nevertheless, he considered that there was no alternative but to praise the report, because he had used it to keep questioners at bay for weeks. Immediate recognition that the report was inadequate would be a disowning of the army, and he did not want that. Voorhoeve had become the prisoner of the debriefing report.

        (14) The limited debriefing policy of the army top bounced back on the defence organisation like a boomerang. It was virtually paralysed, especially in the summer of 1998, by the constant Srebrenica exposures in the media. The new Minister of Defence, De Grave, felt the effects of this immediately after assuming office. He decided to act more forcefully: he ordered an inquiry to see whether Srebrenica had been hushed up. The Van Kemenade report found no evidence for that, but his investigation was not in the first instance intended to discover the truth; in the last resort it was about a problem of political administration that required an acute solution. Van Kemenade therefore did not conclude, as the present report does, that there was not only incapacity but also a deliberate attempt by the army top, contrary to the wishes of the Minister, to limit the flow of information and, where possible, to avoid sensitive issues. Van Kemenade failed to recognise the evidence for that; it should have led him, at least, to be more suspicious of his early conclusion that there had been no hushing up.

        (15) After July 1995 the tragedy of Srebrenica has continued to have a profound effect, first of all for the survivors and next of kin of the population. For most of them, the events have wrecked their lives. In particular, many women from Srebrenica still suffer every day from what they have been through. Many of them had already had a series of exhausting and horrifying experiences before the setting up of the safe area. The attack, deportation and mass killings came after two years in a besieged fortress, in which the VRS used its 'stranglehold strategy' in an attempt to create an impossible situation in humanitarian terms. The process of digging up and identifying the corpses has still not been completed yet. In many respects the next of kin feel abandoned by the rest of the world, in Bosnia and outside it.

        (15) The members of Dutchbat have also been deeply affected by their time in the enclave. Many of them have long-term psychological problems arising from their experiences in Srebrenica, and in some cases they are still serious. Many of them were not impressed by the counselling and aftercare they received. Their reception in the Netherlands, in an atmosphere of public debate in which Dutchbat was often presented in a very negative light, certainly did not help them to cope with their problems in a healthy and balanced way on the home front. That atmosphere left little room for understanding what it had 'really' been like according to the Dutchbat members. They did not recognise themselves in the image that dominated in the media, of deep black (mainly Bosnian) Serbs and lily-white Muslims. Most of the members of Dutchbat had difficulty in accepting that picture. The world that they had known during their stay in the enclave had been different.

        (15) The mass killing had a strong shock effect in UN and NATO and contributed to a U- turn in US policy. In July 1995 a line was drawn at the menace to Gorazde, where British troops were stationed. The UN's lack of flexibility because of the need to maintain impartiality diminished and there was an increased readiness to deploy the air force. The military were given wider powers to deploy it, and the 'smoking gun' condition was dropped. The shelling of the Markale market in Sarajevo in August 1995 triggered tough air strikes by the UN and NATO against the Bosnian Serbian air defence. That united action - "Deliberate Force" - led to Dayton November 1995, where the reluctant parties were nevertheless forced to sign an agreement. The Netherlands played no role at all at this stage. It was even banned from the conference table.

        For more information:
        David Barnouw
        Information Officer
        020-5233800


        THE DEMOCRACY ACTIVIST
        A Monthly Report from the Front Lines on the Impact of U.S. Policy
        Issue 2, April 10, 2002

        BOSNIA’S YOUTH DEMANDS A BETTER FUTURE
        By Milan Bastinac, Nejla Sakic, and Stela Vasic
        founding members of Stranka Mladih, the Youth Party of Bosnia and
        Hercegovina

        --------------------------------------------------------
        View this article online:  www.DPInstitute.org
        --------------------------------------------------------

        The almost seven years since the Dayton Peace Agreement promised us a future without isolation, hatred, and misery, have instead been more like medieval times, with warlords being hailed as great “democrats” and even “martyrs for (their) people.”  They have used their stolen riches to
        buy protection from puppet politicians and officials, and are the real enemies of every Bosnian citizen.
        In essence, Stranka Mladih (Youth Party) is not a party.  It is a revolt against all those who are killing our future, our hopes, our country.
        For the first time since 1995, a group of young people composed of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks from all over Bosnia has committed itself to a common goal by forming the Youth Party of Bosnia and Hercegovina.  We will drive for a bright future, and push from power forever the few who have benefited from the suffering of Bosnia’s people.  This may strike some as utopian, but as inheritors of our country, we have no other choice.  We won't let 1992 happen again.
        The Youth Party wants to help Bosnians overcome their crippling self-doubt, built up through years of disappointment and misery.  We propose far-reaching reforms that tackle the difficult issues impeding a stable and prosperous future.  So long as the international community administers Bosnia, strong U.S. backing will be imperative for reforms whose success will be instrumental to Bosnians regaining control over their future.
        Bosnia urgently needs strong state institutions, and a politically efficient, accountable government that has respect abroad.  The United States should shun nationalist parties and those who favor changing the Dayton Peace Agreement without consent of all three constituent peoples. 
        The Youth Party will neither deal with any nationalist party, nor embroil itself in endless recriminations over the war.
        We want to make radical changes to build a less corrupt, more educated society.  We propose several pan-Bosnian commissions at the state level to address the country’s most pressing social problems.  These would be composed of independent Bosnian experts, together with international
        experts appointed by the High Representative.  Having fought against each other, we can now fight together against our real enemy.
        Serious reform can only happen in a non-nationalist political environment. We advocate radical changes to electoral law, including a 30-30-30-10% (Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, Others) division in the House of Peoples at the state level; this body should review both state and entity-level
        legislation for “vital interests,” allowing both entity legislatures to become unicameral.  Every Bosnian citizen should have a vote for each seat of the three-member presidency, a mechanism that naturally discourages extremist candidates.  The United States should use its considerable leverage to put these and other crucial election reforms back on the
        international community’s agenda.
        Having multiple armies is absurd, not to mention expensive for a poor country. We call for the abolition of both entities’ armies, except for a few unified brigades in the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and a strengthening of the State Border Service (SBS).
        Bosnia is just now gaining control over its borders, and smuggled goods drain the entity treasuries while discouraging Bosnian domestic production.  A unified state customs service that directs collected revenues to the state level would generate increased funds for vital public interests and create space for local production.  While extremists who profit from corruption in the entity customs agencies will surely object, the United States can help build an international consensus to take them on.
        Bosnia’s economy is over-regulated and lacks functioning business law to protect entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers.  The black market dominates now, but small and medium-sized private companies must build the backbone of the new economy.  Quickly adopting a comprehensive business law package throughout Bosnia, designed by Bosnians and backed, or imposed, by the
        international community, would spur competition and growth.  The business regulatory and tax package should be designed to play to Bosnia’s competitive strengthits educated and cheap labor force.
        The current privatization process in both entities is inefficient and prone to corruption, but it is difficult to make changes at this advanced stage.  Once the process is completed, a state-level commission should be established to review privatized businesses and ensure that they are being run legally. 
        A Research and Development Commission composed of Bosnian economic experts and international advisors should be created to determine where prospects exist for investment and economic growth.  The Commission would work to promote these to potential investors and monitor each to ensure that it is conducted correctly, with benefits for both entities.
        Beyond economic reforms, all Bosnian administrative institutions must be strengthened to enforce the rule of law and provide all citizens with a stable social, economic, and political state.  Legislation and all other regulations adopted after Dayton should be equally implemented in both
        entities.  This should include equal treatment of all individuals without regard to ethnic, religious and political affiliation in accordance with constitutional law and international conventions.  A reformed legal system should prosecute war profiteers and corrupt individuals and investigate properties gained during the war period.  It should legally protect war
        veterans and socially endangered people. 

        Washington should support strengthened investigative and legal bodies to aggressively tackle pervasive corruption.  An independent state Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) should be established by the Bosnian Parliament, in tandem with a unified anti-corruption law.  The ACC would be tasked with monitoring public officials and government expenses at all levels of government.  It should collaborate with the OHR Anti-Fraud Unit as closely as possible, and provide information to appropriate legal authorities for prosecution.
        Building a democratic society cannot be successful without help from the international community, especially the European Union and the United States.  The U.S. should strongly back the new High Representative’s reform agenda and pressure Bosnia’s neighbors to cease interfering in its internal affairs.
        Washington should forgo support of recycled communist politicians and support the Youth Party, which is bringing young people from all over Bosnia together to promote the common interest of all Bosnian citizens.
        Meager financial resources prevent us from presenting our ideas to the Bosnian electorate as broadly as we would like.  However, we are keen to do our best in this year’s campaign to prove to our countrymen that they can count on us, their children, as a guarantee that some things will never happen again.  The Youth Party's mere existence has proved that there are people in Bosnia who think and act without prejudice, who have freed their minds in order to recapture their future.

        -----------------
        The authors are founding members of Stranka Mladih, the Youth Party of Bosnia and Hercegovina.  Milan Bastinac is founder and former President of the Progressive Youth Organization of Republika Srpska in Banja Luka.  Nejla Sakic, a native of Zenica, studied at the University of Sarajevo’s Faculty of Law, and worked in a variety of capacities for the OSCE in Bosnia.  Stela Vasic, also of Zenica, received her BA in Diplomatic and Strategic Studies from the International University in Vienna, and will complete her MA studies this year.  Bastinac and Sakic will graduate with BAs this summer.



        http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=618

        Implementing Equality: The "Constituent Peoples" Decision in Bosnia & Herzegovina

        EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS


        In July 2000, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina made an


        historic ruling requiring the two entities, the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska (RS), to amend their constitutions to ensure the full equality of the country's three "constituent peoples" throughout its territory.

        This ruling offers a probably unrepeatable chance to push the Dayton

        Peace Accords (DPA) to their limits and to permit BiH to become a functional multinational state. As it stands, the Dayton model of three constituent peoples and two entities is inherently unstable. It can be pushed in one of two directions: towards recognising the right of the third and smallest people, the Croats, to have their own mini-state, or towards making both entities truly and effectively multinational. The "constituent peoples" decision represents the best means to reform the existing entities within the Dayton architecture and to move Bosnia in the second direction.

        Opponents of effective Bosnian statehood quickly denounced this

        decision as an effort to overturn the DPA. Having succeeded in delaying serious debate about implementation for a year and a half, these factions are now determined to protect their fiefdoms by diluting the consequent reforms to the greatest possible extent.

        Supporters of an integral Bosnian state, by contrast, hailed the Court's

        decision as a political and constitutional watershed, and have urged the domestic authorities to agree or, if necessary, the international community to impose far-reaching reforms that would improve upon the Dayton structures.

        Since January 2001, the High Representative, the Council of Europe and

        several Western capitals have nudged the entities towards considering and drafting the constitutional changes necessary to implement the Court's decision. This process included the establishment of multinational constitutional commissions attached to the entities' legislatures, the engagement of political parties in drafting proposals of their own, consultations with international constitutional experts, a period of public debate, inter-party negotiations and, finally, a month of intensive haggling in the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

        The parties struck a political deal in Sarajevo on 27 March 2002,

        agreeing a package of precepts and principles to be embodied in both entities' constitutional amendments. Having superintended the marathon bargaining sessions, the High Representative, the U.S. Ambassador and the Spanish Ambassador (representing the EU presidency) praised the parties for having had the courage to compromise, and swore to see that the Sarajevo Agreement would be translated faithfully into workable amendments.

        While this agreement did not represent the best possible interpretation

        of the Constitutional Court's ruling, or a complete catalogue of all the required amendments, it offered an acceptable framework based on compromise - until now a dirty word in Bosnian politics. Unfortunately, the honeymoon has so far proved less happy than the wedding. The RS party leaders who had signed the agreement returned to Banja Luka to preside over the passage of a set of amendments by the National Assembly (RSNA) that violated the agreement in several places, added caveats and 'minor' changes in others, and introduced new amendments either contrary to the spirit of the Court's decision or - in some instances - to the DPA itself.

        Even more brazen than the amendments themselves was the manner in

        which the speaker of the RSNA forced them through: over the objections of Bosniak and Croat members whose constituent" status they were meant to safeguard, and in the face of ineffectual hand- wringing on the part of OHR representatives.

        Acceptance of the RSNA amendments would mean abandoning this

        opportunity to remodel the entities and to bring Bosnia closer to effective statehood. It would confer a bogus stamp of multinational legitimacy upon the RS without actually ensuring that the Constitutional Court's demand for equal rights throughout the country was realised.

        Moreover, it would destabilise the position of the non-nationalist

        Alliance for Change coalition in the Federation, exposing it to accusations of treachery from Bosniak and Croat opposition parties for having signed up to a failed pact. By compromising, the Alliance parties hoped to make a start on ensuring national equality in the entities while showing that Bosnia was ready to manage its own affairs. If the international community allows these parties to be shown up as having miscalculated on both counts, it will help to return their nationalist opponents to power.

        This report recounts the origins of the "constituent peoples" case and

        the scope of the Court's decision. It then describes the unprecedented debate on fundamental aspects of the DPA that has occurred in both entities since December 2001. It analyses the Sarajevo Agreement, the amendments enacted by the RSNA and the draft amendments awaiting debate in the Federation parliament in terms of the guarantees needed to ensure equal rights for Bosnia's "constituent peoples" and "others". Finally, it analyses changes not specifically regulated by the Sarajevo Agreement, but mandated by the decision of the Constitutional Court.

        ICG believes that "symmetry in substance" requires both entities to

        have legislative bodies empowered not only to object to laws that violate "vital interests", but also to participate in their revision. This means endowing the RS with a second chamber, even if its competence need not extend beyond legislation affecting such "vital interests" It will also be essential to base representation of the "constituent peoples" in the RS government on no lesser standard than that agreed in Sarajevo. To accept anything less would legitimise 'ethnic cleansing'. Nor would it be just to exclude Bosnia's "others" from government or the bodies mandated to safeguard "vital interests". Implementation of the "constituent peoples" decision in the entities' courts, law enforcement agencies and local governments is no less important than securing equitable representation for all nations in their cabinets and parliaments.

        Neither the High Representative nor the Peace Implementation Council

        (PIC) to which he is accountable should allow themselves to be deterred by Serb and Croat extremists into accepting half-baked or unjust sets of amendments. Although the Federation looks set to adopt a set of amendments fully in line with both the Court's decision and the Sarajevo Agreement, pressure or imposition could prove necessary in that entity - as it is now required in the RS. In order to overcome resistance, however, any imposition will need to be accompanied by mobilisation of the full arsenal of international weapons and inducements. Otherwise, constitutional amendments imposed upon dissenting parties will not stick, and Bosnia will remain a dysfunctional and resentful Western dependency.

        RECOMMENDATIONS



        GENERAL



        The constitutional reforms now under discussion must provide

        equal protection for "constituent peoples" and citizens throughout the country. If the entities fail to provide such a solution, the High Representative should impose it.

        (a) In Republika Srpska (RS), this will mean imposing changes to
        the amendments passed on 4 April 2002, bringing some into line with the Sarajevo Agreement and altering others that diverge from the original ruling of the Constitutional Court.
        (b) Imposition may be required in the Federation as well, if its parliament fails to pass adequate amendments.

        INTERNATIONAL IMPOSITION AND IMPLEMENTATION



        The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board -

        including Britain, France, the U.S., Russia, Germany, Canada, Spain, Italy, the European Union (EU) presidency, and the European Commission (EC) - should support the High Representative fully in imposing and implementing an appropriate solution.

        International donors should be prepared to impose economic

        sanctions on any party that refuses or fails to implement aspects of the Constitutional Court's decision. This would include the withdrawal of 'soft' loans and budget support grants by the World Bank and other international financial institutions.

        SFOR's troop-contributing countries should buttress security for

        returnees, particularly in hard-line areas of eastern RS and of Croat-controlled western Herzegovina, with ostentatious patrols if necessary.

        The international community should adopt a 'zero-tolerance'

        stance towards violence against 'minority' returnees, holding the entity authorities directly responsible for infractions.

        FAIR REPRESENTATION



        A just, appropriate and workable package of constitutional

        amendments on fair representation would include the following elements:

        (a) Fair representation of the constituent peoples and "others" in
        the governments of both entities would be assured under the terms of the Sarajevo Agreement. RS Amendment LXXXIV contradicts the agreement's transitional formula for government before the implementation of Annex 7, and the High Representative needs to correct this if the RSNA will not. He should also ensure that the Federation passes an amendment on government in accordance with the agreement.

        (b) The RS definition of the implementation of Annex 7, also
        contained in Amendment LXXXIV, reduces the substantial obligations which the authorities have under the DPA to support return to the mere issuance of a few thousand administrative decisions. It sets a dangerous precedent and should be annulled by the High Representative if the RSNA fails to reconsider.

        (c) In both entities, the international community should ensure
        that either the House/Council of Peoples or the two vice- presidents participate in the election of government members.

        (d) The requirement that no one constituent people hold more
        than two of six top entity positions (premier, speaker/president of the National Assembly/House of Representatives, chair of the House/Council of Peoples, president of the constitutional court, president of the supreme court, and entity public prosecutor) is not an ideal solution, but should be upheld in both entities as an element of the political compromise reached in the Sarajevo Agreement. This need not preclude the entities from adding a provision that the president and premier cannot come from the same people.

        (e) The entity president and vice-presidents, coming from the
        three separate peoples, should rotate during the course of their mandate in both entities.

        (f) The number of deputies to the Federation House of
        Representatives and House of Peoples should be reduced, as provided in the Federation government's proposal and the Sarajevo Agreement, as a first step towards streamlining Bosnia's governing structures.

        (g) The "others" must be adequately represented in the RS
        Council of Peoples and the Federation House of Peoples, as the Sarajevo Agreement provides.

        (h) The Sarajevo Agreement requirement that regional (cantonal
        and district) and municipal courts should have national representation based on the 1991 census is a good solution and should be upheld. This will mean changing RS Amendment LXXXV, paragraph 3, which violates this principle.

        (i) For the entity constitutional courts, the Sarajevo Agreement's
        stipulation that at least two judges come from each constituent people (and one from the category of "others") is acceptable. The RS and Federation constitutions should include amendments making this requirement explicit.

        (j) The benches of the entity supreme courts, about which the
        Sarajevo Agreement is mute, should be constituted on the basis of parity, with a lesser number of places for "others". The constitutions should make this explicit.

        (k) Constituent peoples and "others" must be adequately
        represented in the other public institutions of the entities, including the administration of the entity ministries, the cantons and the municipalities. This should be according to the 1991 census until Annex 7 is implemented. Strict benchmarks and timelines should be set to ensure that the authorities do not drag their feet on implementing this provision.

        VITAL INTERESTS



        Appropriate amendments on "vital interests" would include the

        following elements:

        (a) "Vital interests" must be defined in the same way in both
        entities and, ultimately, at state level. The set of interests contained in the Sarajevo Agreement is adequate, but should also include matters related to refugee return and the calling of a referendum.

        (b) As a parliamentary mechanism for protecting "vital interests",
        the Federation House of Peoples will have to be retained and Serbs accorded parity of representation with Bosniaks and Croats.

        (c) The Council of Peoples defined in the Sarajevo Agreement is
        an acceptable body for the protection of vital interests in the RS.

        (d) RS Amendment LXXXII alters the vital interest procedure for
        halting and amending legislation, regulations and general acts specified in the Sarajevo Agreement. Either the RSNA or the High Representative must rectify this.

        OTHER ENTITY REFORMS



        Both the House and Council of Peoples should have the right to

        consider whether legislation is of a generally discriminatory character.

        They should also have the right, for a period of two to three

        years, to review and suggest revision or nullification of existing legislation, regulations, acts and decisions in force at the entity, cantonal or municipal levels.

        The political structures of the cantons and municipalities of the

        Federation and of the municipalities of the RS must reflect the reforms at entity level. The cantons, in particular, will have to amend their constitutions.

        Integration of the entity public sectors and police forces - within

        entity ministries and, most importantly, in the cantons and municipalities - should begin forthwith. This means setting targets (based on the 1991 census) and requiring that representation should conform to election results within two years. The benchmarks for minority recruitment of police in the RS and Federation should be harmonised.

        RS Amendment LXXXV, paragraph 2, negates this formula based

        on the 1991 census, to which the RS parties agreed in Sarajevo Agreement. It must be reconsidered by the RSNA or changed by the High Representative.

        Either the RSNA or the High Representative must remove the

        designation of "Bosniak" as one of the official languages of the RS (Amendment LXXI, paragraph 1) and replace it with the term "Bosnian", as authorised by the DPA.

        RS Amendment LXVII, paragraph 1, should be reviewed for

        consistency with the DPA. It asserts the "independence" of the RS constitutional and judicial order, in seeming violation of the supremacy of the BiH Constitutional Court.

        The second paragraph of Amendment LXVII, referring to all

        authority of the RS belonging to the people and being expressed through a referendum, should either be altered or the calling of referenda should be included among vital national interests.

        Sarajevo/Brussels, 16 April 2002
      • Florian Bieber
        1. South Eastern Europe Policy Brief (International IDEA) 2. Policing The Police In Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda (ICG) ... 23 May 2002 International IDEA
        Message 3 of 15 , Jun 2, 2002
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          1. South Eastern Europe Policy Brief (International IDEA)
          2. Policing The Police In Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda (ICG)



           23 May 2002
           International IDEA Releases New South Eastern Europe Policy Brief
           A Policy Brief commenting on the results of the International IDEA-sponsored South Eastern Europe (SEE) Public Agenda Survey Report released in March 2002, is published today. The Policy Brief, the second in a series of regional policy documents published by International IDEA, is available at http://www.idea.int/balkans/index.htm
           Written by Mark Thompson, the Policy Brief looks at the SEE Public Agenda Survey Report's findings on public attitudes to critical issues of political and economic reform in the region, and outlines a number of policy recommendations addressed both to the international community at large and international organizations active in South Eastern Europe.
           Dr. Mark Thompson, Balkans Program Director of the International Crisis Group until early May 2002, is the author of A Paper House. The Ending of Yugoslavia (1992) and Forging War. The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999). He has also worked for missions of the UN and the OSCE in the Balkans.
           To view the SEE Public Agenda Survey and for further information on the International IDEA project of which it is an output visit: http://www.idea.int/balkans/index.htm
           A Press Release on the SEE Public Agenda Survey is also available at: http://www.idea.int/press/pr20020404.htm
          For further information contact International IDEA:
          Hélène Ahlberger
          Project Manager
           Tel: +46 8 698 3730, Fax: +46 8 202422
           E-mail: h.ahlberger@...
           
           Mark Salter
           Senior Information Officer
           Tel: +46 8 698 37 14 Fax: +46 8 20 24 22
           E-mail: m.salter@...
           
          International IDEA
          Strömsborg, 103 34 Stockholm, Sweden
          Web: http://www.idea.int

          http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=644
          Policing The Police In Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda

          EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS


          Despite more than six years of increasingly intrusive reforms carried out at


          the behest of the UN Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the local police cannot yet be counted upon to enforce the law. Too often - like their opposite numbers in the judiciary - nationally partial, under-qualified, underpaid, and sometimes corrupt police officers uphold the law selectively, within a dysfunctional system still controlled by politicised and nationalised interior ministries.

          The 'long arm of the law' is inconsistent and infirm, suffering from

          jurisdictional divisions that do not hinder organised crime and from national- political manipulations that ensure there is one law for well-connected members of majority populations and another for powerless minorities. Top- tier criminals ply their trades with relative impunity, ethnic violence is tolerated and corruption is widespread.

          The role of the police is not seen as being to 'serve and protect' everyone,

          but to serve and protect 'one's own kind', whether they be co-nationals, colleagues or political masters. The communist-era doctrine that the police exist to defend the regime persists, except that the working class has been replaced by the nation as the ostensible beneficiary. Even 'moderate' politicians expect - and are often allowed - to influence investigations, recruitment and budgetary allocations.

          Citizens know they are not only unequal before the law, but unequal before

          its enforcers. Getting the police to investigate cases that involve the moneyed or powerful invariably requires international pressure and supervision. Even with international insistence and assistance, investigations are often botched. Nowhere is this more evident than in cases involving the continuation or consolidation of wartime 'achievements': 'ethnic cleansing', the appropriation of public assets and the maintenance of national-territorial divisions. Violence against returning refugees and displaced persons waxes and wanes with the political cycle, but cases are frequently left unresolved after an initial show of serious concern. In similar vein, most war crimes suspects enjoy the effective protection of 'their own'.

          These unsophisticated but effective methods are symbolised and

          safeguarded by the continued employment of police officers who were complicit in war crimes. The law enforcement and criminal justice systems will remain compromised until these officers have been purged. Removal of these and other recidivist or obstructionist elements has been slow. It only takes place when ordered by the international community and, even then, is often circumvented by the domestic authorities. Those who are removed frequently switch jobs within the interior ministries, are rewarded with plum posts in publicly-owned companies, or gain elected office. Culpable individuals are rarely prosecuted.

          Yet matters could be much worse. However halting the progress, the

          international community has taken police reform seriously from the outset - and certainly more seriously than it has heretofore taken judicial reform. At Dayton, the United Nations was tasked to reform police forces that had been part and parcel of their respective masters' war machines. After initial disorientation and incapacity as it built up its resources and sought to flesh out its mandate, UNMIBH's International Police Task Force (IPTF) began in earnest: screening officers, de-authorising reprobates and war criminals among them, ensuring that 'minority' recruits are hired, seeking to depoliticise police commands, creating new, all-Bosnian law-enforcement bodies such as the State Border Service (SBS), and facilitating inter-entity and regional co-operation.

          UNMIBH has latterly been active across a broad field and has initiated

          numerous remedial programs. After three years of intensified reform efforts, Bosnia's police forces have begun to justify the decision taken at Dayton that they should be reformed rather than replaced. But the UNMIBH mandate expires at the end of 2002. The European Union (EU) decided in February 2002 to provide a follow-on mission. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) is charged with picking up where the UN will leave off. There is plenty of work still to be done, as many of the UN's programs have not been fully implemented or have been subverted by obstructionist political elites and recalcitrant police officers.

          If Bosnia & Herzegovina is eventually to have affordable and competent

          police forces that serve and protect all citizens, regardless of nationality or place of residence, from politically and ethnically motivated violence, persecution and 'justice' - as well as from rampant organised crime - then there must be no diminution of either oversight or reform. To make this happen, EUPM and the Office of the High Representative (OHR, to which EUPM will be subordinate) should consider the following, general recommendations. The full set of detailed recommendations is given in the Conclusion of this report.

          RECOMMENDATIONS



          TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

          1. Whichever forum or OHR task force is designated to preside over the full

          range of rule of law reforms under the incoming High Representative, that body should ensure effective coordination among the organisations involved in order to:

          (a) Standardise the terms and conditions under which police officers serve
          across Bosnia & Herzegovina;

          (b) Guarantee that sufficient resources are made available to support a depoliticised, honest, competent and cost-effective police service;

          (c) Provide a means for human rights monitors to participate directly in the oversight of the police, alongside the follow-on mission.

          TO UNMIBH, EUPM AND OHR

          2. Measures to enhance the accountability of Bosnia's police forces should


          be put in train or reinforced. These should include:

          (a) The establishment of an independent police complaints authority;

          (b) The maintenance of the UN mission's anti-trafficking and judicial
          assessment teams and its register of police personnel;

          (c) The completion of in-depth audits of police commands and administrations and the establishment of an EUPM liaison office in The Hague.

          3. The recruitment of 'minority' personnel to the entities' police forces should
          be revamped in line with the implementation of the "Constituent Peoples" decision and according to targets based on the 1991 census.

          4. EUPM will need to build on UNMIBH efforts to professionalise and de-

          politicise the BiH police, reviewing the operations of Professional Standards Units (PSUs), disciplinary procedures, police academies, and police commissioners. Given its strategy of upper-level co-location, it will also have to ensure that its own ranks are filled by officers and experts of the requisite calibre.

          5. The screening and de-authorisation of serving Bosnian police officers and

          interior ministry employees should be extended and reinvigorated to eliminate war crimes suspects, those with bogus qualifications and already de-authorised officers who have been recycled into administrative or advisory positions.

          6. EUPM should mandate operational-level information-sharing among

          Bosnia's police forces and work to facilitate such practical exchanges among the states of the region. It might also encourage greater citizen involvement in and identification with the fight against crime.

          7. The rationalisation of Bosnia's police forces should be expedited while

          both international financial assistance and supervisory mechanisms remain available. Not only should the overall complement of police officers be cut by some 20 per cent, but the opportunity should also be taken to reinforce state-level forces and to reconfigure those of the entities in line with contemporary needs.

          Sarajevo/Brussels, 10 May 2002
        • Florian Bieber
          1. UN in Kosovo 2. Albania Weak Democracy, Weak State 3. Fighting To Control Yugoslavia’s Military ... Institute for Security Studies (EU) L’ONU au Kosovo
          Message 4 of 15 , Jul 17 10:35 AM
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            1. UN in Kosovo
            2. Albania Weak Democracy, Weak State
            3. Fighting To Control Yugoslavia’s Military


            Institute for Security Studies (EU)
            L’ONU au Kosovo : leçons de la première MINUK Eric Chevallier Mai 2002
            http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ35.pdf


             Albanian Institute for International Studies
            Albania Weak Democracy, Weak State : Report on the State of Democracy in Albania
            http://www.aiis-albania.org/publications.htm#albania



            Fighting To Control Yugoslavia’s Military

            http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=702

            Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica’s 24 June 2002 sacking of Yugoslav

            Army (VJ) Chief of the General Staff Nebojsa Pavkovic was necessary, welcome, and long overdue. The EU, U.S., and NATO acclaimed the move as an effort to assert civilian control over the military, and Kostunica indeed deserves credit for removing a significant obstacle to the country’s reintegration with Europe. Nonetheless, the action was probably more the result of the ongoing power struggle between Kostunica and Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic than a genuine effort to bring the military under civilian control or dismantle the extra-constitutional parallel command structures that the post-Milosevic leadership of the country has created within the VJ.

            The dramatic action will deserve to be interpreted as a genuine step in the right direction only if Kostunica follows up with concerted efforts to remove other compromised individuals and introduce democratic civilian control over the military. Until then, Pavkovic’s charges – since supported by two other generals – that the president ordered VJ troops to attack the Serbian Republic government as part of his power struggle with Djindjic will continue to raise questions about the nature of politics and governance inside a state that has not yet shaken off the dark legacy of the 1990s.

            The “Pavkovic Affair” highlights the lack of democratic parliamentary control over Yugoslavia’s military and brings into public view the questionable chain of command Kostunica’s cabinet has used with respect to the VJ. It also highlights similar structures Djindjic has created within the Interior Ministry. The manner in which Kostunica removed Pavkovic was legally controversial, and is undergoing judicial and parliamentary scrutiny. The assertion that Kostunica ordered the army to attack his political rival, Djindjic, has set the stage for a constitutional and legal challenge that could weaken the president domestically during the crucial run-up to Serbian presidential elections and may even lead to his impeachment for violations of the constitution.

            Belgrade/Brussels, 15 July 2002
          • Florian Bieber
            1. Finding the balance: The scales of justice in Kosovo (ICG) 2. A secure and expedited freight corridor from Belgrade to Thessaloniki ... www.crisisweb.org
            Message 5 of 15 , Sep 17, 2002
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              1. Finding the balance: The scales of justice in Kosovo (ICG)
              2. A secure and expedited freight corridor from Belgrade to Thessaloniki




              www.crisisweb.org

              Finding the balance: The scales of justice in Kosovo
              EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
              An independent, effective, and transparent justice system will be the
              cornerstone of a stable and democratic society in Kosovo. Ensuring that
              such a system is developed in a sustainable manner must be one of the top
              priorities of the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo
              (UNMIK) and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). In
              this report, ICG argues that although progress has been made, serious
              obstacles and challenges remain.
              When UNMIK entered Kosovo, it found that the previous law enforcement and
              judicial structure had collapsed. Since that time, the system has been
              completely rebuilt and reformed. Although much has been done -
              investigations are undertaken, indictments filed, and courts function -
              the judiciary still lacks the capacity to investigate crimes effectively.
              Critical instruments for the prosecution, including the witness protection
              program, will remain largely a shell until the right equipment and
              resources are provided.
              While international judges and prosecutors are crucial for ensuring that
              justice is impartially delivered, the international community must
              continue to strengthen the justice system by building local capacity of
              judicial personnel. This includes the further training and mentoring of
              the local judiciary, as well as a timetable to gradually introduce local
              judges and prosecutors into sensitive cases such as war crimes, ethnically
              motivated crime, and organized crime.
              Under the Constitutional Framework, authority for the justice sector -
              with the exception of the administration of courts - is reserved to the
              Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). However, this does
              not absolve UNMIK of the responsibility to involve Kosovo officials in
              planning the system. The Department of Justice is currently developing a
              transition strategy for the implementation of UNMIK's benchmarks. ICG
              calls on the Department to include Kosovo officials in the development of
              this strategy. Moreover, Kosovo officials should be gradually introduced
              into policy and planning functions more generally, co-head positions
              should be established in the Department of Justice, and international
              staff dedicated solely to building the capacity of local officials should
              be seconded into the Department.
              Finding the Balance also examines the prosecution of sensitive offences
              such as war crimes and ethnically motivated violence. Despite the
              significant resources devoted to the documentation of war crimes, they
              have largely gone unpunished as has subsequent violence against Kosovo's
              minorities. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
              (ICTY) has issued only one indictment for Kosovo, while investigations
              conducted by UNMIK suffer from the general weaknesses in the system. To
              increase the capacity of the judiciary to try these crimes, a Memorandum
              of Understanding, similar to the Rules of the Road in Bosnia,should be
              established to share evidence and technical advice between UNMIK and ICTY.
              In August 2002 UNMIK arrested a number of individuals - including former
              members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) - for crimes committed during
              the 1998 and 1999 period. The arrests provoked an outcry from some of
              Kosovo's political leaders. The consequent prosecutions will test the
              capacity of the judiciary to investigate crimes and secure evidence, as
              well as its ability to conduct free and fair trials while protecting the
              rights of victims, witnesses, and the accused. It will also test the
              commitment of Kosovo's politicians and public to an independent justice
              system that treats everyone equally before the law. The international
              community justified the NATO military intervention by citing the extensive
              violations of international law committed by Yugoslav forces in Kosovo. It
              would be highly paradoxical for politicians to now condemn the enforcement
              of this law for crimes committed by Kosovo Albanians during and after the
              conflict.
              Given the potential divisiveness of these prosecutions, UNMIK should
              undertake a public information campaign to explain that the Geneva
              Conventions must be applied equally to all parties and that no-one is
              above the law. Moreover, UNMIK should seek to overcome the lack of public
              trust in the system by expanding this campaign to cultivate public
              confidence more generally. While public respect will only be truly secured
              with successful reforms that produce an effective and fair system,
              politicians and leaders of civil society need to value and promote
              judicial independence and freedom. Without that independence, the
              foundations of democracy in Kosovo will lack one of its most important
              pillars.
              RECOMMENDATIONS
              To the International Community:
              1. Strengthen the current system's capacity to investigate and prosecute
              crimes by ensuring UNMIK has the technical, financial, and political
              support for judicial reform.
              2. Support the development of a witness relocation program to other
              countries, and strengthen the witness protection program by improving
              police surveillance and providing much needed equipment.
              3. Provide additional resources to support the efforts of UNMIK to resolve
              cases of war crimes and ethnically motivated violence.
              4. Second experts to build Kosovo officials' capacity to administer the
              Department of Justice.
              5. Encourage Belgrade to work with ICTY and UNMIK to develop a mechanism
              to ensure war crimes suspects charged by UNMIK are transferred to UNMIK
              courts.
              To Belgrade:
              6. Implement the agreement signed on 9 July 2002 to protect the
              professional status and pensions of judges and prosecutors who work with
              UNMIK and dissolve the parallel courts operating in Kosovo, including the
              parallel District Court in Mitrovica.
              7. Amend the law on cooperation with the ICTY to eliminate its
              restrictions on indictments and make a public commitment to transfer to
              The Hague any new war crimes suspects the ICTY indicts.
              8. Commit to the transfer of war crimes suspects indicted by UNMIK to
              Kosovo.
              To ICTY:
              9. Conclude with UNMIK a Memorandum of Understanding, based on the Bosnia
              Rules of the Road, to facilitate and institutionalise cooperation,
              including evidence sharing, technical advice on war crimes cases, and
              mechanisms to ensure that sufficient evidence exists before a case is
              brought to trial.
              10. Build on the existing outreach program to share more war
              crimes-related information with Kosovo judges, prosecutors, and defence
              counsel.
              To UNMIK Department of Justice:
              11. Develop a transition and exit strategy, including a financial plan,
              for the gradual handover of power from internationals to local officials,
              including involvement of Kosovo officials in developing and implementing
              the strategy and an increase in Kosovo officials - of all ethnicities
              working in policy and planning at the Department of Justice, including,
              where possible, as unit co-heads.
              12. Develop a long-term strategy and curriculum for the Kosovo Judicial
              Institute based on a needs assessment, and ensure that attendance is
              compulsory and evaluation procedures are established.
              13. Provide legally binding guidelines for international judges and
              prosecutors, while using these officials only for extremely sensitive
              cases - war crimes, ethnically motivated violence, and organized crime -
              so as not to impede development of local judicial capacity and
              responsibility. Gradually phase in a heightened role for local judges in
              such sensitive cases.
              14. Create a clear hierarchy for international prosecutors which would
              ensure sufficient oversight of cases to verify that sufficient evidence
              exists before charges are filed.
              15. Quickly promulgate into law the new Criminal Code and Criminal
              Procedures Code for Kosovo.
              16. Ensure that forensic evidence is organised and stored properly so that
              critical evidence is not lost.
              17. Intensify efforts to resolve cases of war crimes and ethnically
              motivated violence, delay in which impacts on the peace process.
              To UNMIK:
              18. Issue regulations simultaneously in English, Albanian and Serbian.
              19. Undertake a public information campaign to increase public
              understanding of, and confidence in, the judicial system, and address in
              this campaign Albanian concerns about trials of former members of the
              Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
              20. With the PISG (including Serb members), establish a working group to
              consider possible reconciliation mechanisms.
              To the PISG:
              21. Increase the justice system's transparency by using the Department of
              Judicial Administration to develop accurate and relevant statistics for
              court cases, particularly those involving minority victims or defendants.
              22. Work with the Department of Justice to develop a judicial branch of
              government that ultimately will be independent from the legislative and
              executive branches.
              To the Kosovo Albanians:
              23. Political leaders must respect the independence of the judicial
              process.
              24. Build public respect for the justice system through provision by civil
              society groups of information to the public on the importance of an
              independent and impartial judiciary.
              To the Kosovo Serbs:
              25. Take advantage of the 9 July 2002 agreement between UNMIK and Belgrade
              to participate in the judicial system.
              Pristina/Brussels, 12 September 2002


              To: GlennLevine@...

              Port Technology International has published an
              abbreviated version of my presentation on Pan-European
              Transport Corridor 10 container security and trade
              facilitation at:
              http://www.porttechnology.org
              "A secure and expedited freight corridor from Belgrade
              to Thessaloniki," Port Technology International,
              London, UK, September 12, 2002.
            • Florian Bieber
              1. The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience (PER) 2. Governance in the Transition Economies: Current Issues in Bulgaria (CIPE) 3. Civil Society Takes The Lead in
              Message 6 of 15 , Nov 25, 2002
              • 0 Attachment
                1. The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience (PER)
                2. Governance in the Transition Economies: Current Issues in Bulgaria (CIPE)
                3. Civil Society Takes The Lead in Srebrenica Reconstruction (Advocacy Net)
                4. Simulating Kosovo (USIP)
                5. Moving Macedonia Toward Self-Sufficiency (ICG)



                A new PER report "The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience" has been published
                and is available on PER's Web site at
                http://www.per-usa.org/balkans.htm.




                GOVERNANCE IN THE TRANSITION ECONOMIES: CURRENT ISSUES IN
                BULGARIA
                By Prof. Bistra Boeva
                University for National and World Economic Studies
                Sofia, Bulgaria
                In this latest CIPE Feature Service article, Prof. Boeva write
                about the importance of developing sound principles of governance
                in emerging markets and the progress made by local reformers and
                international organizations in the last decade. Various questions
                concerning the role of governance and its contribution to the
                reforms in the developing countries have been raised by policy
                makers, scholars, business leaders and stakeholders on both
                national and international levels and transition economies
                continue to face problems in establishing good governance
                mechanisms.
                Problems persist in the transition of ownership and the changing
                role of the State in creating a new type of relationship between
                the state, society and business. The ongoing reforms in these
                economies have created a new framework for business activities,
                one in which respective economic, administrative, information and
                legal instruments have not automatically lead to a market
                democracy, or to the establishment of governance institutions. In
                reality, governance issues have to be addressed independently -
                as an important and a separate part of the transition process.
                The State and society should both be actively involved in the
                process of building new institutions and the mechanisms of
                governance
                The complete article is available now on CIPE web site at
                http://www.cipe.org/publications/fs/articles/boeva.htm.
                CIPE is a non-profit affiliate of the U.S Chamber of Commerce and
                one of the four core institutes of the National Endowment for
                Democracy. CIPE has supported more than 700 local initiatives in
                over 80 developing countries, involving the private sector in
                policy advocacy, institutional reform, improving governance, and
                building understanding of market-based democratic systems. CIPE
                programs are also supported through the United States Agency for
                International Development.





                NEW FROM THE ADVOCACY PROJECT

                Washington DC - November 19, 2002

                *

                CIVIL SOCIETY TAKES THE LEAD IN SREBRENICA'S RECONSTRUCTION

                - New campaign website tells the story of the 1995 massacre and the
                struggle to rebuild -

                A new illustrated campaign web site from the Advocacy Project (AP)
                profiles the heroic efforts of Bosnian nongovernmental organizations
                to assist refugees to return to Srebrenica, site of the infamous 1995
                massacres, in which over 7,000 Muslim men and boys were murdered.
                Visit our new campaign site at:
                http://www.advocacynet.org/cpage_view/srebrenica_01aintro_18_85.html

                The material for the site was collected by Peter Lippman, an AP
                associate, who has made several visits to Srebrenica.

                Following the massacres, the Bosnian Serb authorities populated
                Srebrenica with destitute Bosnian Serb refugees from the war and
                deliberately ran down the town's remaining assets. Donors gave
                Srebrenica a wide berth. The town's isolation combined with
                intimidation to discourage any attempt to return by Srebrenica's
                former Muslim inhabitants. 30,000 were expelled during the war.

                According to the UN, approximately 650 Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims)
                have now returned to the Srebrenica municipality. This represents a
                breakthrough, and it is due largely to the persistence of individual
                families and Bosnian organizations, which are profiled on our site.
                They include Drina and Srebrenica 99, two local groups that helped
                refugees return to the village of Suceska near Srebrenica in June
                2000.

                The courage of the Suceska refugees helped to stiffen the resolve of
                the international community. NATO deployed troops in Srebrenica, and
                several obstructive local Serb politicians were dismissed during
                November 2000 municipal elections. On May 13, 2002 the UN Development
                Program (UNDP) launched a 3-year, $13 million reconstruction program
                for Srebrenica. Thus far, about $5 million has been pledged.

                Eight leading Bosnian NGOs have formed a network, the Forum of
                Srebrenica NGOs, to monitor reconstruction. The Forum has asked the
                Advocacy Project for assistance in promoting their message. All eight
                members are profiled on the new site.

                The Forum represents both Serbs and Muslims, and is committed to
                respecting the rights of Srebrenica's temporary Serb population. The
                Forum itself is constrained from demanding punishment for those who
                committed the 1995 crimes. Still, most Muslims insist that there will
                be no real reconstruction until justice is served.

                The new AP site relates how the Serb authorities and NATO forces have
                both declined to go after suspects. Only two individuals have been
                sentenced by the Hague tribunal for their part in the 1995 massacre.
                It has even proved difficult to lay the victims to rest. Only 2,028
                intact bodies have been exhumed from mass graves, and fewer than 500
                victims have been identified. The uncertainty has left many of the
                relatives deeply traumatized.

                In spite of the UNDP's reconstruction plans, there are also growing
                signs of 'donor fatigue' towards Bosnia. Clearly, the drive to
                rebuild this deeply damaged region will continue to come from the
                Forum's member NGOs and their supporters abroad.

                ----------------------
                The Advocacy Project was created in 1998 to support the information
                needs of advocates who are working for peace and human rights. Visit
                the AP website for information about current projects, including AP's
                work with women's civil society in Afghanistan and with the Roma of
                East Europe.

                For more information please e-mail info@... or visit
                http://www.advocacynet.org




                New Special Report: SIMULATING KOSOVO: LESSONS FROM
                FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS. See
                http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr95.html for report
                summary and online version. To receive a hard copy, send an email to
                usip_requests @... or call 202-429-3832.




                CRISISWEB NEWS
                -------------------------------
                Friday, 15 November 2002

                MACEDONIA
                ------------------
                Moving Macedonia Toward Self-Sufficiency: A New Security Approach for NATO
                and the EU

                NATO should extend its presence in Macedonia for six months, or at least
                until the European Union is ready to take over, whichever is the shorter.
                Although the last year has seen a successful stabilisation and political
                transition in Macedonia, there remains a security vacuum. While the United
                States is cool about extending NATO's mission, a presence such as NATO's
                Task Force Fox is still indispensable. Until the EU is ready to take on the
                burden of military peace-keeping in the region, NATO's presence remains
                crucial to stability.

                -------------------------------------
                For the full report, please see CrisisWeb -
                <http://www.crisisweb.org>http://www.crisisweb.org

              • Florian Bieber
                1. The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience (PER) 2. Governance in the Transition Economies: Current Issues in Bulgaria (CIPE) 3. Civil Society Takes The Lead in
                Message 7 of 15 , Dec 3, 2002
                • 0 Attachment
                  1. The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience (PER)
                  2. Governance in the Transition Economies: Current Issues in Bulgaria (CIPE)
                  3. Civil Society Takes The Lead in Srebrenica Reconstruction (Advocacy Net)
                  4. Simulating Kosovo (USIP)
                  5. Moving Macedonia Toward Self-Sufficiency (ICG)
                  6. Putting Peace into Practice. Can Macedonia's New Government Meet the Challenge? (USIP)
                  7. Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection (ICG)


                  A new PER report "The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience" has been published
                  and is available on PER's Web site at
                  http://www.per-usa.org/balkans.htm.




                  GOVERNANCE IN THE TRANSITION ECONOMIES: CURRENT ISSUES IN
                  BULGARIA
                  By Prof. Bistra Boeva
                  University for National and World Economic Studies
                  Sofia, Bulgaria
                  In this latest CIPE Feature Service article, Prof. Boeva write
                  about the importance of developing sound principles of governance
                  in emerging markets and the progress made by local reformers and
                  international organizations in the last decade. Various questions
                  concerning the role of governance and its contribution to the
                  reforms in the developing countries have been raised by policy
                  makers, scholars, business leaders and stakeholders on both
                  national and international levels and transition economies
                  continue to face problems in establishing good governance
                  mechanisms.
                  Problems persist in the transition of ownership and the changing
                  role of the State in creating a new type of relationship between
                  the state, society and business. The ongoing reforms in these
                  economies have created a new framework for business activities,
                  one in which respective economic, administrative, information and
                  legal instruments have not automatically lead to a market
                  democracy, or to the establishment of governance institutions. In
                  reality, governance issues have to be addressed independently -
                  as an important and a separate part of the transition process.
                  The State and society should both be actively involved in the
                  process of building new institutions and the mechanisms of
                  governance
                  The complete article is available now on CIPE web site at
                  http://www.cipe.org/publications/fs/articles/boeva.htm.
                  CIPE is a non-profit affiliate of the U.S Chamber of Commerce and
                  one of the four core institutes of the National Endowment for
                  Democracy. CIPE has supported more than 700 local initiatives in
                  over 80 developing countries, involving the private sector in
                  policy advocacy, institutional reform, improving governance, and
                  building understanding of market-based democratic systems. CIPE
                  programs are also supported through the United States Agency for
                  International Development.





                  NEW FROM THE ADVOCACY PROJECT

                  Washington DC - November 19, 2002

                  *

                  CIVIL SOCIETY TAKES THE LEAD IN SREBRENICA'S RECONSTRUCTION

                  - New campaign website tells the story of the 1995 massacre and the
                  struggle to rebuild -

                  A new illustrated campaign web site from the Advocacy Project (AP)
                  profiles the heroic efforts of Bosnian nongovernmental organizations
                  to assist refugees to return to Srebrenica, site of the infamous 1995
                  massacres, in which over 7,000 Muslim men and boys were murdered.
                  Visit our new campaign site at:
                  http://www.advocacynet.org/cpage_view/srebrenica_01aintro_18_85.html

                  The material for the site was collected by Peter Lippman, an AP
                  associate, who has made several visits to Srebrenica.

                  Following the massacres, the Bosnian Serb authorities populated
                  Srebrenica with destitute Bosnian Serb refugees from the war and
                  deliberately ran down the town's remaining assets. Donors gave
                  Srebrenica a wide berth. The town's isolation combined with
                  intimidation to discourage any attempt to return by Srebrenica's
                  former Muslim inhabitants. 30,000 were expelled during the war.

                  According to the UN, approximately 650 Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims)
                  have now returned to the Srebrenica municipality. This represents a
                  breakthrough, and it is due largely to the persistence of individual
                  families and Bosnian organizations, which are profiled on our site.
                  They include Drina and Srebrenica 99, two local groups that helped
                  refugees return to the village of Suceska near Srebrenica in June
                  2000.

                  The courage of the Suceska refugees helped to stiffen the resolve of
                  the international community. NATO deployed troops in Srebrenica, and
                  several obstructive local Serb politicians were dismissed during
                  November 2000 municipal elections. On May 13, 2002 the UN Development
                  Program (UNDP) launched a 3-year, $13 million reconstruction program
                  for Srebrenica. Thus far, about $5 million has been pledged.

                  Eight leading Bosnian NGOs have formed a network, the Forum of
                  Srebrenica NGOs, to monitor reconstruction. The Forum has asked the
                  Advocacy Project for assistance in promoting their message. All eight
                  members are profiled on the new site.

                  The Forum represents both Serbs and Muslims, and is committed to
                  respecting the rights of Srebrenica's temporary Serb population. The
                  Forum itself is constrained from demanding punishment for those who
                  committed the 1995 crimes. Still, most Muslims insist that there will
                  be no real reconstruction until justice is served.

                  The new AP site relates how the Serb authorities and NATO forces have
                  both declined to go after suspects. Only two individuals have been
                  sentenced by the Hague tribunal for their part in the 1995 massacre.
                  It has even proved difficult to lay the victims to rest. Only 2,028
                  intact bodies have been exhumed from mass graves, and fewer than 500
                  victims have been identified. The uncertainty has left many of the
                  relatives deeply traumatized.

                  In spite of the UNDP's reconstruction plans, there are also growing
                  signs of 'donor fatigue' towards Bosnia. Clearly, the drive to
                  rebuild this deeply damaged region will continue to come from the
                  Forum's member NGOs and their supporters abroad.

                  ----------------------
                  The Advocacy Project was created in 1998 to support the information
                  needs of advocates who are working for peace and human rights. Visit
                  the AP website for information about current projects, including AP's
                  work with women's civil society in Afghanistan and with the Roma of
                  East Europe.

                  For more information please e-mail info@... or visit
                  http://www.advocacynet.org




                  New Special Report: SIMULATING KOSOVO: LESSONS FROM
                  FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS. See
                  http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr95.html for report
                  summary and online version. To receive a hard copy, send an email to
                  usip_requests @... or call 202-429-3832.




                  CRISISWEB NEWS
                  -------------------------------
                  Friday, 15 November 2002

                  MACEDONIA
                  ------------------
                  Moving Macedonia Toward Self-Sufficiency: A New Security Approach for NATO
                  and the EU

                  NATO should extend its presence in Macedonia for six months, or at least
                  until the European Union is ready to take over, whichever is the shorter.
                  Although the last year has seen a successful stabilisation and political
                  transition in Macedonia, there remains a security vacuum. While the United
                  States is cool about extending NATO's mission, a presence such as NATO's
                  Task Force Fox is still indispensable. Until the EU is ready to take on the
                  burden of military peace-keeping in the region, NATO's presence remains
                  crucial to stability.






                  http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr96.html

                  SPECIAL REPORT

                  Brenda Pearson


                  Putting Peace into Practice
                  Can Macedonia's New Government Meet the Challenge?


                  Briefly...

                  Macedonia's September 15 parliamentary elections were the first since the country narrowly avoided an all-out civil war with the brokering of the Ohrid Framework Agreement by the United States and the European Union (EU) in August 2001. Macedonia's future as a unitary state largely depends upon the successful implementation of the Framework Agreement. The underlying problems that sparked the seven-month conflict between ethnic Albanian insurgents and Macedonian security forces remain unresolved and could again erupt.
                  The recent polls were perhaps the most free and fair since Macedonia gained independence from the disintegrating Yugoslav federation in 1991. The new government led by the Social Democrats has little time to waste in translating electoral promises into reality. Ethnic Macedonians and Albanians alike expect significant economic improvements quickly.
                  Intra-Albanian rivalries in parts of Macedonia are marked by murders, bombings, kidnappings, and sheer banditry; gunfire exchanges between unidentified Albanians and Western peacekeepers often go unreported. Macedonian paramilitaries pose a threat to peace on the other side of the ethnic divide.
                  Lingering bitterness about the conflict remains high in Macedonia, despite the relatively low number of casualties. Great damage has been inflicted on the social fabric of the country. The uneasy coexistence between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians has been ruptured, and incidents suggesting a breakdown in civil society are frequent.
                  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) mission in Macedonia was extended for a fourth time until December 15, 2002. The presence of 750 NATO soldiers, though largely symbolic, has enforced a cessation of interethnic hostilities and anchors Western commitment to the peace agreement.
                  The West has avoided negotiations regarding the final status of Kosovo, but the constant deferment affects stability in Macedonia. The Kosovo issue remains open, and ethnic Albanian insurgents in Kosovo and in Macedonia are likely to exploit the instability in Macedonia for their nationalist agenda.
                  European management of the crisis has been mixed but greatly exceeds the low expectations set a year ago. Claims of success in achieving 95 percent of the terms laid out in the Framework Agreement, the cornerstone of the West's peace initiative in Macedonia, are misleading. The enormous gap between legislative adoption and actual implementation of government reform has not narrowed.
                  The new government's first contentious issue will be managing the political implications of the census being conducted this month. The international community's inclination to treat the census results as a statistical exercise, without understanding the underlying politics of ethnic competition, could spark another round of attacks from disgruntled Albanian guerrillas who remain outcast.


                  http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=835

                  Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection


                  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

                  The democratic government elected in Belgrade in 2000 did not end the
                  extensive busting of arms sanctions engaged in for many years by its predecessor, the Milosevic dictatorship. The NATO (SFOR) troops who raided an aircraft factory in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska on 12 October 2002 found documents that have begun to strip the veils of secrecy from this significant scandal. From ICG’s own investigations, as well as from those initial revelations and stories that have appeared subsequently in the Serbian press, it appears that arms deals of considerable monetary value continued with Iraq and Liberia despite the change of administrations.

                  In the case of Iraq, the international community still needs to ascertain or clarify many important details, but it is already apparent that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has engaged in transactions respecting missile, aviation and chemical technology and equipment that contravene United Nations sanctions. These transactions may have assisted Saddam Hussein’s efforts to develop a primitive cruise missile and to maintain or develop chemical weapons capabilities, as well as to repair or preserve his conventional military capabilities with respect to air defence, artillery, and security of bunkers. Weapons grade nuclear material does not appear to have been involved though the possibility of nuclear technology transfer to third countries requires further exploration. Extensive, though less technically sophisticated, Yugoslav arms have also been sold to Liberia which is likewise under a UN arms embargo.

                  This activity raises serious questions about how much has changed in Belgrade since Milosevic’s day, or even since there was a single, unified Yugoslavia – specifically with regard to respect for international obligations (commitments under arms control conventions as well as UN sanctions), the power of Communist-era networks linking military, industrial and criminal elites, and the willingness or ability of civilian political leaders to control the security sector.

                  Significant elements of the arms activity, as the NATO raid indicates, were spread across borders to include not only the Serb entity in Bosnia but also the Federation. Likewise, there was Montenegrin involvement. Top authorities, including President Kostunica, Federal Premier Pesic, Serbian Premier Djindjic, Defence Minister Radojevic, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Federal and Serbian Interior Ministers either knew about the sales and did nothing to halt them – or should have known and acted.

                  The disclosures open a window on the real power structures inside Yugoslav politics. That the special relationship with Iraq (and with Liberia) continued indicates that civilian control over the military is still absent, that connections between criminal, military and political elements are extensive, and that the two strongmen of the post-Milosevic era, Kostunica and Djindjic, have thus far been impotent or unprepared to assert civilian control over the military or remove Milosevic cronies from top positions.

                  Belgrade’s political leadership and the international community must get to the bottom of the arms scandal itself and attack the fundamental problems it illustrates. The ultimate responsibility for these twin tasks falls on the FRY authorities. The political paralysis produced by the long-running Kostunica- Djindjic power struggle as well as the apparent convergence of interests between many politicians and arms merchants, however, make it likely that serious remedial measures will only be taken if the international community insists – firmly and consistently.

                  The stakes are high. Failure to achieve reform would leave the FRY still a potential threat to regional stability. Moving this important Balkan country toward Euro-Atlantic integration will require the international community to use all the diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal to weaken the extensive remnants of the old guard and strengthen reformers in Belgrade. The time for special treatment for Yugoslavia because it has rid itself of Milosevic has passed.

                  RECOMMENDATIONS

                  To the governments of Yugoslavia and Serbia:

                  1. Make full disclosure of all weapons sales and technology transfers to countries under UN arms embargos, especially Iraq, and assist the international community to get to the bottom of the arms transaction scandal by answering such specific questions as:

                  (a) whether chemical munitions were sold to Iraq;

                  (b) what happened to the stocks of chemical munitions removed from Hadzici (Bosnia) in 1992;

                  (c) whether precursors or manufacturing equipment or technology for chemical weapons were sold to Iraq; and

                  (d) whether any nuclear materials or technology were sold to third countries prior to the U.S. removal of remaining nuclear materials in July 2002.

                  2. Reform the security sector completely and rapidly by:

                  (a) placing the military under control of the Ministry of Defence;

                  (b) making the Ministry of Defence, the military and military industrial relations fully accountable to parliament and under its transparent control;

                  (c) requiring transparent parliamentary approval for all foreign weapons sales; and

                  (d) placing the state-owned arms firm Jugoimport-SDPR under transparent parliamentary control and replacing its entire board of directors.

                  To the international community:

                  3. Apply consistent and continuing pressure on Serbian, Montenegrin, and Yugoslav authorities to undertake the requisite reforms, using conditionality in the following areas as a positive tool to help willing politicians:

                  (a) membership of the Council of Europe;

                  (b) membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace;

                  (c) negotiations on a Stability and Association Agreement with the EU;

                  (d) Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with the United States; and

                  (e) other financial and economic assistance.

                  4. Consider, if Belgrade shuns reforms and does not comply with its international obligations, suspending bilateral and multilateral aid, including through the international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, EBRD).

                  Belgrade/Brussels, 3 December 2002

                • Florian Bieber
                  1. Current Perspectives on Macedonia: The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Security (Boell Foundation) 2. The Future of the Balkans (CAP & ELIAMEP) 3. Die
                  Message 8 of 15 , Dec 11, 2002
                  • 0 Attachment
                    1. Current Perspectives on Macedonia: The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Security (Boell Foundation)
                    2. The Future of the Balkans (CAP & ELIAMEP)
                    3. Die deutsche Debatte um den Kosovo-Krieg: Schwerpunkte und Ergebnisse (Boell Foundation)


                    The Heinrich Böll Foundation has recently organized an increasing
                    number of activities focusing on Macedonia. These activities have
                    primarily taken the form of international expert meetings that (1)
                    provide critical analyses of the international community's
                    involvement in Macedonia and (2) seek to identify lessons learned for
                    future international conflict resolution efforts.

                    As part of its focus on Macedonia, the Heinrich Böll Foundation has
                    invited Biljana Vankovska, Professor of Political Science at the
                    University of Skopje and prominent analyst of the Macedonian
                    conflict, to provide a four-part analysis of recent political and
                    security developments in Macedonia. This series, entitled

                    "Current Perspectives on Macedonia:
                    The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Security,"

                    will appear on the Böll Foundation's website over the coming weeks
                    and will focus on the following topics:

                    Part I: The Path from "Oasis of Peace" to "Powder Keg" of the Balkans

                    Part II: Democracy and/or Peace? Macedonia's Dilemma (exploring the
                    2002 elections in Macedonia)

                    Part III: International Mediation of the Macedonian Conflict:
                    Capabilities and Limitations

                    Part IV: Problems and Prospects of Security Sector Reform: Conflict
                    Prevention and/or Post-conflict Reconstruction in Macedonia

                    Parts I and II are already currently available as free downloads (pdf-
                    format) under http://www.boell.de/en/05_world/1733.html

                    Thank you for your interest.

                    Kurt Klotzle
                    Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung/Heinrich Böll Foundation
                    Regionalgruppe Südosteuropa/Southeastern Europe Dept.
                    Rosenthaler Str. 40/41, 10178 Berlin
                    Tel. (49) (30) 285 34 389
                    Fax (49) (30) 285 34 308


                    In a joint project the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Athens-based think tank ELIAMEP and the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich have outlined the strategic and institutional prerequisites of an Agenda for Southeastern enlargement of the European Union after 2004.

                    The 30-page paper written by Alexandros Yannis (ELIAMEP) and Wim van Meurs (CAP) is based on the conclusions from three experts meetings earlier this year. The paper offers policy recommendations on a range of relevant issues, e.g. the enhancement of the Informal Consultation Council, the rethinking of the Stability Pact as an auxiliary to the Stabilisation and Association Process and the flexibilisation of the SAP itself to include both laggards and more advanced Balkan countries

                    On November 5, the final version of the paper was presented to the EU High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana in Brussels
                    On December 18, to the EU Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact, Erhard Busek

                    An electronic copy of the paper is available at: <http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2002/2002_EU_Balkans.pdf>

                    For more information on the CAP/Bertelsmann activities on Southeastern Europe contact Wim van Meurs, Tel. +49-89-2180.1339 or meurs@...-muenchen.de

                    -----

                    Executive Summary

                    THE FUTURE OF THE BALKANS: Historically, the term “Balkans” is widely associated
                    with fragmentation, violent conflict, backwardness and misery. Only very recently, the region
                    started to generate a common vision: the perspective of future EU membership. The EU
                    perspective is emerging as the Archimedean point of the entire process of stabilisation and
                    development for the region, providing both the peoples in the Balkans and the international
                    community with a real prospect for a breakthrough that would lead the region away from the
                    divisions and the conflicts of the past and towards stability, co-operation and prosperity. The
                    1999 Helsinki European Council gave the prospect for integration of the Western Balkans in
                    EU structures a new geographic logic and strategic momentum, particularly as the existence
                    of a Balkan enclave would refute the concept of a European territorial finalité. Moreover,
                    basic preconditions for eventual EU membership, such as the Helsinki principles, the
                    Copenhagen criteria and the adoption of the acquis communautaire, are more and more
                    becoming the guiding principles and the role model for political and economic reform and
                    institution building in the countries of the region. The EU countries have by now accepted
                    that the entire region is already part of Europe, that its problems are European ones, and that
                    any viable solution has to be a European solution.
                    Today, the European perspective is basically represented institutionally in the region by the
                    Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) as well as in some respects by the Stability Pact
                    (SP). Although the EU’s bilateral agreements with the Balkan countries were originally
                    modelled along the lines of those for non-accession states, the SP and the European promise
                    triggered a redefinition along the lines of Eastern enlargement, resulting in the Stabilisation
                    and Association Process. Yet, there is heterogeneity within the region defying the pattern of
                    conditionality and regionality as practised in Eastern enlargement. Unlike the case of East
                    Central Europe, considerations of stabilisation and scale require that regional co-operation in
                    South East Europe operates prior to and parallel to the EU integration process instead of
                    being treated as its natural consequence and a follow-up to integration.
                    SP and SAP are not a perfect match and do not jointly provide a comprehensive framework
                    for the European perspective in the region. Strategically, SP and SAP are based on
                    contrasting contractual principles. The SP prioritises regional co-operation as a stabilising
                    remedy for the structural deficits as well as recent conflicts in the region. The SAP prioritises
                    the power of bilateral conditionality and consequently identifies regional co-operation as only
                    an auxiliary mechanism. The bilateral conditionality of the SAP or the pre-accession process
                    causes a new fragmentation or divide within the region and competes with the SP’s logic by
                    promoting integration via Schengen borders and an internal market. By its very logic,
                    conditionality rewards those countries that have successfully mastered the quantifiable and
                    urgent challenges of political and economic reform rather than the less tangible long-term
                    objectives of regional co-operation. In sum, while the European integration constitutes the
                    Archimedean point for the region, individual weaknesses and fundamental tensions between
                    the two main instruments of the European perspective in the Balkans persist. The complexity
                    and unpredictability of the Balkans’ road towards Europe calls for the re-thinking and re-arrangement
                    of some of the available instruments for crisis management, conflict prevention,
                    reform assistance, regional co-operation and European integration in the direction of
                    strengthening the European perspective in the region.
                    CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD: Many factors distinguish the
                    development in the region from other regional transitions to pluralist democracy and market
                    economy. It is even a bold hypothesis that the process of EU integration in the region would
                    qualify automatically as a strategy for development, modernisation and transition, all in one.
                    Unlike in East Central Europe, stabilisation predominated over reform assistance and pre-accession
                    support. In sum, there are three specifics in Southeastern Europe that merit deeper
                    attention in the process of defining objectives and strategies in support of the European
                    perspective.
                    1 Modernisation and Transition: the weakness of the state, despite its strong pretences to
                    sovereignty and ethnic statehood; the weakness of civil society with the excessive
                    intertwining of economic and political power; and the deficits of economic
                    modernisation, as the modernisation process has not yet reached its take-off phase in
                    larger parts of the region.
                    2 Managing Ethnic Conflicts and Security: the endemic crises of the weak states in the
                    region; crisis management of internal conflicts; and the legacies of ten years of inter-ethnic
                    and inter-state conflict. The evident difference between the Balkans and East
                    Central Europe is between ten years of steady transition in East Central Europe and ten
                    volatile years of ethnic conflicts and instability in the major parts of South East Europe.
                    3 Duration and Heterogeneity: The last two distinctive features of the region as far as
                    strategies of regional co-operation and EU integration are concerned involve the
                    projected duration of the integration process and the structural heterogeneity of the
                    region as such.
                    Even in the best-case scenario, a set of strategies and institutions both qualitatively and
                    quantitatively different from the ones employed in the enlargement process in East Central
                    Europe are needed in the Balkans in order to cope with the specific requirements for stability
                    in the region and in order to successfully complement the Stabilisation and Association
                    Process towards EU integration. Overall, the integration process will be significantly more
                    arduous, heterogeneous and asynchronous. A more realistic scenario for the Southeastern
                    enlargement process after 2004 calls for a consistent and transparent overall strategy with
                    more coherent sets of policies and instruments providing concrete “stepping stones” - distinct
                    incremental incentives linked to tangible interim benefits. The paradigm for Southeastern
                    Europe has irrevocably changed from stabilisation to enlargement. Thus, what is necessary
                    today and will become an even more pressing need after Eastern enlargement is a
                    comprehensive re-arrangement of existing institutions and policies in a single strategic
                    framework: Europe and the region need now an Agenda for Southeastern Enlargement.
                    ENHANCED STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITY: Complementary strategies partly
                    precede (in a logical rather than temporal sense) the actual Stabilisation and Association
                    Process (e.g. the start-up assistance), partly accompany the SAP in parallel (e.g. regional co-operation)
                    and partly proactively block interfering factors to the process (e.g. crisis
                    management). In sum, bilateral conditionality and regional co-operation are separate strategic
                    objectives promoting separate but equally important and complementary reforms and should
                    not be allowed to emerge as competing agendas. The responsibility here lies both with the
                    local political elites in demonstrating forward-looking leadership and with the EU in ensuring
                    that regional co-operation is not construed (and thereby discredited) as a substitute to EU
                    membership. For the issues this involves both a new quality of public policy in the region and
                    a strategic prioritisation of functional forms of co-operation.
                    ENHANCED INSTITUTIONAL CONGRUENCE: The logical next question is about the
                    congruence of the institutions to shoulder the tasks for assisting in the development and the
                    implementation of these complementary strategies. In this regard, a major question is whether
                    the current proliferation of international and regional initiatives and, particularly the
                    pluralism that characterises the institutional interface between the EU and the region, is
                    appropriate and helpful. Yet, since the current situation is not the result of a comprehensive
                    international approach to the realities in the Balkans but rather, as usual, the outcome of the
                    well-known complexity of the international community and the sui generis set-up of the EU,
                    the question is rather how to do better out of the available instruments and mechanisms
                    currently employed in the region and not to try to reinvent the wheel. The obvious
                    consequence of the requirement for enhanced institutional congruence under the current
                    circumstances is the need for a new deal for the current key initiatives in flexible
                    arrangements under an informal common roof.
                    AN AGENDA FOR SOUTHEASTERN ENLARGEMENT: Adopting an Agenda for
                    Southeastern enlargement would therefore signify the progressive and balanced shift of the
                    position of the international community and the local leadership: from stabilisation to
                    enlargement; from international micro-management of the region to macro-management with
                    greater local responsibilities; and from an international institutional proliferation to an
                    integral institutional framework. The development of a flexible and informal common roof
                    under which all current strategic objectives, actors and initiatives would be re-arranged to
                    create dynamic synergies would be the acknowledgement of this paradigm shift. The above
                    strategic complementarity and institutional congruence of the Southeastern enlargement
                    process has to be consolidated in the next 2-3 years with the 2004/2005 Eastern enlargement
                    as a deadline.
                    In conclusion, what may have worked reasonably well in Eastern enlargement process
                    requires additional endeavours in the case of Southeastern enlargement due to the
                    qualitatively and quantitatively different challenges this region poses. A consistent Agenda
                    for Southeastern Enlargement after 2004, including the establishment of an Informal
                    Consultation Council to provide the much-needed strategic and institutional coherence and
                    orientation under EU leadership as well as an enhanced Stabilisation and Association Process
                    will be needed soon, in order to secure a credible Balkan trajectory to Europe.


                    -

                    Die deutsche Debatte um den Kosovo-Krieg: Schwerpunkte und Ergebnisse
                    von Heiko Hänsel und Heinz-Günter Stobbe
                    Nach den Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001 in den USA und
                    dem anschließenden Antiterrorkrieg gegen Afghanistan ist die bis
                    dahin lebhafte deutsche Diskussion um den Kosovo-Krieg
                    abgeflaut. Die politischen Parameter, die der Kosovo-Krieg in
                    der deutschen politischen Landschaft gesetzt hat, wirken dennoch
                    bis heute fort. Aus diesem Grund erschien es sinnvoll, den
                    Versuch zu unternehmen, sowohl die Entwicklung der deutschen
                    Debatte um den Kosovo-Krieg zu skizzieren als auch die damit
                    verbundenen historischen und thematischen Zusammenhänge
                    herauszuarbeiten. Dabei steht natürlich die Frage nach
                    Legitimität und Verhältnismäßigkeit des NATO-Einsatzes im
                    Zentrum. Die Argumente von Befürwortern, Kritikern und Gegnern
                    des Interventionskrieges sollen präsentiert werden. Diskussionen
                    um einzelne strittige Punkte werden noch einmal nachvollzogen.
                    Die Autoren hoffen, damit einen hilfreichen Beitrag zur
                    Bilanzierung des ersten deutschen Waffenganges nach 1945 zu
                    leisten.
                    Zu den Autoren:
                    Heiko Hänsel ist Südosteuropa-Historiker und lebt als freier
                    Autor in Berlin. Heinz-Günter Stobbe ist Professor für
                    Systematische Theologie und theologische Friedensforschung an
                    der Universität Siegen.
                    Die Studie steht zur Verfügung (im pdf-Format) unter folgender
                    Internet-Adresse:
                    http://www.boell.de/downloads/europa/kosovo.pdf
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