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[TIMELINE] Official Start of the Internment Camps / February 14, 1942

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  • madchinaman
    This is a portion of Lt. Gen. J.L. DeWitt s letter of transmittal to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, June 5, 1943, of his Final Report; Japanese Evacuation from
    Message 1 of 1 , Aug 11, 2006
      This is a portion of Lt. Gen. J.L. DeWitt's letter of transmittal
      to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, June 5, 1943, of his
      Final Report; Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942.


      Intelligence services records reflected the existence of hundreds of
      Japanese organizations in California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona
      which, prior to December 7, 1941, were actively engaged in advancing
      Japanese war aims. These records also disclosed that thousands of
      American-born Japanese had gone to Japan to receive their education
      and indoctrination there and had become rabidly pro-Japanese and
      then had returned to the United States. Emperor-worshipping
      ceremonies were commonly held and millions of dollars had flowed
      into the Japanese imperial war chest from the contributions freely
      made by Japanese here. The continued presence of a large,
      unassimilated, tightly knit and racial group, bound to an enemy
      nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion along a
      frontier vulnerable to attack constituted a menace which had to be
      dealt with. Their loyalties were unknown and time was of the
      essence. The evident aspirations of the enemy emboldened by his
      recent successes made it worse than folly to have left any stone
      unturned in the building up of our defenses. It is better to have
      had this protection and not to have needed it than to have needed it
      an not to have had it – as we have learned to our sorrow.


      1. I transmit herewith my final report on the evacuation of Japanese
      from the Pacific Coast.

      2. The evacuation was impelled by military necessity. The security
      of the Pacific Coast continues to require the exclusion of Japanese
      from the area now prohibited to them and will so continue as long as
      that military necessity exists. The surprise attack at Pearl Harbor
      by the enemy crippled a major portion of the Pacific Fleet and
      exposed the West Coast to an attack which could not have been
      substantially impeded by defensive fleet operations. More than
      115,000 persons of Japanese ancestry resided along the coast and
      were significantly concentrated near many highly sensitive
      installations essential to the war effort. Intelligence services
      records reflected the existence of hundreds of Japanese
      organizations in California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona which,
      prior to December 7, 1941, were actively engaged in advancing
      Japanese war aims. These records also disclosed that thousands of
      American-born Japanese had gone to Japan to receive their education
      and indoctrination there and had become rabidly pro-Japanese and
      then had returned to the United States. Emperor-worshipping
      ceremonies were commonly held and millions of dollars had flowed
      into the Japanese imperial war chest from the contributions freely
      made by Japanese here. The continued presence of a large,
      unassimilated, tightly knit and racial group, bound to an enemy
      nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion along a
      frontier vulnerable to attack constituted a menace which had to be
      dealt with. Their loyalties were unknown and time was of the
      essence. The evident aspirations of the enemy emboldened by his
      recent successes made it worse than folly to have left any stone
      unturned in the building up of our defenses. It is better to have
      had this protection and not to have needed it than to have needed it
      an not to have had it – as we have learned to our sorrow.

      3. On February 14, 1942, I recommended to the War Department that
      the military security of the Pacific Coast required the
      establishment of broad civil control, anti-sabotage and counter-
      espionage measures, including the evacuation, therefrom of all
      persons of Japanese ancestry. In recognition of this situation, the
      President issued Executive Order No. 9066 on February 19, 1942,
      authorizing the accomplishment of these and any other necessary
      security measures. By letter dated February 20, 1942, the Secretary
      of War authorized me to effectuate my recommendations and to
      exercise all powers which the Executive Order conferred upon him and
      upon any military commander designated by him. A number of separate
      and distinct security measures have been instituted under the broad
      authority thus delegated, and future events may demand the
      initiation of others. Among the steps taken was the evacuation of
      Japanese from western Washington and Oregon, California and southern
      Arizona. Transmitted is the final report of that evacuation ... .

      5. There was neither pattern nor precedent for an undertaking of
      this magnitude and character; and yet over a period of less than
      ninety operating days, 110,442 persons of Japanese ancestry were
      evacuated from the West Coast. This compulsory organized mass
      migration was conducted under complete military supervision. It was
      effected without major incident in a time of extreme pleasure and
      severe national stress, consummated at a time when the energies of
      the military were directed primarily toward the organization and
      training of an Army of sufficient size and equipment to fight a
      global war. The task was, nevertheless, completed without any
      appreciable divergence of military personnel. Comparatively few were
      used, and there was no interruption in a training program.

      6. In the orderly accomplishment of the program, emphasis was placed
      upon the making of due provision against social and economic
      dislocation. Agricultural production was not reduced by the
      evacuation. Over ninety-nine percent of all agricultural acreage in
      the affected area owned or operated by evacuees was successfully
      kept in production. Purchasers, lessees, or substitute operators
      were found who took over the acreage subject to relinquishment. The
      Los Angeles Herald and Express and the San Diego Union, on February
      23, 1943, and the Tacoma News-Tribune, on February 25, 1943,
      reported increases not only in the value but also in the quantity of
      farm production in their respective areas.

      7. So far as could be foreseen, everything essential was provided to
      minimize the impact of evacuation upon evacuees, as well as upon
      economy. Notwithstanding, exclusive of the costs of construction of
      facilities, the purchase of evacuee motor vehicles, the aggregate of
      agricultural crop loans made and the purchase of office equipment
      now in use for other government purposes, the entire cost was $1.46
      per evacuee day for the period of evacuation, Assembly Center
      residence and transfer operations. This cost includes financial
      assistance to evacuees who voluntarily migrated from the area before
      the controlled evacuation phase of the program. It also covers
      registration and processing costs; storage of evacuee property and
      all other aspects of the evacuee property protection program. It
      includes hospitalization and medical care of all evacuees from the
      date of evacuation; transportation of evacuees and their personal
      effects from their homes to Assembly Centers; complete care in
      Assembly Centers, including all subsistence, medical care and
      nominal compensation for work performed. It also reflects the cost
      of family allowances and clothing as well as transportation and
      meals during the transfer from Assembly to Relocation Centers... .


      THE WEST COAST 1942
      Headquarters Western Defense Command
      and Fourth Army

      Office of the Commanding General
      Presidio of San Francisco, California
      Chapter I

      Action Under Alien Enemy Proclamations

      The ultimate decision to evacuate all person of Japanese ancestry
      from the Pacific Coast under Federal supervision was not made
      coincidentally with the outbreak of war between Japan and the United
      States. It was predicated upon a series of intermediate decisions,
      each of which formed a part of the progressive development of the
      final decision. At certain stages of this development, various semi-
      official views were advanced proposing action less embracing than
      that which finally followed.

      On December 7 and 8th, 1941, the President issued proclamations
      declaring all nationals and subjects of the nations with which we
      were at were to be enemy aliens. This followed the precedent of the
      last war, and was based upon the same statutory enactment which
      supported the proclamations of President Wilson in this regard. (See
      50 U.S.C. 21.) By executive action, certain restrictive measures
      were applied against all enemy aliens on an equal basis. In
      continental United States, the Attorney General, through the
      Department of Justice, was charged with the enforcement and
      administration of these proclamations. Where necessary fully to
      implement his action, the Attorney General was assigned to
      responsibility of issuing administrative regulations. He was also
      give the authority to declare prohibited zones, to which enemy
      aliens were denied admittance or from which they were to be excluded
      in any case where the national security required. The possession of
      certain articles was declared by the proclamations to be unlawful,
      and these articles are described as contraband. Authority was
      granted for the internment of such enemy aliens as might be regarded
      by the Attorney General as dangerous to the national security if
      permitted to remain at large. In continental United States
      internment was left in any case to the discretion of the Attorney

      On the night of December 7th and the days that followed, certain
      enemy aliens were apprehended and held in detention pending the
      determination whether to intern. essentially, the apprehensions thus
      effected were based on lists of suspects previously compiled by the
      intelligence services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
      Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Service.
      During the initial stage of this action, some 2,000 persons were
      apprehended. Japanese aliens were included in their number.

      Beyond this, little was done forcefully to implement the
      Presidential proclamations. No steps were taken to provide for the
      collection of contraband and no prohibited zones were proclaimed.

      The Commanding General, during the closing weeks of December,
      requested that the War Department induce the Department of Justice
      to take vigorous action along the Pacific Coast. He sought steps
      looking toward the enforcement of the contraband prohibitions
      contained in the proclamations and toward the declaration of certain
      prohibited zones surrounding "vital installation" along the coast.
      The Commanding General had become convinced that the military
      security of the coast required these measures.

      His conclusion was in part based upon interception of unauthorized
      radio communications which had been identified as emanating from
      certain areas along the coast. Of further concern to him was the
      fact that for a period of several weeks following December 7th,
      substantially every ship leaving a West Coast port was attacked by
      an enemy submarine. This seemed conclusively to point to the
      existence of hostile ship-to-shore communication.

      The Commanding General requested the War Department to send a
      representative, and to arrange with the Department of Justice for an
      officer so that agency to meet with him at San Francisco, in order
      to consider the situation "on the ground." His objective was to
      crystallize a program of forthright action to deal with subversive
      segments of the population. Preliminary to this, and primarily at
      the request of the Commanding General, a number of discussions had
      been held between War and Justice Department representatives in
      Washington, D.C. The Provost Marshall, Major General Allen W.
      Gullion, the Assistant Secretary of War, Honorable John J. McCloy,
      the Chief of the Enemy Alien Control Unit, Department of Justice,
      Mr. Edward J. Ennis, and the Chief of the Aliens Division, Office of
      the Provost Marshal General, participated in these meetings.

      These conferences between War and Justice Department representatives
      in Washington were followed by the conference requested by the
      Commanding General in San Francisco. Mr. James Rowe, Jr., Assistant
      to the Attorney General, representative the Department of Justice.
      The Commanding General urged that the Justice Department provide for
      spot raids in various areas to determine the presence and possession
      of contraband; that it authorize the ready seizure of contraband
      than adopt means for collecting and storing it. He further requested
      that the Attorney General declare prohibited zones surrounding
      certain coastal installations. These conferences continued over the
      period between January 2nd and 5th, 1942, and, as an outgrowth of
      these meetings, the Department of Justice agreed to a program of
      enforcement substantially as desired by the Commanding General and
      Mr. Rowe (Appendix to Chapter II infra).

      The salient feature of the intended program was an agreement
      arranging for creation of prohibited zones. The Department of
      Justice agreed to declare prohibited zones of enemy aliens.; The
      extent and location of these zones was to be determined on the basis
      of recommendations submitted by the Commanding General. At the
      conclusion of these conferences, identical memoranda were exchanged
      on January 6, 1942 between the Commanding General and the Assistant
      Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr., crystallizing the
      intermediate understandings which had been developed. These were:

      "Following is a summary of the principles applicable and procedure
      to be followed in the implementation of the proclamations of the
      President dated December 7th and 8th, 1941, and the instructions and
      regulations of the Attorney General, respecting alien enemies in the
      Western Theater of Operations. These principles and procedure[s]
      were formulated in conferences during the past week between
      Lieutenant General J.L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western
      Theater of Operations, Mr. James Rowe, special representative of the
      Attorney General of the United States, Mr. N.J.L. Pieper, of the
      Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Major Karl R. Bendetsen,
      J.A.G.D., Office of the Provost Marshal General.
      "1. Restricted Areas: The Attorney General will designate restricted
      areas. He will entertain Army recommendations. He will require the
      Army to determine the exact description of each restricted area.
      What further requirements he will make will depend in large measure
      upon the nature of the area involved and the extent of alien enemy
      population in such area. Indications are that, should Army
      recommendations include areas in which there is resident a large
      number of alien enemies and evacuation will thereby be rendered
      necessary, he will also require the submission of detailed plans for
      evacuation and resettlement. The Army has expressed disinclination
      to compliance on its part with such a requirement for the reason
      that the Justice Department will undertake an alien enemy
      registration and will have in its possession all the information
      essential for planning purposes once the proposed restricted are
      have been made known to that Department by the Army.

      "2. Alien Enemy Registration: The Department of Justice is committed
      to an alien enemy registration with the least practicable delay. It
      is understood that registration will include provision for finger
      printing, photographing, and other information to be filed locally
      and probably with local police, as well as at a central office, such
      information to be compiled alphabetically, by nationality and race
      as well as geographical.

      "3. Apprehension: United States Attorneys have been or will be
      instructed to issue apprehension warrants upon application of the
      F.B.I. special agents in charge. F.B.I. agents in charge will
      entertain Army requests for apprehensions submitted in writing, or,
      if time does not permit, oral requests which shall be confirmed
      later in writing. In any case where an alien enemy is found in
      violation of any of the provisions of the proclamation or any part
      of the regulations of the Attorney General there under, he is
      subject to summary apprehension without a warrant. Presumably at
      least he is subject to summary apprehension by the Army as well as
      by the civil authorities. Example: A known alien enemy in possession
      of contraband is subject to summary apprehension without a warrant.
      Example: An alien enemy found within a restricted area without
      authority is subject to apprehension.

      "In an emergency apprehensions may be made without a warrant.

      "4. Searches and Seizures: A warrant authorizing the search of the
      premises of an alien enemy for the presence of contraband may be
      obtained merely on application to the United States Attorney. It is
      only necessary to support the issuance of such a warrant that it be
      stated that the premises are those of an alien enemy. In an
      emergency where the time is insufficient in which to procure a
      warrant, such premises may be searched without a warrant.

      "5. Mixed Occupancy Dwellings: The search of mixed occupancy
      premises or dwellings may be by warrant only. In emergencies
      involving contraband such as radio transmitters, it may be necessary
      to keep the premises under surveillance while a search warrant is
      procured. As previously noted, however, in such an emergency an
      alien enemy's premises may be searched for contraband without a

      "6. Multiple Searches: The term "mass raid" will not be employed by
      the Attorney General. Instructions which have been or will be issued
      to United States Attorneys and to F.B.I. Special Agents will
      permit 'spot raids.' This is to say, if lists of known alien enemies
      with addresses of each are prepared by the F.B.I. and warrants are
      requested to cover such list, a search of all premises involved may
      be undertaken simultaneously. Thus all of the alien enemy premises
      in a given area can be searched at the same moment.

      "7. Much of the effective action will be facilitated by a complete
      registration. It is important that it go forward with dispatch.
      However, there should be no cessation in the vigorous implementation
      of the President's proclamations regarding alien enemies. It appears
      that considerable progress of a clarifying nature has been made.
      Only actual application of the streamlined mechanics can establish
      whether there is a need for further changes in the principles to be
      applied and the procedure to be followed."

      After a series of surveys made by the Commanding Generals of the
      several Western Defense Command sectors, the Commanding General
      submitted a number of recommendations calling for the establishment
      of 99 prohibited zones in the State of California, and two
      restricted zones. These were to be followed by similar
      recommendations pertaining to Arizona, Oregon, and Washington.
      Primarily, the prohibited zones in California surrounded various
      points along the California Coast, installations in the San
      Francisco Bay area, particularly along the waterfront, and in Los
      Angeles and San Diego. The recommendation as to California was
      transmitted by the Commanding General by letter dated January 21,
      1942, and was received from the Commanding General by the War
      Department on January 25, 1942, and was forwarded by the Secretary
      of War to the Attorney General on the same date.
      In a series of press releases the Attorney General designated as
      prohibited zones the 99 areas recommended by the Commanding General
      in California. Considerable evacuation thus was necessitated, but
      most of the enemy aliens concerned were able to take up residence in
      or near places adjacent to the prohibited zone. For example, a large
      prohibited zone followed the San Francisco waterfront area. Enemy
      aliens living in this section were required only to move elsewhere
      in San Francisco. Of course, only aliens of enemy nationality were
      affected, and no persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United
      States were required to move under the program.

      Although some problems were presented which required provision for
      individual assistance, essentially there was little of this
      involved. By arrangement with the Justice Department, the associated
      agencies of the Federal Security Agency were asked to lend
      assistance in unusually needy cases.

      Mr. Tom C. Clark, then the West Coast representative of the Anti-
      Trust Division of the Justice Department, supervised this phase of
      enemy alien control and coordinated all activities for the Justice
      Department. There was much conjecture that this was the forerunner
      of a general enemy alien evacuation. Mr. Clark and his Anti-Trust
      Division staff were deluged with inquiries and comments. Conflicting
      reports and rumors were rampant along the coast; public excitement
      in certain areas reached a high pitch, and much confusion
      characterized the picture. However, in essence, there was no
      substantial dislocation or disruption socially or economically of
      the affected groups.


      Need for Military Control and for Evacuation
      The Commanding General, meantime, prepared and submitted
      recommendations for the establishment of prohibited zones in
      Arizona, Oregon and Washington, similar to those he had prepared for
      California. Upon receipt of these supplemental recommendations,
      forwarded by the Secretary of War, the Attorney General declined to
      act until further study. In the case of Washington State, the
      recommended prohibited zone included virtually all of the territory
      lying west of the Cascades. A general enemy alien evacuation from
      this area would have been required. More than 9,500 persons would
      have been affected. No agency was then prepared to supervise or
      conduct a mass movement, and the Attorney General was not convinced
      of the necessity.

      As early as January 5, however, the Commanding General pointed to
      the need for careful advanced planning to provide against such
      economic and social dislocations as might ensure from any necessary
      mass evacuation. This was made eminently clear in a memorandum dated
      January 5, 1942, from the Commanding General to Mr. Rowe, during
      their initial conference at San Francisco. The point was also
      established that the Army had no wish to assume any aspects of civil
      control if there were any means by which the necessary security
      measures could be taken through normal civilian channels. In order
      to trace clearly the developments which ultimately lead to Executive
      Order No. 9066, and the establishment of military control, that
      memorandum is quoted in full at the end of this chapter.

      The Department of Justice had indicated informally that it did not
      consider itself in a position to direct any enforced migrations. The
      Commanding General's recommendations for prohibited zones in
      Washington and Oregon were therefore viewed with particular concern
      by the Department. No only did it feel that such action should be
      predicated on convincing evidence of the military necessity, it
      regarded the responsibility for collective evacuation as one not
      within its functions.

      The Attorney General, on February 9, 1942, formally advised the
      Secretary of War, by letter, that he could not accept the
      recommendation of the Commanding General for the establishment of a
      zone prohibited to enemy aliens in the States of Washington and
      Oregon of the extent required by him.

      It is already noted, however, that the Department of Justice had
      previously adopted such recommendations in California. He stated in

      "Your recommendation of prohibited areas for Oregon and Washington
      include the cities of Portland, Seattle and Tacoma and therefore
      contemplate a mass evacuation of many thousands * * *. No reasons
      were given for this mass evacuation* * * I understand that * * *
      Lieutenant General DeWITT has been requested to supply the War
      Department with further details and further material before any
      action is taken on these recommendations. I shall, therefore, await
      your further advise.
      "* * * The evacuation* * * from this area, would, of course, present
      a problem of very great magnitude. The Department of Justice is not
      physically equipped to carry out any mass evacuation. It would mean
      that only the War Department has the equipment and personnel to
      manage the task.

      "The proclamations directing the Department of Justice to apprehend,
      and where necessary, evacuate alien enemies, do not, of course,
      include American citizens of the Japanese race. If they have to be
      evacuated, I believe that this would have to be done as a military
      necessity in these particular areas. Such action, therefore, should
      in my opinion, be taken by the War Department and not by the
      Department of Justice."

      The Commanding General therefore submitted a résumé of the military
      considerations which prompted his recommendation for a prohibited
      zone in Washington and Oregon embracing virtually the westerly half
      of those states. The Department of Justice, however, concluded that
      it was not in a position to undertake any mass evacuation, and
      declined in any event to administer such general civil control
      Meanwhile, the uncertainties of the situation became further
      complicated. The enforcement of the contraband provisions was
      impeded by the fact that many Japanese aliens resided in premises
      owned by American-born person of Japanese ancestry. The Department
      of Justice had agreed to authorize its special field agents of the
      Federal Bureau of Investigation to undertake spot raids without
      warrant to determine the possession of arms, cameras and other
      contraband by Japanese, but only in those premises occupied
      exclusively by enemy aliens. The search of mixed occupancy premises
      or dwellings had not been authorized except by warrant only. (See
      Memo 1/5/42 at end of this chapter.)

      In the Monterey area in California a Federal Bureau of Investigation
      spot raid made about February 12, 1942, found more than 60,000
      rounds of ammunition and many rifles, shotguns and maps of all
      kinds. These raids had not succeeded in arresting the continuance of
      illicit signaling. Most dwelling places were in the mixed occupancy
      class and could not be searched promptly upon receipt of reports. It
      became increasingly apparent that adequate security measures could
      not be taken unless the Federal Government placed itself in a
      position to deal with the whole problem.

      The Pacific Coast had become exposed to attack by enemy successes in
      the Pacific. The situation in the Pacific theatre had gravely
      deteriorated. There were hundreds of reports nightly of signal
      lights visible from the coast, and of intercepts of unidentified
      radio transmissions. Signaling was often observed at premises which
      could not be entered without a warrant because of mixed occupancy.
      The problem required immediate solution. It called for the
      application of measures not then in being.

      Further, the situation was fraught with danger to the Japanese
      population itself. The combination of spot raids revealing hidden
      caches of contraband, the attacks on coastwise shipping, the
      interception of illicit radio transmissions, the nightly observation
      of visual signal lamps from constantly changing locations, and the
      success of the enemy offensive in the Pacific, had so aroused the
      public along the West Coast against the Japanese that it was ready
      to take matters into its own hands. Press and periodical reports of
      the public attitudes along the West Coast from December 7, 1941, to
      the initiation of controlled evacuation clearly reflected the
      intensity of feeling. Numerous incidents of violence involving
      Japanese and others occurred; many more were reported but were
      subsequently either unverified or were found to be cumulative.

      To return again for a moment to the situation confronting the
      Commanding General. When the Attorney General advised that his
      Department was not in a position to declare as prohibited to enemy
      aliens the extensive areas recommended for such action in Oregon and
      Washington, he did not thereby establish the need for military
      control. It had become apparent that even those measures would not
      have satisfied the military necessities facing the Commanding
      General. For, by these means, no control would have been exerted
      over nearly two-thirds of the total Japanese population. Only about
      one-third were aliens, subject to enemy alien regulations.

      Because of the ties of race, the intense feeling of filial piety and
      the strong bonds of common tradition, culture and customs, this
      population presented a tightly-knit racial group. It included in
      excess of 115,000 persons deployed along the Pacific Coast. Whether
      by design or accident, virtually always their communities were
      adjacent to very vital shore installations, war plants, etc. While
      it is believed that some were loyal, it was known that many were
      not. It was impossible to establish the identity of the loyal and
      the disloyal with any degree of safety. It was not there was
      insufficient time in which to make such a determination; it was
      simply a matter of facing the realities that a positive
      determination could not be made, that an exact separation of
      the "sheep from the goats" was unfeasible.

      It could not be established, of course, that the location of
      thousands of Japanese adjacent to strategic points verified the
      existence of some vast conspiracy to which all of them were parties.
      Some of them doubtless resided there through mere coincidence. It
      seems equally beyond doubt, however, that the presence of others was
      not mere coincidence. It was difficult to explain the situation in
      Santa Barbara County, for example, by coincidence alone.

      Throughout the Santa Maria Valley in that County, including the
      cities of Santa Maria and Guadalupe, every utility, air field,
      bridge, telephone and power line or other facility of importance was
      flanked by Japanese. They even surrounded the oil fields in this
      area. Only a few miles south, however, in the Santa Ynez Valley, lay
      an area equally as productive agriculturally as the Santa Maria
      Valley and with lands equally available for purchase and lease, but
      without any strategic installations whatever. There were no Japanese
      in the Santa Ynez Valley.

      Similarly, along the coastal plain of Santa Barbara County from
      Gaviota south, the entire plain, though narrow, had been subject to
      intensive cultivation. Yet, the only Japanese in this area were
      located immediately adjacent to such widely separated points as the
      El Capitan Oil Field, Elwood Oil Field, Summerland Oil Field, Santa
      Barbara airport and Santa Barbara lighthouse and harbor entrance.
      There were no Japanese on the equally attractive lands between these
      points. In the north end of the county is a stretch of open beach
      ideally suited for landing purposes, extending for 15 or 20 miles,
      on which almost the only inhabitants are Japanese.

      Such a distribution of the Japanese population appeared to manifest
      something more than coincidence. In any case, it was certainly
      evident that the Japanese population of the Pacific Coast was, as a
      whole, ideally situated with reference to points of strategic
      importance, to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage
      on a mass scale should any considerable number of them have been
      inclined to do so.

      There were other very disturbing indications that the Commanding
      General could not ignore. He was forced to consider the character of
      the Japanese colony along the coast. While this is neither the place
      nor the time to record in detail significant pro-Japanese activities
      in the United States, it is pertinent to note some of them in
      passing. Research has established that there were over 124 separate
      Japanese organizations along the Pacific Coast engaged, in varying
      degrees, in common pro-Japanese purposes. This number does not
      include local branches of parent organizations, of which there were
      more than 310.

      Research and co-ordination of information had made possible the
      identification of more than 100 parent fascistic or militaristic
      organizations in Japan which have some relation, either direct or
      indirect, with Japanese organizations or individuals in the United
      States. Many of the former were parent organizations of subsidiary
      or branch organizations in the United States and in that capacity
      directed organizational and functional activities. There was
      definite information that the great majority of activities followed
      a line of control from the Japanese government, through key
      individuals or associations to the Japanese residents in the United

      That the Japanese associations, as organizations, aided the military
      campaigns of the Japanese Government is beyond doubt. The
      contributions of these associations toward the Japanese war effort
      had been freely published in Japanese newspapers throughout

      The extent to which Emperor worshipping ceremonies were attended
      could not have been overlooked. Many articles appearing in issues of
      Japanese language newspapers gave evidence that these ceremonies had
      been directed toward the stimulation of "burning patriotism"
      and "all-out support of the Japanese Asiatic Co-Prosperity Program.

      Numerous Emperor worshipping ceremonies had been held. Hundreds of
      Japanese attended these ceremonies, and it was an objective of the
      sponsoring organization to encourage one hundred per cent
      attendance. For example, on February 11, 1940, at 7:00 P.M., the
      Japanese Association of Sacramento sponsored an Emperor worshipping
      ceremony in commemoration of the 2,600th anniversary of the founding
      of Japan.

      Another group of Japanese met on January 1, 1941, at Lindsay,
      California. They honored the 2,601st Year of the Founding of the
      Japanese Empire and participated in the annual reverence to the
      Emperor, and bowed their heads toward Japan in order to indicate
      that they would be

      * * * ready to respond to the call of the mother country with one
      mind. Japan is fighting to carry out our program of Greater Asiatic
      co-prosperity. Our fellow Japanese countrymen must be of one spirit
      and should endeavor to united our Japanese societies in this country
      * * *.
      Evidence of the regular occurrence of Emperor worshiping ceremonies
      in almost every Japanese populated community in the United States
      had been discovered.
      A few example of the many Japanese associations extant along the
      Pacific Coast are described in the following passages:

      The Hokubei Butoku Kai. The Hokubei Butoku Kai or Military Virtue
      Society of North America was organized in 1931 with headquarters at
      Alvarado, Alameda County, California, and a branch office in Tokyo.
      One of the purposes of the organization was to instill the Japanese
      military code of Bushido among the Japanese throughout North
      America. This highly nationalistic and militaristic organization was
      formed primarily to teach Japanese boys "military virtues" through
      Kendo (fencing), Judo (Jiujitsu), and Sumo (wrestling).
      The manner in which this society became close integrated with many
      other Japanese organizations, both business and social, is well
      illustrated by the post address of some of these branches.
      The Heimusha Kai. The Heimusha Kai was organized for the sole
      purpose of furthering the Japanese war effort. The intelligence
      services (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
      Military Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence)
      has reached the conclusion that this organization was engaged in
      espionage. Its membership was composed of highly militaristic males
      eligible for compulsory military service in Japan. Its prime
      function was the collection of war funds for the Japanese army and
      navy. In more than 1,000 translated articles in which Heimusha Kai
      was mentioned, there was no evidence of any function save the
      collection of war relief funds.

      A prospectus was issued to all Japanese in the United States by the
      Sponsor Committee for Heimusha Kai in America. The prospectus is
      quoted as follows:

      "The world should realize that our military action in China is based
      upon the significant fact that we are forced to fight under
      realistic circumstances. As a matter of historical fact, whenever
      the Japanese government begins a military campaign, we, Japanese,
      must be united and everyone of us must do his part.
      "As far as our patriotism is concerned, the world knows that we are
      superior to any other nation. However, as long as we are staying on
      foreign soil, what can we do for our mother country? All our
      courageous fighters are fighting at the front today, forgetting
      their parents, wives and children in their homes! It is beyond our
      imagination, the manner in which our imperial soldiers are
      sacrificing their lives at the front line, bomb after bomb, deaths
      after deaths! Whenever we read or hear this sad news, who can keep
      from crying in sympathy? Therefore, we, the Japanese in the United
      States, have been contributing a huge amount of money for war relief
      funds and numerous comfort bags for our imperial soldiers.

      "Today, we, Japanese in the United States, who are not able to
      sacrifice our lives for our National cause are new firmly resolved
      to stand by to settle present war as early as possible. We are proud
      to say that our daily happy life in America is dependent upon the
      protective power of Great Japan! We are facing a critical emergency,
      and we will take strong action as planned. We do hope and beg you
      all to cooperate with us for our National cause." (Italics supplied.)

      The Heimusha Kai was organized on October 24, 1937, in San
      Francisco. The meeting took place at the Golden Gate Hall, and there
      were more than 200 members present. The following resolution was
      "We, the members of the Japanese Reserve Army Corps in America are
      resolved to do our best in support of the Japanese campaign in China
      and to set up an Army Relief Department For Our Mother Country."
      According to reliable sources there were more than 10,000 members of
      the Heimusha Kai in 1940... .
      One extremely important obstacle in the path of Americanization of
      the second-generation Japanese was the widespread formation, and
      increasing importance, of the Japanese language schools in the
      United States. The purposes and functions of these Japanese language
      schools are well known. They employed only those text books which
      had been edited by the Department of Education of the Japanese
      Imperial Government.

      In order to assist the Japanization of the second generation, the
      Zaibei Ikuei Kai (Society for the Education of the Second Generation
      in America) was organized in Los Angeles in April 1940. "With the
      grace of the Emperor, the ZAIBEI IKUEI KAI is being organized in
      commemoration of the 2,600th Anniversary of the Founding of the
      Japanese Empire to Japanize the second and third generations in this
      country for the accomplishment of establishing a greater Asia in the
      future * * *.

      In California alone there were over 248 schools with an aggregate
      faculty of 454 and a student body of 17,800.

      The number of American-born Japanese who had been sent to Japan for
      education and who were now in the United States could not be
      overlooked. For more than twenty-five years American-born progeny of
      alien Japanese had been sent to Japan by their parents for education
      and indoctrination. There they remained for extended periods,
      following which they ordinarily returned to the United States. The
      extent of their influence upon other Nisei Japanese could not be
      accurately calculated. But it could not be disregarded.

      The Kibei Shimin movement was sponsored by the Japanese Association
      of America. Its objective for many years had been to encourage the
      return to America from Japan of American-born Japanese. When the
      movement started it was ascertained that there were about 50,000
      American-born Japanese in Japan. The Japanese Association of America
      sent representatives to Japan to confer with Prefectural officials
      on the problems of financing and transportation. The Association
      also arranged with steamship companies for special rates for groups
      of ten or more so returning, and requested all Japanese associations
      to secure employment for returning American-born Japanese.

      During 1941 alone more than 1,573 American-born Japanese entered
      West Coast ports from Japan. Over 1,147 Issei, or alien Japanese, re-
      entered the United States from Japan during that year.

      The 557 male Japanese less than twenty-five years of age who entered
      West Coast ports from Japan during 1941 had an average age of 18.2
      years and had spent an average of 5.2 years in Japan. Of these, 239
      had spent more than three years there. This latter group had spent
      an average of 10.2 years in Japan.

      Of the 239 males who spent three years or more abroad, 180 were in
      the age group 15 to 19 (with an assumed average age of 17.5 years)
      and had spent 10.7years abroad. In other words, these 180 Kibei
      lived, on an average, 6.8 years at the beginning of their life in
      the United States and the next 10.7 years in Japan. Forty of the 239
      who had spent three or more years abroad were in the age group 20 to
      24, with an assumed average age 22.5. These were returning to the
      United States after having lived here, on the average, for their
      first 13 years and having spent the last 9.5 years in Japan,
      including one or more years when they were of compulsory (Japanese)
      military age.

      The table below indicates the nearest relative in Japan for the age
      groups 15 to 19, and 20 to 24 years of age.

      It will be noted that 42.3 per cent of those in the 15 to 19 year
      group lived with a father or mother in Japan, and that 13.2 lived
      with a grandparent. In other words, more than 50 per cent of this
      group of Kibei had a parent or grandparent in Japan, and it is
      reasonable to assume that in most instances these Kibei lived with
      this nearest relative.

      Combining this information with that from the preceding table, it is
      seen that in a group of an average age of 17.5 years who were
      returning to the United States after having spent an average of 7.4
      years aboard continuously (in other words, from the time they were
      ten years of age) one-half had lived with their parent or
      grandparent in Japan. Yet, this group consists entirely of American
      citizens and almost entirely of men who are of draft age at the
      present time!

      Of the Kibei in Hawaii, Andrew W. Lind, Professor of Sociology,
      University of Hawaii, says: "Finally, there is the rather large
      Kibei group of the second generation who, although citizens of the
      United States by virtue of birth within the Territory [of Hawaii],
      are frequently more fanatically Japanese in their disposition than
      their own parents. Many of these individuals have returned from
      Japan so recently as to be unable to speak the English language and
      some are unquestionably disappointed by the lack of appreciation
      manifested for their Japanese education." (American Council Paper
      No. 5, page 187, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
      129 East 52nd Street, New York.)

      It was, perforce, a combination of factors and circumstances with
      which the Commanding General had to deal. Here was a relatively
      homogeneous, unassimilated element bearing a close relationship
      through ties of race, religion, language, custom, and indoctrination
      to the enemy.

      The mission of the Commanding General was to defend the West Coast
      from enemy attack, both from within and without. The Japanese were
      concentrated along the coastal strip. The nature of this area and
      its relation to the national war effort had to be carefully

      The areas ultimately evacuated of all persons of Japanese ancestry
      embraced the coastal area of the Pacific slope. In the States of
      Washington and Oregon to the north, Military Area No. 2 contains all
      that portion lying westerly of the eastern bases of the Cascade
      Mountains. In other words, the coastal plain, the forests, and the
      mountain barrier. In California the evacuation program encompassed
      the entire State-that is to say, not only Military Area No. 1 but
      also Military Area No. 2. Military Area No. 2 in California was
      evacuated because (1) geographically and strategically the eastern
      boundary of the State of California approximates the easterly limit
      of Military Area No. 1 in Washington and Oregon (figure 1 shows the
      boundaries of these two Military Areas), and because (2) the natural
      forests and mountain barriers, from which it was determined to
      exclude all Japanese, lie in Military Area No. 2 in California,
      although these lie in Military Area No. 1 of Washington and Oregon.
      A brief reference to the relationship of the coastal states to the
      national war effort is here pertinent.

      That part of the States of Washington, Oregon, and California which
      lies west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Ranges, is dominated by
      many waterways, forests, and vital industrial installations.
      Throughout the Puget Sound area there are many military and naval
      establishments as well as shipyards, airplane factories and other
      industries essential to total war. In the vicinity of Whidby Island,
      Island County, Washington, at the north end of the island, is the
      important Deception Pass bridge. This bridge provides the only means
      of transit by land from important naval installations, facilities,
      and properties in the vicinity of Whidby Island. This island
      afforded an ideal rendezvous from which enemy agents might
      communicate with enemy submarines in the Strait of Juan de Fuca or
      with other agents on the Olympic Peninsula. From Whidby and Camano
      Islands, comprising Island County, the passages through Admiralty
      Inlet, Skagit Bay, and Saratoga Passage from Juan de Fuca Strait to
      the vital areas of the Bremerton Navy Yard and Bainbridge Island can
      be watched. The important city of Seattle with its airplane plants,
      airports, waterfront facilities, Army and Navy transport
      establishments, and supply terminals required that an unassimilated
      group of doubtful loyalty be removed a safe distance from these
      critical areas. . . . [There is] a high concentration of persons of
      Japanese ancestry in the Puget Sound area. Seattle is the principal
      port in the Northwest; it is the port from which troops in Alaska
      are supplied; its inland water route to Alaska passes the north
      coast of Washington into the Straits of Georgia on its way to

      The lumber industry is of vital importance to the war effort. The
      State of Washington, with Oregon and California close seconds,
      produces the bulk of sawed lumber in the United States. The large
      area devoted to this industry afforded saboteurs unlimited freedom
      of action. The danger from forest fires involved not only the
      destruction of valuable timber but also threatened cities, towns,
      and other installations in the affected area. The entire coastal
      strip from Cape Flattery south to Lower California is particularly
      important from a protective viewpoint. There are numerous naval
      installations with such facilities constantly under augmentation.
      The coastline is particularly vulnerable. Distances between
      inhabited areas are great and enemy activities might be carried on
      without interference.

      The petroleum industry of California and its great centers of
      production for aircraft and shipbuilding, are a vital part of the
      lifeblood of a nation at war. The crippling of any part of this
      would seriously impede the war effort. Through the ports of Seattle,
      Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego, flow the sinews
      of war-the men, equipment, and supplies for carrying the battle
      against the enemy in the Pacific... .[A] high concentration of this
      segment of the population surround nearly all these key

      In his estimate of the situation, then, the Commanding General found
      a tightly knit, unassimilated racial group, substantial numbers of
      whom were engaged in pro-Japanese activities. He found them
      concentrated in great numbers along the Pacific Coast, an area of
      the utmost importance to the national war effort. These
      considerations were weighed against the progress of the Emperor's
      Imperial Japanese forces in the Pacific. This chapter would be
      incomplete without a brief reference to the gravity of the external
      situation obtaining in the Pacific theater. It is necessary only to
      state the chronology of war in the Pacific to show this.

      At 8:05 A.M., the 7th of December, the Japanese attacked the United
      States naval base at Pearl Harbor without warning. Simultaneously
      they struck against Malaysia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Wake
      and Midway Islands.

      On the day following, the Japanese Army invaded Thailand. Two days
      later the British battleships H.M.S. Wales and H.M.S. Repulse were
      sunk off the Malay Peninsula. The enemy's successes continued
      without interruption. On the 13th of December, Guam was captured and
      on successive days the Japanese captured Wake Island and occupied
      Hong Kong, December 24th and 25th, respectively. On January 2nd
      Manila fell and on the 27th of February the battle of the Java Sea
      resulted in a crushing naval defeat to the United Nations. Thirteen
      United Nations' warships were sunk and one damaged. Japanese losses
      were limited to two warships sunk and five damaged.

      On the 9th of March the Japanese Imperial forces established full
      control of the Netherlands East Indies; Rangoon and Burma were
      occupied. Continuing during the course of evacuation, on the 9th of
      April, Bataan was occupied by the Japanese and on May 6th Corregidor

      On June 3rd, Dutch Harbor, Alaska, was attacked by Japanese carrier
      based aircraft and, with the occupation by the Japanese on June 7th
      of Attu and Kiska Islands, United States territory in continental
      Northern America had been invaded.

      As already stated, there were many evidences of the successful
      communication of information to the enemy, information regarding
      positive knowledge on his part of our installations. The most
      striking illustrations of this are found in three of the several
      incidents of enemy attacks on West Coast points.

      On February 23, 1942, a hostile submarine shelled Goleta, near Santa
      Barbara, California, in an attempt to destroy vital oil
      installations there. On the preceding day the shore battery in
      position at this point had been withdrawn to be replaced by another.
      On the succeeding day, when the shelling occurred, it was the only
      point along the coast where an enemy submarine could have
      successfully surfaced and fired on a vital installation without
      coming within the range of coast defense guns.

      In the vicinity of Brookings (Mt. Emily), Oregon, an enemy submarine
      based plane dropped incendiary bombs in an effort to start forest
      fires. At that time it was the only section of the Pacific Coast
      which could have been approached by enemy aircraft without
      interception by aircraft warning devices.

      Similarly, a precise knowledge of the range of coast defense guns at
      Astoria, Oregon, was in the possession of the enemy. A hostile
      submarine surfaced and shelled shore batteries there from the only
      position at which a surfaced submarine could have approached the
      coastline close enough to shell a part of its coast defenses without
      being within range of the coastal batteries.

      In summary, the Commanding General was confronted with the Pearl
      Harbor experience, which involved a positive enemy knowledge of our
      patrols, our naval dispositions, etc., on the morning of December
      7th; with the fact that ships leaving West Coast ports were being
      intercepted regularly by enemy submarines; and with the fact that an
      enemy element was in a position to do great damage and substantially
      to aid the enemy nation. Time was of the essence.

      The Commanding General, charged as he was with the mission of
      providing for the defense of the West Coast, had to take into
      account these and other military considerations. He had no
      alternative but to conclude that the Japanese constituted a
      potentially dangerous element from the viewpoint of military
      security–that military necessity required their immediate evacuation
      to the interior. The impelling military necessity had become such
      that any measures other than those pursued along the Pacific Coast
      might have been "too little and too late."

      IN: Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942,
      Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Office of the
      Commanding General, Presidio of San Francisco, California; Chapters
      1 and 2.
      Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1943.


      Memorandum from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, to
      the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr.

      "January 5, 1942

      "Memorandum for: Assistant Attorney General Rowe.
      Subject: Alien Enemy Control Requirements.

      "1. Reference is made to the summary of report of the Assistant
      Attorney General Rowe to General DeWitt on Sunday, January 4, 1942,
      at 6:30 P.M. (TAB. 'A')

      "2. It should be stated at the outset that the Army has no wish to
      undertake the conduct and control of alien enemies anywhere within
      the continental United States. Impressions to the contrary
      notwithstanding, the army would accept transfer of such
      responsibility and authority with the greatest reluctance. Its
      desire is only that the Department of Justice act with expedition
      and effectiveness in the discharge of its responsibilities under the
      Presidential Proclamations of December 7th and 8th. The developments
      which have resulted in the current conferences between the Attorney
      General's representative, and General DeWitt and his staff, have
      been occasioned by the almost complete absence of action on the part
      of the Department of Justice over a period of nearly four weeks
      since promulgation of the mentioned proclamations, toward
      implementing sections 5 and 9.

      "3. To the extent that an estimate can be made, in the absence of
      actual demonstration, the courses of action proposed to be taken by
      the Department of Justice, as set forth in paragraphs 1,2, 3 and 4
      of Tab. 'A', appear to constitute a great step forward.

      "4. While some amendment, clarification and implementation may be
      necessary, it appears that section 5 of the proclamation relative to
      prohibited articles will have been fully implemented when the
      measures detailed in Tab. 'A' have been taken. The means of
      determining whether all alien enemies are complying with the
      proscriptions of the Proclamations, as repeated in the contraband
      regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, may have to be
      further clarified. This phase of the problem, however, is closely
      associated with [the] warrant issuance aspect of the alien enemy

      "5. As agreed in the conference referred to in paragraph 1 hereof,
      the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command has initiated
      action within California, Oregon and Washington portions of his
      command (as augmented by the inclusion of the Air Corps
      installations throughout his command), to furnish U.S. Attorneys not
      later than January 9, 1942, a list of the areas which are regarded
      by Army authorities as falling within section 9 of the regulations
      relative to restricted areas. This report will include definite
      descriptions of such areas and will divide them into two categories
      as follows:

      "Category A: Those areas within, or through which no alien enemy be
      permitted, under any circumstances.
      "Category B: Those areas through, or within which alien enemies may
      be permitted on pass or permit.

      "In this section attention is invited to the concluding paragraph of
      Section 9 of the regulations which provides in substance that any
      alien enemy found within any restricted area contrary to the
      regulations shall be subject to summary apprehension. The military
      authorities are empowered to enforce.
      In order to avoid absolute confusion in the matter, Army authorities
      strongly urge that the Department of Justice undertake to establish
      immediate liaison and coordination with all appropriate relief
      agencies prepared to alleviate hardship resulting from compulsory
      change of residence on the part of alien enemies residing in
      Category A, restricted areas. As the Department of Justice has
      requested permission to announce that the establishment of
      restricted areas has been made by the Attorney General only because
      the Commanding General of this theatre has so requested, military
      authorities desire it to be unequivocally clear that they desire
      that everything possible be done to eliminate unnecessary hardship
      and the need for planning and coordination along this line is
      strongly emphasized.

      "6. Comments relative to paragraph 3 of Tab. 'A' entitled 'Search
      Warrants' will be deferred for inclusion in the portion of this
      memorandum relative to particular problems.

      "7. As already noted, neither the War Department nor the Army desire
      to undertake responsibility for the alien enemy program in
      Continental United States. In view of this, the comment in paragraph
      4 of Tab. 'A' to the effect that the Department of Justice is of the
      view that it is better qualified to conduct an alien enemy
      registration than is the Army, and in view of the expressed
      intention of that Department to act without delay, it would appear
      that the action proposed in paragraph 4, Tab. 'A', if speedily
      accomplished will satisfy the need for immediate registration of
      alien enemies.

      "8. Reference is made to paragraph 5 of Tab. 'A' relative to 'spot
      raids' and 'mass raids.' The military authorities in this theatre
      are of the view that counter espionage measures require that the
      Department of Justice take whatever steps are necessary, effectively
      to provide for simultaneous 'mass raids' without warning to
      determine the presence of prohibited articles which may be in
      possession or under the control of alien enemies, or to which such
      persons may have access. By this type of raid is meant 'coordinated
      action' in several areas at the same moment and on successive
      occasions providing for the search of a given number of alien enemy
      premises in each area. Under such circumstances the premises to be
      searched during any such 'mass raid' would be only those in which it
      is known that an alien enemy may be found or in which there is cause
      to believe that an alien enemy may be found. It does not mean
      the 'willy-nilly' raiding of all premises within a prescribed area.
      The number of premises to be searched during any given 'mass raid'
      will depend upon the circumstances and the means at hand. This type
      of sampling or cross-sectional raiding is regarded as vitally
      important. While such raids may not be successful from the viewpoint
      of rounding up great quantities of contraband, they will have the
      important effect of driving contraband more deeply underground with
      the result that its illicit use becomes increasingly difficult.

      "The military authorities request that they be advised by the
      Department of Justice of its position in this matter. If it is
      inclined to provide for this type of search, advice is requested as
      to the steps proposed by this Department.

      "9. The courses of action proposed in Tab. 'A', when accomplished,
      will not solve a number of pressing problems. It is neither possible
      no practicable to undertake an attempt to illustrate all of the
      problems which may arise in connection with the alien enemy program.
      As limited in the foregoing sentence, some of the problems and some
      of the questions remaining unsolved are:

      "(a). A fix is established on a radio transmitter. Transmission of
      unlawful radio signals is established but the location is determined
      only within a defined area such as a city block. Manifestly an
      accurate description of the premises, the operator's name and a
      description of equipment cannot be furnished. the operation of such
      a transmitter is equally unlawful on the part of a citizen, alien or
      an alien enemy. Unless a 'John Doe' search warrant can be obtained
      immediately, the consequences may be grave and the transmitter may
      be moved without trace. What action can be taken?

      "(b). The facts are sufficient to support the issuance of an alien
      enemy warrant or a contraband search warrant, but the responsible
      law enforcement officer on the ground is unable to communicate with
      the issuing authority due to the lack of means or because of the
      time element. What action can he take?
      "(c). A known alien enemy is observed, in transit, in the possession
      of contraband or in the possession of articles believed, for good
      cause, to be contraband. If a warrant is procured under present as
      well as proposed machinery, the quarry will be lost. What action can
      be taken?

      "(d). The unlawful transmission of radio signals has been
      established through interception. A series of fixes determines the
      location of the transmitter within a general area, such as Monterey
      County. Further, there is convincing evidence of shore to enemy
      submarine communication. What action can be taken to isolate the
      area and conduct an effective search to locate the mobile unit?

      "(e). An alien enemy is resident with a citizen, perhaps a relative
      such as a wife. While it cannot be proven that he owns or actually
      controls contraband it can be proven that he has unlimited access to
      such. The situation is as potentially dangerous as if it could be
      proven that he owns or actually controlled the contraband. What
      action can be taken?

      "(f). Question arises whether access of the character description in
      (e) above is unlawful under the Proclamations. Assuming that it is
      unlawful to what extent may the search, under a contraband search
      warrant of a mixed occupancy dwelling or other premises be carried
      to determine access to contraband?

      "(g). The dual citizen problem is perplexing. Self-serving
      declarations of an election are of little meaning, particularly when
      conduct is incompatible with the so-called election. What methods
      exist or what steps are in contemplation looking toward the control

      1. Dual citizens.
      2. Disloyal, subversive citizens (where there has been no overt act
      "(h). In the opinion of the Attorney General, to what extent may the
      responsible Military Commander in a theatre of operations,
      contravene normal processes to take necessary action in an emergency
      in order to provide for the internal as well as the external
      security of his theatre-to what extent is the Department of Justice
      able to take similar measures?
      "(i). Military authorities are convinced of the desirability of
      close cooperation and collaboration between the War Department and
      the Department of Justice in connection with the instant subject.
      However, it is considered desirable to request advice as to the
      extent to which the Department of Justice is prepared to assume and
      to discharge the responsibility of taking whatever steps are
      necessary for the prevention of sabotage, espionage, and other fifth
      column activities from enemy alien courses [causes], and the extent
      to which the Department of Justice will expect the military
      authorities to continue the outline of necessary steps for
      progressive implementation of the enemy alien program.

      "10. The foregoing represents the consensus of those concerned as
      understood by the undersigned. It does not necessarily reflect the
      official opinions of anyone concerned. It is intended primarily as
      exploratory of the problem.
      Incl. I.

      J.L. DeWITT,
      Lieutenant General, U.S. Army."

      IN: Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942,
      Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Office of the
      Commanding General, Presidio of San Francisco, California; Chapters
      1 and 2.
      Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1943.
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