Re: European Parliament Identifies Wahabi and Salafi Roots of Global Terrorism
- PREAMBLEPresenting a comprehensive picture of Salafist/Wahhabi organisations who have deliberately chosen to abandon non-violence for terrorism or who turned violent following major geopolitical transformations of the past decades would be a serious challenge as the number of jihadist movements increased.From the most nebulous organisations to the most organised ones, from smaller cells with to the most complex networks, no country in the Muslim world is safe from their operations, crude or sophisticated, as they always aim to terrorise their opponents and arouse the admiration of their supporters.Not to mention a new dimension of the problem, i.e. competition between groups and leaders of Salafist /Wahhabis terrorist organisations. The very recent hostage crisis on the Algerian site of In Amenas (from 16 to 19 January 2013) is an illustration of this “new war chiefs”. Under the guise of the French offensive in Mali, Mokhtar Belmokhtar actually led a publicity campaign designed to impose his splinter group of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Due to the complexity of the operation, In Amenas attack certainly occurred after a long preparation and had certainly been planned well before the French engagement in Mali on January 11, 2013.Clearly, the risks posed by Salafist/Wahhabi terrorism go far beyond the geographical scope of the Muslim world. The attacks on New York, Washington D.C., London and Madrid remind us of this. However, these deadly attacks remain “exports” of problems whose origin is located in the cradle ofjihadist Salafism.We have therefore chosen to build this study around the original historical and geopolitical contexts of Salafism/Wahhabism jihad.This study is divided into four geopolitical zones.In the case of South and South East Asia, we have given priority to the Afghan-Pakistan area due to the historical significance and consequence of the Soviet occupation on the development of jihadist networks.To account for the situation in the Middle East, we decided to focus our analysis on the Syrian civil war which is at the heart of the jihadist problem.We gathered in the same chapter the case of Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. With the exception of Morocco, these countries have experienced revolutions whose ultimate consequences are not yet final but which have produced direct effects on the Salafi/Wahhabi jihadist movement. Despite belonging to the same geographical area, we excluded Algeria from this chapter to account for its influence on networks that operate today in Saharan Mali, Niger, and Mauritania until Nigeria and Cameroon.The question of these last Salafist networks is studied in the chapter which deals specifically with the Saharan issue on the basis of the perspective displayed by the war which is currently being played out in Northern Mali.