> "But a certain difference is found among ends (telôn); some are activities (energeiai), others are products (erga) apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions (praxeis), it is the nature of the products (erga) to be better than the activities (energeiôn)." (Ross)
>

I got Aquinas (and Aristotle) wrong here; in fact his examples are:

> "activities (praxis):" Aquinas:seeing, wishing and understanding
> "others are products (erga, cf. technê):" Aquinas: "riding or playing the zither" and "when a carpenter constructs a house or a bed."

And among the technê, he distinguishes those done for themselves (music) and those done to produce an object. Cf. Aristotle's start:
"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good;"

Aquinas:
"For evidence of this we must consider that activity is of two kinds, as noted in the ninth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 8, 1050a23; St. Th. Lect. VIII, 1862-1865). One, which remains in the agent himself, as seeing, wishing and understanding, is an operation of the type properly called "action." The other is an operation passing over into external matter and is properly called "making." Sometimes a person accepts external matter only for use, as a horse for riding and a zither for playing, and at other times he takes external matter to change it into some other form, as when a carpenter constructs a house or a bed."





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