--- In aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com, Edwar Gonzalez <gonzalez8988@...> wrote:
>

----------------------------snip---------------------------

>
> Secondly, Hey Ron, thanks again. Your insights are pretty good and to the point. There
are some thing that I missed wrote and others that I did not show the translation correctly
(or specify in English correctly). Let me begin first with
>
> I want to use logic to show that Aristotle is talking about words. I am sure that logic
cannot show anything, since it is only truth preserving. But I am going to use it as a tool to
make my point clear and if I have made a mistake, it will show easily where the mistake is.
>

In the first few books of the "Categories", Aristotle is talking about things, words, and
accounts of things according to the word.

> Also, I would like to discus your paragraph, which is very good by being to the point of
what could be a problem in my formalization. You said the following:
>
> “Also, I wondered if your formulation is correct. P seems to be a predicate, so that Px
> means x has the property P, and yet it's an unbounded variable. Uh, doesn't this put you
> into 2nd order logic? I think you want to have something like Prop(P, x), where P is a
> variable, x is a variable, and Prop is a binary predicate.�
>
> You said other things which show where the problems could be in my formalization. I
assume that the paragraph above is you general objection and the others are more detail
points of your objection. I will bring them up of course when I am discussing the
problems and possible solutions. Just to make sure, I am going to treat this e-mail as
investigation of possible solutions to alleviate any miss understanding on Aristotle’s
works.

OK, sounds reasonable. Yes, I made a general objection from the point of view of 1st order
logic. Not that I eschew 2nd order logic, of course. It's just so difficult.

>
> I am also try to work on different formalizations. I am going to go back and forth on
syllogisms, prepositional logic, predicate logic and I might try some modal logic (given
that Aristotle did work some on it too, it would not hurt extending our logic there too).

Excellent. I've quoted a number of modern scholars on this point, and they seem to resort
to a logical formulation of Aristotle's definition of what it means to be a homonym, or,
equivalently, what it means to be homonymous.

>
> I will continue later on this. I have to work and also there are other things that you Ron
and you Kevin have written that I need to pay close attention. You guys are really helping
me to understand Aristotle.
>
> Eduardo

Thanks, & again, sorry for all the offensive noise irrelevant to Aristotle. I look forward to
your future contributions on these Aristotelian matters.

Thank!
--Ron

>
>
> --- On Wed, 1/7/09, waveletter <wavelets@...> wrote:
>
> > From: waveletter <wavelets@...>
> > Subject: [aristotle-organon] Re: Aristotle Organon Group Homonyms
> > To: aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com
> > Date: Wednesday, January 7, 2009, 12:57 AM
> > I forgot to add: Do you think I'm pissed off?
> >
> > --- In aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com,
> > "waveletter" <wavelets@> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Kevin:
> > >
> > > You are correct about several of the following things.
> > I am not the former president of
> > > Delta Airlines, I am not a sniper, I did not murder
> > anyone in south Texas, and I did not
> > do
> > > anything heinous in North Carolina. I am a former
> > lecturer in signal and image
> > processing
> > > at the advanced undergraduate and graduate level at
> > universities in TX and CA. And I
> > > wrote a book, with a co-author who's a friend and
> > colleague of mine.
> > >
> > > But, you need to not be stalking me.
> > >
> > > Here's the deal. You adhere to philosophical
> > issues (1) or you do research on the
> > personal
> > > data of your interlocutors on this list (2). It's
> > a (1) or (2) arrangement.
> > >
> > > I need my privacy, such as it is, and others engaged
> > on the web philosophical
> > discussions
> > > need theirs. It's very kind that someone else on
> > the list provided you with literary data,
> > but
> > > it's not for you to contact them about services
> > *through this list*. Got it? Got it? Two
> > forks
> > > in the road: You are cooperative in this regard, or
> > you are viciously destructive. Your
> > > choice.
> > >
> > > Don't tell me anything.
> > >
> > > Your behavior is your answer.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > --Ronald L. Allen, Ph.D., 740 North 3rd Street, San
> > Jose, CA 95112, USA
> > > you want my phone number?
> > >
> > >
> > > --- In aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com,
> > PaedoSocrates@ wrote:
> > > >
> > > > In a message dated 30/12/08 3:26:13 PM Mountain
> > Standard Time,
> > > > wavelets@ writes:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > Hi Kevin:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ANSWER:
> > > > Evidently I am. I seek anyone from this list to
> > give me Aristotle's Greek
> > > > term for the English term things in those first
> > few sentences of The Categories.
> > > >
> > > > Another member of this group, John Kontos, has
> > sent me the original Greek
> > > > text, on the "ONOMies", from his home
> > at Athens. John is an AI (artificial
> > > > intelligence) professor. You, too, seem to be a
> > professor, if you are the Ron
> > > > Allen who wrote an "e-book", on
> > signalling, where a derivation of your monikor
> > > > "waveletter", to wit,
> > "wavelets" was mentioned by your fellow writer (?)
> > in one
> > > > of his own publications.
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > I think Yahoo is putting the messages up as 8-bit
> > fonts, so that your 16-bit
> > > > characters are getting split in half, which makes
> > them meaningless gibberish.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > Yes. But when they are highlighted and copied,
> > then placed into either an
> > > > email program or a word processor, the Greek
> > letters actually show up quite
> > > > perfectly, even when the public posting is
> > garbled, although one must select the
> > > > gibberish and change fonts to eg. "Arial
> > (Greek)" or eg. "Times (Greek)" to see
> > > > the Greek letters. So, despite the apparent
> > gibberish, the info to transform
> > > > said "gibberish" into Greek letters,
> > seems to remain. It works even with the
> > > > garbled public postings. I checked.
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > There doesn't seem to be a Greek text for
> > "Categories" on the web...but you
> > > > can see fragments of the texts from the Loeb
> > edition on amazon.com
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > Actually all the text with which we were
> > concerned is quite legible, in Greek
> > > > characters, on the .pdf file listed at your Yahoo
> > site in the files section.
> > > > Nobody, other than Eduardo, yourself and myself
> > seems interested because I
> > > > posted a poll at your site asking if anyone had
> > those first 3 "paragraphs" in
> > > > Greek. But nobody has replied so far, except
> > John Kontos, to whom I wrote
> > > > directly. In short "the gallery"
> > doesn't seem interested.
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > Just click on "Look inside this book",
> > and they will show you a few
> > > > pages--maybe not all you want, but some. Or, head
> > to the library.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > I have the 3 "pgphs.", we were
> > discussing, courtesy of professor Kontos. But
> > > > that discussion ended with your assertions that
> > The Topics was "about
> > > > rhetoric" and "off topic".
> > However, to the contrary, The Topics is not "about
> > > > rhetoric". The Topics is, rather, about the
> > subjects upon which reasonings and
> > > > arguments take place [ie. Genus, Definition,
> > Property and Accident].
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > If you have some specific Greek passages you want
> > to show everyone, let me
> > > > know, and perhaps I can post a .pdf file with
> > Greek. I'll just copy it from the
> > > > Bekker edition into Word or Notepad and then .pdf
> > it.
> > > >
> > > > Thanks!
> > > > --Ron
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > I thought you were doing well at explaining
> > Aristotle's Attic Greek
> > > > terminology, and pointing out the grammar points
> > you made which favored your
> > > > interpretation (in terms of Aristotle's
> > grammar terms and usages) from the disputed
> > text
> > > > on "The homonymous". But then I
> > mentioned Greek syntax, at which point you
> > > > changed direction to counting "experts"
> > who also favor your interpretation
> > > > after asserting that The Topics is "about
> > rhetoric" and "off topic" from The
> > > > Categories.
> > > >
> > > > However, nobody in my previous experience, has
> > ever thought or said that The
> > > > Topics is "about rhetoric", especially
> > when that text begins with the
> > > > translated (to English) sentences:-
> > > >
> > > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > > Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry,
> > whereby we shall be able to
> > > > reason from opinions generally accepted about
> > every problem propounded to us,
> > > > and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an
> > argument avoid saying
> > > > anything that shall obstruct us. First, then we
> > must explain what reasoning is, and
> > > > what its varieties are, in order to grasp
> > dialectical reasoning; for this is
> > > > the object or our search in the treatise before
> > us."
> > > > [Aristotle; The Topics; 100a lines 18 - 24]
> > > >
> > > > I doubt that many people would argue that
> > rhetoricians neither argue, nor
> > > > reason, in order to persuade people, because they
> > do both argue and reason.
> > > > However, the object of any rhetorician is to
> > persuade, rather than to logically
> > > > analyse the value of his or her rhetoric vs. any
> > adversary's contrary or
> > > > contradictory rhetoric.
> > > >
> > > > And from the Prior Analytics, one should have
> > already read that after the
> > > > demonstrator lays down his personal choice
> > between contradictory propositions,
> > > > or the dialectician, by contrast, gives his or
> > her dialogue partner (or
> > > > adversary as the case may be) his or her choice
> > between a pair of contradictory
> > > > propositions, they both (demonstrator and
> > dialectician) argue syllogistically from
> > > > either their chosen premise [alleged
> > demonstrator] or their dialogue partner's
> > > > choice between contradictory premises [the
> > dialectician].
> > > >
> > > > As Aristotle continues:
> > > >
> > > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > > "But this [the initial premise of a
> > demonstrator or the initial choice
> > > > between contradictory premises offered by a
> > dialectician] will make no difference in
> > > > the production of a syllogism in either case, for
> > both the demonstrator and
> > > > the dialectician argue syllogistically after
> > stating that something does or
> > > > does not belong to something else. Therefore a
> > syllogistic premiss, without
> > > > qualification [ie. not qualified as either a
> > demonstrator's premise or a
> > > > dialectician's given choice between
> > contradictory premises KB], will be an affirmation
> > > > or a denial of something concerning something
> > else in the way we have
> > > > described:
> > > >
> > > > It will be demonstrative, if it is true and
> > obtained through the first
> > > > principles of its science; while a dialectical
> > premise is the giving of a choice
> > > > between 2 contradictories when a man is
> > proceeding by question, but when he is
> > > > syllogizing it is the assertion of that which is
> > apparent and generally
> > > > admitted, as we have said in The Topics."
> > > > [Prior Analytics Bk. I, Ch. 1. 24a line 26 to 24b
> > line 12]
> > > >
> > > > So, according to Aristotle, the object of The
> > Topics is dialectic, not
> > > > rhetoric.
> > > >
> > > > Additionally, the logical object of The Posterior
> > Analytics is demonstration.
> > > > The logical object of The Prior Analytics is
> > syllogism. The logical objects
> > > > of On Interpretation are contrary and
> > contradictory propositions. Finally
> > > > the logical objects of The Categories are terms,
> > or in Aristotle's Greek, horos,
> > > > from which the derivative term horismos, meaning
> > definition, in Greek, seems
> > > > to be derived.
> > > >
> > > > It is an arguably fine thing to be able to count
> > grammar terms which may or
> > > > may not support one's thesis or opinion, or
> > even to find and count various
> > > > experts who "side" with one's
> > opinion. But counting is not the same thing as
> > > > syllogizing. And in order to even argue
> > properly, let alone win an argument, one
> > > > has to syllogize as either a demonstrator or as a
> > dialectician.
> > > >
> > > > At almost 60 years of age, I've heard almost
> > every kind of bad argument
> > > > possible, especially from professors, who seldom
> > receive challenges from their 18
> > > > to 22 year old undergraduate students, who, for
> > the most part, are simply
> > > > grovelling for good marks and will regurgitate
> > anything to obtain their young
> > > > little "heart's" desires.
> > > >
> > > > Who can blame them? Their tuition fees are
> > astronomical compared to what I
> > > > paid in the late 1960's and early 1970's,
> > in Canada, where everything is State
> > > > subsidized. But the majority of my teachers
> > could literally point to their
> > > > mistakes on autopsy tables and when we made
> > mistakes, in a laboratory, people
> > > > could, and rarely did, end up on such autopsy
> > tables. Hence, we had far more
> > > > serious motivations for not making mistakes, or
> > for accepting mere opinion, than
> > > > simply getting "good grades".
> > > >
> > > > Our mistakes, or erroneous opinions, could kill
> > people --- people who might,
> > > > or might not, have relatives or friends in the
> > legal profession, who tend to
> > > > ask embarrassing and terrifically expensive
> > questions, such as:- How did this
> > > > patient end up dead?
> > > >
> > > > There is a funny thing about medical malpractice
> > lawyers. They don't care
> > > > what the "count" is for verified
> > laboratory results, or patients who got the
> > > > right treatments, based on good laboratory
> > results or good answers to medical
> > > > questions. They only care about that 1 wrong
> > laboratory result, which
> > > > facilitated that one wrong treatment, which
> > killed a client's relative, or friend, or
> > > > even utter strangers who are simply members of a
> > "class" of dead or injured (by
> > > > negligence) patients.
> > > >
> > > > Malpractice lawyers are wonderfully biased in
> > favor of exceptions to the
> > > > general rule. Of course, hospital
> > "lawyers" and "defence counsel", for
> > medical
> > > > insurance companies, are just as biased in favor
> > of the general rule (good
> > > > diagnosis & good treatment) --- which is one
> > reason why "health care" is way too
> > > > expensive.
> > > >
> > > > Can you guess how long such terrifically
> > expensive modern dialectical sophists
> > > > (a.k.a. lawyers) "last" in an actual
> > court of law, against even an average
> > > > laboratory technologist who has read a bit of
> > Aristotle and 2 or 3 of Plato's
> > > > Dialogues, especially The Eutyphro? They last
> > exactly 1 question by the lab
> > > > tech., or one proposition, contrary to the
> > propositions of a trained laboratory
> > > > technologist who's understood what Socrates
> > was doing in ancient Athens ---
> > > > ie. searching for a counter-example, which is
> > what every actual scientist does
> > > > to get him or herself a "name" in
> > science.
> > > >
> > > > Lawyers know the law, but do not know the facts.
> > Scientists know the facts
> > > > and the causes thereof and can get copies of
> > every "law" upon which any
> > > > dialectical sophist relies to "ground"
> > his or her argument. It's like shooting fish
> > > > in a rain barrel. Of course, philosophers do not
> > argue adversarially, nor do
> > > > lawyers allow philosophers to win arguments in
> > their pin-headed little
> > > > "bailiwicks" at "Courts",
> > because their university professors told them that
> > > > litigants "can't" argue.
> > > >
> > > > Litigants and witnesses just have to answer the
> > "simple minded questions" of
> > > > "simpler-minded" lawyers. However, if
> > you don't hire a lawyer, you can place
> > > > your sworn true propositions on an Affidavit and
> > then ask the Judges and
> > > > lawyers your own questions at "Court"
> > --- which disturbs them.
> > > >
> > > > In a simlar manner, I've asked you several
> > questions and one entirely
> > > > relevant (not "off topic") question
> > during our debate, Ron, which is:-
> > > >
> > > > Where is Aristotle's Greek word for the
> > English term things in those first
> > > > few sentences of his Categories?
> > > >
> > > > You haven't answered that question, nor any
> > other question I've asked, nor
> > > > have you found me Aristotle's Greek term for
> > things among those first few
> > > > sentences of Aristotle's Categories. There
> > is something "fishy" in that fact, Ron.
> > > > And I'm not your 20 year old undergrad
> > student. You may not have seen it,
> > > > yet, but, for our argument, I'm relying upon
> > Aristotle's propostion from On
> > > > Interpretation which is clearly tantamount to the
> > simple negative assertion or
> > > > negative proposition:
> > > > No natural thing is a word.
> > > > And its logical converse, or
> > conversely-predicated, proposition, which is:-
> > > > No word is a natural thing.
> > > >
> > > > So you can talk about Aritotle's grammar
> > until the cows come home, to roost,
> > > > but you'll never be able to turn things into
> > any kind of word, whether verb,
> > > > adjective, noun, adverb, homonym, paronym or
> > synonym on any Aristotelian ground.
> > > >
> > > > He follows the same routine, in his first 3
> > chapters of The Categories, that
> > > > he follows in the entire Organon's corpus of
> > 6 Logic treatises. First he
> > > > talks about terms, which is Ch. 1. of The
> > Categories. Then he talks about terms
> > > > and forms of speech in Chapter 2. of The
> > Categories. Then in Chapter 3. he
> > > > makes his initial logical remarks about
> > predicating sentences re. individuals,
> > > > species and genera.
> > > >
> > > > In Chapter 4., he begins with the meat of his
> > treatise, which is mostly about
> > > > things, which can be signified by
> > "expressions which are in no way composite"
> > > > (symbolized by logic's simplest terms or
> > words), because his first logic
> > > > treatise is, primarily, about logical terms,
> > which symbolize things, even though
> > > > he must employ actual grammar (full sentences and
> > arguments) to talk about such
> > > > things, since they cannot be brought into
> > discussions without employing
> > > > grammar-terms to do so.
> > > >
> > > > When he gets to the proposition, in his 2nd Logic
> > treatise (On Interpretation)
> > > > , he explains why things are not words, employing
> > his first 3 chapters to,
> > > > once again, explain simple grammar, which
> > he'll employ in a treatise about
> > > > declarative sentences or propositions of
> > affirmative and negative varieties.
> > > >
> > > > He goes through the same routine in The Prior
> > Analytics, beginning with
> > > > simple propositions, which are called premises in
> > this treatise and, once again,
> > > > terms. Only this time he talks about how to
> > logically and illogically convert
> > > > the terms of the premises of syllogisms. Again
> > he takes up 3 chapters [or his
> > > > editors made the arrangement into 3 Chapters] on
> > terms and grammar before
> > > > beginning his treatise on the syllogism in Ch. 4.
> > > >
> > > > Same thing in The Posterior Analytics --- eg.
> > Aristotle:- The pre-existent
> > > > knowledge required is of 2 kinds. In some cases
> > admission of the fact must be
> > > > assumed, in others comprehension of the meaning
> > of the term used, and
> > > > sometimes both assumptions are essential.
> > [Aristotle's talk about terms.] Thus we
> > > > assume that every predicate can be either truly
> > affirmed or truly denied of any
> > > > subject [his talk about the premises or
> > propositions of scientific knowledge
> > > > KB] and that triangle means so and so...
> > [Posterior Analytics; Ch. 1. 71a lines
> > > > 11 - 14].
> > > >
> > > > But, with each treatise, his short and
> > preliminary introductions, dealing
> > > > with terms and propositions, gets more complex
> > and extends his previous
> > > > treatises, when he actually gets to the object of
> > each treatise, while his "shorthand"
> > > > comments about previously covered terms,
> > propositions and arguments becomes
> > > > more summary and concise. So to talk about his
> > "development" of the treatises,
> > > > while at the same time arguing that maybe these
> > treatises are lecture notes,
> > > > taken by his students, is bizarre, for if they
> > really are lecture notes (I
> > > > think they are), we arguably have his previously
> > corrected versions taken down by
> > > > his most critical, but still indoctrinated
> > students, who, arguably, may have
> > > > been involved in the actual criticisms,
> > corrections and revisions, if any,
> > > > that Aristotle did under the influence of his
> > questioners/critics.
> > > >
> > > > Either Aristotle or his students, cite The Topics
> > in On Interpretation, at
> > > > Ch. 11. 20b, line 26. Again The Topics is cited
> > in The Prior Analytics in Book
> > > > I, Ch. 1., at 24b line 12. Once again, The
> > Topics is implied, though not
> > > > explicitly cited, at Book II, Ch. 13. of The
> > Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle
> > > > speaks of "establishing a definition by
> > division". He clearly states that
> > > > definitions may be established by keeping 3
> > subjects in view, and of the first
> > > > subject mentioned, he says, quote:
> > > >
> > > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > > "The first is feasible because one can
> > establish genus and differentia
> > > > through the Topic of The Genus, just as one can
> > conclude the inherence of an
> > > > accident though the Topic of the accident."
> > [Post. Analy. 97a lines 25 - 28].
> > > >
> > > > So, to say that The Topics is "about
> > rhetoric" and not the Categories is
> > > > utterly dubious at best. Then to further say,
> > quote
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > "No. Aristotle would call an ox and a man
> > synonymous things, because they
> > > > both have the same account of their essence
> > according to the name 'animal' or, in
> > > > Greek, zôon.",
> > > >
> > > > is to clearly miss several of Aristotle's
> > propositions about substance or
> > > > ousia from both Ch. 3 and Ch. 5. of The
> > Categories, to wit:-
> > > >
> > > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > > Ch. 3. When one thing is predicated of another,
> > all that which is predicable
> > > > of the predicate will be predicable also of the
> > subject. Thus 'man' is
> > > > predicable of the individual man; but
> > 'animal' (zoon) is predicated of 'man'
> > > > (anthropos); it will, therefore, be predicable of
> > the individual man also; for the
> > > > individual man is both 'man' (anthropos)
> > and 'animal' (zoon). [Categories; Ch.
> > > > 3. 1b lines 10 - 13]
> > > >
> > > > COMMENTS:
> > > > In short, man and ox both have the identical
> > genus, which is 'animal' (zoon),
> > > > but they differ in species, and hence, do not
> > have the allegedly same account
> > > > of their essence, according to the name
> > 'zoon'. They have the same account
> > > > of their genus, which is called zoon, in Greek,
> > or animal, in English. But...
> > > >
> > > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > > Ch. 5. "Of secondary substance, the
> > species is more truly substance than
> > > > the genus, being more nearly related to primary
> > substance. For if anyone should
> > > > render an account of what a primary substance is,
> > he would render a more
> > > > instructive account and one more proper to the
> > subject by stating the species than
> > > > by stating the genus. Thus he would give a more
> > instructive account of an
> > > > individual man by stating that he was man
> > [anthropos] than by stating that he
> > > > was animal [zoon], for the former description is
> > peculiar to the individual in a
> > > > greater degree, while the latter [the genus
> > animal KB) is too general. Again
> > > > the man who gives an account of the nature of an
> > individual tree, will give a
> > > > more instructive account by mentioning the
> > species 'tree' than by mentioning
> > > > the genus 'plant'.
> > > > [Categories; Ch. 5. 2b lines 7 - 14]
> > > >
> > > > So to say, requote:
> > > > RON:
> > > > And then there follows the example, which has one
> > word 'zôon' and *two
> > > > things*: the
> > > > human being and the thing drawn. So, the homonyms
> > (pleural) are the human
> > > > being and the picture, and the word that denotes
> > them both, namely 'zoon', is
> > > > equivocal, but that's it. It isn't the
> > word that is a homonym; it's the things
> > > > denoted by this particular word.
> > > >
> > > > IS TO EQUALLY SAY:
> > > > (1) A human being and a picture are homonyms.
> > > > (2) "zoon" is not a homonym.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > According to Aristotle, everything that is
> > predicated of the predicate, can
> > > > also be predicated of the subject. One can
> > easily predicate animal or 'zoon'
> > > > of every man. And since (2) "'zoon'
> > is not a homonym", is an indefinite
> > > > proposition, Ron may mean that, "No
> > 'zoon' is a homonym", or, conversely, "No
> > > homonym
> > > > is a 'zoon'." Then, again, he might
> > only mean, "Some 'zoon' is not a
> > > > homonym."
> > > >
> > > > Ron might want to clarify what, exactly, he
> > means. But if I similarly say:-
> > > > (2a) "Man is not a mouse" or (2b)
> > "Man is not a horse", I actually mean that,
> > > > (2a) NO man is a mouse and (2b) NO man is a
> > horse. So I'll take Ron's
> > > > indefinite proposition (2) 'zoon' is not
> > a homonym, to mean (2a) NO 'zoon' is a
> > > > homonym. I could do the same thing with his
> > sentence, requote: "It isn't the word
> > > > that is a homonym." where he may mean
> > "No word is a homonym." or "Some word is
> > > > not a homonym", which, once again, he'd
> > have to clarify as to his meaning.
> > > >
> > > > At any rate, many old time logicians say that
> > indefinite propositions are
> > > > universal in character (Men are not mice; Women
> > are not men), unless they are
> > > > merely disguised overgeneralizations, such as
> > "men are sexists" (All? Some?) or
> > > > "women are fickle" (All? Some?), while
> > modern logicians say almost nothing
> > > > about them.
> > > >
> > > > My bracketed "[U]" or "[P]"
> > symbolizes universal or particular logical
> > > > supposition.
> > > >
> > > > No 'zoon' (U) is a homonym (U) [Ron]
> > > > Every man (U) is a 'zoon' (P) [Kevin]
> > > > No man (U) is a homonym (U) [Conclusion]
> > > > That looks like a valid CELARENT syllogism, to
> > me.
> > > >
> > > > BUT SAYS RON:
> > > > Some man (human being) is a homonym.
> > > > RON (requote):
> > > > the homonyms (pleural) are the human being and
> > the picture.
> > > >
> > > > If some homonym is a human being, then some human
> > being is a homonym.
> > > > Similarly if Some dog is an animal, then Some
> > animal is a dog, which Aristotle
> > > > confirms in the Prior Analytics at Bk I, Ch. 2.
> > 25a line 20, quote:-
> > > >
> > > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > > Similarly too if the premise is particular. For
> > if some B is A, then some of
> > > > the As must be B. For if none were, then No B
> > would be A.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > So, figure it out... Some man is a homonym [Ron]
> > vs. No man is a homonym
> > > > [Kevin] are directly contradictory propositions.
> > One is true. The other is
> > > > false, according to Aristotle. However,
> > according to Ron's and my respective
> > > > arguments, both contradictory propositions are
> > "true".
> > > >
> > > > So say, for example, the man is Aristotle. Are
> > the man, Aristotle, and the
> > > > bust of that same man, Aristotle, pictured at
> > this site, "homonyms"? One is a
> > > > sculpted art work (zoon; in Herodotus's
> > sense). The other was a real man
> > > > (zoon in the sense of living animal). According
> > to Ron, it seems, that Aristotle
> > > > and a statue/bust of Aristotle, are
> > "homonyms", but Aristotle, as ONE COMMON
> > > > NAME attributed to both the man and the statue is
> > not a homonym.
> > > >
> > > > Very confusing, since things are not names and
> > Aristotle certainly seems to
> > > > be ONE COMMON NAME for both a statue and a man
> > which are homonyms, but the
> > > name
> > > > "Aristotle" is not a homonym. So what
> > is COMMON about the name Aristotle,
> > > > his statue and himself, on Ron's
> > "account" of homonyms?
> > > >
> > > > The man and the statue are "homonyms"
> > on Ron's account. But the name
> > > > "Aristotle" is not a homonym, although
> > it can be predicated of both Aristotle's bust
> > > > and his ousia, as in "This marble statue is
> > a likeness of Aristotle." and
> > > > "This man is Aristotle!", meaning,
> > since no singular substance can form the
> > > > predicate of a correctly predicated logical
> > proposition [Categories; Ch. 2. 1b line 5
> > > > , Quote "To speak more generally, that which
> > is individual and has the
> > > > character of a unit is never predicable of a
> > subject."], that "Aristotle is a
> > > > likeness of this marble statue.", and,
> > "Aristotle was a man".
> > > >
> > > > But since everything which is predicable of the
> > predicate is also predicable
> > > > of the subject [Categories; Ch. 3. 1b line 10,
> > quote, "When one thing is
> > > > predicated of another, all that which is
> > predicable of the predicate, will be
> > > > predicable also of the subject.], it is arguable
> > that since Aristotle's statue's
> > > > face is made of marble, Aristotle's face was
> > also made of marble, or since
> > > > Aristotle was a man and was alive, his marble
> > face was alive, since all that is
> > > > predicable of predicates is also predicable of
> > subjects.
> > > >
> > > > Things, thought and words --- very difficult
> > things!!! More arguments to
> > > > follow.
> > > >
> > > > Kevin
> > > >
> > >
>