Hey guys!! Firstly, what in the hell is going on with the two of you? Are you guys kidding or are you being serious?? Anyhow, I just want to talk about Aristotle and other cool stuff about philosophy and I am not interested in whatever you guys are getting into. If this is going to continue, I prefer not to get any e-mails from the group. It is just a waste of time. If you guys are just kidding, then do something that indicates that you are just kidding. I hate conflict.

Secondly, Hey Ron, thanks again. Your insights are pretty good and to the point. There are some thing that I missed wrote and others that I did not show the translation correctly (or specify in English correctly). Let me begin first with

I want to use logic to show that Aristotle is talking about words. I am sure that logic cannot show anything, since it is only truth preserving. But I am going to use it as a tool to make my point clear and if I have made a mistake, it will show easily where the mistake is.

Also, I would like to discus your paragraph, which is very good by being to the point of what could be a problem in my formalization. You said the following:

“Also, I wondered if your formulation is correct. P seems to be a predicate, so that Px
means x has the property P, and yet it's an unbounded variable. Uh, doesn't this put you
into 2nd order logic? I think you want to have something like Prop(P, x), where P is a
variable, x is a variable, and Prop is a binary predicate.”

You said other things which show where the problems could be in my formalization. I assume that the paragraph above is you general objection and the others are more detail points of your objection. I will bring them up of course when I am discussing the problems and possible solutions. Just to make sure, I am going to treat this e-mail as investigation of possible solutions to alleviate any miss understanding on Aristotle’s works.

I am also try to work on different formalizations. I am going to go back and forth on syllogisms, prepositional logic, predicate logic and I might try some modal logic (given that Aristotle did work some on it too, it would not hurt extending our logic there too).

I will continue later on this. I have to work and also there are other things that you Ron and you Kevin have written that I need to pay close attention. You guys are really helping me to understand Aristotle.

Eduardo

--- On Wed, 1/7/09, waveletter <wavelets@...> wrote:

> From: waveletter <wavelets@...>
> Subject: [aristotle-organon] Re: Aristotle Organon Group Homonyms
> To: aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com
> Date: Wednesday, January 7, 2009, 12:57 AM
> I forgot to add: Do you think I'm pissed off?
>
> --- In aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com,
> "waveletter" <wavelets@...> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Kevin:
> >
> > You are correct about several of the following things.
> I am not the former president of
> > Delta Airlines, I am not a sniper, I did not murder
> anyone in south Texas, and I did not
> do
> > anything heinous in North Carolina. I am a former
> lecturer in signal and image
> processing
> > at the advanced undergraduate and graduate level at
> universities in TX and CA. And I
> > wrote a book, with a co-author who's a friend and
> colleague of mine.
> >
> > But, you need to not be stalking me.
> >
> > Here's the deal. You adhere to philosophical
> issues (1) or you do research on the
> personal
> > data of your interlocutors on this list (2). It's
> a (1) or (2) arrangement.
> >
> > I need my privacy, such as it is, and others engaged
> on the web philosophical
> discussions
> > need theirs. It's very kind that someone else on
> the list provided you with literary data,
> but
> > it's not for you to contact them about services
> *through this list*. Got it? Got it? Two
> forks
> > in the road: You are cooperative in this regard, or
> you are viciously destructive. Your
> > choice.
> >
> > Don't tell me anything.
> >
> > Your behavior is your answer.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > --Ronald L. Allen, Ph.D., 740 North 3rd Street, San
> Jose, CA 95112, USA
> > you want my phone number?
> >
> >
> > --- In aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com,
> PaedoSocrates@ wrote:
> > >
> > > In a message dated 30/12/08 3:26:13 PM Mountain
> Standard Time,
> > > wavelets@ writes:
> > >
> > >
> > > > Hi Kevin:
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ANSWER:
> > > Evidently I am. I seek anyone from this list to
> give me Aristotle's Greek
> > > term for the English term things in those first
> few sentences of The Categories.
> > >
> > > Another member of this group, John Kontos, has
> sent me the original Greek
> > > text, on the "ONOMies", from his home
> at Athens. John is an AI (artificial
> > > intelligence) professor. You, too, seem to be a
> professor, if you are the Ron
> > > Allen who wrote an "e-book", on
> signalling, where a derivation of your monikor
> > > "waveletter", to wit,
> "wavelets" was mentioned by your fellow writer (?)
> in one
> > > of his own publications.
> > >
> > > RON:
> > > I think Yahoo is putting the messages up as 8-bit
> fonts, so that your 16-bit
> > > characters are getting split in half, which makes
> them meaningless gibberish.
> > >
> > > REPLY:
> > > Yes. But when they are highlighted and copied,
> then placed into either an
> > > email program or a word processor, the Greek
> letters actually show up quite
> > > perfectly, even when the public posting is
> garbled, although one must select the
> > > gibberish and change fonts to eg. "Arial
> (Greek)" or eg. "Times (Greek)" to see
> > > the Greek letters. So, despite the apparent
> gibberish, the info to transform
> > > said "gibberish" into Greek letters,
> seems to remain. It works even with the
> > > garbled public postings. I checked.
> > >
> > > RON:
> > > There doesn't seem to be a Greek text for
> "Categories" on the web...but you
> > > can see fragments of the texts from the Loeb
> edition on amazon.com
> > >
> > > REPLY:
> > > Actually all the text with which we were
> concerned is quite legible, in Greek
> > > characters, on the .pdf file listed at your Yahoo
> site in the files section.
> > > Nobody, other than Eduardo, yourself and myself
> seems interested because I
> > > posted a poll at your site asking if anyone had
> those first 3 "paragraphs" in
> > > Greek. But nobody has replied so far, except
> John Kontos, to whom I wrote
> > > directly. In short "the gallery"
> doesn't seem interested.
> > >
> > > RON:
> > > Just click on "Look inside this book",
> and they will show you a few
> > > pages--maybe not all you want, but some. Or, head
> to the library.
> > >
> > > REPLY:
> > > I have the 3 "pgphs.", we were
> discussing, courtesy of professor Kontos. But
> > > that discussion ended with your assertions that
> The Topics was "about
> > > rhetoric" and "off topic".
> However, to the contrary, The Topics is not "about
> > > rhetoric". The Topics is, rather, about the
> subjects upon which reasonings and
> > > arguments take place [ie. Genus, Definition,
> Property and Accident].
> > >
> > > RON:
> > > If you have some specific Greek passages you want
> to show everyone, let me
> > > know, and perhaps I can post a .pdf file with
> Greek. I'll just copy it from the
> > > Bekker edition into Word or Notepad and then .pdf
> it.
> > >
> > > Thanks!
> > > --Ron
> > >
> > > REPLY:
> > > I thought you were doing well at explaining
> Aristotle's Attic Greek
> > > terminology, and pointing out the grammar points
> you made which favored your
> > > interpretation (in terms of Aristotle's
> grammar terms and usages) from the disputed
> text
> > > on "The homonymous". But then I
> mentioned Greek syntax, at which point you
> > > changed direction to counting "experts"
> who also favor your interpretation
> > > after asserting that The Topics is "about
> rhetoric" and "off topic" from The
> > > Categories.
> > >
> > > However, nobody in my previous experience, has
> ever thought or said that The
> > > Topics is "about rhetoric", especially
> when that text begins with the
> > > translated (to English) sentences:-
> > >
> > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry,
> whereby we shall be able to
> > > reason from opinions generally accepted about
> every problem propounded to us,
> > > and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an
> argument avoid saying
> > > anything that shall obstruct us. First, then we
> must explain what reasoning is, and
> > > what its varieties are, in order to grasp
> dialectical reasoning; for this is
> > > the object or our search in the treatise before
> us."
> > > [Aristotle; The Topics; 100a lines 18 - 24]
> > >
> > > I doubt that many people would argue that
> rhetoricians neither argue, nor
> > > reason, in order to persuade people, because they
> do both argue and reason.
> > > However, the object of any rhetorician is to
> persuade, rather than to logically
> > > analyse the value of his or her rhetoric vs. any
> adversary's contrary or
> > > contradictory rhetoric.
> > >
> > > And from the Prior Analytics, one should have
> already read that after the
> > > demonstrator lays down his personal choice
> between contradictory propositions,
> > > or the dialectician, by contrast, gives his or
> her dialogue partner (or
> > > adversary as the case may be) his or her choice
> between a pair of contradictory
> > > propositions, they both (demonstrator and
> dialectician) argue syllogistically from
> > > either their chosen premise [alleged
> demonstrator] or their dialogue partner's
> > > choice between contradictory premises [the
> dialectician].
> > >
> > > As Aristotle continues:
> > >
> > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > "But this [the initial premise of a
> demonstrator or the initial choice
> > > between contradictory premises offered by a
> dialectician] will make no difference in
> > > the production of a syllogism in either case, for
> both the demonstrator and
> > > the dialectician argue syllogistically after
> stating that something does or
> > > does not belong to something else. Therefore a
> syllogistic premiss, without
> > > qualification [ie. not qualified as either a
> demonstrator's premise or a
> > > dialectician's given choice between
> contradictory premises KB], will be an affirmation
> > > or a denial of something concerning something
> else in the way we have
> > > described:
> > >
> > > It will be demonstrative, if it is true and
> obtained through the first
> > > principles of its science; while a dialectical
> premise is the giving of a choice
> > > between 2 contradictories when a man is
> proceeding by question, but when he is
> > > syllogizing it is the assertion of that which is
> apparent and generally
> > > admitted, as we have said in The Topics."
> > > [Prior Analytics Bk. I, Ch. 1. 24a line 26 to 24b
> line 12]
> > >
> > > So, according to Aristotle, the object of The
> Topics is dialectic, not
> > > rhetoric.
> > >
> > > Additionally, the logical object of The Posterior
> Analytics is demonstration.
> > > The logical object of The Prior Analytics is
> syllogism. The logical objects
> > > of On Interpretation are contrary and
> contradictory propositions. Finally
> > > the logical objects of The Categories are terms,
> or in Aristotle's Greek, horos,
> > > from which the derivative term horismos, meaning
> definition, in Greek, seems
> > > to be derived.
> > >
> > > It is an arguably fine thing to be able to count
> grammar terms which may or
> > > may not support one's thesis or opinion, or
> even to find and count various
> > > experts who "side" with one's
> opinion. But counting is not the same thing as
> > > syllogizing. And in order to even argue
> properly, let alone win an argument, one
> > > has to syllogize as either a demonstrator or as a
> dialectician.
> > >
> > > At almost 60 years of age, I've heard almost
> every kind of bad argument
> > > possible, especially from professors, who seldom
> receive challenges from their 18
> > > to 22 year old undergraduate students, who, for
> the most part, are simply
> > > grovelling for good marks and will regurgitate
> anything to obtain their young
> > > little "heart's" desires.
> > >
> > > Who can blame them? Their tuition fees are
> astronomical compared to what I
> > > paid in the late 1960's and early 1970's,
> in Canada, where everything is State
> > > subsidized. But the majority of my teachers
> could literally point to their
> > > mistakes on autopsy tables and when we made
> mistakes, in a laboratory, people
> > > could, and rarely did, end up on such autopsy
> tables. Hence, we had far more
> > > serious motivations for not making mistakes, or
> for accepting mere opinion, than
> > > simply getting "good grades".
> > >
> > > Our mistakes, or erroneous opinions, could kill
> people --- people who might,
> > > or might not, have relatives or friends in the
> legal profession, who tend to
> > > ask embarrassing and terrifically expensive
> questions, such as:- How did this
> > > patient end up dead?
> > >
> > > There is a funny thing about medical malpractice
> lawyers. They don't care
> > > what the "count" is for verified
> laboratory results, or patients who got the
> > > right treatments, based on good laboratory
> results or good answers to medical
> > > questions. They only care about that 1 wrong
> laboratory result, which
> > > facilitated that one wrong treatment, which
> killed a client's relative, or friend, or
> > > even utter strangers who are simply members of a
> "class" of dead or injured (by
> > > negligence) patients.
> > >
> > > Malpractice lawyers are wonderfully biased in
> favor of exceptions to the
> > > general rule. Of course, hospital
> "lawyers" and "defence counsel", for
> medical
> > > insurance companies, are just as biased in favor
> of the general rule (good
> > > diagnosis & good treatment) --- which is one
> reason why "health care" is way too
> > > expensive.
> > >
> > > Can you guess how long such terrifically
> expensive modern dialectical sophists
> > > (a.k.a. lawyers) "last" in an actual
> court of law, against even an average
> > > laboratory technologist who has read a bit of
> Aristotle and 2 or 3 of Plato's
> > > Dialogues, especially The Eutyphro? They last
> exactly 1 question by the lab
> > > tech., or one proposition, contrary to the
> propositions of a trained laboratory
> > > technologist who's understood what Socrates
> was doing in ancient Athens ---
> > > ie. searching for a counter-example, which is
> what every actual scientist does
> > > to get him or herself a "name" in
> science.
> > >
> > > Lawyers know the law, but do not know the facts.
> Scientists know the facts
> > > and the causes thereof and can get copies of
> every "law" upon which any
> > > dialectical sophist relies to "ground"
> his or her argument. It's like shooting fish
> > > in a rain barrel. Of course, philosophers do not
> argue adversarially, nor do
> > > lawyers allow philosophers to win arguments in
> their pin-headed little
> > > "bailiwicks" at "Courts",
> because their university professors told them that
> > > litigants "can't" argue.
> > >
> > > Litigants and witnesses just have to answer the
> "simple minded questions" of
> > > "simpler-minded" lawyers. However, if
> you don't hire a lawyer, you can place
> > > your sworn true propositions on an Affidavit and
> then ask the Judges and
> > > lawyers your own questions at "Court"
> --- which disturbs them.
> > >
> > > In a simlar manner, I've asked you several
> questions and one entirely
> > > relevant (not "off topic") question
> during our debate, Ron, which is:-
> > >
> > > Where is Aristotle's Greek word for the
> English term things in those first
> > > few sentences of his Categories?
> > >
> > > You haven't answered that question, nor any
> other question I've asked, nor
> > > have you found me Aristotle's Greek term for
> things among those first few
> > > sentences of Aristotle's Categories. There
> is something "fishy" in that fact, Ron.
> > > And I'm not your 20 year old undergrad
> student. You may not have seen it,
> > > yet, but, for our argument, I'm relying upon
> Aristotle's propostion from On
> > > Interpretation which is clearly tantamount to the
> simple negative assertion or
> > > negative proposition:
> > > No natural thing is a word.
> > > And its logical converse, or
> conversely-predicated, proposition, which is:-
> > > No word is a natural thing.
> > >
> > > So you can talk about Aritotle's grammar
> until the cows come home, to roost,
> > > but you'll never be able to turn things into
> any kind of word, whether verb,
> > > adjective, noun, adverb, homonym, paronym or
> synonym on any Aristotelian ground.
> > >
> > > He follows the same routine, in his first 3
> chapters of The Categories, that
> > > he follows in the entire Organon's corpus of
> 6 Logic treatises. First he
> > > talks about terms, which is Ch. 1. of The
> Categories. Then he talks about terms
> > > and forms of speech in Chapter 2. of The
> Categories. Then in Chapter 3. he
> > > makes his initial logical remarks about
> predicating sentences re. individuals,
> > > species and genera.
> > >
> > > In Chapter 4., he begins with the meat of his
> treatise, which is mostly about
> > > things, which can be signified by
> "expressions which are in no way composite"
> > > (symbolized by logic's simplest terms or
> words), because his first logic
> > > treatise is, primarily, about logical terms,
> which symbolize things, even though
> > > he must employ actual grammar (full sentences and
> arguments) to talk about such
> > > things, since they cannot be brought into
> discussions without employing
> > > grammar-terms to do so.
> > >
> > > When he gets to the proposition, in his 2nd Logic
> treatise (On Interpretation)
> > > , he explains why things are not words, employing
> his first 3 chapters to,
> > > once again, explain simple grammar, which
> he'll employ in a treatise about
> > > declarative sentences or propositions of
> affirmative and negative varieties.
> > >
> > > He goes through the same routine in The Prior
> Analytics, beginning with
> > > simple propositions, which are called premises in
> this treatise and, once again,
> > > terms. Only this time he talks about how to
> logically and illogically convert
> > > the terms of the premises of syllogisms. Again
> he takes up 3 chapters [or his
> > > editors made the arrangement into 3 Chapters] on
> terms and grammar before
> > > beginning his treatise on the syllogism in Ch. 4.
> > >
> > > Same thing in The Posterior Analytics --- eg.
> Aristotle:- The pre-existent
> > > knowledge required is of 2 kinds. In some cases
> admission of the fact must be
> > > assumed, in others comprehension of the meaning
> of the term used, and
> > > sometimes both assumptions are essential.
> [Aristotle's talk about terms.] Thus we
> > > assume that every predicate can be either truly
> affirmed or truly denied of any
> > > subject [his talk about the premises or
> propositions of scientific knowledge
> > > KB] and that triangle means so and so...
> [Posterior Analytics; Ch. 1. 71a lines
> > > 11 - 14].
> > >
> > > But, with each treatise, his short and
> preliminary introductions, dealing
> > > with terms and propositions, gets more complex
> and extends his previous
> > > treatises, when he actually gets to the object of
> each treatise, while his "shorthand"
> > > comments about previously covered terms,
> propositions and arguments becomes
> > > more summary and concise. So to talk about his
> "development" of the treatises,
> > > while at the same time arguing that maybe these
> treatises are lecture notes,
> > > taken by his students, is bizarre, for if they
> really are lecture notes (I
> > > think they are), we arguably have his previously
> corrected versions taken down by
> > > his most critical, but still indoctrinated
> students, who, arguably, may have
> > > been involved in the actual criticisms,
> corrections and revisions, if any,
> > > that Aristotle did under the influence of his
> questioners/critics.
> > >
> > > Either Aristotle or his students, cite The Topics
> in On Interpretation, at
> > > Ch. 11. 20b, line 26. Again The Topics is cited
> in The Prior Analytics in Book
> > > I, Ch. 1., at 24b line 12. Once again, The
> Topics is implied, though not
> > > explicitly cited, at Book II, Ch. 13. of The
> Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle
> > > speaks of "establishing a definition by
> division". He clearly states that
> > > definitions may be established by keeping 3
> subjects in view, and of the first
> > > subject mentioned, he says, quote:
> > >
> > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > "The first is feasible because one can
> establish genus and differentia
> > > through the Topic of The Genus, just as one can
> conclude the inherence of an
> > > accident though the Topic of the accident."
> [Post. Analy. 97a lines 25 - 28].
> > >
> > > So, to say that The Topics is "about
> rhetoric" and not the Categories is
> > > utterly dubious at best. Then to further say,
> quote
> > >
> > > RON:
> > > "No. Aristotle would call an ox and a man
> synonymous things, because they
> > > both have the same account of their essence
> according to the name 'animal' or, in
> > > Greek, zôon.",
> > >
> > > is to clearly miss several of Aristotle's
> propositions about substance or
> > > ousia from both Ch. 3 and Ch. 5. of The
> Categories, to wit:-
> > >
> > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > Ch. 3. When one thing is predicated of another,
> all that which is predicable
> > > of the predicate will be predicable also of the
> subject. Thus 'man' is
> > > predicable of the individual man; but
> 'animal' (zoon) is predicated of 'man'
> > > (anthropos); it will, therefore, be predicable of
> the individual man also; for the
> > > individual man is both 'man' (anthropos)
> and 'animal' (zoon). [Categories; Ch.
> > > 3. 1b lines 10 - 13]
> > >
> > > COMMENTS:
> > > In short, man and ox both have the identical
> genus, which is 'animal' (zoon),
> > > but they differ in species, and hence, do not
> have the allegedly same account
> > > of their essence, according to the name
> 'zoon'. They have the same account
> > > of their genus, which is called zoon, in Greek,
> or animal, in English. But...
> > >
> > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > Ch. 5. "Of secondary substance, the
> species is more truly substance than
> > > the genus, being more nearly related to primary
> substance. For if anyone should
> > > render an account of what a primary substance is,
> he would render a more
> > > instructive account and one more proper to the
> subject by stating the species than
> > > by stating the genus. Thus he would give a more
> instructive account of an
> > > individual man by stating that he was man
> [anthropos] than by stating that he
> > > was animal [zoon], for the former description is
> peculiar to the individual in a
> > > greater degree, while the latter [the genus
> animal KB) is too general. Again
> > > the man who gives an account of the nature of an
> individual tree, will give a
> > > more instructive account by mentioning the
> species 'tree' than by mentioning
> > > the genus 'plant'.
> > > [Categories; Ch. 5. 2b lines 7 - 14]
> > >
> > > So to say, requote:
> > > RON:
> > > And then there follows the example, which has one
> word 'zôon' and *two
> > > things*: the
> > > human being and the thing drawn. So, the homonyms
> (pleural) are the human
> > > being and the picture, and the word that denotes
> them both, namely 'zoon', is
> > > equivocal, but that's it. It isn't the
> word that is a homonym; it's the things
> > > denoted by this particular word.
> > >
> > > IS TO EQUALLY SAY:
> > > (1) A human being and a picture are homonyms.
> > > (2) "zoon" is not a homonym.
> > >
> > >
> > > According to Aristotle, everything that is
> predicated of the predicate, can
> > > also be predicated of the subject. One can
> easily predicate animal or 'zoon'
> > > of every man. And since (2) "'zoon'
> is not a homonym", is an indefinite
> > > proposition, Ron may mean that, "No
> 'zoon' is a homonym", or, conversely, "No
> > homonym
> > > is a 'zoon'." Then, again, he might
> only mean, "Some 'zoon' is not a
> > > homonym."
> > >
> > > Ron might want to clarify what, exactly, he
> means. But if I similarly say:-
> > > (2a) "Man is not a mouse" or (2b)
> "Man is not a horse", I actually mean that,
> > > (2a) NO man is a mouse and (2b) NO man is a
> horse. So I'll take Ron's
> > > indefinite proposition (2) 'zoon' is not
> a homonym, to mean (2a) NO 'zoon' is a
> > > homonym. I could do the same thing with his
> sentence, requote: "It isn't the word
> > > that is a homonym." where he may mean
> "No word is a homonym." or "Some word is
> > > not a homonym", which, once again, he'd
> have to clarify as to his meaning.
> > >
> > > At any rate, many old time logicians say that
> indefinite propositions are
> > > universal in character (Men are not mice; Women
> are not men), unless they are
> > > merely disguised overgeneralizations, such as
> "men are sexists" (All? Some?) or
> > > "women are fickle" (All? Some?), while
> modern logicians say almost nothing
> > > about them.
> > >
> > > My bracketed "[U]" or "[P]"
> symbolizes universal or particular logical
> > > supposition.
> > >
> > > No 'zoon' (U) is a homonym (U) [Ron]
> > > Every man (U) is a 'zoon' (P) [Kevin]
> > > No man (U) is a homonym (U) [Conclusion]
> > > That looks like a valid CELARENT syllogism, to
> me.
> > >
> > > BUT SAYS RON:
> > > Some man (human being) is a homonym.
> > > RON (requote):
> > > the homonyms (pleural) are the human being and
> the picture.
> > >
> > > If some homonym is a human being, then some human
> being is a homonym.
> > > Similarly if Some dog is an animal, then Some
> animal is a dog, which Aristotle
> > > confirms in the Prior Analytics at Bk I, Ch. 2.
> 25a line 20, quote:-
> > >
> > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > Similarly too if the premise is particular. For
> if some B is A, then some of
> > > the As must be B. For if none were, then No B
> would be A.
> > >
> > >
> > > So, figure it out... Some man is a homonym [Ron]
> vs. No man is a homonym
> > > [Kevin] are directly contradictory propositions.
> One is true. The other is
> > > false, according to Aristotle. However,
> according to Ron's and my respective
> > > arguments, both contradictory propositions are
> "true".
> > >
> > > So say, for example, the man is Aristotle. Are
> the man, Aristotle, and the
> > > bust of that same man, Aristotle, pictured at
> this site, "homonyms"? One is a
> > > sculpted art work (zoon; in Herodotus's
> sense). The other was a real man
> > > (zoon in the sense of living animal). According
> to Ron, it seems, that Aristotle
> > > and a statue/bust of Aristotle, are
> "homonyms", but Aristotle, as ONE COMMON
> > > NAME attributed to both the man and the statue is
> not a homonym.
> > >
> > > Very confusing, since things are not names and
> Aristotle certainly seems to
> > > be ONE COMMON NAME for both a statue and a man
> which are homonyms, but the
> > name
> > > "Aristotle" is not a homonym. So what
> is COMMON about the name Aristotle,
> > > his statue and himself, on Ron's
> "account" of homonyms?
> > >
> > > The man and the statue are "homonyms"
> on Ron's account. But the name
> > > "Aristotle" is not a homonym, although
> it can be predicated of both Aristotle's bust
> > > and his ousia, as in "This marble statue is
> a likeness of Aristotle." and
> > > "This man is Aristotle!", meaning,
> since no singular substance can form the
> > > predicate of a correctly predicated logical
> proposition [Categories; Ch. 2. 1b line 5
> > > , Quote "To speak more generally, that which
> is individual and has the
> > > character of a unit is never predicable of a
> subject."], that "Aristotle is a
> > > likeness of this marble statue.", and,
> "Aristotle was a man".
> > >
> > > But since everything which is predicable of the
> predicate is also predicable
> > > of the subject [Categories; Ch. 3. 1b line 10,
> quote, "When one thing is
> > > predicated of another, all that which is
> predicable of the predicate, will be
> > > predicable also of the subject.], it is arguable
> that since Aristotle's statue's
> > > face is made of marble, Aristotle's face was
> also made of marble, or since
> > > Aristotle was a man and was alive, his marble
> face was alive, since all that is
> > > predicable of predicates is also predicable of
> subjects.
> > >
> > > Things, thought and words --- very difficult
> things!!! More arguments to
> > > follow.
> > >
> > > Kevin
> > >
> >