Hey Ron and Kevin!!! This has been a wonderful discussion thanks to both of you guys. I would like to contribute and I would like to give the following formalization that maybe would help us. But it is just a maybe. Just to let you guys know Ax= for all x, Ex = for at least one x. I don't have the backward E or the upside down A. Anyways, here we go.

1. Ax[Px <--> Ey(Q(y,x,P) & Dy)] That is

Px = x has the property of P (or a name P)
Q(y,x,P) = y qualifies x as p
Dy = y is a definition (or a account).

Lets assume that "P" is the name "animal" and "s" for Socrates and "m" for the picture of a monkey and "r" for a rational animal and "t" for the figure of an animal. So we have the following

2. Ps <--> Ey(Q(y,s,p) & Dy) UI from 1

So since it is Socrates, we would have to choose "r".

3. Ps <-->(Q(r,s,P) & Dr) EI from 2

Here is where I have to stop because I cannot choose "t", since the rule of EI says that I cannot choose another object. Like we all know. So let me start over for "m".

1.Ax[Px <--> Ey(Q(y,x,P) & Dy)]
2. Pm <--> Ey(Q(y,m,P) & Dy) UI from 1
3. Pm <--> (Q(t,m,P) & Dt) EI from 2


Of course, like everyone knows, this is not Aristotelian Scholar talking here--just a janitor who find this stuff fascinating. It seems to me that I would have to make two separate arguments for me to know what s and m are. In other words, P is not as important as to what type of thing s or m is since the corresponding definition has to be, by their nature, different. But if two things have the same nature (or definition) then I can keep using the same argument. That is the following: Let us say that "b" is Plato and "a" is Aristotle.

1.Ax[Px <--> Ey(Q(y,x,P) & Dy)] Assumption
2.Ax[Px <-->(Q(r,x,P) & Dr)] EI from 1.
3. [Ps <-->(Q(r,s,P) & Dr)] UI from 2
4. [Pa <-->(Q(r,a,P) & Dr)] UI from 2
5. [Pb <-->(Q(r,b,P) & Dr)] UI from 2

And so on. That is whatever individual that fits in the definition. So for me to know when two things are Homonymous, I must have a separate argument and when they are synonymous I only need one argument. I guess the main problem is that a syllogism would not help us because I am always using the same middle term for two different conclusions. So homonymous and synonymous are proper for Categories although there are in some way remove from simple apprehension or that is:

1. All P are r
2. s is P
Therefore 3. s is r

1. All P are t
2. m is P
There fore 3. m is t.

Or I guess I could be more respectful to Aristotle and W-R by formalizing in the following way.

1. AxAz{H(x,z) <--> En ED1 ED2[ C(nx,D1) & C(nz,D2) & ~(D1 = D2)]} where

H(x,z) = x is homonymous with z.
C(nx,D1) = x's name corresponds to definition 1 (D1)
C(nz,D2) = z's name corresponds to definition 2 (D2)
~(D1 = D2) = D1 is not identical with D2.

I will continue later. I have to clean some toilets. LOL.

--- On Sat, 12/27/08, waveletter <wavelets@...> wrote:

> From: waveletter <wavelets@...>
> Subject: [aristotle-organon] Re: Reducing a Definitive Argument to a Single Point of Contrast (TOPICS)
> To: aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com
> Date: Saturday, December 27, 2008, 12:28 PM
> Hi Kevin & other Aristotelians following along on the
> discussion of "homonyms" in
> Aristotle's "Categories" and elsewhere:
>
> I'm continuing to review commentary (ancient and
> modern) on the notion of homonymy.
> Does it refer to words, like we use the term today, or does
> it refer to things in the
> "Categories"?
>
> Here is what Wolfgang-Rainer Mann offers for the definition
> of homonyms:
>
> " x and y are *homonyms* iff
> (a) there is a name P such that both x and y are called
> P;
> and
> (b) the account of what it is to be P is *not* the same
> for x and y"
>
> [W-R. Mann, "The Discovery of Things: Aristotle's
> 'Categories' and Their Context,"
> Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000, p. 44]
>
> So Mann agrees with Ammonius (quoted in my last post,
> attached below) and me that
> homonyms are things. The mathematical formulation of
> Mann's definition uses the mathy
> slang "iff" or "if and only if". Note
> that there is a single name in Mann's formulation and
> two things x and y and an account for x and an account for
> y and these accounts are
> different. So there are two things, two accounts, and one
> name--corresponding exactly to
> the grammatical number that A. uses in 1a1 of the
> "Categories".
>
> Thanks!
> --Ron
>
> --- In aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com,
> "waveletter" <wavelets@...> wrote:
> >
> > Hello again Kevin & Aristotle Organon group:
> >
> > I thought that I would review what some other
> interpreters of Aristotle's logic wrote
> about
> > homonyms in the "Categories".
> >
> > In his commentary on Aristotle's
> "Categories" Ammonius (435-517 CE) writes as
> follows:
> >
> > "1a1. Things are called homonyms that have only
> their name in common; the account of
> > being (logos tes ousias) corresponding to the name is
> different. The thought behind this
> > passage is completely clear; those things are
> homonyms, he says, that have their name
> in
> > common but differ in definition (horismos)."
> [S.M. Cohen & G.B. Matthews, trans.,
> > "Ammonius: On Aristotle's Categories,"
> Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991, p. 24]
> >
> > And a little bit later, Ammonius adds emphatically:
> >
> > "1a1. They are called homonyms...One must
> understand *things*." [ibid., p. 25].
> >
> > Cohen & Matthews have a footnote to this last
> statement: "As opposed to expression.
> > Ammonius is clear on the point that for Aristotle it
> is things, not expressions, that are
> > homonyms." [ibid., p. 25 note]
> >
> > So, it looks like Cohen, Matthews, and Ammonius are in
> agreement with me: A. uses
> > 'homonym' to refer to things not words in the
> "Categories" Book 1.
> >
> > Well, OK, Ron, so what?
> >
> > Well, on the one hand, I've found some support for
> my position amongst ancient and
> > modern Aristotelian scholars. But, on the other hand,
> it looks like back in the days of
> > philosophy at Alexandria, there was some contention
> amongst the scholars there that,
> as
> > Kevin likes to say, that the homonyms here are the
> words, not the things the words
> > denote. In an indirect way, the Ammonius passage
> points to a discussion between
> ancient
> > thinkers about the same thing that Kevin and I are
> arguing here.
> >
> > One way to proceed would be to look up other uses of
> the term 'homonym' or
> > 'homonymous' in the ancient texts and see if
> both usages are found...as both referring
> to
> > the multiple things or to the individual word that
> denotes these things that differ by the
> > account of their essence. I think that long ago I
> produced and posted to the list some
> > examples of usages of 'homonym' that evidently
> referred to words--that is, supported
> > Kevin's interpretation--in other works of
> Aristotle. So, this fact, and the modern usage,
> > are certainly cause for confusion, but I don't see
> how Aristotle's usage of the term in the
> > "Categories" can be understood in any other
> way than the one that Ammonius tells us
> > emphatically is correct: homonyms are things, not
> words.
> >
> > But, I'll stop for now. I have to wrap some
> Christmas presents and work on my Suda
> > translations. Next, I'll quote some modern
> commentators on Aristotle's "Categories".
> >
> > Thanks!
> > --Ron
> >
> > --- In aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com,
> "waveletter" <wavelets@> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Kevin:
> > >
> > > We seem to be missing each other by a long ways.
> There is a disagreement about
> what
> > > Aristotle means in the "Categories" by
> a homonym--whether the homonyms are
> *words*
> > > (like we use the term today) or whether they are
> the things referred to by a particular
> > word
> > > (so that A. is using 'homonymous' in a
> technical sense, different than we do now). My
> > > approach has been to go back to the text of the
> "Categories" and analyze what is said
> > > there.
> > >
> > > More comments below.
> > >
> > > --- In aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com,
> PaedoSocrates@ wrote:
> > > >
> > > > From: wavelets@ (waveletter)
> > > > Sender: aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com
> > > > Reply-to: aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com
> > > > To: aristotle-organon@yahoogroups.com
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > Hi Kevin:
> > > >
> > > > I thought I covered this fairly thoroughly
> before, but it's a bit complex and
> > > > maybe worth some more discussion. The main
> argument that I'd offer is from
> > > > the grammar of the first few sentences of
> the "Categories".
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > Hello Ron. I don't think that either
> Greek or English grammarians can help
> > > > us settle this question for these reasons:
> (1) It is bilingual English-Greek
> > > > and X-Greek [Where X means any other
> language than Greek] grammarians, who
> have
> > > > (2) either explicit or implicit
> philosophical positions themselves, and (3)
> > > > who have differently translated and
> differently interpreted Aristotle's meaning
> > > > of the 1st Chapter of the Categories, which
> (4) has caused our controversy
> > > > (and many other controversies among
> scholars) in the first place.
> > >
> > > I wasn't quoting "Greek or English
> grammarians"; I was quoting Aristotle's
> "Categories".
> > > What could be better, in a case of what an author
> said, than analyzing the text itself?
> > >
> > > >
> > > > After all, were Aristotle alive, he could,
> presumably, set everybody straight
> > > > on what he actually meant in Ch. 1. of The
> Categories. I think he can also
> > > > help us settle our differences by means of
> his TOPICS treatise. Our
> > > > controversy involves definitions (Homonym;
> Synonym; Paronym) and Aristotle has
> > > something
> > > > to say about definitions in the TOPICS (Ch.
> 5.), quote:
> > >
> > > OK. But why don't you want to read what he
> says in the "Categories"?
> > >
> > > >
> > > > ARISTOTLE:
> > > > We must now say what are
> 'definition', 'property', 'genus'
> and 'accident'.
> > > >
> > > > A 'definition' is a phrase
> signifying a thing's essence. It is rendered in
> > > > the form either of a phrase in lieu of a
> term [ie. in lieu/place of; as in,
> > > > "the lieutenant is in charge of this
> unit, while I (the major?) am at
> > > > headquarters], or a phrase in lieu of
> another phrase; for it is sometimes possible to
> > > > define the meaning of a phrase as well.
> > >
> > > There's nothing wrong with this, except that
> you're intruding with some modern
> > > terminology and special military terminology
> ('lieutenant').
> > >
> > > A definition specifies the essense (substance,
> your choice) of a thing. We already know
> > > from the "Categories" that A. invokes
> the concept of a "definition" or "account of
> the
> > > essence" or "account of the
> substance" in exactly this way.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > People who's rendering consists of a
> term only, try it as they may, clearly
> > > > do not render the definition of the thing in
> question, because a definition is
> > > > always a phrase of a certain kind. One may,
> however, use the word 'definitory
> > > > ' also of such a remark as, ' The
> "becoming" is "beautiful" ' and
> likewise
> > > > also of the question 'Are sensation and
> knowledge the same or different?', for
> > > > argument about definitions is mostly
> concerned with questions of sameness and
> > > > difference.
> > > >
> > > > In a word we may call 'definitory'
> everything that falls under the same
> > > > branch of inquiry as definitions; and that
> all the above mentioned examples are of
> > > > this character is is clear on the face of
> them. For if we are able to to
> > > > argue that two things are the same or are
> different, we shall be well supplied, by
> > > > the same turn of the argument, with lines of
> attack upon their definitions as
> > > > well; for when we have shown that they [2
> things] are not the same we shall
> > > > have demolished the definition. Observe,
> please, that the converse [The same
> > > > are not 2 things?] of this last statement
> does not hold; for to show that they
> > > > [2 things?] are the same is not enough to
> establish a definition. To show,
> > > > however, that they are not the same is
> enough of itself to overthrow it [a
> > > > definition].
> > > >
> > > > [Etc. ie. A property is a predicate...A
> genus is what is predicated...An
> > > > accident is (I) something which .... or (II)
> something which may possibly either
> > > > belong or not belong to any one and the
> selfsame thing.]
> > > > [TOPICS Bk. I Ch. 5. 101b line 37 through
> 102a line 16 approx.]
> > >
> > > I didn't say any of this ^. It is not from
> the "Categories", which is what we are
> discussing.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > COMMENT:
> > > > Again, the examples of a common genus, or
> generic question, were given as
> > > > 'man' and 'ox', falling
> under 1 generic term 'animal' as they did in the
> > > > categories, when exemplified as 2 things
> with the same name and same definition
> > > > attributed to them. Ron would apparently
> call 'ox' and 'man' synonymous things,
> > >
> > > No. Aristotle would call an ox and a man
> synonymous things, because they both have
> > the
> > > same account of their essence according to the
> name 'animal' or, in Greek, zôon.
> > >
> > > A genus is not a generic question.
> > >
> > > > whereas I would call 'ox' and
> 'man' generically the same, as animals, and
> > > > specifically different as species of the
> genus animal. Back to Ron, quote, who's
> > > > using grammar distinctions to argue his
> case:-
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > The first word is homônuma, which is an
> adjective in the nominative plural.
> > >
> > > I'm reading Aristotle. That might presuppose
> grammatical distinctions, yes. But I'm
> > > reading Aristotle, and you are not.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > And, according to present day grammar,
> adjectives modify nouns.
> > >
> > > Same in ancient Greek, but we are reading the
> text, not getting our ideas from
> modern
> > > notions of what a 'homonym' happens to
> be. Or, at least, I am reading the text. What
> are
> > > you doing, Kevin?
> > >
> > > However if
> > > > they are words or terms which modify verbs,
> they're called adverbs. But
> > > > whether words or terms, are called nouns, or
> verbs, or adjectives, or adverbs, you
> > > > are talking about grammatical, or
> artificial, things, signified by convention.
> > > > So a word is a "thing". I'll
> grant you that. But what kind of thing?
> > > > Aristotle has already informed us that words
> are conventional "symbolic things" or
> > > > "articulate symbols", which I, for
> my part, usually describe as "grammatical
> > > > things". Proceed.
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > Now, right off, that tells us that if
> Aristotle gives an example, then the
> > > > homonymous things in the example are going
> to be more than one; otherwise, he
> > > > would have given ***his definition*** of a
> homonymous thing in the singular.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > Aristotle has given us no such thing as a
> definition with a one term adjective
> > > > as his 1st written word of the Categories.
>
> > >
> > > Well, the first word in the
> "Categories" is an adjective. I didn't say the
> adjective was a
> > > definition; I said it was an adjective. Kevin,
> you are putting out crap, specious crap, I
> > don't
> > > appreciate it. I will address it to a point as a
> courtesty to the rest of the group that
> may
> > > not see through what you are doing, but I
> won't patronize your feints and
> obfuscations.
> > >
> > > As he tells us in the Topics, a
> > > > definition is a certain phrase in lieu of a
> term.
> > >
> > > You already said that, and it's the same in
> the "Categories" as in the "Topics", and
> we
> are
> > > talking about Aristotle's concept of
> *homonymous* in the "Categories".
> > >
> > > What may not be clear, now,
> > > > is that the certain phrase must also be
> convertibly predicable with the term.
> > >
> > > This ^ doesn't mean anything. What is your
> "certain phrase"? What is "convertibly
> > > predicable"? You throw out this crap like we
> are supposed to be scared of it. But it's
> just
> > > spew. Enough.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Moreover, the same term is never allowed as
> part of a definition. If you use
> > > > the same term in a definition, or only one
> term, you clearly do not give the
> > > > definition of the thing in question, as
> Aristotle clearly teaches in The
> > > > Topics. Whether homonyms are things or
> names is the question under discussion.
> > > > Hence, simply including the expression
> homonymous things in your argument is to
> > > > "beg the question", I respectfully
> submit. Proceed...
> > >
> > > Where does A. teach this in the
> "Topics"? If you use the term to define the term,
> then
> > you
> > > have a circularity. That's elementary and
> stupid.
> > >
> > > So, suppose I define an animal as a living thing
> with a sensitive soul. I do not use the
> > term
> > > 'animal' in the definiens, so isn't
> this a plausible definition of what constitutes an
> > animal?
> > >
> > > What if I define a plant to be a living thing
> with a nutritive soul, but without a sensitive
> > > soul? Isn't this a plausible definition of
> what constitutes a plant?
> > >
> > > Uh, Kevin, these definitions are 25 centuries
> old. You got better ones? I'm listening.
> > >
> > > Are you willing to discuss the
> "Categories"?
> > >
> > > Or do you just want to bring in off-topic
> excerpts from a text that is about rhetoric
> > > ("Topics") into the exegesis of text
> that is about ontology ("Categories")?
> > >
> > > Your answer to this final question is sorely
> needed.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > --Ron
> > >
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > If you look in a standard classical Greek
> dictionary, like
> > > > Liddell-Scott-Jones (called the
> "LSJ" by everyone) you find that:
> > > >
> > > > "IV. in the Logic of Arist., ta ho. are
> things having the same name but
> > > > different natures and definitions, things
> denoted by equivocal or ambiguous words,
> > > > Cat.1a1, cf. EN 1096b27. Adv. -môs
> equivocally, ib.1129a30, de An.412b14, al.,
> > > > cf. Thphr. CP1.22.1."
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > "ta ho." [Q. Is "ho." an
> abbreviation of "homonymous"?) is the (plural)
> > > > substantivization with the Greek article
> 'ta' of the adjective: "the homonymous".
> > > > Since 'ta' is plural, this means
> "the homonymous things".
> > > >
> > > > REBUTTAL:
> > > > Again, you "beg the question" in
> dispute. When Plato gave his lecture on
> > > > "the good" many people were
> surprized that his entire presentation was on "the
> > > > mathematical", as Aristotle relates,
> somewhere in the Metaphysics. They
> > > > expected a lecture on morals or the
> desireable life, but got "the mathematical/s"
> > > > instead.
> > > >
> > > > What does Aristotle mean when he describes a
> definitory remark as, "The
> > > > becoming is beautiful."? Does he mean
> the "becoming/adjective hat" is
> "beautiful"
> > > > or the "becoming/adjective figure is
> beautiful" or "The becoming" buildings
> > > > are "beautiful", or that
> "becoming/verb beautiful" is
> "beautiful"? He'd have to
> > > > define his terms to explain what he means.
> Anyway you've begun with an
> > > > adjective, which modifies a noun, and which
> is not a definition. You have also
> > > > placed the term "mos" in your
> Perseus reference to "ta homonuma" with references
>
> > > > to a section of De Anima and to Nichomachean
> Ethics 1096b line 27, which is
> > > > probably the line where Aristotle asks
> "Are goods one, then, by being derived
> > > > from one good, or by all contributing to one
> good or are they rather one by
> > > > analogy." In short, is Good an
> equivocal term, with more than one meaning. Is
> > > > "mos" a term that modifies your
> specifically mentioned verb (legetai) in the 1st
> > > > sentence of the Categories? Proceed...
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > It could still be unclear whether the things
> are words or other stuff like
> > > > human beings and drawn figures. Indeed the
> LSJ tells us that the homonymous
> > > > things are "denoted by equivocal
> words". So the LSJ is agreeing with me.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > But, evidently, I don't agree with you.
> Aristotle doesn't seem to agree
> > > > either, in light of The Topics and what he
> has stated about definitions as phrases
> > > > in the place of terms which signify the
> essence (definition) of names. Again
> > > > you refer to "homonymous things"
> because it is a settled question in your
> > > > mind.
> > > >
> > > > Here's a link to the LSJ entry in
> question (online version of the dictionary
> > > > at Perseus):
> > > >
> > > >
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?layout.reflang=greek;layout.refembe
> > > > d=2;
> > > > layout.reflookup=o%28mw%2Fnuma;
> > > >
> doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3D%2373975
> > > >
> > > > Eh, hope that humongous link works for
> you....
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > Thank you, Ron. But Perseus doesn't
> have The Categories "on line" so far as
> > > > I am aware of that site. However, if an
> impartial Greek grammarian from
> > > > Perseus is willing to throw some light on
> the question, or to moderate our
> > > > discussion, which I don't think is
> necessary, I would certainly consider his or her
> > > > opinion/s. However, as previously noted, it
> is the translators and commentators
> > > > on Aristotle, themselves, who are in
> disagreement about what Aristotle means.
> > > > Yet none of them can ever change what
> Aristotle said, nor what Aristotle
> > > > meant. For my part, I'm with Socrates
> on almost every dispute among "experts"
> > > > --- most bystanders do better than, or at
> least as well as (no worse than) the
> > > > wrong disputing expert. I've seen the
> disagreements among the modern experts.
> > > >
> > > > What that means to me is that experts
> contradict experts. And what
> > > > Aristotle, Socrates and Plato all tell me is
> one very simple thing:- Experts with
> > > > contrary opinions may both have false
> opinions. However experts with directly
> > > > contradictory opinions feature 1 true
> opinion vs. 1 false opinion.
> > > >
> > > > So, that is what I rely upon, when
> considering the contrary and contradictory
> > > > opinions of experts or anyone else. True
> propositions and opinions
> > > > contradict, and are contradicted by, false
> propositions or opinions. Contrary
> opinions
> > > > may both be false. But if one is true the
> other is necessarily false.
> > > >
> > > > Socrates (Plato?) in the Republic and
> Arisotle, in great detail in the
> > > > Metaphysics, but also elsewhere, even in
> this Organon, says that the "contradiction
> > > > principle" is what everybody, who knows
> anything at all, also knows. Hence I
> > > > don't need the authority of
> "Tufts" to persuade me. I have Aristotle and
> > > > Socrates, upon whom I rely for guidance, in
> the principles of arguments. Then I
> > > > have you, yourself, to provide me with the
> propositions of your argument/s.
> > > >
> > > > Hence, if I can't refute you, or better,
> learn from you, on your own
> > > > arguments and grounds, there is no point in
> arguing with you. Like Socrates, I'm
> easy
> > > > to refute, but the truth is not so easy to
> refute. Aristotle, on the 3rd
> > > > hand, is very hard to refute.
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > Well, OK, back to Aristotle.
> > > >
> > > > QUIBBLE:
> > > > You mean, in truth, back to you and your
> interpretation of Aristotle's words.
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > You might get confused by the verb in the
> first line of the "Categories":
> > > > 'legetai'. This is the
> middle/passive third person *singular*. It means he/she/it
> > > > is called. So that's *singular*.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > No confusion there at all.
> "Legetai" is the Greek root verb for naming
> > > > things and legislating behaviour.
> Legislation and the word for "Law" which is
> "Lex"
> > > > in Latin are all derived from that verb.
> Thus dictionaries are named
> > > > "lexicons" and the harsh laws of
> Rome were called "Lex talionis"---the laws of the
> > > > Roman eagle's talons. Just as parents
> give names (Legetai) names for things to
> > > > their children, they also give them there
> first household laws (legislation).
> > > >
> > > > Whether the subject of a proposition is
> singular or pleural and how verbs
> > > > handle subjects as singular or pleural in
> various languages and grammars, is a
> > > > matter of convention. We also have terms
> like Astronomy and trigonometry for
> > > > the law like rules of certain geometrical
> objects and the laws governing the
> > > > "motions of the objects of the
> heavens" --- without even considering Kant's
> > > > alleged Deductive Nomological rules
> governing "dinge 'n sich".
> > > >
> > > > I've also read Socrates's
> conversation with Hermogenes and Cratylus courtesy
> > > > of Plato, in the dialogue Cratylus. I
> recall that one of the other 2 persons
> > > > (Hermogenes I think at... 385c. So it is.)
> and Socrates agreed that names as
> > > > well as propositions could be true or false.
> But I've also read Aristotle's
> > > > theses in On Interpretation that unconnected
> thoughts, like unconnected words or
> > > > names, are neither true nor false. Nor are
> prayers, poems or fictional works
> > > > true or false. Only propositions or
> declarative sentences, expressing mental
> > > > compositions or divisions, are true or
> false, according to Aristotle. He says
> > > > that the value of other sorts of sentences
> belongs to another science or art,
> > > > such as poetry or rhetoric. I agree with
> Aristotle, but not with Socrates,
> > > > as depicted by Plato in Cratylus, on that
> point. Proceed...
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > So, am I wrong?
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > You are probably not wrong about how nouns
> are declined or verbs conjugated
> > > > or the way regular or irregular verbs treat
> subjects and their objects, in
> > > > Greek grammar, whether the subjects are
> collective nouns, pleural nouns or
> > > > singular nouns. But we have established
> that Aristotle's first term is an adjective,
> > > > which, to my Greek untutored mind, is going
> to modify a noun, as distinct
> > > > from an existential object. Again to my
> untutored, in Greek, mind, I suppose
> > > > that your mentioned verb is going to link a
> subject with an object, as you point
> > > > out, --- in the "passive" voice.
> So what we seem to have so far, without
> > > > taking my own position or yours is:-
> > > > "The homonymous"(?) is
> (equivocally?) named/called...
> > > >
> > > > From one of your other points on
> predication, and as a similar example:-
> > > > "The Courageous" is or belongs to
> All Spartans.
> > > > Thus, Courageous-(adjective)-Spartans
> (nouns).
> > > >
> > > > I also know that Homo means "same"
> in Greek and that "onoma" means name, and
> > > > how the same name, in combination, or not,
> can be either a noun, an adjective
> > > > or a verb, as in "rock" (noun;
> mineral) rock candy (adjective) and "rock the
> > > > cradle" (verb). So, from grammar,
> Aristotle's adjective "The homonymous" and
> > > > his verb "Legetai" (to call or to
> name as "infinitives") are going to say
> > > > something about a noun methinks
> > > >
> > > > RON (Am I wrong?):
> > > > Well, no. The adjective 'homônuma'
> is actually of the neuter gender. And, it
> > > > is a rule of Greek grammar that neuter
> plurals take the third person singular
> > > > form of the verb. So, we have
> "homônuma legetai" or "things are called
> > > > homonymous".
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > I think that all you actually have is:-
> "The homonuma (adjective) are named
> > > > (verb)...", as in "The courageous
> (adj.) spartans (pleural-noun) died at
> > > > Thermopylae." or "The courageous
> (adj.) Socrates (singular-noun) stood trial."
> > > > Since you are not speaking to the term
> "mos" (equivocal?) attributed to Bekker
> > > > numbers located in De Anima and Nichomachean
> Ethics, I'm not sure if the adverb
> > > > "equivocal" is modifying the verb
> "legetai" in your Greek version of The
> > > > Categories. You are not explicitly
> mentioning the Greek term "mos" in your
> > > > argument above. But whether the adverb is
> there or not in the Categories (as
> > > > indicated by Edghill's English
> translation) we have, so far, according to your
> > > > argument, an adjective and a verb.
> > > >
> > > > So, I think you're still looking for a
> noun which our agreed upon adjective
> > > > (Homonymous in English) must modify.
> Proceed...
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > There's another plural, the relative
> pronoun 'hon', which is the genitive
> > > > plural: "of which". Again, what A.
> is saying is a homonym is going to come not in
> > > > singles, but in twos or more.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > No, Ron. What Aristotle said, is fixed on
> paper. He hasn't said anything
> > > > about a homonym, which is a noun, not an
> adjective. He's given us an adjectival
> > > > expression, either singular or pleural,
> apparently derived from the Greek name
> > > > for the English noun, homonym. So, please
> don't confuse your interpretation
> > > > of what Aristotle said/wrote with exactly
> what he said/wrote or meant. On your
> > > > own admissions Aristotle has given us an
> adjective and a verb. And an
> > > > adjective such as "courageous" or
> "homonymous" can modify either singular nouns
> or
> > > > pleural nouns or collective nouns. But, no
> noun occurs in the first 2 words.
> > > >
> > > > So, now, as you point out, he's given us
> a third term. In sum we have (1) an
> > > > adjectival expression ("The
> homonymous"), (2) a verb ("are called"; Or
> "are
> > > > named" or "are legislated",
> per Cratylus) and (3) a genitive pleural pronoun,
> > > > meaning "of which", according to
> what you've written above.
> > > >
> > > > IN SUM (per Aristotle):
> > > > "The homonymous (adj.) are called
> (verb) of which (relative pronoun)..."
> > > >
> > > > That 3rd term and relative pronoun begs two
> questions, to wit (1) What noun
> > > > is the adjectival expression modifying? and
> (2) To what noun or collective noun
> > > > does your pleural relative pronoun relate?
> Proceed...
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > And then right after that we read that
> "onoma monon koinon" or "the name
> > > > alone [is]
> > > > common", so we have multiple homonymous
> things and single words.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > I think we have finally found the noun that
> an admitted adjective modifies.
> > > > And you have already informed me, at Google,
> how the syntax of Greek varies
> > > > from English. You told me, and others, that
> when we English speakers translate
> > > > Aristotle's Greek idiom into
> propositions such as "Every Spartan is
> > > > courageous.", Aristotle's way of
> expressing the same proposition, in Greek, is:-
> > > > "Courage belongs to all Spartans".
> Hence if we employ that same kind of Greek
> > > > syntax, as a model, to Aristotle's 1st
> sentence of the categories, we should get
> > > > something like:
> > > >
> > > > "One common name" (noun) is called
> (passive verb)
> > > > "homonymous" (adjective) of which
> (relative pronoun)
> > > > a man (zoon; 1 example) and a painted
> > > > man (zoon; different example) are zoon
> > > > [Maybe? Maybe not?
> > > > And what of "equivocal"?]
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > The clues as to what A. intends are really
> piling up...on my side, I think.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > The clues you have given us about Greek
> syntax imply otherwise.
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > And then there follows the example, which
> has one word 'zôon' and *two
> > > > things*:
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > You mean two examples [1. living man and 2.
> painted man] and one name (zoon).
> > > > But the examples are not the thesis, which
> seems to be...
> > > > In Greek syntax:
> > > > The homonymous is called of which One Common
> Name...
> > > >
> > > > In English syntax (reverse):
> > > > One common name is called
> "homonymous" of which (examples?)...
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > So, since adjectival expressions, such as
> "courageous" or "homonymous" modify
> > > > nouns and Greek syntax, as you have pointed
> out, is the reverse of English,
> > > > the homonymous adjective, arguably modifies
> a noun "one common name", or
> > > > Aristotle's expression, "onoma
> monon koinon" [name-one-common; in English].
> Even
> > in
> > > > complex-nouns the Greek syntax appears
> "odd" to English speakers.
> > > >
> > > > In review:
> > > > We put our subjects first, verbs in the
> middle and predicates last. Greeks,
> > > > like Aristotle, apparently reverse that
> syntax. Hence the noun or name you
> > > > mention, as "one common name"
> arguably receives the adjective "homonymous", in
> > > > the same way that All 300 Spartans received
> the adjective "courageous".
> > > >
> > > > RON (Reguote: And then there follows the
> example, which has one word 'zôon'
> > > > and *two things*) the human being and the
> thing drawn.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > However, in Greek syntax, the "one
> common name" (onoma monon koinon)
> received
> > > > the adjective "homonymous".
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > So, the homonyms are the human being and the
> picture, and the word that
> > > > denotes them both, namely 'zoon', is
> equivocal, but that's it. It isn't the word
> > > > that is a homonym; it's the things
> denoted by this particular word.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > To the contrary and in Greek syntax
> "onoma monon koinon" [one common name]
> > > > received the adjectival expression
> "homonuma" [homonymous].
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > This is a technical sense of
> 'homonymous' in Aristotle's
> "Categories". Of
> > > > course, yes, we nowadays say that homonyms
> are words, not the things referred to
> > > > by the words. I think this is what I argued
> before.
> > > >
> > > > REBUTTAL:
> > > > Yes you have argued that case before. But
> homonyms are nouns, in English,
> > > > and arguably in Greek too. We English
> speakers arguably don't use adjectival
> > > > expressions such as "homomymous (adj.)
> names (nouns)" or "synonymous (adj.)
> > > > names (noun)". But, arguably, both
> Greek speakers and English speakers modify
> > > > nouns with adjectives.
> > > >
> > > > The Greeks, as you have argued, apparently
> employed the reverse syntax to
> > > > that of common English. Hence, if you are
> going to talk about Aristotle's
> > > > "technical expressions", then his
> technical expressions are best demonstrated using
> > > > his techne for expressing words --- in other
> words employing the reverse
> > > > syntax to that of English syntax.
> > > >
> > > > And when you do employ that syntax, the
> subject noun of Aristotle's first
> > > > sentence appears to be "One Common
> Name", modified by an adjective
> > "homomymous"
> > > > and linked by a verb which has the English
> infinitive form, "to name" or "to
> > > > call". So if you are going to get
> "technical" with Greek grammar, use the full
> > > > technique, not only what the words mean, but
> also how they are expressed in
> > > > Greek syntax. And if "mos",
> meaning "equivocal", is actually one of the terms
> > > > in the Greek of that 1st sentence of The
> Categories, you should also have
> > > > included it in your evidence.
> > > >
> > > > Finally, since you keep using the English
> word "things" and I've asked you
> > > > this question previously: Where is
> Aristotle's Greek term for "things" in the
> > > > first 3 translated sentences of The
> Categories?
> > > >
> > > > I know that English speakers, taking 1st
> year philosophy courses, hear about
> > > > "the good" (from Plato) in English
> translation and "the beautiful" (from
> > > > Socrates), in English translation and
> "the true" (from anybody). So, they
> > > > immediately ask themselves in their minds (I
> certainly did!) the standard English
> > > > questions:- The good what? The beautiful
> what? and The true what?
> > > >
> > > > That is because we non-expert English
> speakers usually use such terms as
> > > > good, beautiful and true, as adjectives,
> rather than as strict nouns. Hence, turn
> > > > about is fair play on a Greek speaker:
> > > >
> > > > Question:- The "Homonymous"
> (adjective) What (noun)?
> > > >
> > > > And the only noun that I see to be a complex
> noun in the first few words of
> > > > Aristotle's categories, as demonstrated
> by yourself, Ron, and as translated
> > > > into an English expression is:- "one
> common name".
> > > >
> > > > Let me try to get through some more of your
> post below and insert comments.
> > > >
> > > > REPLY:
> > > > I've read your inserted comments and we
> can get back to them, if you want,
> > > > sometime. At present, I want you to pull
> everything you have together,
> > > > including Greek syntax and semantics and do
> that whole first paragraph over again,
> > > > word for word, in both Greek and English.
> My windows 95 operating system has SL
> > > > Greek font on it, among others. So you
> could do it that way. Or you can
> > > > continue with your English transliterated
> letters, of Greek letters, as one sees
> > > > customarily done at the the Perseus project
> at the Tuft's site.
> > > >
> > > > As we all know, paragraphing is a relatively
> modern way to present sentences
> > > > so that one "overall idea" is
> conveyed per paragraph --- something that was
> > > > not done using all capitals, almost no
> punctuation, and neither book
> > > > numberings, nor paragraphs, on rolled up
> linen (or papyrus) scrolls in Plato's or
> > > > Aristotle's times. These guys did
> almost everything from memory, until they,
> > > > themselves, began to establish the libraries
> which we moderns take for granted
> > among
> > > > scholars.
> > > >
> > > > As you admitted in the comments you inserted
> in my previous post, you
> > > > wouldn't call yourself a logician, but
> you have received training in both logic and
> > > > mathematics. And one "beauty" of
> mathematics is that equations mean the same
> > > > thing, both forward and backward, since
> equality is their "forte", and a
> > > > categorical "note" of numbers,
> according to Aristotle. John Stuart Mill made that
> > > > same point on one occasion. Thus, he
> argued, simple conversion of mathematical
> > > > terms is foolproof in mathematical
> equations. But, as he also argued, simple
> > > > conversion (of subject with predicate terms
> or expressions) is not easy, in
> > > > either grammar or logic.
> > > >
> > > > I would add to what Mr. Mill actually
> complained about:- Simple conversion
> > > > is quite difficult unless and until you
> really get a good grasp of both
> > > > Aristotle's Categories and On
> Interpretation. Then it's The TOPICS which both
> > > > simplifies and clarifies both the Categories
> and On Interpretation. One might think
> > > > that the Categories and On Interpretation
> naturally lead into the Prior
> > > > Analytics. But, as Aristotle remarks in the
> 2nd, very long, paragraph of The Prior
> > > > Analytics, at around 24b 10, quote:
> > > >
> > > > ARISTOTLE:- ...(while) a dialectical
> premise is the giving of a choice
> > > > between 2 contradictories, when a man is
> proceeding by question. (My break) But
> > > > when he (the dialectician) is syllogizing it
> is the assertion of that which is
> > > > apparent and generally admitted (from which
> dialecticians get their premises
> > > > for syllogizing KB), as has been said in the
> Topics (Prior Analytics; 24b 12).
> > > >
> > > > What Aristotle said in the Topics is a good
> 75 Bekker numbers, both half
> > > > pages (a and b) further on, in the Organon,
> at around 100a 29.
> > > >
> > > > At any rate, we seem to be in agreement,
> now, that names are different from
> > > > things, given your comments, since you did
> say, in your insertions, quote
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > RON:
> > > > A thing is different from its name.
> > > >
> > > > IN SUM:
> > > > (1) We agree that Greek syntax is different
> from English syntax. (2) We've
> > > > heard from Aristotle that the most common
> fallacy is the fallacy that turns
> > > > upon names only, from the Sophistical
> Refutations. (3) We know from the Topics
> > > > that definitions can never be single terms.
> (4) And, finally, we know from
> > > > common grammar that adjectives modify nouns.
> Hence, I think if you employ
> Greek
> > > > syntax, Ron, along with the meanings of
> Greek verbs and nouns, in reanalysing
> > > > the first 3 sentences (first pgph.) of the
> Categories, you'll see Aristotle's
> > > > syllogistic conclusion as:-
> > > >
> > > > (2) Thus, homonymously named
> 'animals' are different in definition. At least
> > > > the term "thus" occurs in his 2nd
> translated sentence. The (3)rd translated
> > > > sentence begins with the English term
> "for", which is a premise indicator.
> > > > Hence, arguably, his first sentence of The
> Categories is 1 premise, when/if
> > > > associated with the 3rd translated sentence,
> gives us the conclusion indicated, by
> > > > "thus", in his 2nd sentence.
> > > >
> > > > Your entire argument, however, on this
> matter, has been entirely predicated
> > > > upon a few mere terms from one premise of
> what appears to be a 1 pgph. and 3
> > > > sentence (at least in translation) argument.
> You can do better than that, given
> > > > a working knowledge of sentential logic, and
> Greek grammar, by doing all 3
> > > > translated sentences with your full
> technical knowledge of Greek grammar and
> > > > sentential logic, for one of the premises of
> that argument appears to be the 3rd
> > > > proposition.
> > > >
> > > > Have another go --- especially at the 2nd
> and third sentences using every
> > > > Greek word you have, since you seem to
> insist on analysing Greek grammar. I have
> > > > little doubt that Aristotle, in Greek idiom,
> is just as logical as in the
> > > > Prior Analytics, where he symbolizes terms
> with unambiguous letters. But these
> > > > first 3 sentences of the categories are not
> the so-called "atomic sentences" of
> > > > SL. So they need a very close look since at
> least the 1st-three sentences of
> > > > the Categories are entirely about ambiguity,
> otherwise known as
> > > > "equivocation". As you concluded
> in your interjected remarks, of my previous post,
> in
> > > > effect --- It's a helpful exercize.
> > > >
> > > > Kevin
> > > >
> > >
> >