Thank you, Joseph. The passage you refer to is lines 987a29-b1 at the
beginning of chapter vi of Book I (Alpha). May I first make a
suggestion: in your particular situation, with a need for a
translation and a curiosity about the Greek text, you might find
most useful the Loeb edition of the Metaphysics, 2 vols., Harvard
University Press. They cost $21.50 each, perhaps slightly less at
Amazon, but it you plan to spend much time with the Metaphysics, you
will find them worthwhile.

The word, "men", you will usually find used in conjunction with the
word, "de." This pair of "particles," as the grammarians call them,
is also usually found at the heads, each of them , of two subordinate
clauses that the writer wishes to set in apposition or opposition
with each other. They often do mean "on the one hand . . . on the
other," although also the contrast may be expressed much more loosely

The "men . . . de" clause you refer to is at 987b1, the opposition it
expresses is almost lost in the translation, as Tredennick gives it.
"tauta men kai husteron houtOs hupelaben , SOkratous de . . .
etc., [Plato] later understood these things thus." tauta = these
things; husteron = later; houtOs = thus; hupelaben = took up or
understood. "SOkratous de = BUT ON THE OTHER HAND Socrates, etc." The
contrast implied there (rather strongly) is between the physical
doctrines of the Heracliteans and the ethical interests of Socrates.
No irony there. Aristotle is straight-facedly reporting some history
as he sees it. But not as clearly as he might have done.

This is an example of where the Greek helps. It is slow getting at
first of course, but if you keep plugging away at these little
puzzles here and there, you will be rewarded. - Ed L.

Hello again,

Regarding my previous question I want to ask it again in view of the
multiple occurrences of 'men' to avoid misunderstanding. I double
asterixed the phrase I was asking about. I understand there is the
men...de clause in and around what follows concerning Socrates but
there is a 'men...' just before Socrates too.

The point I am after is whether by some stretch of the imagination
Aristotle could have been pointing out the irony of a Plato who
agreed that all is flux but at the same time arrived at unchanging
eternal forms 'which he held onto till the end' as if in answer. The
point being that for Aristotle, Plato sorted out Physis and Stasis
according to his theorem just as all thinkers do. So Aristotle may
have been saying, lost within the dim regions of translation, that
Plato thought all things were in flux and yet he held on to the
unchanging forms to the end. This would mean that Aristotle had a
modern intentionality by which he knowingly took 'eternal forms' and
placed them on the level of presentations as we do sense data. And he
says 'see, some presentations after all are admitted to be
unchanging.'

I am not a scholar and of course all I am asking is whether by some
stretch of the imagination Aristotle could be translated to mean he
was pointing out an irony in Plato's thinking about 'all is flux'
and 'unchanging eternal forms' and I ask that question on the basis
of the other 'men' which precedes the word 'Socratous'. Are all the
instances of men..., men...de, and 'mentoi' taken into account in the
current translations. I have snipped the Greek and the English of the
passages from Perseus and double asterixed the area I am interested
in. Many thanks for your attention to my question.

Joseph Ferrara


meta de tas eirêmenas philosophias hê Platônos epegeneto [30]
pragmateia, ta men polla toutois akolouthousa, ta de kai idia para
tên tôn Italikôn echousa philosophian. ek neou te gar sunêthês
genomenos prôton **Kratulôi kai tais Hêrakleiteiois doxais, hôs
hapantôn tôn aisthêtôn aei rheontôn kai epistêmês peri autôn ouk
ousês, tauta men kai husteron houtôs hupelaben**:[987b][1] Sôkratous
de peri men ta êthika pragmateuomenou peri de tês holês phuseôs
outhen, en mentoi toutois to katholou zêtountos kai peri horismôn
epistêsantos prôtou tên dianoian, ekeinon apodexamenos dia to
toiouton [5] hupelaben hôs peri heterôn touto gignomenon kai ou tôn
aisthêtôn: adunaton gar einai ton koinon horon tôn aisthêtôn tinos,
aei ge metaballontôn. houtos oun ta men toiauta tôn ontôn ideas
prosêgoreuse, ta d' aisthêta para tauta kai kata tauta legesthai
panta: kata methexin gar einai ta [10] polla homônuma tois eidesin.
tên de methexin tounoma monon metebalen: hoi men gar Puthagoreioi
mimêsei ta onta phasin einai tôn arithmôn, Platôn de methexei,
tounoma metabalôn.

The philosophies described above were succeeded by the system of
Plato,4 which in most respects accorded with them, but contained also
certain peculiar features distinct from the philosophy of the
Italians.In his youth Plato first became acquainted with **Cratylus5
and the Heraclitean doctrines--**that the whole sensible world is
always in a state of flux,6 and that there is no scientific knowledge
of it--and in after years he still held these opinions.**[987b][1]
And when Socrates, disregarding the physical universe and confining
his study to moral questions, sought in this sphere for the universal
and was the first to concentrate upon definition, Plato followed him
and assumed that the problem of definition is concerned not with any
sensible thing but with entities of another kind; for the reason that
there can be no general definition of sensible things which are
always changing.These entities he called "Ideas,"1 and held that all
sensible things are named after2 them sensible and in virtue of their
relation to them; for the plurality of things which bear the same
name as the Forms exist by participation in them. (With regard to
the "participation," it was only the term that he changed; for
whereas the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of
numbers, Plato says that they exist by participation--merely a change
of term.As to what this "participation" or "imitation" may be, they
left this an open question.)

Joseph, it seems to me that you have asked two questions: (1) What
did Aristotle mean or intend? Was he turning Plato's Ideas into
things on the same level as sensibles? and (2) what was his
attitude? Was it irony, or was he being straight-faced about this? My
inclination is that the answer to the first is "yes", definitely; and
the answer t the second is that he is quite serious about this. Irony
however is a very delicate and subtle thing, and may be missed or
mistaken, but my understanding of Aristotle au fond is that he does
not aim to repudiate his teacher but to correct him (or was it really
his followers in the Academy after his death?) on the notion of
Ideas "ekei", and not "entautha", i.e. the notion that they were
physically transcendent a la Phaedo. It all comes back to the
ambiguity of transcendence, physical or mental.

Best we be not upset by the particle. They are usually most helpful,
but often they are used with a profusion that is confusin',
as "Lord" Timothey Dexter, the sage of Newburyport, "The Greatest
Philosopher in the West, " sprinkled his text of "A Pickle for the
Knowing Ones" with commas and other punctuation marks. Well, that is
unfair to Aristotle and his friends, but it is an amusing analogy,
for which to see, "google" it.

- Ed

On Oct 5, 2006, at 5:00 PM, jpferrara06379 wrote:

> Hello again,
>
> Regarding my previous question I want to ask it again in view of the
> multiple occurrences of 'men' to avoid misunderstanding. I double
> asterixed the phrase I was asking about. I understand there is the
> men...de clause in and around what follows concerning Socrates but
> there is a 'men...' just before Socrates too.
>
> The point I am after is whether by some stretch of the imagination
> Aristotle could have been pointing out the irony of a Plato who
> agreed that all is flux but at the same time arrived at unchanging
> eternal forms 'which he held onto till the end' as if in answer. The
> point being that for Aristotle, Plato sorted out Physis and Stasis
> according to his theorem just as all thinkers do. So Aristotle may
> have been saying, lost within the dim regions of translation, that
> Plato thought all things were in flux and yet he held on to the
> unchanging forms to the end. This would mean that Aristotle had a
> modern intentionality by which he knowingly took 'eternal forms' and
> placed them on the level of presentations as we do sense data. And he
> says 'see, some presentations after all are admitted to be
> unchanging.'
>
> I am not a scholar and of course all I am asking is whether by some
> stretch of the imagination Aristotle could be translated to mean he
> was pointing out an irony in Plato's thinking about 'all is flux'
> and 'unchanging eternal forms' and I ask that question on the basis
> of the other 'men' which precedes the word 'Socratous'. Are all the
> instances of men..., men...de, and 'mentoi' taken into account in the
> current translations. I have snipped the Greek and the English of the
> passages from Perseus and double asterixed the area I am interested
> in. Many thanks for your attention to my question.
>
> Joseph Ferrara
>
> meta de tas eirêmenas philosophias hê Platônos epegeneto [30]
> pragmateia, ta men polla toutois akolouthousa, ta de kai idia para
> tên tôn Italikôn echousa philosophian. ek neou te gar sunêthês
> genomenos prôton **Kratulôi kai tais Hêrakleiteiois doxais, hôs
> hapantôn tôn aisthêtôn aei rheontôn kai epistêmês peri autôn ouk
> ousês, tauta men kai husteron houtôs hupelaben**:[987b][1] Sôkratous
> de peri men ta êthika pragmateuomenou peri de tês holês phuseôs
> outhen, en mentoi toutois to katholou zêtountos kai peri horismôn
> epistêsantos prôtou tên dianoian, ekeinon apodexamenos dia to
> toiouton [5] hupelaben hôs peri heterôn touto gignomenon kai ou tôn
> aisthêtôn: adunaton gar einai ton koinon horon tôn aisthêtôn tinos,
> aei ge metaballontôn. houtos oun ta men toiauta tôn ontôn ideas
> prosêgoreuse, ta d' aisthêta para tauta kai kata tauta legesthai
> panta: kata methexin gar einai ta [10] polla homônuma tois eidesin.
> tên de methexin tounoma monon metebalen: hoi men gar Puthagoreioi
> mimêsei ta onta phasin einai tôn arithmôn, Platôn de methexei,
> tounoma metabalôn.
>
> The philosophies described above were succeeded by the system of
> Plato,4 which in most respects accorded with them, but contained also
> certain peculiar features distinct from the philosophy of the
> Italians.In his youth Plato first became acquainted with **Cratylus5
> and the Heraclitean doctrines--**that the whole sensible world is
> always in a state of flux,6 and that there is no scientific knowledge
> of it--and in after years he still held these opinions.**[987b][1]
> And when Socrates, disregarding the physical universe and confining
> his study to moral questions, sought in this sphere for the universal
> and was the first to concentrate upon definition, Plato followed him
> and assumed that the problem of definition is concerned not with any
> sensible thing but with entities of another kind; for the reason that
> there can be no general definition of sensible things which are
> always changing.These entities he called "Ideas,"1 and held that all
> sensible things are named after2 them sensible and in virtue of their
> relation to them; for the plurality of things which bear the same
> name as the Forms exist by participation in them. (With regard to
> the "participation," it was only the term that he changed; for
> whereas the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of
> numbers, Plato says that they exist by participation--merely a change
> of term.As to what this "participation" or "imitation" may be, they
> left this an open question.)
>
>
>



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