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Re: Paradoxes and Contradictions

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  • ted.wrinch
    There s two more interesting quotes from lecture 1 of KoU on this topic. The first is from George Brandes: `So the Kaiser was not all that keen on a war with
    Message 1 of 15 , Jan 26, 2012
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      There's two more interesting quotes from lecture 1 of KoU on this topic. The first is from George Brandes:

      `So the Kaiser was not all that keen on a war with England at that time. And it will not be easy to convince any thoughtful person that six years after the publication of that interview he was all of a sudden eagerly planning to go to war with the whole globe. It is obvious, of course, that his Government made a false calculation. But they did not want war with England in 1914, and the uncontrollable hate of the German people against the English which burst out so repulsively was obviously the result of the surprise of discovering in Great Britain an unexpected and uncommonly powerful enemy.

      To the last minute, Germany sought through her diplomats to win England's neutrality. They worked cautiously. The German Chancellor proposed to Sir Edward Goschen (the British Ambassador in Berlin) that he would stand for the inviolability of French territory if Germany should happen to conquer France and Russia. But Sir Edward Grey's attitude was negative because Germany would not extend this guarantee to include the French colonies.

      Now Prince Lichnowsky, [ Note 22 ] the German Ambassador in London, asked whether England would agree to remain neutral if Germany refrained from violating Belgium's neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused. He wanted to retain a free hand. ("I did not think we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.") Would he agree if Germany were to guarantee the integrity of both France and her colonies? No. ("The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her Colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.")

      Sir Edward Grey afterwards maintained that Prince Lichnowsky had certainly over-stepped his authority in making these offers. Surely he could only say such a thing because he was, and still is, convinced that Germany had an invincible urge to do battle simultaneously with Russia, France, England and Belgium.

      `As I said earlier, and this is obvious to common sense, Germany was prepared for a German-Russian war, should this arise from the invasion of Serbia by Austria. But Germany did not want to molest France (or Belgium) if she remained neutral…."

      Farbenblinde Neutralität, Internationafe Rundschau, Zurich 1916


      The second is:

      "On 3 August, in the House of Commons, Grey gave his long speech to prepare people's minds for the English declaration of war. He suppressed Germany's latest suggestions and calculated that England would suffer scarcely more damage by joining in than by remaining on the sidelines. On 6 August Prime Minister Asquith spoke to Parliament to justify the declaration of war. He based his justification on the suggestions made by the German Chancellor on 29 July, rejected with deep moral indignation the request of the German Government, refrained (as his "honourable friend" Grey had done) from mentioning the negotiations with the German ambassador of 1 August, and deliberately gave Parliament, the English people and, indeed, the whole world, a false version of the facts."

      Zur Geschichte des Kriegsausbruches. Nach den amtlichen Akten der Königlich Grossbritannischen Regierung dargestellt, Bern, 1916

      Steiner says of this:

      " This article, the fruit of a historical seminar at a Swiss university, was even awarded a prize by the University of Berne."

      http://wn.rsarchive.org/Lectures/GA173/English/RSP1988/19161204p01.html

      T.

      Ted Wrinch

      --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "ted.wrinch" <ted.wrinch@...> wrote:
      >
      > I'm not sure we're discussing the same thing here. The relevant bit of the communication is this:
      >
      > "He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.
      >
      > I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.
      >
      > The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.
      >
      > I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."
      >
      > The 'neutrality' of Britain Grey is referring to is with respect to the other partners of the Triple Alliance, France and Russia. The German Ambassador is offering that Germany not invade Belgium or France if Britain doesn't defend France. The result would have been no war in the West, though still probably a localised war in the East.
      >
      > If you think the whole thing is a ploy then it doen't much matter what was said; but I AFAIK, that is an unusual interpretation of a communication like this.
      >
      > T.
      >
      > Ted Wrinch
      >
      > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "Frank Thomas Smith" <fts.trasla@> wrote:
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "ted.wrinch" <ted.wrinch@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > "Germany invaded Belgium in order to get at France by the most direct route. Could Britain have prevented that? How?"
      > > >
      > > > By accepting the German ambassador's offer to remain neutral wrt Belgium and France if England would remain neutral. The question is not about the Belgians' 'cries for help', as those occurred after that communication on 1 August 1914. According to that communication from Sir Edward Grey the German ambassador had offered French and Belgian neutrality in exchange for English neutrality. If Grey had accepted it seems that Germany would not have mobilised to the West at all and there would have been no Belgian neutrality violation or invasion of France. This seems the inevitable conclusion, if that communication is genuine. On which latter subject, no one has claimed it isn't genuine; there also seems a degree of further corroboratory evidence in that the British government a couple of years later accepted its existence, but not that the offer was 'formal' one. This is just an evasion - ambassadors of a country have the right to make 'formal', binding offers (as much as anything is binding in international relations).
      > > >
      > >
      > > Belgium was already neutral, so Britain's "guarantee" was not necessary. It was all a German ploy to be able to claim that Britain was the guilty party. Really too transparent to take seriously.
      > > Frank
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > >
      > > > Ted Wrinch
      > > >
      > > > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "Frank Thomas Smith" <fts.trasla@> wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "elfuncle" <elfuncle@> wrote:
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "ted.wrinch"
      > > > > > <ted.wrinch@> wrote:
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > I also would like to ask: what do you think about this thesis and the
      > > > > > evidence, that Britain could have prevented WW1?
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Maybe Frank or somebody else will bite, but I'm not ready to go there
      > > > > > yet; I haven't done enough research. I'm currently going through the
      > > > > > long 19th century, which Robert I. Weiner (Professor of History,
      > > > > > Lafayette College) reckons from 1789 to 1917. There is plenty of
      > > > > > historical background stuff to be picked up from Steiner's lectures btw,
      > > > > > with respect to the often chaotic events in 19th century Europe, the
      > > > > > rivalries, short wars and changing alliances and so on. The detailed
      > > > > > political developments inside the major European imperial powers between
      > > > > > 1900 and 1914 are also very important. Perhaps we can get back to this
      > > > > > some other time.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Tarjei
      > > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > Germany invaded Belgium in order to get at France by the most direct route. Could Britain have prevented that? How? Of course the Brits could have ignored their treaty with Belgium and the latter's cries for help and let the Germans win...but that's no way of avoiding war...or is it? There was a tremendous anti-German propaganda campaign during the war. Steiner's defense was to argue that the German *people* were not to blame, but their idiotic kaiser and his government.
      > > > > Fot an excellent web site about the First WW, see:
      > > > > http://www.firstworldwar.com/origins/causes.htm
      > > > >
      > > > > and/or a more concise description prepared by me:
      > > > >
      > > > > 12. Page l35 'the decisive events in Berlin'. The memoirs of General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff at the outbreak of the war, were ready for publication in May 1919. Von Moltke describes the German Government's attitude at that time, especially on 31 July and 1 August 1914:'The atmosphere grew steadily more tense and I was completely alone.' Then he was told by the Kaiser, 'So now you can do whatever you want.' Rudolf Steiner wrote in a commentary: 'So there it was: the Chief of the General Staff stood completely alone. Due to the fact that German policy had reached the zero-point, Europe's destiny on 31 July and 1 August rested in the hands of a man who was obliged to do his military duty.' (Vorbemerkungen zu Die Schuld am Krieg, Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen des Generalstabschefs H. von Moltke.) Aufsätze über die Dreigliederung des Sozialen Organismus. This 'military duty' involved implementing the German army's predetermined war-plan, prepared by von Moltke's predecessor General Schlieffen, which provided for the domination of France before invading Russia. France was to be attacked through Belgium and Holland. Von Moltke modified the plan to the extent that Holland was omitted. His memoirs were suppressed in 1919, but Rudolf Steiner, who was personally acquainted with him, was familiar with their contents. In an interview which appeared in the French newspaper Le Matin in October 1921,Steiner said that the memoirs should have been published in 1919, but they were suppressed because of fear on the part of the authorities. `Why this fear? These memoirs are in no way an accusation against the imperial government. Something else is involved, which is perhaps even worse: that this imperial government found itself in a state of complete confusion and under an incredibly frivolous and ignorant leadership.' Jules Sauerman's interview with Dr. Rudolf Steiner on the unpublished memoirs of the late Chief of the German General Staff von Moltke. ibid.
      > > > >
      > > > > http://southerncrossreview.org/Ebooks/ebbasicissues2.htm
      > > > >
      > > > > Frank
      > > > >
      > > >
      > >
      >
    • ted.wrinch
      Missed the author: the second extract was by Dr Jakob Ruchti. T. Ted Wrinch
      Message 2 of 15 , Jan 26, 2012
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        Missed the author: the second extract was by Dr Jakob Ruchti.

        T.

        Ted Wrinch

        --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "ted.wrinch" <ted.wrinch@...> wrote:
        >
        > There's two more interesting quotes from lecture 1 of KoU on this topic. The first is from George Brandes:
        >
        > `So the Kaiser was not all that keen on a war with England at that time. And it will not be easy to convince any thoughtful person that six years after the publication of that interview he was all of a sudden eagerly planning to go to war with the whole globe. It is obvious, of course, that his Government made a false calculation. But they did not want war with England in 1914, and the uncontrollable hate of the German people against the English which burst out so repulsively was obviously the result of the surprise of discovering in Great Britain an unexpected and uncommonly powerful enemy.
        >
        > To the last minute, Germany sought through her diplomats to win England's neutrality. They worked cautiously. The German Chancellor proposed to Sir Edward Goschen (the British Ambassador in Berlin) that he would stand for the inviolability of French territory if Germany should happen to conquer France and Russia. But Sir Edward Grey's attitude was negative because Germany would not extend this guarantee to include the French colonies.
        >
        > Now Prince Lichnowsky, [ Note 22 ] the German Ambassador in London, asked whether England would agree to remain neutral if Germany refrained from violating Belgium's neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused. He wanted to retain a free hand. ("I did not think we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.") Would he agree if Germany were to guarantee the integrity of both France and her colonies? No. ("The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her Colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.")
        >
        > Sir Edward Grey afterwards maintained that Prince Lichnowsky had certainly over-stepped his authority in making these offers. Surely he could only say such a thing because he was, and still is, convinced that Germany had an invincible urge to do battle simultaneously with Russia, France, England and Belgium.
        >
        > `As I said earlier, and this is obvious to common sense, Germany was prepared for a German-Russian war, should this arise from the invasion of Serbia by Austria. But Germany did not want to molest France (or Belgium) if she remained neutral…."
        >
        > Farbenblinde Neutralität, Internationafe Rundschau, Zurich 1916
        >
        >
        > The second is:
        >
        > "On 3 August, in the House of Commons, Grey gave his long speech to prepare people's minds for the English declaration of war. He suppressed Germany's latest suggestions and calculated that England would suffer scarcely more damage by joining in than by remaining on the sidelines. On 6 August Prime Minister Asquith spoke to Parliament to justify the declaration of war. He based his justification on the suggestions made by the German Chancellor on 29 July, rejected with deep moral indignation the request of the German Government, refrained (as his "honourable friend" Grey had done) from mentioning the negotiations with the German ambassador of 1 August, and deliberately gave Parliament, the English people and, indeed, the whole world, a false version of the facts."
        >
        > Zur Geschichte des Kriegsausbruches. Nach den amtlichen Akten der Königlich Grossbritannischen Regierung dargestellt, Bern, 1916
        >
        > Steiner says of this:
        >
        > " This article, the fruit of a historical seminar at a Swiss university, was even awarded a prize by the University of Berne."
        >
        > http://wn.rsarchive.org/Lectures/GA173/English/RSP1988/19161204p01.html
        >
        > T.
        >
        > Ted Wrinch
        >
        > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "ted.wrinch" <ted.wrinch@> wrote:
        > >
        > > I'm not sure we're discussing the same thing here. The relevant bit of the communication is this:
        > >
        > > "He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.
        > >
        > > I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.
        > >
        > > The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.
        > >
        > > I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."
        > >
        > > The 'neutrality' of Britain Grey is referring to is with respect to the other partners of the Triple Alliance, France and Russia. The German Ambassador is offering that Germany not invade Belgium or France if Britain doesn't defend France. The result would have been no war in the West, though still probably a localised war in the East.
        > >
        > > If you think the whole thing is a ploy then it doen't much matter what was said; but I AFAIK, that is an unusual interpretation of a communication like this.
        > >
        > > T.
        > >
        > > Ted Wrinch
        > >
        > > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "Frank Thomas Smith" <fts.trasla@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "ted.wrinch" <ted.wrinch@> wrote:
        > > > >
        > > > > "Germany invaded Belgium in order to get at France by the most direct route. Could Britain have prevented that? How?"
        > > > >
        > > > > By accepting the German ambassador's offer to remain neutral wrt Belgium and France if England would remain neutral. The question is not about the Belgians' 'cries for help', as those occurred after that communication on 1 August 1914. According to that communication from Sir Edward Grey the German ambassador had offered French and Belgian neutrality in exchange for English neutrality. If Grey had accepted it seems that Germany would not have mobilised to the West at all and there would have been no Belgian neutrality violation or invasion of France. This seems the inevitable conclusion, if that communication is genuine. On which latter subject, no one has claimed it isn't genuine; there also seems a degree of further corroboratory evidence in that the British government a couple of years later accepted its existence, but not that the offer was 'formal' one. This is just an evasion - ambassadors of a country have the right to make 'formal', binding offers (as much as anything is binding in international relations).
        > > > >
        > > >
        > > > Belgium was already neutral, so Britain's "guarantee" was not necessary. It was all a German ploy to be able to claim that Britain was the guilty party. Really too transparent to take seriously.
        > > > Frank
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > Ted Wrinch
        > > > >
        > > > > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "Frank Thomas Smith" <fts.trasla@> wrote:
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "elfuncle" <elfuncle@> wrote:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > --- In anthroposophy_tomorrow@yahoogroups.com, "ted.wrinch"
        > > > > > > <ted.wrinch@> wrote:
        > > > > > > >
        > > > > > > > I also would like to ask: what do you think about this thesis and the
        > > > > > > evidence, that Britain could have prevented WW1?
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Maybe Frank or somebody else will bite, but I'm not ready to go there
        > > > > > > yet; I haven't done enough research. I'm currently going through the
        > > > > > > long 19th century, which Robert I. Weiner (Professor of History,
        > > > > > > Lafayette College) reckons from 1789 to 1917. There is plenty of
        > > > > > > historical background stuff to be picked up from Steiner's lectures btw,
        > > > > > > with respect to the often chaotic events in 19th century Europe, the
        > > > > > > rivalries, short wars and changing alliances and so on. The detailed
        > > > > > > political developments inside the major European imperial powers between
        > > > > > > 1900 and 1914 are also very important. Perhaps we can get back to this
        > > > > > > some other time.
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Tarjei
        > > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Germany invaded Belgium in order to get at France by the most direct route. Could Britain have prevented that? How? Of course the Brits could have ignored their treaty with Belgium and the latter's cries for help and let the Germans win...but that's no way of avoiding war...or is it? There was a tremendous anti-German propaganda campaign during the war. Steiner's defense was to argue that the German *people* were not to blame, but their idiotic kaiser and his government.
        > > > > > Fot an excellent web site about the First WW, see:
        > > > > > http://www.firstworldwar.com/origins/causes.htm
        > > > > >
        > > > > > and/or a more concise description prepared by me:
        > > > > >
        > > > > > 12. Page l35 'the decisive events in Berlin'. The memoirs of General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff at the outbreak of the war, were ready for publication in May 1919. Von Moltke describes the German Government's attitude at that time, especially on 31 July and 1 August 1914:'The atmosphere grew steadily more tense and I was completely alone.' Then he was told by the Kaiser, 'So now you can do whatever you want.' Rudolf Steiner wrote in a commentary: 'So there it was: the Chief of the General Staff stood completely alone. Due to the fact that German policy had reached the zero-point, Europe's destiny on 31 July and 1 August rested in the hands of a man who was obliged to do his military duty.' (Vorbemerkungen zu Die Schuld am Krieg, Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen des Generalstabschefs H. von Moltke.) Aufsätze über die Dreigliederung des Sozialen Organismus. This 'military duty' involved implementing the German army's predetermined war-plan, prepared by von Moltke's predecessor General Schlieffen, which provided for the domination of France before invading Russia. France was to be attacked through Belgium and Holland. Von Moltke modified the plan to the extent that Holland was omitted. His memoirs were suppressed in 1919, but Rudolf Steiner, who was personally acquainted with him, was familiar with their contents. In an interview which appeared in the French newspaper Le Matin in October 1921,Steiner said that the memoirs should have been published in 1919, but they were suppressed because of fear on the part of the authorities. `Why this fear? These memoirs are in no way an accusation against the imperial government. Something else is involved, which is perhaps even worse: that this imperial government found itself in a state of complete confusion and under an incredibly frivolous and ignorant leadership.' Jules Sauerman's interview with Dr. Rudolf Steiner on the unpublished memoirs of the late Chief of the German General Staff von Moltke. ibid.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > http://southerncrossreview.org/Ebooks/ebbasicissues2.htm
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Frank
        > > > > >
        > > > >
        > > >
        > >
        >
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