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R: [anthroposophy] Whohlstetter not Strauss, and a guy named Quine - From the horse's mouth

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    Tks a lot. In order to gain a full picture of the events Wolfo is talkin about from his own standpoint (. mostly the 9/11 issue) , you should have to read :
    Message 1 of 1 , Jun 2, 2003
      Tks a lot.
      In order to gain a full picture of the events Wolfo is talkin' about from
      his own standpoint (. mostly the 9/11 issue) , you should have to read :
      "The War on Freedom. How and Why America was attached on 2001 Sept.11" by
      N-Mossadeq Ahmed (London 2002).
      (Something about it is also on www.copvcia.com )
      The author works for the "Institute for Policy research & Development" in
      Brighton, England.


      ----- Original Message -----
      From: <eyecueco@...>
      To: <anthroposophy@yahoogroups.com>
      Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2003 8:08 PM
      Subject: [anthroposophy] Whohlstetter not Strauss, and a guy named Quine -
      From the horse's mouth

      > An interview from planet earth about decision-making by human beings, (not
      > secret lodge conspirators carrying out occult world plots) doing their
      best when
      > confronted with decisions that have to be made to prevent western
      > as we know it from going down the tube...
      > ______________________________________________________________________
      > Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair
      > Q: What do you think all the conspiritorial talk is? Do you have any
      > in Europe and here? What are people looking at this way?
      > Wolfowitz: I think it's pretty obvious and I think it's pretty disgraceful
      > but all you can do is ignore it and go on and get the job done.
      > Q: What is it? I mean some say anti-Semitism. I guess in Europe that would
      > be --
      > Wolfowitz: I just said all I'm going to say about it.
      > Q: Okay.
      > There's a question now as to whether in Iraq itself --
      > Wolfowitz: You know it's completely out in the open who holds what views
      > this Administration. You couldn't be more transparent about what the
      > arguments are. The most significant thing that has produced what is
      > admittedly a fairly significant change in American policy is the events of
      > September 11th which are going to count as one of the -- If you had to
      > the ten most important foreign policy things for the United States over
      > last 100 years it would surely rank in the top ten if not number one. It's
      > the reason why so much has changed, and people who refuse to look at that,
      > for whatever reason, or are unwilling to face up to the implications of
      > then go around and look for some nefarious explanation. But it's shameful.
      > Q: Since you brought that up let me ask you something related to that.
      > looked at the remarkable Defense Policy Guidance of 1992 --
      > Wolfowitz: Wait a minute. Did you look at the guidance or did you look at
      > the draft that was leaked before I saw it?
      > Q: That's a very good point. Actually all I saw were summaries of it. Is
      > there a big discrepancy as to what was reported and what was in it?
      > Wolfowitz: Yes. In short. At some point I guess it's acquired such a life
      > its own I ought to go back and refresh my memory.
      > But the way I remember it approximately is as follows. I gave a quite
      > substantial briefing to Secretary Cheney and what was then called I guess
      > the Defense Resources Board on a post-Cold War defense strategy, the
      > of which was to shift from a strategy for being prepared to fight a global
      > war, to being focused on two possible regional conflicts. And to downsize
      > the U.S. military by some 40 percent.
      > That was sort of taken to the President, promulgated in a speech in Aspen
      > August 2, 1990, which you may recall happened also to be the day that Iraq
      > invaded Kuwait. In fact we had, in that briefing that I gave in May I
      > it focused on the Iraqi threat to the Arabian peninsula as one of the
      > regional problems we needed to be prepared to deal with. At the time that
      > was considered a revolutionary idea. By the time the President gave the
      > speech it had already happened. [Laughter]
      > Then that general briefing had to be translated into a guidance document
      > the department. Some people on my staff wrote a draft. Before I even got
      > see the draft someone leaked it to the New York Times, apparently because
      > they didn't like it. The New York Times then wrote about the draft.
      > If you go back, and you can do this with Lexis/Nexis. If you go back, the
      > excerpts from the draft are nowhere near as hysterical as the way the New
      > York Times reported it. So people in the first place were reacting to the
      > New York Times description of the draft as opposed to the actual text of
      > draft which the Times in fact did publish.
      > I repeat, it was not a draft that I'd even reviewed yet.
      > As I recall, one of the pieces of hysteria was the idea that this is a
      > blueprint for a massive increase in U.S. defense spending, when in fact it
      > was a blueprint for a 40 percent reduction in U.S. defense spending. It
      > on from there.
      > When we did a revised draft that in fact I had reviewed carefully, the
      > Department initially didn't want us to put it out, I think because it was
      > little too much. Well, I don't know why. They didn't want us to put it
      > I don't want to speculate on motives. But in January of 1993 as we were
      > about to leave, I said to Cheney don't you think we should publish it? And
      > he said yes, we should. So it's available in the full text as the Regional
      > Defense Strategy of January, 1993.
      > I know people say oh well, they just sanded off the corners because the
      > thing received such an adverse reaction. But the truth of the matter is
      > the Times was writing about was something that I'd never seen. What is
      > published, while I will admit some of the corners are rounded off on it,
      > reflects my views.
      > Q: What did you make of the reaction at the time? You were an important
      > public official then, but you weren't particularly visible. And I looked
      > the Times -- That was the right hand column front page story on the same
      > day, by the way, that the Whitewater story broke in the paper, March 8,
      > 1992.
      > And of course there were Democratic primaries coming up, Super Tuesday.
      > this your first taste of what the media will do to you when they think
      > have a story? Or were you schooled in that before?
      > Wolfowitz: I've run into it before. If the media had more of a right wing
      > bias I would have run into it in a major way with the Philippine policy.
      > had a few shots at us from the conservative press that we were undermining
      > Reagan's good friend Ferdinand Marcos. No, I've been shot at from both
      > directions.
      > I think the first time was over the Team B exercise back in 1976.
      > Q: Oh, that's right.
      > Wolfowitz: It seems to go with the territory.
      > Q: And there again you'd written a fairly straightforward account, wasn't
      > of intermediate missiles or something?
      > Wolfowitz: That's right. Which turned out to be, I wouldn't say prophetic,
      > but it was prescient. It was completely borne out by what came
      > but it was again -- I don't know whether people caricature it in order to
      > discredit it, or they caricature it because they don't understand it. Or
      > maybe some of both.
      > But the way I would put it in terms of the '92 document and briefings is
      > that, you have to remember, the Cold War had ended. There were a lot of
      > people who said we don't need any of these Cold War alliances any more. We
      > don't need NATO any more. Then President Bush was asked why do you need
      > now that the threat's gone away? He said the threat's still there. They
      > what is it? He said the threat's uncertainty, and people sort of laughed
      > that.
      > Well, it's not a bad description for what's happened in the Balkans in the
      > intervening period. And what we were basically arguing in that document is
      > that while we can manage with a substantially reduced U.S. defense force,
      > for a lot of people to retain 60 percent of it in those alliance
      > commitments, they somehow, I guess, thought we could go to complete
      > disarmament or something. I'm not sure what their model was.
      > In fact the New York Times specifically had this absurd line, I remember,
      > that we had abandoned 50 years of reliance on the doctrine of collective
      > security, I think. I'd have to go back and get the quote. But basically
      > as though for 50 years we'd been relying on the United Nations and this
      > document was going to undo it, as opposed to for 50 years we'd relied on
      > NATO and our alliances in Northeast Asia and this document was trying to
      > support them.
      > I remember at the time that a couple of Democratic senators -- It's easy
      > recover them. You just go and look in Pat Buchanan's book -- sort of
      > hysterical about this grand plan for continuing and maybe even expanding
      > American commitments. Because we did, in a sense one of the more radical
      > things in there was, if I can use an awful phrase, the adumbration of NATO
      > enlargement. We weren't quite so bold as to say it but we were hinting at
      > it. There was some discussion about, in a complementary document that was
      > also leaked, about whether the United States could honor a defense
      > commitment to Lithuania if we had one. This was considered wildly
      > and various Democratic senators attacked us.
      > Pat Buchanan's "Republic Not an Empire" book spends its first chapter
      > attacking the so-called Wolfowitz Memorandum.
      > Q: Right, I know that book.
      > Wolfowitz: And he laments the fact that these same Democratic senators who
      > were attacking--in his view, appropriately attacking--the Wolfowitz
      > Memorandum, had climbed on board the whole policy when it became Clinton's
      > policy in the mid 1990s. He's correct in saying that what was considered
      > the New York Times to be such an outrageous document was U.S. consensus
      > foreign policy, but during the Clinton Administration, not in this
      > Administration. That is that these alliances needed to be retained, that
      > NATO could be enlarged successfully, that we could downsize our military
      > we needed to retain a capability to deal with two major regional
      > which, by the way, is something that needed revision by the time I got
      > here. But it was the defense policy of the Clinton years, ironically.
      > Q: In fact John Louis Gaddis said that.
      > Wolfowitz: Who?
      > Q: John Louis Gaddis has said that, that if you look at Clinton's policy
      > actually does come out of the '92 guidance to some extent.
      > Wolfowitz: Not to some extent. It's pretty much verbatim.
      > Q: But you're --
      > Wolfowitz: -- without acknowledgement.
      > Q: Except you have been skeptical about Clinton's, the sentimental
      > liberalism in his ideas, his approach to foreign policy, right?
      > Wolfowitz: Well, yes but let's remember that -- I think they made a
      > over-reach in Somalia when they went beyond just ending starvation and
      > to do nationbuilding. I think Haiti was a waste of American effort. I
      > as we've learned, the North Korea Framework Agreement was delusional. But
      > two of the key things they did, namely Bosnia and Kosovo, Bob Dole
      > Clinton quite strongly and I would say courageously on Bosnia and I'm
      > to claim some credit in having advised --
      > Q: You did too.
      > Wolfowitz: I did too, but I also was there when Dole was being pushed by
      > some of his Republican colleagues to go after Clinton saying this would be
      > catastrophe. I said no it won't be, and moreover, it's the right thing to
      > do.
      > If they had dropped the arms embargo on the Bosnians as they promised to
      > when they came into office it might not have been necessary to still have
      > thousands of foreign troops in Bosnia. But by the time you got to it in
      > it was the only alternative.
      > And similarly, on Kosovo, when Bush was deciding whether to support it or
      > not, I was strongly urging him to do so. When some Republicans tried to
      > undercut Clinton on Kosovo, it was Bush and McCain together who told them
      > don't do that. It's wrong.
      > So it's not that everything they did was wrong, but I think things like
      > Haiti and Somalia were over-reached and generally there was, I think, a
      > difficulty in distinguishing what was American interest from what were
      > of vaguely seen as international community preferences. But I'm not a
      > unilateralist by any means. In fact I don't think you can get much done in
      > this world if you do it alone.
      > Q: Do you think there was a reluctance on their part even to use the
      > of force? To make force an option in the way that it's now become -- I
      > about North Korea, Syria and Iran, and actually --
      > Wolfowitz: And Iraq.
      > Q: And Iraq. When I think about it, these other three that have now been
      > brought up, being discussed, have actually been very kind of multinational
      > and diplomatic and yet it's partly the threat of force that seems to
      > strengthen the approach, doesn't it?
      > Wolfowitz: There's no question that in certain -- First of all, diplomacy
      > that it's just words is rarely going to get you much unless you're dealing
      > with people who basically share your values and your interests. I'm not
      > against, I mean sometimes it does help to just have a better
      > But if you're talking about trying to move people to something that
      > not inclined to do, then you've got to have leverage and one piece of
      > leverage is the ultimate threat of force. It's something you need to be
      > careful about because, as Rumsfeld likes to say, don't cock unless you're
      > prepared to throw it.
      > By the way I think there was a tendency to cock it too often with Kosovo.
      > you go back and look at the year and a half or so leading up to when we
      > finally did use force there were so many empty threats issued that
      > clearly concluded, ultimately wrongly, that we weren't serious.
      > So I think yeah, I think the threat of force is one of the instruments of
      > diplomacy, but it's one that needs to be used carefully.
      > I'm going to have to break here for a few minutes and we'll try to get
      > to you soon.
      > Q: Thanks so much. Goodbye.
      > [Session Two, Saturday, May 10, 2003]
      > Wolfowitz: Hello.
      > Q: How are you doing?
      > Wolfowitz: Pretty good. How are you?
      > Q: Okay. I will try to make this painless. It reminds me of an interview I
      > read with Philip Ross once in the Times and he said what a day. First the
      > dentist, now a journalist. [Laughter]
      > Wolfowitz: The dentist was easy, so I hope you can stay below his
      > [Laughter]
      > You're kind of faint.
      > Q: I was telling Kevin, I have a headset and I type as we speak, which is
      > one reason I'll want to see the transcript just so I don't make errors.
      > reliable, but I'm not a letter-perfect typist and I won't always be able
      > keep up with you.
      > Can you hear me okay now?
      > Wolfowitz: Pretty well. It's okay.
      > Q: This is a feature magazine and people want to know a little about you
      > let me just lead you through a few questions there.
      > One is, where were you on September 11th? Were you at the Pentagon when --
      > Wolfowitz: I was in my office. We'd just had a breakfast with some
      > congressmen in which one of the subjects had been missile defense. And we
      > commented to them that based on what Rumsfeld and I had both seen and
      > on the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, that we were probably in for
      > some nasty surprises over the next ten years.
      > Q: Oh, my gosh.
      > Wolfowitz: I can't remember, then there was the sort of question of what
      > kind of nasty surprises? I don't remember exactly which ones we came up
      > with. The point was more just that it's in the nature of surprise that you
      > can't predict what it's going to be.
      > Q: Do you remember then the impact of the plane into the Pentagon? Or had
      > you first heard stories about New York? What was --
      > Wolfowitz: We were having a meeting in my office. Someone said a plane had
      > hit the World Trade Center. Then we turned on the television and we
      > seeing the shots of the second plane hitting, and this is the way I
      > it. It's a little fuzzy.
      > Q: Right.
      > Wolfowitz: There didn't seem to be much to do about it immediately and we
      > went on with whatever the meeting was. Then the whole building shook. I
      > to confess my first reaction was an earthquake. I didn't put the two
      > together in my mind. Rumsfeld did instantly.
      > Q: Did he really?
      > Wolfowitz: Yeah. He went charging out and down to the site where the plane
      > had hit, which is what I would have done if I'd had my wits about me,
      > may or may not have been a smart thing to do. But it was, instead the next
      > thing we heard was that there'd been a bomb and the building had to be
      > evacuated. Everyone started streaming out of the building in a quite
      > way. Congregated on the parade ground basically right in front of the
      > Pentagon which would have been about the worst place to have a crowd of a
      > couple of thousand people in that moment if we'd again had our wits about
      > us. But we were out of the building anyway.
      > Q: Let me ask you then about the next couple of days. There is --
      > Wolfowitz: Just to complete it. We went back into the building and that
      > an experience I won't ever forget. There was a huge fire, there was smoke
      > gradually filling -- not all, just the small number of us who were
      > in the command group. Rumsfeld was there and General Myers who was still
      > Vice Chairman at that point. The Chairman was on his way back from
      > and I was there. We were in the National Military Command Center and there
      > was this acrid smoke gradually seeping into the place. Rumsfeld simply
      > refused to leave. He finally made me leave, which I was not happy about.
      > I went up to this bizarre location that was prepared to survive nuclear
      > Q: Really?
      > Wolfowitz: Yes.
      > Q: In the Pentagon.
      > Wolfowitz: No, no. Way out of town.
      > Kellems: That's why he left, was to separate them.
      > Q: I see.
      > Kellems: To provide continuity.
      > Q: And then in the next few days, then there was the statement which now
      > looks remarkably [prescient] when you said this is a campaign. At that
      > point, I think it was the 13th, at that point was Iraq sort of moving into
      > the scope, under the radar screen? What was your thinking at that point?
      > Wolfowitz: I know my thinking at that point was that the old approach to
      > terrorism was not acceptable any longer. The old approach being you treat
      > as a law enforcement problem rather than a national security problem. You
      > pursue terrorists after they've done things and bring them to justice, and
      > to the extent states are perhaps involved, you retaliate against them but
      > you don't really expect to get them out of the business of supporting
      > terrorism completely.
      > To me what September 11th meant was that we just couldn't live with
      > terrorism any longer.
      > Throughout the '80s and '90s it was sort of, I've never found quite the
      > right words because necessary evil doesn't describe it, but a sort of an
      > evil that you could manage but you couldn't eliminate. And I think what
      > September 11th to me said was this is just the beginning of what these
      > bastards can do if they start getting access to so-called modern weapons,
      > and that it's not something you can live with any longer. So there needs
      > be a campaign, a strategy, a long-term effort, to root out these networks
      > and to get governments out of the business of supporting them. But that
      > wasn't something that was going to happen overnight.
      > Q: Right. So Iraq naturally came to the top of the list because of its
      > history and the weapons of mass terror and all the rest, is that right?
      > Wolfowitz: Yes, plus the fact which seems to go unremarked in most places,
      > that Saddam Hussein was the only international figure other than Osama bin
      > Laden who praised the attacks of September 11th.
      > Q: So now there is the much-reported, I just want to make sure I get it
      > right, famous meeting at --
      > It's been reported in a couple of different ways, and I'd like to get it
      > your words if I can, the famous meetings that first weekend in Camp David
      > where the question of Iraq came up. I believe the President heard you
      > discussing Iraq and asked you to elaborate on it or speak more about it.
      > you give us a little sense of what that was like?
      > Wolfowitz: Yeah. There was a long discussion during the day about what
      > if any Iraq should have in a counterterrorist strategy. On the surface of
      > the debate it at least appeared to be about not whether but when. There
      > seemed to be a kind of agreement that yes it should be, but the
      > was whether it should be in the immediate response or whether you should
      > concentrate simply on Afghanistan first.
      > There was a sort of undertow in that discussion I think that was, the real
      > issue was whether Iraq should be part of the strategy at all and whether
      > should have this large strategic objective which is getting governments
      > of the business of supporting terrorism, or whether we should simply go
      > after bin Laden and al Qaeda.
      > To the extent it was a debate about tactics and timing, the President
      > clearly came down on the side of Afghanistan first. To the extent it was a
      > debate about strategy and what the larger goal was, it is at least clear
      > with 20/20 hindsight that the President came down on the side of the
      > goal.
      > Q: Believe it or not, because this is a feature magazine, I'd like to ask
      > you a little bit about your background. None of this is going to be
      > personal. I know that you protect the privacy of your family so this has
      > really nothing to do with that.
      > First of all, the question of ideas. That is, is there anything at all, we
      > talked about this a little off the record, is there anything at all to the
      > Straussian Connection?
      > Wolfowitz: It's a product of fevered minds who seem incapable of
      > understanding that September 11th changed a lot of things and changed the
      > way we need to approach the world. Since they refused to confront that,
      > looked for some kind of conspiracy theory to explain it.
      > I mean I took two terrific courses from Leo Strauss as a graduate student.
      > One was on Montesquieu's spirit of the laws, which did help me understand
      > our Constitution better. And one was on Plato's laws. The idea that this
      > anything to do with U.S. foreign policy is just laughable.
      > Q: There is something kind of humorous in it because a few weeks ago all
      > heard was he's been the kind of cowboy, rampaging around the globe looking
      > for evildoers. And now he seems to be in the vehicle of erudite
      > This is very helpful.
      > Wolfowitz: It sort of calls to mind the joke about the President and the
      > Pope are on a boat, and the Pope's hat blows off. The President says, no,
      > I'll get it for you and walks across the top of the waves, picks up the
      > and walks back across the top of the waves, hands the hat to the Pope and
      > the next day the headlines are, "President Bush can't swim." [Laughter]
      > Q: Let me ask about one other [inaudible], and that's Albert Wohlstetter.
      > couple of people, believe me, who are not [inaudible] at all, say that
      > Wohlstetter was a far-sighted military strategist whose notions have been
      > about low yield nuclear weapons that we're hearing about today, and
      > different ways of fighting wars. It doesn't have to be an all or nothing,
      > zero sum, no mutually assured destruction. Are there any notions like that
      > on where the military is today or how you look at --
      > Wolfowitz: Wohlstetter is a much more relevant figure and it's interesting
      > too, by the way, that the same fellow who, or one of the same fellows who
      > discovered the Straussian Conspiracy kind of throws Wohlstetter in as a
      > Straussian when Wohlstetter was actually philosophically a student of
      > Q: The analytical --
      > Wolfowitz: Exactly. If there was anything anathema to Leo Strauss it was
      > analytical philosophy.
      > Q: I bet.
      > Wolfowitz: And Wohlstetter was somebody who really just almost painfully
      > resisted being labeled even as to political party. He was so insistent on
      > ascertaining the facts. He had a very fact-based approach to policy. It's
      > very impressive. And indeed, I was his student and often identified as
      > and it occasionally troubled me just a little bit that I thought, well,
      > maybe he was also associated with these sort of cold-blooded systems
      > analysts who kind of seemed to leave the moral piece of politics and
      > strategy as though it wasn't part of the equation.
      > It was terrifically gratifying to me as I got to know him better, to
      > that there were intensely moral considerations in the way he approached
      > these issues. Most dramatically in his deep concern about the fate of
      > in his late years.
      > But to come back to sort of more concretely, I mean here's something that
      > think is quite important, quite relevant. Albert Wohlstetter was one of
      > first people, most influential people, to understand what a dramatic
      > difference it would make to have accurate weapons. And that in particular
      > what he was really interested in was the ability, two things. Number one,
      > be able to use conventional weapons in ways that people, that only nuclear
      > weapons could be used, to be able to get out of the nuclear mindset kind
      > things.
      > But secondly and importantly, to be able to avoid unnecessary loss of
      > innocent life in war. And in fact there's a fairly seminal document that
      > done under Fred Ikle when he was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
      > called Discriminate Deterrence which may be interesting to know if you can
      > find it on the internet. As I recall, even at the time, the State
      > didn't like it because for some reason or other it offended some of our
      > allies.
      > Q: Was that when you were working --
      > Wolfowitz: No, no. I was actually doing East Asia policy at the time. I
      > can't claim any credit for it.
      > Q: This was in the '80s then.
      > Wolfowitz: Yes, mid '80s. '84 or '86, I don't remember which.
      > But going back much earlier, Albert, starting in '73 or '74 put together
      > something called the New Alternative Workshop or New Alternative Panel. I
      > think it was Workshop. To look at the implications of new technology. But
      > the ones that interested him the most were the ones that promised great
      > improvements in accuracy. And as a result he was the first intellectual
      > figure to recognize that the Tomahawk cruise missile which was being
      > developed by the Navy primarily as a nuclear delivery system, was much
      > significant as a conventional delivery system because it could give you
      > accurate weapons with ranges of what we have now, 600 miles or more.
      > If it hadn't been for Albert, I believe the Tomahawk cruise missile would
      > have been traded away in the SALT II talks in 1976. But what happened --
      > I getting into too much historical detail?
      > Q: No, this is fascinating.
      > Wolfowitz: What happened was the Ford Administration at the time was
      > very hard to get a SALT II agreement based on the agreement in principle
      > that emerged in Vladivostok. The Soviets were basically saying they would
      > only make an agreement if we banned all cruise missiles at ranges greater
      > than 600 kilometers which would have included the Tomahawk. The Navy,
      > frankly, was quite happy to give it up because they'd only built it in
      > measure at Kissinger's urging earlier on, when Kissinger wanted some
      > delivery system he could use as bargaining material in the SALT talks and
      > far as they were concerned, it was just an unnecessary burden to be
      > by attack submarines that had only limited torpedo space.
      > It was Albert and his group who said wait a minute, if you can have a
      > conventional delivery system it's worth the torpedo space, I mean an
      > accurate conventional delivery system, and the way I understood the
      > but I'm sure there are slightly different versions of this, he and I
      > persuaded Fred Ikle who was then the Director of ACDA that we should
      > giving up the tomahawk on arms control grounds because it had the
      > to substitute conventional for nuclear weapons and that was a good thing
      > from the point of view of arms control.
      > The Secretary of Defense at the time who was somebody named Rumsfeld, by
      > whatever means he came to it, concluded it was not something he wanted to
      > give up even if the Navy brass were prepared to. As a result it was not
      > of used as a bargaining chip in those negotiations, although I think
      > those two individuals it probably would have been.
      > So it was a matter of considerable personal satisfaction to watch those
      > missiles turning right angle corners in the Gulf War in 1991 and
      > demonstrating that this stuff really could do what Albert Wohlstetter had
      > envisioned 15 years before it might be able to do.
      > It's also an interesting case I think, without wanting to suggest that
      > there's anything unintelligent about the military, it's too easy to
      > misinterpret this comment. I mean there are very smart people trying very
      > hard to do the right thing, but what's involved here is a tradeoff between
      > very expensive system that might some day be accurate, against things that
      > are available here and now and that are much cheaper, and they may not be
      > accurate but they seem to "do the job".
      > It's been true also of things like global positioning systems and the
      > the accurate GPS bombs that were used so heavily in the last war. The last
      > two wars. It took a certain amount of pressure from the Congress to get
      > Air Force and the other services to invest adequately in those systems
      > because a certain skepticism about the promise of briefing charts versus
      > reality of the here and now, and I think it was -- It's somewhat, I'm
      > way too far off on this. But if you wanted to understand Albert
      > you've got to understand how somebody can perceive that a seemingly cold
      > technical fact like this fact about accuracy translates into a whole
      > transformation of strategy and politics.
      > That had a similar impact in the 1950s when he was asked to look at, by
      > Air Force, at what's the most cost-effective way to base our bomber force
      > and came out of that with the observation which is like a blinding flash
      > the obvious but no one had noticed it before then, that the real issue
      > what's cost effective, the real issue is how do you build a bomber force
      > that's not vulnerable to a first strike by the other side?
      > Q: That was seminal.
      > Wolfowitz: Absolutely seminal. And it derived not from reading Plato,
      > believe me. Nor did it derive from any ideological prejudices whatsoever.
      > derived from saying here's the problem, look at it factually, see what the
      > questions are that emerged from the thing itself so to speak -- inductive
      > rather than deductive -- and I suppose that's the difference between
      > ideological thinking and pragmatic thinking.
      > Q: Is that true for your own approach as well?
      > Wolfowitz: Well, it turns out he was a mixture and I think I'm a mixture.
      > People ask me how do you characterize yourself. I guess the closest I can
      > come to saying it is I think I'm a practical idealist. I mean I don't like
      > the caricature Wilsonian view that says we're going to impose something on
      > the world regardless of whether it can take in the real world. But I also
      > don't like the sort of, the kind of pragmatism -- I consider myself
      > pragmatic but I don't like the kind of pragmatism that sort of stares at
      > people who hold principles very strongly and think that it's all just a
      > matter of doing business and being sensible.
      > Q: Which leads me to the last couple of questions --
      > Wolfowitz: I remember once when the President in the middle of a
      > about a particular country said just how brutal are its leaders. I thought
      > it was an incredibly perceptive question and it's too often left out of
      > equation as a sort of pragmatic view that you've got to deal with them as
      > the leaders of country X and you shouldn't inquire too deeply into what
      > of people they are. I think you do have to deal with all kinds of dubious
      > characters in the world in order to accomplish the national security
      > objectives of the country.
      > But it's really important to keep in mind what this country is about. It's
      > lot more than just physical security or economic health.
      > Q: Does that also raise a question then if you're looking at leader who
      > truly is brutal, [inaudible], raising that question, and also maybe
      > who doesn't necessarily think the way you do. I know Wohlstetter had this
      > phrase, I think he called it Western preferred Soviet strategy.
      > Wolfowitz: Exactly. It's probably the second greatest source of
      > error is mirror imaging. I mean I think the greatest mistake is assuming
      > that people will behave, well it's a version of mirror imaging, I guess.
      > People will be rational according to our definition of what is rational.
      > Q: Right.
      > Wolfowitz: I guess they really are the same thing.
      > Q: I'm sorry. What's the first one?
      > Wolfowitz: The first one is that people will, the kind of mistake that in
      > sense I think we made implicitly in assuming that anyone who was
      > enough to fly an airplane wouldn't commit suicide with it. Or the mistake
      > that Saddam Hussein made of thinking that -- Let me back up. I guess I'm
      > getting --
      > The mistake that Saddam made was in assuming that we would behave in a
      > certain way, i.e. we would never go to war until we'd had six weeks of
      > bombing first. That's a sort of classic intelligence failure, to have a
      > certain expectation and then see all the evidence in light of that
      > expectation.
      > Hitler made the same mistake in assuming that of course we'd attack in
      > Calais, so we achieved one of history's great deceptions by reinforcing
      > conviction of his. But the sort of second and related source is mirror
      > imaging. Those are not examples of mirror imaging. In fact Saddam was
      > assuming that we were too weak to go in on the ground, unlike his tough
      > macho approach to life. But mirror imaging I think is another major source
      > of error.
      > What was that phrase, U.S. preferred Soviet --
      > Q: I think it's Western preferred Soviet strategy, which is kind of an
      > ingeniously [compressed] phrase.
      > Wolfowitz: That's typical Albert, yeah.
      > Q: And of course that was part of his approach to the Cold War as well.
      > also the sort of standard, now we are getting off the track but it is
      > interesting, that the sort of standard arms negotiation which entails that
      > we should sort of remove options from our side of the table actually kind
      > limited our ability to have choices and to maybe even win the Cold War,
      > right?
      > Wolfowitz: I think that's right, but I'd rather you not put those words --
      > Q: No, I wouldn't put them in your mouth.
      > Wolfowitz: It's too complicated a subject to --
      > Q: I was just curious to see what you had to say about that.
      > Wolfowitz: I think if one dug into it that's not a bad characterization.
      > Q: Then, and this is about as personal as I'm going to get, your father
      > at distinguished mathematician. You studied math and I think chemistry at
      > Cornell. Were you interested in politics all along? I know you were in
      > Washington I believe in '63 when Dr. King made his great speech.
      > Wolfowitz: '64 I think it was.
      > Q: I think it was '63, but --
      > Wolfowitz: Whichever year it was, the "I have a dream" speech.
      > Q: Right. And you were there. You were interested in politics and also
      > questions of social justice and democracy? How did all this happen for
      > someone who was kind of a science guy?
      > Wolfowitz: I think my father deserves a large part of the blame or
      > it is. It's a funny thing because he really did think that the ultimate
      > thing in life was to be a mathematician or a theoretical physicist.
      > a certain snobbery about mathematicians and theoretical physics, in some
      > ways a branch of mathematics almost that is well known among scientists at
      > least.
      > I was good at math but I kept feeling it was too abstract and I thought
      > maybe if I could work on a cure for cancer I'd be more fully satisfied
      > is why I sort of headed into the chemistry major. I was actually accepted
      > for a PhD at MIT which I was going to do in biophysical chemistry, but I
      > also, I think unbeknownst to my father. I don't remember now, applied
      to --
      > I'm not saying it was -- There's no deep, dark secret here. I had applied
      > Chicago for political science. And what I remember is the decisive moment
      > was when I had to decide with respect to Harvard, was I going to apply for
      > government or chemistry. And I finally came out realizing that I wanted to
      > do government, applied to Harvard in government, and told my father and
      > my chemistry professors that I had looked at the MIT catalog and I had
      > already completed the first two years of graduate course requirements in
      > chemistry so I could afford to take a year and experiment with political
      > science.
      > They all saw through it and they basically said you don't understand son,
      > the real stars have already completed three years of graduate course work
      > chemistry. That wasn't really the point. The point was they knew I was --
      > you're serious about hard science you don't go off and experiment for a
      > with something as soft as political science.
      > Q: You applied to Harvard as well?
      > Wolfowitz: Yeah.
      > Q: You were admitted everywhere?
      > Wolfowitz: Yeah. They just loved having mathematicians, it was sort of
      > funny.
      > But to go back to why -- He was one of these scientists, and there are
      > -- I don't know whether it's many. I think largely because of the
      > of World War II and also because -- Well, he read the New York Times every
      > day as though the future of the world depended on his reading the New York
      > Times. And he had an absolutely passionate interest in politics and
      > read a lot of history, knew a lot of history, and I can't help thinking
      > that's where I got the bug from at a fairly young age.
      > I remember when I was in high school, ninth grade, I'd been looking for
      > Paton's "Cry the Beloved Country" in English, and we arrived on what was
      > going to be a long three or four months in Europe, arrived in France and
      > there it was in French on a book stand. I'd had one year of high school
      > French and not a very good year at that. But I picked it up and I sort of
      > struggled my way through it with a dictionary. And it was partly because I
      > wanted to learn French, but it's also because that sort of, I don't know
      > you know "Cry the Beloved Country" --
      > Q: Oh, yeah, I know the novel. It's a tremendous important novel in that
      > era, late '50s, early '60s.
      > Wolfowitz: It really was, and it was sort of gripping from a political,
      > moral point of view. Those are the kinds of things I tended to read a lot
      > of. George Orwell. Books about the Holocaust unfortunately. John Hersey's
      > Hiroshima.
      > Q: Did you look at --
      > Wolfowitz: I did not -- See, this was my big recognition my senior year in
      > college was that when I had spare time I read politics and history and
      > my fellow math majors had spare time they did extra math problems. I
      > realized there was a message there.
      > To be really good at something you need to do more than just do well in
      > coursework. You need to be consumed by it.
      > Q: And just to get this straight, the Allen Bloom connection. You've now
      > entered literary history because a Nobel Laureate has fictionalized,
      > referenced you at least.
      > Wolfowitz: It's half of one paragraph, which again -- [Laughter]
      > Q: Well, it's irresistible for journalists. Because there he is, the great
      > American novelist and you are a very important figure and you're in his
      > novel, and if it [inaudible], it's hard not to use --
      > Wolfowitz: By the way, that conversation never happened. That particular
      > one.
      > Q: It didn't make sense. He was fabricating then.
      > Wolfowitz: He was sort of -- He wasn't fabricating the fact that Bloom
      > to talk to any students of his who were in government, and even though I
      > wasn't his closest student I was probably one at the highest level in
      > government so it gave him the most bragging rights. And I'm sure that
      > time we had a conversation, judging from the way Bellow describes it and I
      > would have expected it. He sort of -- He had a way of seeing everyone as
      > larger than life. Almost everyone he dealt with was a figure from a
      > dialogue almost. In a way it's -- The way of looking at the world that was
      > eye-opening in a certain sense, maybe the story -- [Laughter] Anyway, I'm
      > sure that whatever things were exchanged were exaggerated.
      > The thing I was grateful to Bellow for was noting very clearly that nobody
      > would ever have told Bloom anything that was classified because he
      > be trusted with a secret.
      > Q: That's right. He was very clear about that. He said in fact that
      > [inaudible] doesn't tell him anything that you don't want to appear in
      > tomorrow's press. [Laughter]
      > Did you take several courses with Bloom?
      > Wolfowitz: I actually only took one course with Bloom but he was a
      > faculty member of the place where I was living.
      > Q: That was Teluride?
      > Wolfowitz: Yeah.
      > Q: And is it true that, Bellow actually had I think, [inaudible] faculty
      > actually warning your father against Bloom. Is that something [inaudible]
      > that point?
      > Wolfowitz: I think it's a composite of various Bloom students. I don't
      > -- Certainly the way it's put there is not my father, and my father was
      > a business professor. In fact my father was actually one of the leading
      > figures in mathematical statistics and, even though Bloom didn't have a
      > as to what the whole subject was, he knew that my father was something
      > more than a, however it's described in there.
      > Q: Right.
      > Wolfowitz: In fact I remember he was in some awe of my father because he
      > would do his work pacing the large quadrangle of the Arts and Sciences
      > College at Cornell, lost in pure thought, without a pencil or paper, and
      > working, and I think it's a fairly rare phenomenon --
      > Q: This is your father who did that?
      > Wolfowitz: Yeah.
      > Q: He would think it through --
      > Wolfowitz: He would be thinking about math problems in his head. On the
      > hand Bloom was somewhat disdainful of hard science in general because it
      > left out the philosophical dimension, but on the other hand I think he was
      > in some awe of, he believed in the life of the mind and theory and all of
      > that, that somebody could actually be thinking through fundamental
      > simply in his head.
      > Q: This is great.
      > Wolfowitz: So it's a kind of a mixture. When I read that particular
      > paragraph I could have --
      > Wolfowitz: -- that I had never sort of really seen before. I mean there
      > a bravery about the guy which included his facing death the way he did I
      > think that's pretty remarkable. I mean I'm not saying I didn't see it
      > before, but I saw it more clearly.
      > There's an uglier side that I don't want to get into here, but it is sort
      > glossed over.
      > Q: It's fair to say you're not a disciple of Allen Bloom. We can say that.
      > You studied with him.
      > Wolfowitz: And I didn't even study a great deal with him. He had a lot to
      > with my coming to appreciate that the study of politics could be a serious
      > business even though it wasn't science in the sense that I understood
      > science to be. That was an important eye-opener. But I never, for better
      > for worse, took the political theory either way most of his other students
      > did.
      > Q: Did he know Wohlstetter? Bloom had studied with Strauss at Chicago
      and --
      > Wolfowitz: No, it was kind of an interesting accident. In trying to choose
      > between Harvard and Chicago, Harvard seemed to have the advantages of a
      > stronger international relations department and Chicago had the advantage
      > a much stronger political theory department. Even though I thought
      > international relations was what I wanted to do, I have more confidence in
      > my ability to sort of learn that without a lot of help, and I thought -- I
      > mean Strauss really is quite a remarkable figure. That doesn't make me an
      > acolyte but he really is pretty remarkable. I thought well here's a chance
      > you shouldn't pass up.
      > Q: So you knew who he was.
      > Wolfowitz: Yes, I certainly knew who he was. And one of my professors at
      > Cornell said, and by the way there's this guy Albert Wohlstetter who's
      > moving to Chicago from Rand and you and he would probably get along very
      > well. I'd never heard of the man, if that tells you something about how
      > unconnected I was to the field. This was 1965.
      > I arrive in Chicago. The first student/faculty tea I'm introduced to
      > Wohlstetter and he said, "Oh, are you related to Jack Wolfowitz?" I said
      > a matter of fact that's my father. He said I studied mathematics with him
      > and Abraham Wald at Columbia. Then he said, what's your --
      > Q: They were collaborators, weren't they? Your father and Wald?
      > Wolfowitz: Yeah. My father was Walds' student and then his principal
      > collaborator until Wald died in an airplane accident in India at too young
      > an age.
      > But then when Albert discovered I was a math major he immediately glommed
      > onto me. I was his dream of -- His approach to issues was very technical
      > very technologically oriented and I was the perfect student.
      > By the way, Alan Greenspan also was a student of my father's. He says that
      > my father had a fundamental influence on his understanding of what was
      > the brand new field of econometrics.
      > Q: Right, so this is at Cornell?
      > Wolfowitz: No, that was at Columbia. That was 1949-1950.
      > Q: I see. When did he go to Cornell?
      > Wolfowitz: -- my father, I shouldn't do that.
      > Q: We're supposed to brag about our fathers.
      > When did you all go to Ithaca?
      > Wolfowitz: The first move there was the fall of '51--'52, and then my
      > immediately had a sabbatical -- no, '52--'53 we moved to Ithaca. Then he
      > immediately had a sabbatical and '53--'54 we spent half in Los Angeles and
      > half in Urbana, Illinois. I still remember, the reason I see the
      > announcement of Stalin's death in 1954 was the street I lived on in
      > Illinois at the time.
      > Q: You'd been living in Manhattan before that?
      > Wolfowitz: Manhattan. I was born in Brooklyn but we grew up in Manhattan,
      > one block down on Morningside Drive in a house that no longer exists. One
      > block down from the President of Columbia who for part of that time was
      > Dwight Eisenhower. My sister tells me that she remembers seeing Eisenhower
      > go to his car as we were roller-skating on that block, but it didn't make
      > any impression on me. I was probably three or four.
      > Q: This is all very helpful.
      > This is sort of the two very small, well, they're big questions but I
      > expect you to give me extended answers to the questions of the day. One is
      > there is some question as to whether the Pentagon underestimated Iran's
      > readiness to intervene in Iraq and whether that upset the plans at all,
      > post-war plans.
      > Wolfowitz: That's nonsense.
      > Q: Okay. That had been reported.
      > Wolfowitz: There's so much that's reported that -- No. In fact it's, I
      > want to comment [inaudible] government. We've understood very clearly that
      > Iraq, especially the Shia population of Iraq, is both a source of danger
      > opportunity to the Iranians. I think it's more danger than it is
      > opportunity. But the danger itself is incentive for them to try to
      > because the last thing they want to see, which I think is a real
      > possibility, is an independent source of authority for the Shia religion
      > emerging in a country that is democratic and pro-Western.
      > Q: That's a --
      > Wolfowitz: There's going to be a huge struggle for the soul of Iraqi
      > there's no question about it.
      > Q: What about the notion that the military campaign went so quickly and so
      > brilliantly that you did not have everything else as much as you might
      > in place for this later era, later period [inaudible]?
      > Wolfowitz: It certainly has gone quickly. People that remember when you
      > to take your story, I mean we're, 50 days after the war began people
      > -- Having been wrong about the first quagmire saying we were in a quagmire
      > in terms of the restoration of the civil services in Iraq or dealing with
      > any number of other obvious problems. To me what's remarkable is how much
      > was accomplished in 50 days.
      > Things are not going to happen overnight. The notion -- I mean policy,
      > life, is fundamentally about choices and the notion that we should have
      > chosen to delay until we had a huge force and go more slowly and deal with
      > all the problems that would have come from going slowly so that we would
      > have had enough people, for example, to guard the museum in Baghdad is
      > frankly absurd. And it may well turn out, in fact, that the museum in
      > Baghdad was looted before the war even began, in which case no amount of
      > guarding would have done any good.
      > There are choices that had to be made and I don't think there's any
      > that the fundamental speed of the operation, the remarkable speed of the
      > operation, played a role in preventing a number of the worst things that
      > feared from happening. We'll never know exactly why the oilfields were not
      > destroyed. We did not have an environmental disaster resulting from huge
      > hydrogen sulfide fires in the north. We did not have attacks on Israel. We
      > did not have a fortress Baghdad. We did not have a civil war in northern
      > Iraq or a Turkish intervention in northern Iraq. We didn't have an Iranian
      > intervention to speak of in southern Iraq. We didn't have any Arab
      > governments collapse. Should I keep going?
      > Q: These were all possibilities you weighed, right?
      > Wolfowitz: Absolutely. And most of these were things that people warned
      > absolutely certain to happen if we went to war. I think a few of them I
      > thought were exaggerated. The one that has always worried me the most was
      > the use of weapons of mass destruction. We still don't know why they
      > used. That's something maybe we'll know more about one of these days, I
      > don't know.
      > But there seems to be very little doubt that everything came at the Iraqi
      > regime much faster than they expected it. That the war began sooner, that
      > the ground troops moved in faster, that they moved up north faster, that
      > they moved into Baghdad faster, and a lot of things happened before for
      > matter some of the meddling neighbors could interfere, either.
      > One of our senior generals in a discussion of a related but different
      > subject made the observation that speed kills, as in it kills the enemy,
      > that getting to an objective quickly is often the thing that's most
      > effective militarily. There's always usually a tradeoff between speed and
      > mass.
      > Q: And then the last question, you've been very patient and generous. That
      > is what's next? Where do we stand now in the campaign that you talked
      > right after September 11th?
      > Wolfowitz: I think the two most important things next are the two most
      > obvious. One is getting post-Saddam Iraq right. Getting it right may take
      > years, but setting the conditions for getting it right in the next six
      > months. The next six months are going to be very important.
      > The other thing is trying to get some progress on the Israeli-Palestinian
      > issue. I do think we have a better atmosphere for working on it now than
      > did before in all kinds of ways. Whether that's enough to make a
      > is not certain, but I will be happy to go back and dig up the things I
      > a long time ago which is, while it undoubtedly was true that if we could
      > make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue we would provide a better
      > of circumstances to deal with Saddam Hussein, but that it was equally true
      > the other way around that if we could deal with Saddam Hussein it would
      > provide a better set of circumstances for dealing with the Arab-Israeli
      > issue. That you had to move on both of them as best you could when you
      > could, but --
      > There are a lot of things that are different now, and one that has gone by
      > almost unnoticed--but it's huge--is that by complete mutual agreement
      > between the U.S. and the Saudi government we can now remove almost all of
      > our forces from Saudi Arabia. Their presence there over the last 12 years
      > has been a source of enormous difficulty for a friendly government. It's
      > been a huge recruiting device for al Qaeda. In fact if you look at bin
      > Laden, one of his principle grievances was the presence of so-called
      > crusader forces on the holy land, Mecca and Medina. I think just lifting
      > that burden from the Saudis is itself going to open the door to other
      > positive things.
      > I don't want to speak in messianic terms. It's not going to change things
      > overnight, but it's a huge improvement.
      > Q: Was that one of the arguments that was raised early on by you and
      > that Iraq actually does connect, not to connect the dots too much, but the
      > relationship between Saudi Arabia, our troops being there, and bin Laden's
      > rage about that, which he's built on so many years, also connects the
      > Trade Center attacks, that there's a logic of motive or something like
      > Or does that read too much into --
      > Wolfowitz: No, I think it happens to be correct. The truth is that for
      > reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we
      > settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of
      > mass destruction as the core reason, but -- hold on one second --
      > (Pause)
      > Kellems: Sam there may be some value in clarity on the point that it may
      > take years to get post-Saddam Iraq right. It can be easily misconstrued,
      > especially when it comes to --
      > Wolfowitz: -- there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is
      > weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the
      > is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could
      > say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the
      > first two. Sorry, hold on again.
      > Kellems: By the way, it's probably the longest uninterrupted phone
      > conversation I've witnessed, so --
      > Q: This is extraordinary.
      > Kellems: You had good timing.
      > Q: I'm really grateful.
      > Wolfowitz: To wrap it up.
      > The third one by itself, as I think I said earlier, is a reason to help
      > Iraqis but it's not a reason to put American kids' lives at risk,
      > not on the scale we did it. That second issue about links to terrorism is
      > the one about which there's the most disagreement within the bureaucracy,
      > even though I think everyone agrees that we killed 100 or so of an al
      > group in northern Iraq in this recent go-around, that we've arrested that
      > Qaeda guy in Baghdad who was connected to this guy Zarqawi whom Powell
      > about in his UN presentation.
      > Q: So this notion then that the strategic question was really a part of
      > equation, that you were looking at Saudi Arabia --
      > Wolfowitz: I was. It's one of the reasons why I took a very different view
      > of what the argument that removing Saddam Hussein would destabilize the
      > Middle East. I said on the record, I don't understand how people can
      > believe that removing this huge source of instability is going to be a
      > of instability in the Middle East.
      > I understand what they're thinking about. I'm not blind to the
      > of this situation, but they just seem to be blind to the instability that
      > that son of a bitch was causing. It's as though the fact that he was
      > $25,000 per terrorist family and issuing regular threats to most friendly
      > governments in the region and the long list of things was of no account
      > the only thing to think about was that there might be some inter-communal
      > violence if he were removed.
      > The implication of a lot of the argumentation against acting -- the
      > implication was that the only way to have the stability that we need in
      > is to have a tyrant like Saddam keeping everybody in check -- I know no
      > ever said it that way and if you pointed it out that way they'd say that's
      > not what I mean. But I believe that really is where the logic was leading.
      > Q: Which also makes you wonder about how much faith there is in spreading
      > democracy and all the rest among some of those who --
      > Wolfowitz: Probably not very much. There is no question that there's a lot
      > of instability that comes with democracy and it's the nature of the beast
      > that it's turbulent and uncertain.
      > The thing is, at a general level, I've encountered this argument from the
      > defenders of Asian autocracies of various kinds. Look how much better off
      > Singapore is than Indonesia, to pick a glaring contrast. And Indonesia's
      > really struggling with democracy. It sort of inherited democracy under the
      > worst possible conditions too, one might say. But the thing that -- I'd
      > actually say that a large part of Indonesia's problems come from the fact
      > that dictatorships are unstable in the one worst way which is with respect
      > to choosing the next regime. Democracy, one could say, has solved, not
      > perfectly, but they represent one of the best solutions to one of the most
      > fundamental instabilities in politics and that's how to replace one regime
      > with another. It's the only orderly way in the world for doing it other
      > hereditary monarchy which doesn't seem to have much of a future.
      > Q: Thanks so much.
      > Wolfowitz: You're very welcome.
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