Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

Central Intelligence and Cosmic Intelligence

Expand Messages
  • Bradford Riley
    Pre-emptive strkes, lies, deceptions, invading Iraq for lucrative Oil contracts and positioning the U.S. dollar against the Euro and against the U.N.. Invading
    Message 1 of 1 , May 5, 2003
    • 0 Attachment
      Pre-emptive strkes, lies, deceptions, invading Iraq for lucrative Oil
      contracts and positioning the U.S. dollar against the Euro and against the
      U.N.. Invading under the false pretenses of bringing Iraq Freedom and
      finding WMD is a horrible deceptive way to start the New Century. It
      requires students, the press, the media and society to step back from the
      Consciousness Soul and inflamed the country with nationalistic and patriotic
      lies in order to achieve its aims. It promotes this in its people instead of
      seeking and holding Intelligence that is worthy. This is a betrayal of both
      the Intellectual Soul, the religious and noble loyalty of the Sentient Soul
      and the cosmopolitan forces of the Consciousness Soul. It is even a higher
      reason for impeachment of this President than a BJ in the oval office. Do
      not let these sweet Lincoln Carrier landings and massive Karl Rove
      manipulation continue to steer this country towards total retardation and
      division.

      http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0501-09.htm

      May 1, 2003

      MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

      FROM: Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity

      SUBJECT: Intelligence Fiasco

      We write to express deep concern over the growing mistrust and cynicism with
      which many, including veteran intelligence professionals inside and outside
      our movement, regard the intelligence cited by you and your chief advisers
      to justify the war against Iraq. The controversy over intelligence on Iraq
      has deep roots, going back a decade. It came to a head over recent months as
      intelligence was said to be playing a key role in support of your
      administration�s decision to make war on Iraq. And the controversy has now
      become acute, since you have been backed into the untenable position of
      assuming the former role of Saddam Hussein in refusing to cooperate with UN
      inspectors. (Chief UN nuclear inspector Mohamed ElBaradei noted earlier this
      week, �We have years of experience and know every scientist worth
      interviewing.�) The implications not only for US credibility abroad but also
      for the future of US intelligence are immense. They need to be addressed
      without delay.

      Prominent pundits (and, quite probably, some of your own advisers) are now
      saying it does not matter whether so-called �weapons of mass destruction�
      are ever found in Iraq. Don�t let them fool you. It matters a great deal.
      The Wall Street Journal had it right in its page-one lead article on April
      8:

      Officials Debate Involving the UN in Verification:

      American forces in Iraq are rapidly confronting two other tasks (besides
      hunting down Saddam Hussein) of enormous importance: finding any weapons of
      mass destruction and convincing the world the finds are real. The weapons
      search is a critical one for the Bush administration, which went to war
      charging that the Iraqi leader had hidden huge amounts of chemical and
      biological weapons and could pass them on to terrorists. If the US doesn�t
      make any undisputed discoveries of forbidden weapons, the failure will feed
      already-widespread skepticism abroad about the motives for going to war.�

      The failure to find weapons of mass destruction six weeks after US and UK
      forces invaded Iraq suggests either that such weapons are simply not there,
      or that those eventually found there will not be in sufficient quantity or
      capability to support your repeated claim that Iraq posed a grave threat to
      our country�s security. Your opposition to inviting UN inspectors into Iraq
      feeds the suspicion that you wish to avoid independent verification; some
      even suggest that your administration wishes to preserve the option of
      �planting� such weapons to be �discovered� later. Sen. Carl Levin recently
      warned that, if some are found �Many people around the world will think we
      planted those weapons, unless the UN inspectors are there with us.�

      Complicating matters still further, foreign resistance is building to
      lifting the economic sanctions against Iraq until the UN can certify that
      Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction. Russian President Vladimir
      Putin this week joined others in insisting that only UN weapons inspectors
      can reliably certify that. With considerable bite and sarcasm, he asked
      Prime Minister Tony Blair on April 29, �Where are these arsenals of weapons
      of mass destruction, if they were there?�

      What is at play here is a policy and intelligence fiasco of monumental
      proportions. It is essential that you be able to separate fact from
      fiction�for your own sake, and for the credibility of our country�s
      intelligence community. We urge you to do two things immediately:

      (1) Invite UN inspectors to return to Iraq without further delay; and

      (2) Ask Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Chair of your Foreign Intelligence Advisory
      Board, to launch an immediate inquiry into the performance of the CIA and
      other intelligence agencies in providing the intelligence upon which you
      have based your fateful decision for war against Iraq.

      You may not realize the extent of the current ferment within the
      Intelligence Community and particularly the CIA. In intelligence, there is
      one unpardonable sin�cooking intelligence to the recipe of high policy.
      There is ample indication that this has been done with respect to Iraq. What
      remains not entirely clear is who the cooks are and where they practice
      their art. Are their kitchens only in the Pentagon, the National Security
      Council, and the Vice President�s office? There are troubling signs, as will
      be seen below, that some senior officials of the CIA may be graduates of the
      other CIA�the Culinary Institute of America.

      While there have been occasions in the past when intelligence has been
      deliberately warped for political purposes, never before has such warping
      been used in such a systematic way to mislead our elected representatives
      into voting to authorize launching a war. It is essential that all this be
      sorted out; Gen. Scowcroft is uniquely qualified to lead such an
      investigation.

      Some things are already quite clear to us from our own sources and analysis.
      We present them below in the hope that our findings will help get the
      investigation off to a quick start.

      Forgery

      One of the many lawmakers who believe they were deceived last summer and
      fall, Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) wrote you a letter on March 17, asking that
      you explain why �evidence� that your administration knew to be forged was
      used with him and others to garner votes for the war. Waxman was referring
      to bogus correspondence purporting to show that Iraq was trying to obtain in
      Africa uranium for nuclear weapons, and noted that it was the perceived need
      to prevent Iraq from developing nuclear weapons that provided �the most
      persuasive justification� for war. The continued lack of any White House
      response to Waxman�s letter can only feed the suspicion that there is no
      innocent explanation and that the use of the forged material was deliberate.

      Determined to find out what had happened, Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV),
      vice-chair of the Senate intelligence oversight committee, suggested that
      the committee ask the FBI investigate, but committee chair Pat Roberts
      (R-OK) resisted�giving a fresh meaning to the word �oversight.� Roberts said
      through a spokeswoman that it was �inappropriate for the FBI to investigate
      at this point.� Roberts then declined to join Rockefeller in signing a
      letter to the FBI requesting an investigation. Rockefeller sent one anyway
      but the response he has just received from the Bureau was a brush-off.
      Unless you give FBI Director Robert Mueller different instructions, it
      appears doubtful that any genuine investigation will take place.

      Rep. Waxman is right to point out that the specter of Saddam Hussein armed
      with nuclear weapons was the crucial element that convinced many
      representatives and senators to vote to give you the authority to use
      military force against Iraq. It is now clear that bogus intelligence fed
      lawmakers� fears before the vote on October 11, 2002.

      NIC Memorandum: �Iraq�s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs�

      On October 4, 2002, a week before Congress voted on the war resolution, the
      National Intelligence Council, an interagency body under the CIA Director as
      head of the entire Intelligence Community, published an unclassified version
      of a memorandum that had been briefed to Congressmen and Senators over the
      previous weeks.

      Among the key judgments: �Most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its
      nuclear weapons program.�

      The clumsy clause conceals a crass cave-in. The preponderant view, then as
      now, among nuclear scientists and engineers of the Intelligence Community
      and the Department of Energy�s national laboratories is that Iraq had not
      been able to reconstitute in any significant way the nuclear development
      program dismantled by UN inspectors prior to 1998. The conclusions of the
      vast majority of analysts dovetailed with the findings repeatedly presented
      to the UN by International Atomic Energy Agency Director Mohamed ElBaradei
      and his inspectors after their inspection work at the turn of the year; i.
      e., that Iraq had no nuclear program worthy of the name.

      The NIC memorandum�s discussion of alleged Iraqi attempts to reconstitute a
      nuclear weapons program does not pass muster as rigorous analysis. The only
      data offered that can remotely be called �evidence� is Iraq�s efforts to
      obtain high-strength aluminum tubes. The NIC memorandum claims, again, that
      �most intelligence specialists� believe the rods were intended for use in
      uranium enrichment, while �some believe that these tubes are probably
      intended for conventional weapons programs.�

      The truth is just the opposite. Those who posit a nuclear application are in
      the distinct minority in the US and foreign intelligence, scientific, and
      engineering community.

      The rest of the �evidence� adduced to support the existence of a �Nuclear
      Weapons Program� includes Baghdad�s failure to provide inspectors with all
      the information sought, the fact Saddam Hussein held frequent meetings with
      nuclear scientists, and the surmise that Baghdad �probably uses some money
      from illicit oil sales to support its weapons of mass destruction efforts.�
      The memorandum concedes that the IAEA �made significant strides toward
      dismantling Iraq�s nuclear weapons program,� but claims that, in the absence
      of inspections since late 1998, �most analysts assess that Iraq is
      reconstituting its nuclear program.� �Most analysts� in the Pentagon,
      perhaps; and in the Vice President�s office, surely; in the
      intelligence/scientific/engineering community, no.

      Addressing how soon Iraq could go nuclear, the NIC memorandum states �Iraq
      is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a
      deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of this decade.� It goes on
      to say that Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon �within a year,� if it could
      acquire the necessary fissile material abroad.

      In your speech of October 7, 2002, just four days before the vote in
      Congress, your advisers had you blur that distinction and raise the prospect
      that if Iraq could �produce, buy, or steal� highly enriched uranium, it
      could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. You went on to warn that
      �the smoking gun could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.� (The �mushroom
      cloud� specter was again used on October 8 by National Security Adviser
      Condoleezza Rice with Wolf Blitzer on national TV, and on October 9 by
      Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Victoria Clarke with TV
      commentator Sam Donaldson.)

      Interestingly, the NIC memorandum does not include the information from the
      forgery purporting to show that Iraq was trying to get uranium from Niger,
      although that material had been around for at least several weeks. Since the
      other �evidence,� like the argument from aluminum rods, was presented in
      such a way as to play up the threat from Iraq, the absence of the forgery
      information is conspicuous. Its absence may be explained by the reluctance
      of the purveyors of that information to make available the actual source
      material, which representatives of the various intelligence agencies
      preparing the NIC paper would have required, and the consequent likelihood
      that the hoax would be prematurely uncovered.

      Whence the �Intelligence� on Weapons of Mass Destruction?

      Glen Rangwala, the Cambridge University analyst who exposed the plagiarism
      by British intelligence of �evidence� on Iraq from a graduate student in
      California, suggests that much of the information on such weapons has come
      from Ahmed Chalabi�s Iraqi National Congress (INC), which has received
      Pentagon money for intelligence gathering. �The INC saw the demand and
      provided what was needed,� says Rangwala. �The implication is that they
      polluted the whole US intelligence effort.�

      It is well known in intelligence circles that Deputy Secretary of Defense
      Paul Wolfowitz has overseen the polluting of the stream of intelligence
      reporting on Iraq with a flood of fabricated material from Chalabi, who has
      few supporters and still fewer sources inside Iraq. When both the CIA and
      the Defense Intelligence Agency refused to give credence to such reporting,
      Defense Secretary Rumsfeld set up his own intelligence analysis unit headed
      by Rich Haver�a passed-over but still ambitious aspirant to the post of CIA
      director. The contribution of reporting from �migr�s has been highly touted
      for months by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, who seem unaware of Machiavelli�s
      warning that of all intelligence sources, exiles are the least reliable.

      In the face of like admonitions from the Intelligence Community, Wolfowitz
      has chosen to take the offensive. He has stated in public, for example, that
      CIA analysis �is not worth the paper it is written on.�


      _________________________________________________________________
      The new MSN 8: advanced junk mail protection and 2 months FREE*
      http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail
    Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.