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  • Patrick McKEE
    Several month ago someone who was arguing some “redemption” BS on another forum posted this link http://sedm.org/Forms/MemLaw/StrawMan.pdf in
    Message 1 of 1 , Apr 9, 2010

      Several month ago someone who was arguing some “redemption” BS on another forum posted this link http://sedm.org/Forms/MemLaw/StrawMan.pdf  in “support” of their “argument”. 


      So I strongly suggested that they actually READ some of those cases CITED since they MAY be OUT OF CONTEXT & they do NOT say what he “believes” they do.  Which is what I did & here’s an example of what I found.


      Section 2.2. AGENCY “claims” that “all powers of government are exercised through individual agency or private contracts” then BRIEFLY cites OSBORN v. BANK OF U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824) & then provides some definitions of “agency” So let’s see WHAT the court was talking about in that case.


      “The mint, the custom house, the process of the federal Courts, bear still less analogy to the Bank than the post office. They partake less of the character of private business. The functions they perform are more palpably of a public nature, requiring the personal agency of individuals, rather than the employment of private property in their performance; especially the papers of the custom house, and the proceedings of the federal Courts.


      I am aware, that an indefinite, indistinct, confused idea exists, by which the charter, and the private trade, and the stockholders, and the government, are combined together, and the whole made to produce a something which cannot well be defined, but which is called a public institution. This might produce some legal effect, if we were compelled to contemplate this something only as a creation of the national government, by the name of the Bank of the United States . If its legal envelope, and legal name, constituted its whole character, or if these could be used so as to shut out all further inquiry into that character, its claim to the incidents and immunities of a public institution might rest upon some sort of foundation. But this misconception of its character vanishes, when we are permitted to examine all its constituent parts. We have seen that the persons who compose it are not public officers; that the business it pursues is not a public business, and that its agency for the government is that of a private individual: from none of which it can derive any exemption not common to private corporations.


      Deriving great advantage from its trade, anxious to extend it into other States, and to be relieved from the embarrassments incident to a joint stock company not incorporated, the corporation apply to the Congress of the United States for an act of incorporation. But this Congress cannot confer, unless the association can be employed by the national government in the execution of some of the powers with which it is invested by the constitution. All the powers of the government must be carried into operation by individual agency, either through the medium of public officers, or contracts made with individuals. Can any public office be created, [22 U.S. 738, 772]   or does one exist, the performance of which may, with propriety, be assigned to this association, when incorporated? If such office exist, or can be created, then the company may be incorporated, that they may be appointed to execute such office. Is there any portion of the public business performed by individuals upon contracts, that this association could be employed to perform, with greater advantage and more safety to the public, than an individual contractor? If there be an employment of this nature, then may this company be incorporated to undertake it.


      Again: the business conducted through the agency of the post office, is not in its nature a private business. It is of a public character, and the [22 U.S. 738, 786]   charge of it is expressly conferred upon Congress by the constitution. The business is created by law, and is annihilated when the law is repealed. But the trade of banking is strictly a private concern. It exists and can be carried on without the aid of the national Legislature. Nay, it is only under very special circumstances, that the national Legislature can so far interfere with it, as to facilitate its operations.


      The post office executes the various duties assigned to it, by means of subordinate agents. The mails are opened and closed by persons invested with the character of public officers. But they are transported by individuals employed for that purpose, in their individual character, which employment is created by and founded in contract. To such contractors no official character is attached. These contractors supply horses, carriages, and whatever else is necessary for the transportation of the mails, upon their own account. The whole is engaged in the public service. The contractor, his horses, his carriage, his driver, are all in public employ. But this does not change their character. All that was private property before the contract was made, and before they were engaged in public employ, remain private property still. The horses and the carriages are liable to be taxed as other property, for every purpose for which property of the same character is taxed in the place where they are employed. The reason is plain: the contractor is employing his own means to promote his own private profit, and the tax collected is from the individual, though assessed upon the [22 U.S. 738, 787]   means he uses to perform the public service. To tax the transportation of the mails, as such, would be taxing the operations of the government, which could not be allowed. But to tax the means by which this transportation is effected, so far as those means are private property, is allowable; because it abstracts nothing from the government; and because, the fact that an individual employs his private means in the service of the government, attaches to them no immunity whatever.


      It is only in this character, that the Bank is in public employ. The business it transacts for the government, originates in contract. It receives the public treasure upon deposit, and pays it out upon the checks of the proper officer. This is an individual business, transacted for the government precisely as if it were an individual concern. It receives the cash of individuals upon deposit in the same manner, and in the same manner pays it out. It is one department of its trade, by which it makes individual profit. Any private person, or moneyed corporation, may be employed to do the same thing; and as to that, would be in the employment of the government; would be an instrument used by the government: a means of executing its powers. Yet it has never been supposed, that such employment constituted a public office, or that the person employed was thereby invested with official character. All these contracts are made with a view to the profitable employment of individual exertion, and are performed by individual means, in the private personal character of the contractor. They are, of course, subject to [22 U.S. 738, 788]   the municipal law; by it they must be protected and enforced, and, therefore, cannot be exempt from its exactions.


      OSBORN v. BANK OF U.S. , 22 U.S. 738 (1824)



      It appears to me that the POWERS of government being referred to were things of a PUBLIC NATURE such as CUSTOMS, MAIL DELIVERY, the MINT & the FEDERAL COURTS & the REAL DISTINCTION being made are those persons & things of a PUBLIC or PRIVATE nature.


      Which would make sense, since the CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS of much governmental REGULATION is people & things AFFECTED with a PUBLIC INTEREST, which includes COMMERCE & TRADE.


      “When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. 'A body politic,' as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.' This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. & B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government, and [94 U.S. 113, 125]   has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, 'are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things.' Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this day, statutes are to be found in many of the States some or all these subjects; and we think it has never yet been successfully contended that such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibitions against interference with private property. With the Fifth Amendment in force, Congress, in 1820, conferred power upon the city of Washington 'to regulate . . . the rates of wharfage at private wharves, . . . the sweeping of chimneys, and to fix the rates of fees therefor, . . . and the weight and quality of bread,' 3 Stat. 587, sect. 7; and, in 1848, 'to make all necessary regulations respecting hackney carriages and the rates of fare of the same, and the rates of hauling by cartmen, wagoners, carmen, and draymen, and the rates of commission of auctioneers,' 9 id. 224, sect. 2.

      This brings us to inquire as to the principles upon which this power of regulation rests, in order that we may determine what is within and what without its operative effect. Looking, [94 U.S. 113, 126]   then, to the common law, from whence came the right which the Constitution protects, we find that when private property is 'affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only.' This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale more than two hundred years ago, in his treatise De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78, and has been accepted without objection as an essential element in the law of property ever since. Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control.


      Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have duties to perform in which the public is interested. New Jersey Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 382. Their business is, therefore, 'affected with a public interest,' within the meaning of the doctrine which Lord Hale has so forcibly stated.


      But we need not go further. Enough has already been said to show that, when private property is devoted to a public use, it is subject to public regulation."  MUNN v. STATE OF ILLINOIS , 94 U.S. 113 (1876)




      And as OPPOSED to things like JURISDICTION, being SUBJECT to the LAWS or being LIABLE for TAXES being based on SUPPOSED “contracts”. 


      JURISDICTION - 1: the power, right, or authority to interpret and apply the law, 2 a : the authority of a sovereign power to govern or legislate b : the power or right to exercise authority : control, 3 : the limits or territory within which authority may be exercised



        JURISDICTION. The power and authority constitutionally conferred upon (or constitutionally recognized as existing in) a court or judge to pronounce the sentence of the law, or to award the remedies provided by law, upon a state of facts, proved or admitted, referred to the tribunal for decision, and authorized by law to be the subject of investigation or action by that tribunal, and in favor or against persons (or a res) who present themselves, or who are brought, before the court in some manner sanctioned by law as proper and sufficient. 1 Black, Judgm. § 215. And see Nenno v. Railroad Co., 105 Mo. App. 540, 80 S. W. 24 ; Ingram v. Fuson, 118 Ky. 882, 82 5. W. 606; Tod v. Crisman, 123 Iowa, 693, 99 N. W. 686; Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 99 N. W. 909 ; Wightman v. Karsner, 20 Ala. 451; Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 11 Sup. Ct. 773, 35 L. Ed. 464; Templeton v. Ferguson , 89 Tex.

      47, 33 S. W. 329 ; Succession of Weigel, 17 La. Ann. 70.

        Jurisdiction is a power constitutionally conferred upon a judge or magistrate to take cognizance of and determine causes according to law, and to carry his sentence into execution. U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 8 L. Ed. 547 ; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns.(N. Y.) 413, 6 Am. Dec. 290; Johnson v. Jones, 2 Neb. 135.

        The authority of a court as distinguished from the other departments; judicial power considered with reference to its scope and extent as respects the questions and persons subject to it; power given by law to hear and decide controversies. Abbott.

      Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to the suit; to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts , 12 Pet. 657, 717, 9 L. Ed. 1233.

        Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a cause; the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of and decide causes. Brownsville v. Basse, 43 Tex. 440. [rest omitted]




      LIABLE. 1. Bound or obliged in law or equity; responsible; chargeable; answerable; compellable to make satisfaction, compensation, or restitution.

        2. Exposed or subject to a given contingency, risk, or casualty, which is more or less probable.

      —Limited liability. The liability of the members of a joint-stock company may be either unlimited or limited; and, if the latter, then the limitation of liability is either the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares, (in which case the limit is said to be "by shares,") or such an amount as the members guaranty in the event of the company being wound up, (in which case the limit is said to be "by guaranty.") Brown.—Personal liability. The liability of the stockholders in corporations, under certain statutes, by which they may 'be held individually responsible for the debts of the corporation, either to the extent of the par value of their respective holdings of stock, or to twice that amount, or without limit, or otherwise, as the particular statute directs.



      SUBJECT. In logic. That concerning which the affirmation in a proposition is made ; the first word in a proposition.

        An individual matter considered as the object of legislation. The constitutions of several of the states require that emery act of the legislature shall relate to but one subject, which shall be expressed in the title of the statute. See Ex parte Thomas, 113 Ala. 1, 21 South. 369 ; In re Mayer, 50 N. Y. 504; State v. County Treasurer , 4 S. C. 528 ; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 577, 50 N. W. 923, 28 Am. St. Rep. 382.

        In constitutional law. One that owes allegiance to a sovereign and is governed by his laws. The natives of Great Britain are subjects of the British government. Men in free governments are subjects as well as citizens; as citizens they enjoy rights and franchises ; as subjects they are bound to obey the laws. Webster. The term is little used, in this sense, in countries enjoying a republican form of government. See The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 245, 4 L. Ed. 226 ; U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark , 169 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890.

        In Scotch law. The thing which is the object of an agreement.



      ALLEGIANCE. The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection which the government affords him.

        2. It is natural, acquired, or local. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the United States ; acquired allegiance is that which is due by a naturalized citizen. It has never been decided whether a citizen can, by expatriation, divest himself absolutely of that character. 2 Cranch, 64; 1 Peters' C. C. Rep. 159; 7 Wheat. R. 283; 9 Mass. R. 461. Infants cannot assume allegiance, (4 Bin. 49) although they enlist in the army of the United States . 5 Bin. 429.

        3. It seems, however, that he cannot renounce his allegiance to the United States without the permission of the government, to be declared by law. But for commercial purposes he may acquire the rights of a citizen of another country, and the place of his domicil determines the character of a party as to trade. 1 Kent, Com. 71; Com. Rep. 677; 2 Kent, Com. 42.

        4. Local allegiance is that which is due from an alien, while resident in the United States, for the protection which the government affords him. 1 Bl. Com. 366, 372; Com. Dig. h.t; Dane's Ab. Index, h. t.; 1 East, P.C. 49 to 57.



      And it would definitely CONTRADICT further ASSERTIONS such as contained in Section 5 which is entitled “The State Created Office of person”, wouldn’t it?


      And since they also mentioned Supreme Law Library, I took a look at Paul Mitchell & his book “The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue”.


      In it Paul effectively ASSERTS that ALLEGED “14th amendment citizenship” is SUPPOSEDLY the basis of most Federal JURISDICTION in the several states.


      “Sovereign individuals are subject only to a Common Law, whose primary purposes are to protect and defend individual rights, and to prevent anyone, whether public official or private person, from violating the rights of other individuals.  Within this scheme, Sovereigns are never subject to their own creations, and the constitutional contract is such a creation.  To quote the Supreme Court, "No fiction can make a natural born subject."  Milvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. 598 (1808).  That is to say, no fiction, be it a corporation, a statute law, or an administrative regulation, can mutate a natural born Sovereign into someone who is subject to his own creations.

      Accordingly, if you choose to investigate the matter, you will find a very large body of legal literature which cites another fiction, the so-called 14th Amendment, from which the federal government presumes to derive general authority to treat everyone in America as subjects and not as Sovereigns…”



      If you were to actually READ that case you would SEE that the phrase “"No fiction can make a natural born subject” was taken completely OUT of CONTEXT & was from the plaintiff in error’s contentions.

      For the plaintiff in error, it was contended

      1. That Daniel Coxe was born an alien to the state of New-Jersey; and when the revolution commenced, had a right to chuse his side in a reasonable time, and could not be made a citizen of the new state against his will. Upon this point were cited, 2 Dall. 234. Coignet v. Pettit. 2 Rutherforth, 30. 1 Bl. Com. 212. 3 Dall. 225. Ware v. Hylton. Plowden on alienage. 3. 4. 7. 15. 19. 24. 119. Laws of the U. S. vol. 7. p. 147. vol. 3. p. 165. vol. 6. p. 80.

      2. That even if he could, contrary to his natural allegiance, be compelled by force to become a citizen of the new state, his consequent allegiance to such new state could be temporary only, and could not exist longer than the pressure of the force existed. He had a right to escape from that force, and to throw off that allegiance, if he could. Natural allegiance, i. e. the allegiance due from birth, is the only kind which by the rule of the common law, cannot be shaken off. Voluntary allegiance, by naturalization, and a fortiori, allegiance imposed by force, is not perpetual. No fiction can make a natural born subject. 7 Co. 13. 38. 19. Vaughan 280. Craw v. Ramsay. 1 Bl. Com. 369. 5 Vesey, Jun. 781. Somerville v. Somerville. Zouch, de Jure inter Gentes, 144.ed. 1659, pars 2. s. 2. num. 16.

      McIlvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. 209 (1808)



      NOTICE that this discusses many of the TERMS that I DEFINED above?  TERMS that show that it is NOT “citizenship” that makes one SUBJECT to a JURISDICTION, it is TERRITORIAL ALLEGIANCE.


      This is WHY I warned people to “be VERY WARY & VERIFY/RESEARCH all of the SUPPOSED "information".”


      This is WHY I CAUTION people about “claims” without having EVIDENCE to BACK them up.


      From what I have seen over the past TEN YEARS, many SO-CALLED “patriots” suffer from DOGMA, POOR JUDGMENT & the FAILURE and/or the INABILITY to properly RESEARCH & VERIFY things at the very least.


      DOCUMENTATION beats conversation.


      And based this & many other things, I again strongly suggest people consider the POSSIBILITY that many of these SUPPOSTED “legal arguments” that are BS are either PURPOSELY DESIGNED to FAIL & create ANGER & FEAR against the GOVERNMENT and/or to enable certain groups to gain POLITICAL POWER.


      SUCCESS leaves CLUES.  So does FAILURE.


      Patrick in California




      "It isn't the jumping that kills you. It is the sudden stop."-Unknown

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