Re: More surprising facts about philosophy of mind
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "Eray Ozkural" <erayo@...> wrote:
>Predicate dualism is about predicates .
> > Show me a physicalist and I'll show you a boson-fermion
> > dualist.
> This is quite a good example as previously discussed on this
> list. I suppose I had given several examples about what I earlier
> called multism and I showed boson-fermion distinction as an
> ontological evidence.
> However, this distinction is perfectly reducible to physical law,
> and as such has nothing to do with predicate dualism which is
> a thesis that posits the extra-physical, hence an unscientific
# The predicate is that part of a sentence which is not the subject
but which gives information about the subject. So, in the sentence
Clare went to school, 'Clare' is the subject and 'went to school' is
- I mean I will concede that the language of psychology is so
twisted that there is no way any scientist can make any sense
of it. I will concede that psychological states cannot be really
inferred by watching people act, after all they can pretend. They cannot
be inferred by watching people describe themselves. After all, they
can be mistaken. But can they be mistaken about what they want
to do next? Very hard. And I think we all know that something surges
in our brain when we are afraid to do something. Or ashamed. Or angry
about something. Or desire so much to do something. So, what is it
that surges? Chemicals? Electrical events?
Thus, this hypothesized circumstance would also be a big problem
for neuroscience if it were true because neuroscientists do deal
with propositional attitudes in their daily lives. I gave some examples
before, but even when they are looking at single neurons and single
synapses, they are effectively looking at microscopic propositional
attitudes. And it seems they can and they will find general statements
fitting to the form of "bridge law" and in due time they will find
mechanical component of this picture when we want something etc. This
way they will be able to help drug addicts, for instance.
As a matter of fact, if we were to simply look at literature, I'm sure
we will find several examples of research of the form:
X is in this psychological state iff X's brain is this and that
Let's do this sometime. Let's go to cognews.org and look at the
news items there about neuroscience.
This is a primary motivation for any neuroscientist and it's definitely
a good way to get grants.
One neuroscientist will be researching curiosity. The other will be
researching reward. Another will be looking at alcoholics. etc. etc.
But anyway, who cares about the real world? Let's talk about Oedipus for
all eternity, banging our heads against trivial uses of language. Let's
pretend in Davidson's time, there was no credible neuroscience research
that linked psychology and neuroscience.
Also downplaying bridge laws as "just statistical" is an abuse of
scientific knowledge. We use statistics when we can't analytically
derive stuff etc. a) It's a method b) Laws CAN be statistical, macro-scale
definitions of ALL SORTS ARE STATISTICAL anyway!
In all retrospect, I think there is something DEEPLY WRONG about
the whole "linguistic philosophy" approach to philosophy of mind,
because they think they can achieve the impossible!!! I've just realized
that, but what do they want to do? They want to use Queen's English,
in extremely awkward ways, and just by doing *that* and nothing else,
no conceptual analysis, no exposition of phenomena, no regard for
scientific work, they want to arrive at facts about cognition. That is
never going to happen. Wittgenstein's program is a bankrupt program.
And this is to be seen best in the failure of his "beetle in a box"
thought experiment. He was wrong. Those internal states are VERY
IMPORTANT to neuroscientists, because it is what makes people tick.
Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
http://www.cs.bilkent.edu.tr/~erayo Malfunct: http://myspace.com/malfunct