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Re: More surprising facts about philosophy of mind

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  • Peter D Jones
    ... Predicate dualism is about predicates . # The predicate is that part of a sentence which is not the subject but which gives information about the subject.
    Message 1 of 103 , Jan 1, 2007
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      --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, "Eray Ozkural" <erayo@...> wrote:
      >
      > > Show me a physicalist and I'll show you a boson-fermion
      > > dualist.
      >
      > This is quite a good example as previously discussed on this
      > list. I suppose I had given several examples about what I earlier
      > called multism and I showed boson-fermion distinction as an
      > ontological evidence.
      >
      > However, this distinction is perfectly reducible to physical law,
      > and as such has nothing to do with predicate dualism which is
      > a thesis that posits the extra-physical, hence an unscientific
      > stance.

      Predicate dualism is about predicates .


      # The predicate is that part of a sentence which is not the subject
      but which gives information about the subject. So, in the sentence
      Clare went to school, 'Clare' is the subject and 'went to school' is
      the predicate.
      www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/keystage3/respub/mflframework/appendices/glossary_of_terms/p_to_r/
    • Eray Ozkural
      I mean I will concede that the language of psychology is so twisted that there is no way any scientist can make any sense of it. I will concede that
      Message 103 of 103 , Jan 5, 2007
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        I mean I will concede that the language of psychology is so
        twisted that there is no way any scientist can make any sense
        of it. I will concede that psychological states cannot be really
        inferred by watching people act, after all they can pretend. They cannot
        be inferred by watching people describe themselves. After all, they
        can be mistaken. But can they be mistaken about what they want
        to do next? Very hard. And I think we all know that something surges
        in our brain when we are afraid to do something. Or ashamed. Or angry
        about something. Or desire so much to do something. So, what is it
        that surges? Chemicals? Electrical events?

        Thus, this hypothesized circumstance would also be a big problem
        for neuroscience if it were true because neuroscientists do deal
        with propositional attitudes in their daily lives. I gave some examples
        before, but even when they are looking at single neurons and single
        synapses, they are effectively looking at microscopic propositional
        attitudes. And it seems they can and they will find general statements
        fitting to the form of "bridge law" and in due time they will find
        every functioning
        mechanical component of this picture when we want something etc. This
        way they will be able to help drug addicts, for instance.

        As a matter of fact, if we were to simply look at literature, I'm sure
        we will find several examples of research of the form:
        X is in this psychological state iff X's brain is this and that

        Let's do this sometime. Let's go to cognews.org and look at the
        news items there about neuroscience.

        This is a primary motivation for any neuroscientist and it's definitely
        a good way to get grants.

        One neuroscientist will be researching curiosity. The other will be
        researching reward. Another will be looking at alcoholics. etc. etc.

        But anyway, who cares about the real world? Let's talk about Oedipus for
        all eternity, banging our heads against trivial uses of language. Let's
        pretend in Davidson's time, there was no credible neuroscience research
        that linked psychology and neuroscience.

        Also downplaying bridge laws as "just statistical" is an abuse of
        scientific knowledge. We use statistics when we can't analytically
        derive stuff etc. a) It's a method b) Laws CAN be statistical, macro-scale
        definitions of ALL SORTS ARE STATISTICAL anyway!

        In all retrospect, I think there is something DEEPLY WRONG about
        the whole "linguistic philosophy" approach to philosophy of mind,
        because they think they can achieve the impossible!!! I've just realized
        that, but what do they want to do? They want to use Queen's English,
        in extremely awkward ways, and just by doing *that* and nothing else,
        no conceptual analysis, no exposition of phenomena, no regard for
        scientific work, they want to arrive at facts about cognition. That is
        never going to happen. Wittgenstein's program is a bankrupt program.
        And this is to be seen best in the failure of his "beetle in a box"
        thought experiment. He was wrong. Those internal states are VERY
        IMPORTANT to neuroscientists, because it is what makes people tick.

        Best,

        --
        Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
        http://www.cs.bilkent.edu.tr/~erayo Malfunct: http://myspace.com/malfunct
        ai-philosophy: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
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