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Re: [Serious Phil] Galen Strawson's panpsychism

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  • walto
    ... They re not mystical, they just contain ineliminable vagueness and ambiguity. They don t claim to have access to MORE than you have (items like God or
    Message 1 of 12 , Jul 3 12:26 PM
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      --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@...> wrote:
      >
      > He is wrong of course.
      >
      > He should have stuck to his earlier love affair with behaviorism,
      > which makes more sense.
      >
      > I had a dislike for Quine and Davidson both when I understood what
      > anomalous monism really was. It was a pathetic attempt to assign to
      > some terms in behaviorism an extra-scientific, mystical status.
      >

      They're not mystical, they just contain ineliminable vagueness and ambiguity. They don't claim to have access to MORE than you have (items like God or angels), they're just more modest about human capabilities than you are. I.e., you think YOU are godlike and they think they aren't.

      Thinking about Vienna isn't reducible to some determinable set of brain states because it isn't a determinable set of mental states. That being the case, there's no fact of the matter of whether you and I are "thinking of exactly the same thing."

      You take a more religious view, however. It is that they, not agreeing that you are a god, must believe in some uncceptable idol, like Ba'al.



      > Therefore, I disagree with your analysis.
      >
      > By admitting anomalous monism, Quine *has* admitted creationism,
      > whether he understands this or not. I think he kind of understands but
      > pretends not to.

      Him being dead for quite some time, you have to admit that this is an awesome pretense on his part.


      >
      > Every valid psychological term is commensurate with physiological
      > language. Countless experiments in neuroscience shows EXACTLY this,
      > the psychological and neural terms are often used interchangeably,
      > this causes no confusion, no misunderstanding, no unscientific
      > consequences. Everyone communicates clearly.
      >



      If you define "valid psychological term" in such a way that each one is "commensurate with physiological language, you will not be able to cover the waterfront with "valid psychological terms". If you cover ALL mental activity (like thinking of Vienna), you will not find "valid psychological terms" handy. And, in spite of your conviction, there are NO experiments in neuroscience or anywhere else that provides any contrary evidence to THAT statement. Neuroscience will continue to discover correlations, but if there is no such "thing" as "thinking of Vienna" it cannot reduce "thinking of Vienna" to any set of neurological activities. That is simply a truth of logic.



      > Invalid psychological terms OTOH cause confusion, thus they need to be
      > refined with science, or eliminated altogether, like "consciousness",
      > or say, "qualia" if we'd consider it a term of psych.
      >


      Sure, if you restrict your thesis to the items you actually CAN reduce, you can make your it true by definition. But until you can show that you can encompass all of psychology using only "valid psychological terms" you will not have effected a non-Davidsonian reduction. That, too is simply logic.


      > Therefore, not only their stupid claims about predicate dualism are
      > wrong. But I'd say that their non-reductionism, silly ideas about
      > translation, etc. are all wrong. Their very foundation is made of
      > sand.
      >


      Saying something is wrong is one thing, having decent arguments is a little tougher.


      > It's better to cleanse philosophy of Quine. If we quine Quine, we'll
      > be pretty much set.
      >
      > Reductive physicalism is 100% true. There is no room for their
      > imbecilic non-reductionism in science.
      >


      Ah, 100%! That IS special!

      When name-calling gets dubbed as a valid form of argumentation in other places besides The Gospel of Eray, you'll be in great shape.

      W
    • Eray Ozkural
      Well, yes, and while that distinction is more or less self-evident, Quine went on to make a big deal out of the analytic-synthetic distinction. I think the way
      Message 2 of 12 , Jul 3 6:50 PM
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        Well, yes, and while that distinction is more or less self-evident,
        Quine went on to make a big deal out of the analytic-synthetic
        distinction.

        I think the way Leibniz distinguished necessary and contingent truth
        is nice, purely mathematical/logical definitions and ordinary
        definitions (that describe empirical discoveries nonetheless). There
        is a sense in which mathematical truths are not so eternal (because
        they are invented), but the distinction there is clear enough. I
        usually think Leibniz's philosophy is far advanced wrt the state of
        empirical findings back then.

        Best,

        On Thu, Jul 4, 2013 at 6:56 AM, Roger Clough <rclough@...> wrote:
        > Hi Eray Ozkural
        >
        > Quine and Davidson seemed to err in taking materialism to be the
        > be-all and end-all of all truth. This caused them deny the mental,
        > which is nonsense, as anybody who has intuitively solved a logic problem
        > can say. Creation of something new or previously unknown
        > can only be done by intuition.
        >
        > That may be why Davidson spent so much of his life
        > unsuccessfully trying to define what truth is.
        >
        > Which is not the problem that Leibniz had, since he
        > defined truth as the agreement of a predicate with its subject,
        > and falsity if it did not, such as "Socrates was a man".
        >
        > He alllowed for the fact that not all truths are permanent
        > (here tommorrow as well as today, such as the failing
        > statement "it is raining."). So he allowed for
        > two types of truth:
        >
        > 1. necessary truth, which is eternally true or false,
        > such as "2_+2=4."
        >
        > and
        >
        > 2. contingent truth, which is not permanent, such as
        > "it is raining."
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
        > See my Leibniz site at
        > http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough
        >
        >
        > ----- Receiving the following content -----
        > From: Eray Ozkural
        > Receiver: ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com
        > Time: 2013-07-03, 15:04:14
        > Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] Re: [Serious Phil] Galen Strawson's panpsychism
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >>He is wrong of course.
        >>
        >>He should have stuck to his earlier love affair with behaviorism,
        >>which makes more sense.
        >>
        >>I had a dislike for Quine and Davidson both when I understood what
        >>anomalous monism really was. It was a pathetic attempt to assign to
        >>some terms in behaviorism an extra-scientific, mystical status.
        >>
        >>Therefore, I disagree with your analysis.
        >>
        >>By admitting anomalous monism, Quine *has* admitted creationism,
        >>whether he understands this or not. I think he kind of understands but
        >>pretends not to.
        >>
        >>Every valid psychological term is commensurate with physiological
        >>language. Countless experiments in neuroscience shows EXACTLY this,
        >>the psychological and neural terms are often used interchangeably,
        >>this causes no confusion, no misunderstanding, no unscientific
        >>consequences. Everyone communicates clearly.
        >>
        >>Invalid psychological terms OTOH cause confusion, thus they need to be
        >>refined with science, or eliminated altogether, like "consciousness",
        >>or say, "qualia" if we'd consider it a term of psych.
        >>
        >>Therefore, not only their stupid claims about predicate dualism are
        >>wrong. But I'd say that their non-reductionism, silly ideas about
        >>translation, etc. are all wrong. Their very foundation is made of
        >>sand.
        >>
        >>It's better to cleanse philosophy of Quine. If we quine Quine, we'll
        >>be pretty much set.
        >>
        >>Reductive physicalism is 100% true. There is no room for their
        >>imbecilic non-reductionism in science.
        >>
        >>Best,
        >>
        >>On Wed, Jul 3, 2013 at 7:53 PM, walto wrote:
        >>>
        >>>
        >>> --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, "walto" wrote:
        >>>>
        >>>> Incidentally, there are several interesting papers on this stuff in the _Wittgenstein and Quine_ anthology (edited by Glock and Arrington). I believe it's available on-line at Scribd.
        >>>>
        >>>> W
        >>>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>> From the John Canfield paper in the above-mentioned book:
        >>>
        >>> From early on Quine repudiates `mental entities', doing so on what
        >>> he conceives of as broadly scientific grounds. Thus he writes in `On
        >>> Mental Entities' (1952):
        >>>
        >>> "The issue is?hether?t is efficacious so to frame our
        >>> conceptual scheme as to mark out a range of entities or units
        >>> of a so-called mental kind in addition to the physical ones. My
        >>> hypothesis, put forward in the spirit of a hypothesis of natural
        >>> science, is that it is not efficacious." (FLPVa 214)
        >>>
        >>> In his latest writings Quine adheres to the tenor of his earlier claims,only complicating matters somewhat by adding in Davidson's thesis of anomalous monism. The basic idea is to identify mind with body, and the motive is still said to be broadly scientific: a matter of a simpler overall scheme of things. He puts the matter elegantly in Quiddities:
        >>>
        >>> "Every mental event reflects some bodily one?. Granted this
        >>> much, it becomes a flagrant breach of?ckham's maxim of
        >>> parsimony to admit mind as a second substance at all?. Better
        >>> to drop the duplication and just recognize mental activity as
        >>> part of the activity of the body. It is only thus, indeed, that the
        >>> enigma of mind-body interaction is disposed of." (Q 132)
        >>>
        >>> Thus, for example:
        >>>
        >>> "Each individual episode of someone's thinking about Vienna ?s a
        >>> neural event, which we could describe in strict neurological terms if
        >>> we knew enough about the specific case and its mechanism." (Q 133)
        >>>
        >>> But this does not mean that any `mental predicate' such as `thinking
        >>> about Vienna' or, to enter another example, `having the intention of
        >>> going to Vienna', can be translated into physical terms. Rather the
        >>> two classification systems, mental and physical, are incommensurate:
        >>>
        >>> "Mental events are physical, but mentalistic language classifies them in ways incommensurable with the classifications expressible in physiological language." (Q 133)
        >>>
        >>> ***********************
        >>>
        >>> Canfield goes on to distinguish Wittgenstein's views on these matters (which don't really coincide). In my post, I slopped them all together.
        >>>
        >>> W
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>> ------------------------------------
        >>>
        >>> Yahoo! Groups Links
        >>>
        >>>
        >>>
        >>
        >>
        >>
        >>--
        >>Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
        >>http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
        >>http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
        >>
        >>
        >>------------------------------------
        >>
        >>Yahoo! Groups Links
        >>
        >>
        >>
        >
        >
        > ------------------------------------
        >
        > Yahoo! Groups Links
        >
        >
        >



        --
        Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
        http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
        http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
      • Roger Clough
        Hi Eray Ozkural Quine and Davidson seemed to err in taking materialism to be the be-all and end-all of all truth. This caused them deny the mental, which is
        Message 3 of 12 , Jul 3 8:56 PM
        • 0 Attachment
          Hi Eray Ozkural

          Quine and Davidson seemed to err in taking materialism to be the
          be-all and end-all of all truth. This caused them deny the mental,
          which is nonsense, as anybody who has intuitively solved a logic problem
          can say. Creation of something new or previously unknown
          can only be done by intuition.

          That may be why Davidson spent so much of his life
          unsuccessfully trying to define what truth is.

          Which is not the problem that Leibniz had, since he
          defined truth as the agreement of a predicate with its subject,
          and falsity if it did not, such as "Socrates was a man".

          He alllowed for the fact that not all truths are permanent
          (here tommorrow as well as today, such as the failing
          statement "it is raining."). So he allowed for
          two types of truth:

          1. necessary truth, which is eternally true or false,
          such as "2_+2=4."

          and

          2. contingent truth, which is not permanent, such as
          "it is raining."




          Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
          See my Leibniz site at
          http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough


          ----- Receiving the following content -----
          From: Eray Ozkural
          Receiver: ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com
          Time: 2013-07-03, 15:04:14
          Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] Re: [Serious Phil] Galen Strawson's panpsychism




          >He is wrong of course.
          >
          >He should have stuck to his earlier love affair with behaviorism,
          >which makes more sense.
          >
          >I had a dislike for Quine and Davidson both when I understood what
          >anomalous monism really was. It was a pathetic attempt to assign to
          >some terms in behaviorism an extra-scientific, mystical status.
          >
          >Therefore, I disagree with your analysis.
          >
          >By admitting anomalous monism, Quine *has* admitted creationism,
          >whether he understands this or not. I think he kind of understands but
          >pretends not to.
          >
          >Every valid psychological term is commensurate with physiological
          >language. Countless experiments in neuroscience shows EXACTLY this,
          >the psychological and neural terms are often used interchangeably,
          >this causes no confusion, no misunderstanding, no unscientific
          >consequences. Everyone communicates clearly.
          >
          >Invalid psychological terms OTOH cause confusion, thus they need to be
          >refined with science, or eliminated altogether, like "consciousness",
          >or say, "qualia" if we'd consider it a term of psych.
          >
          >Therefore, not only their stupid claims about predicate dualism are
          >wrong. But I'd say that their non-reductionism, silly ideas about
          >translation, etc. are all wrong. Their very foundation is made of
          >sand.
          >
          >It's better to cleanse philosophy of Quine. If we quine Quine, we'll
          >be pretty much set.
          >
          >Reductive physicalism is 100% true. There is no room for their
          >imbecilic non-reductionism in science.
          >
          >Best,
          >
          >On Wed, Jul 3, 2013 at 7:53 PM, walto wrote:
          >>
          >>
          >> --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, "walto" wrote:
          >>>
          >>> Incidentally, there are several interesting papers on this stuff in the _Wittgenstein and Quine_ anthology (edited by Glock and Arrington). I believe it's available on-line at Scribd.
          >>>
          >>> W
          >>>
          >>
          >>
          >> From the John Canfield paper in the above-mentioned book:
          >>
          >> From early on Quine repudiates `mental entities', doing so on what
          >> he conceives of as broadly scientific grounds. Thus he writes in `On
          >> Mental Entities' (1952):
          >>
          >> "The issue is?hether?t is efficacious so to frame our
          >> conceptual scheme as to mark out a range of entities or units
          >> of a so-called mental kind in addition to the physical ones. My
          >> hypothesis, put forward in the spirit of a hypothesis of natural
          >> science, is that it is not efficacious." (FLPVa 214)
          >>
          >> In his latest writings Quine adheres to the tenor of his earlier claims,only complicating matters somewhat by adding in Davidson's thesis of anomalous monism. The basic idea is to identify mind with body, and the motive is still said to be broadly scientific: a matter of a simpler overall scheme of things. He puts the matter elegantly in Quiddities:
          >>
          >> "Every mental event reflects some bodily one?. Granted this
          >> much, it becomes a flagrant breach of?ckham's maxim of
          >> parsimony to admit mind as a second substance at all?. Better
          >> to drop the duplication and just recognize mental activity as
          >> part of the activity of the body. It is only thus, indeed, that the
          >> enigma of mind-body interaction is disposed of." (Q 132)
          >>
          >> Thus, for example:
          >>
          >> "Each individual episode of someone's thinking about Vienna ?s a
          >> neural event, which we could describe in strict neurological terms if
          >> we knew enough about the specific case and its mechanism." (Q 133)
          >>
          >> But this does not mean that any `mental predicate' such as `thinking
          >> about Vienna' or, to enter another example, `having the intention of
          >> going to Vienna', can be translated into physical terms. Rather the
          >> two classification systems, mental and physical, are incommensurate:
          >>
          >> "Mental events are physical, but mentalistic language classifies them in ways incommensurable with the classifications expressible in physiological language." (Q 133)
          >>
          >> ***********************
          >>
          >> Canfield goes on to distinguish Wittgenstein's views on these matters (which don't really coincide). In my post, I slopped them all together.
          >>
          >> W
          >>
          >>
          >>
          >> ------------------------------------
          >>
          >> Yahoo! Groups Links
          >>
          >>
          >>
          >
          >
          >
          >--
          >Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
          >http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
          >http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
          >
          >
          >------------------------------------
          >
          >Yahoo! Groups Links
          >
          >
          >
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