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Re: [ai-philosophy] Re: Platonism

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  • Stephen P. King
    Dear Eray, Why does there need to be a somewhere for these independent objects to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that could
    Message 1 of 22 , May 15, 2013
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      Dear Eray,

          Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that could possibly exist?

      On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
       



      On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:

       

      I think he sounds like a Platonist,


          Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
       

      No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence. Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of intelligence. 


      --
      Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
      http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
      http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct





      -- 
      Onward!
      
      Stephen
      
      I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
      and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
    • Eray Ozkural
      Dear Stephen, Does that question even deserve a reply? I ve heard that there are idiots who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they
      Message 2 of 22 , May 15, 2013
      • 0 Attachment
        Dear Stephen,

        Does that question even deserve a reply? I've heard that there are idiots who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)


        On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:


        Dear Eray,

            Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that could possibly exist?

        On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
         



        On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:

         

        I think he sounds like a Platonist,


            Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
         

        No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence. Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of intelligence. 


        --
        Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
        http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
        http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct





        -- 
        Onward!
        
        Stephen
        
        I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
        and all of my posts will contain. ;-)





        --
        Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
        http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
        http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
      • Stephen P. King
        ... Hi Eray, It was you that stipulated by your claim that mathematical objects had to exist somewhere ... I submit that there is no such a thing as
        Message 3 of 22 , May 15, 2013
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          On 5/15/2013 1:44 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
           
          Dear Stephen,

          Does that question even deserve a reply?

          Hi Eray,

              It was you that stipulated by your claim that mathematical objects had to exist 'somewhere'... I submit that there is no such a thing as 'independent objects'. I find Platonism built on a false premise, but my second question below is meant seriously. I am trying to understand your ideas.

          I've heard that there are idiots who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)

              I am not a fan of analytic philosophy expect to gleam ideas from it. Do you mean the 'Quine-Putnam indispensability'. I am not familiar with Durhem's work... Umm, I found this:
          http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g97814051067955_ss1-158
          Also called the Quine–Duhem thesis. The view that any single hypothesis or theoretical sentence is not conclusively refuted when predictions derived from it turn out to be false, that is, when it is apparently incompatible with observation. Predictions may also rest upon other hypotheses, which serve as background knowledge. We can always revise this background knowledge to save the hypothesis in question. Empirical tests can only be applied to the whole system of hypotheses, not to single theoretical sentences. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science. The confirmation conditions of a single sentence are determined by the sentence's role in the language or in the theory in which it occurs. This thesis was defended by the French philosopher of science, P. Duhem , and by Quine . This thesis is also called epistemological holism , and is related to Quine's denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. “The Quine/Duhem thesis says that confirmation is holistic; that is, that every statement in a theory partially determines the level of confirmation of every other statement in the theory.”

              How is this wrong? Theories can not float free of physical facts, even if the physical facts are only that my brain is paralleling my thoughts of some far out abstract mathematical concept. Your ad hominem is not informative of your thinking other than to indicate that you lack a level of maturity required to debate ideas. One is not required to agree with a theory to parse it out and analyze its implications...

              All of that philosophy aside; I am actually researching AGI systems to actually built them and could use some different perspectives on idea surrounding them. Jim Whitescarver thinks that you are smart and so I am am willing to read your arguments. I only ask that you treat me with common courtesy. ;-)



          On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:


          Dear Eray,

              Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that could possibly exist?

          On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
           



          On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:

           

          I think he sounds like a Platonist,


              Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
           

          No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence. Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of intelligence. 


          --
          Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
          http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
          http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct





          -


          -- 
          Onward!
          
          Stephen
          
          I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
          and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
        • Eray Ozkural
          Yeah, keep thinking an AGI is easy to program. :) ... -- Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
          Message 4 of 22 , May 15, 2013
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            Yeah, keep thinking an AGI is easy to program. :)


            On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 12:39 AM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:



            On 5/15/2013 1:44 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
             
            Dear Stephen,

            Does that question even deserve a reply?

            Hi Eray,

                It was you that stipulated by your claim that mathematical objects had to exist 'somewhere'... I submit that there is no such a thing as 'independent objects'. I find Platonism built on a false premise, but my second question below is meant seriously. I am trying to understand your ideas.


            I've heard that there are idiots who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)

                I am not a fan of analytic philosophy expect to gleam ideas from it. Do you mean the 'Quine-Putnam indispensability'. I am not familiar with Durhem's work... Umm, I found this:
            http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g97814051067955_ss1-158
            Also called the Quine–Duhem thesis. The view that any single hypothesis or theoretical sentence is not conclusively refuted when predictions derived from it turn out to be false, that is, when it is apparently incompatible with observation. Predictions may also rest upon other hypotheses, which serve as background knowledge. We can always revise this background knowledge to save the hypothesis in question. Empirical tests can only be applied to the whole system of hypotheses, not to single theoretical sentences. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science. The confirmation conditions of a single sentence are determined by the sentence's role in the language or in the theory in which it occurs. This thesis was defended by the French philosopher of science, P. Duhem , and by Quine . This thesis is also called epistemological holism , and is related to Quine's denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. “The Quine/Duhem thesis says that confirmation is holistic; that is, that every statement in a theory partially determines the level of confirmation of every other statement in the theory.”

                How is this wrong? Theories can not float free of physical facts, even if the physical facts are only that my brain is paralleling my thoughts of some far out abstract mathematical concept. Your ad hominem is not informative of your thinking other than to indicate that you lack a level of maturity required to debate ideas. One is not required to agree with a theory to parse it out and analyze its implications...

                All of that philosophy aside; I am actually researching AGI systems to actually built them and could use some different perspectives on idea surrounding them. Jim Whitescarver thinks that you are smart and so I am am willing to read your arguments. I only ask that you treat me with common courtesy. ;-)



            On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:


            Dear Eray,

                Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that could possibly exist?

            On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
             



            On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:

             

            I think he sounds like a Platonist,


                Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
             

            No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence. Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of intelligence. 


            --
            Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
            http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
            http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct





            -


            -- 
            Onward!
            
            Stephen
            
            I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
            and all of my posts will contain. ;-)





            --
            Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
            http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
            http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
          • Eray Ozkural
            And indispensability thesis... is false. I won t waste my time discussing those silly superstitious viewpoints. I have much more important matters to attend
            Message 5 of 22 , May 15, 2013
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              And indispensability thesis... is false. I won't waste my time discussing those silly superstitious viewpoints. I have much more important matters to attend to.


              On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 2:28 AM, Eray Ozkural <examachine@...> wrote:
              Yeah, keep thinking an AGI is easy to program. :)


              On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 12:39 AM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:



              On 5/15/2013 1:44 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
               
              Dear Stephen,

              Does that question even deserve a reply?

              Hi Eray,

                  It was you that stipulated by your claim that mathematical objects had to exist 'somewhere'... I submit that there is no such a thing as 'independent objects'. I find Platonism built on a false premise, but my second question below is meant seriously. I am trying to understand your ideas.


              I've heard that there are idiots who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)

                  I am not a fan of analytic philosophy expect to gleam ideas from it. Do you mean the 'Quine-Putnam indispensability'. I am not familiar with Durhem's work... Umm, I found this:
              http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g97814051067955_ss1-158
              Also called the Quine–Duhem thesis. The view that any single hypothesis or theoretical sentence is not conclusively refuted when predictions derived from it turn out to be false, that is, when it is apparently incompatible with observation. Predictions may also rest upon other hypotheses, which serve as background knowledge. We can always revise this background knowledge to save the hypothesis in question. Empirical tests can only be applied to the whole system of hypotheses, not to single theoretical sentences. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science. The confirmation conditions of a single sentence are determined by the sentence's role in the language or in the theory in which it occurs. This thesis was defended by the French philosopher of science, P. Duhem , and by Quine . This thesis is also called epistemological holism , and is related to Quine's denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. “The Quine/Duhem thesis says that confirmation is holistic; that is, that every statement in a theory partially determines the level of confirmation of every other statement in the theory.”

                  How is this wrong? Theories can not float free of physical facts, even if the physical facts are only that my brain is paralleling my thoughts of some far out abstract mathematical concept. Your ad hominem is not informative of your thinking other than to indicate that you lack a level of maturity required to debate ideas. One is not required to agree with a theory to parse it out and analyze its implications...

                  All of that philosophy aside; I am actually researching AGI systems to actually built them and could use some different perspectives on idea surrounding them. Jim Whitescarver thinks that you are smart and so I am am willing to read your arguments. I only ask that you treat me with common courtesy. ;-)



              On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:


              Dear Eray,

                  Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that could possibly exist?

              On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
               



              On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:

               

              I think he sounds like a Platonist,


                  Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
               

              No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence. Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of intelligence. 


              --
              Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
              http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
              http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct





              -


              -- 
              Onward!
              
              Stephen
              
              I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
              and all of my posts will contain. ;-)





              --
              Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
              http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
              http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct



              --
              Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
              http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
              http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
            • walto
              Hilary tries to explain to the uncomprehending Eray why it is his anti-holism that is actually bullshit, not Quine/Duhem: Holism is...in the first instance,
              Message 6 of 22 , May 15, 2013
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                Hilary tries to explain to the uncomprehending Eray why it is his anti-holism that is actually bullshit, not Quine/Duhem:


                "Holism is...in the first instance, opposed to positivism. The
                positivist view of language insists that all meaningful descriptive
                words in our language must have definitions in terms of words in a
                ''basic'' ,vocabulary, a vocabulary which consists of words which
                stand for notions which are epistemologically more primitive than, say, the theoretical terms of science. The favorite candidate of positivists was a vocabulary which consists of sensation terms, or, at any rate, terms for what is supposed to be "observable." If we formulate positivism as a thesis about the truth conditions for sentences rather than as a thesis about the definability of terms, we may say that, as a historical fact, positivists originally insisted that the meaning of a sentence should be given by (or be capable of being given by) a rule which determines in exactly which experiential situations the sentence is assertable.

                "Now, most of twentieth-century philosophy of science consisted in
                the gradual overthrow of this view. The logical positivists themselves
                shifted from advocating the view to criticizing it. Basically, what came to be realized (even by the positivists themselves) was that theories cannot be tested sentence by sentence. If the sentences of which a theory consists had their own independent experiential meanings or made so many separately testable claims as to what experience will be like, then one could test a scientific theory by testing sentence 1 and testing sentence 2 and testing sentence 3 and so on. But, in fact, the individual postulates of a theory generally have no (or very few) experiential consequences when we consider them in isolation from the other statements of the theory. For example, Newton's Theory of Universal Gravitation (without any added statements specifying boundary conditions) is compatible with any orbits whatsoever. One could even reconcile square orbits with the Theory of Universal Gravitation, by saying, "Well, that means there are nongravitational forces acting on the system." It is only in the presence of a large body of statements that one derives all of its so-called "consequences" from a scientific theory. As Quine puts it, sentences meet the test of experience as a corporate body," and not one by one. (Hence the term "holism.")

                "The same thing is true of the language of daily life. If someone tells you, for example, that the thief entered through that window, and there is muddy ground outside the window, you will deduce that there are footprints in the mud. But this is not a logical consequence of the facts stated, for you obviously have made use of an unstated auxiliary hypothesis to the effect that if the thief entered through that window, he walked on the ground to get to the window, and other items of general information as well. If your informant says, "No, he was wearing stilts," then instead of expecting to find shoe prints in the mud you will now expect
                to find holes of a different shape. What has experiential import is the corporate body of statements, and this import is not the simple sum of the experiential imports of the individual statements."

                From Putnam, "Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't be Right" in _Representation and Reality_

                W

                --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@...> wrote:
                >
                > Dear Stephen,
                >
                > Does that question even deserve a reply? I've heard that there are idiots
                > who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are
                > retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)
                >
                >
                > On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...>wrote:
                >
                > >
                > >
                > > Dear Eray,
                > >
                > > Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects
                > > to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that
                > > could possibly exist?
                > >
                > > On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > > On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...>wrote:
                > >
                > >>
                > >>
                > >>
                > >> I think he sounds like a Platonist,
                > >>
                > >>
                > >> Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
                > >>
                > >>
                > >
                > > No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence.
                > > Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent
                > > objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of
                > > intelligence.
                > >
                > >
                > > --
                > > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                > > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                > > <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/post;_ylc=X3oDMTJyZm9lNjZvBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzEwNTk1NDQ4BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTk0ODkyMwRtc2dJZAMxODM3OQRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNycGx5BHN0aW1lAzEzNjg2MzY2MDI-?act=reply&messageNum=18379>
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > > --
                > > Onward!
                > >
                > > Stephen
                > >
                > > I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                > > and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                >
                >
                >
                >
                > --
                > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                >
              • Stephen P. King
                ... Silly boy, one does not program an AI. One creates a system that can learn to program itself. ... -- Onward! Stephen I apologize in advance for the gross
                Message 7 of 22 , May 15, 2013
                • 0 Attachment

                  On 5/15/2013 7:28 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                   
                  Yeah, keep thinking an AGI is easy to program. :)

                  Silly boy, one does not program an AI. One creates a system that can learn to program itself.



                  On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 12:39 AM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:



                  On 5/15/2013 1:44 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                   
                  Dear Stephen,

                  Does that question even deserve a reply?

                  Hi Eray,

                      It was you that stipulated by your claim that mathematical objects had to exist 'somewhere'... I submit that there is no such a thing as 'independent objects'. I find Platonism built on a false premise, but my second question below is meant seriously. I am trying to understand your ideas.


                  I've heard that there are idiots who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)

                      I am not a fan of analytic philosophy expect to gleam ideas from it. Do you mean the 'Quine-Putnam indispensability'. I am not familiar with Durhem's work... Umm, I found this:
                  http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g97814051067955_ss1-158
                  Also called the Quine–Duhem thesis. The view that any single hypothesis or theoretical sentence is not conclusively refuted when predictions derived from it turn out to be false, that is, when it is apparently incompatible with observation. Predictions may also rest upon other hypotheses, which serve as background knowledge. We can always revise this background knowledge to save the hypothesis in question. Empirical tests can only be applied to the whole system of hypotheses, not to single theoretical sentences. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science. The confirmation conditions of a single sentence are determined by the sentence's role in the language or in the theory in which it occurs. This thesis was defended by the French philosopher of science, P. Duhem , and by Quine . This thesis is also called epistemological holism , and is related to Quine's denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. “The Quine/Duhem thesis says that confirmation is holistic; that is, that every statement in a theory partially determines the level of confirmation of every other statement in the theory.”

                      How is this wrong? Theories can not float free of physical facts, even if the physical facts are only that my brain is paralleling my thoughts of some far out abstract mathematical concept. Your ad hominem is not informative of your thinking other than to indicate that you lack a level of maturity required to debate ideas. One is not required to agree with a theory to parse it out and analyze its implications...

                      All of that philosophy aside; I am actually researching AGI systems to actually built them and could use some different perspectives on idea surrounding them. Jim Whitescarver thinks that you are smart and so I am am willing to read your arguments. I only ask that you treat me with common courtesy. ;-)



                  On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:


                  Dear Eray,

                      Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that could possibly exist?

                  On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                   



                  On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:

                   

                  I think he sounds like a Platonist,


                      Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
                   

                  No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence. Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of intelligence. 


                  --
                  Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                  http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                  http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct





                  -


                  -- 
                  Onward!
                  
                  Stephen
                  
                  I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                  and all of my posts will contain. ;-)





                  --
                  Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                  http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                  http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct

                  -- 
                  Onward!
                  
                  Stephen
                  
                  I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                  and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                • Stephen P. King
                  ... OK, then point me to an online discussion of your argument for my reading. ;-) ... -- Onward! Stephen I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this
                  Message 8 of 22 , May 15, 2013
                  • 0 Attachment

                    On 5/15/2013 7:30 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                     
                    And indispensability thesis... is false. I won't waste my time discussing those silly superstitious viewpoints. I have much more important matters to attend to.

                    OK, then point me to an online discussion of your argument for my reading. ;-)



                    On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 2:28 AM, Eray Ozkural <examachine@...> wrote:
                    Yeah, keep thinking an AGI is easy to program. :)


                    On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 12:39 AM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:



                    On 5/15/2013 1:44 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                     
                    Dear Stephen,

                    Does that question even deserve a reply?

                    Hi Eray,

                        It was you that stipulated by your claim that mathematical objects had to exist 'somewhere'... I submit that there is no such a thing as 'independent objects'. I find Platonism built on a false premise, but my second question below is meant seriously. I am trying to understand your ideas.


                    I've heard that there are idiots who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)

                        I am not a fan of analytic philosophy expect to gleam ideas from it. Do you mean the 'Quine-Putnam indispensability'. I am not familiar with Durhem's work... Umm, I found this:
                    http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g97814051067955_ss1-158
                    Also called the Quine–Duhem thesis. The view that any single hypothesis or theoretical sentence is not conclusively refuted when predictions derived from it turn out to be false, that is, when it is apparently incompatible with observation. Predictions may also rest upon other hypotheses, which serve as background knowledge. We can always revise this background knowledge to save the hypothesis in question. Empirical tests can only be applied to the whole system of hypotheses, not to single theoretical sentences. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science. The confirmation conditions of a single sentence are determined by the sentence's role in the language or in the theory in which it occurs. This thesis was defended by the French philosopher of science, P. Duhem , and by Quine . This thesis is also called epistemological holism , and is related to Quine's denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. “The Quine/Duhem thesis says that confirmation is holistic; that is, that every statement in a theory partially determines the level of confirmation of every other statement in the theory.”

                        How is this wrong? Theories can not float free of physical facts, even if the physical facts are only that my brain is paralleling my thoughts of some far out abstract mathematical concept. Your ad hominem is not informative of your thinking other than to indicate that you lack a level of maturity required to debate ideas. One is not required to agree with a theory to parse it out and analyze its implications...

                        All of that philosophy aside; I am actually researching AGI systems to actually built them and could use some different perspectives on idea surrounding them. Jim Whitescarver thinks that you are smart and so I am am willing to read your arguments. I only ask that you treat me with common courtesy. ;-)



                    On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:


                    Dear Eray,

                        Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that could possibly exist?

                    On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                     



                    On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:

                     

                    I think he sounds like a Platonist,


                        Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
                     

                    No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence. Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of intelligence. 


                    --
                    Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                    http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct





                    -


                    -- 
                    Onward!
                    
                    Stephen
                    
                    I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                    and all of my posts will contain. ;-)





                    --
                    Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                    http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct



                    --
                    Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                    http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct

                    -- 
                    Onward!
                    
                    Stephen
                    
                    I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                    and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                  • Stephen P. King
                    ... Hi walto, Does Hilary try to ground and center (in a accessible world) the entity that has this vocabulary ? If he does not, ISTM, that his argument is
                    Message 9 of 22 , May 15, 2013
                    • 0 Attachment

                      On 5/15/2013 7:58 PM, walto wrote:
                       

                      Hilary tries to explain to the uncomprehending Eray why it is his anti-holism that is actually bullshit, not Quine/Duhem:

                      "Holism is...in the first instance, opposed to positivism. The
                      positivist view of language insists that all meaningful descriptive
                      words in our language must have definitions in terms of words in a
                      ''basic'' ,vocabulary, a vocabulary which consists of words which
                      stand for notions which are epistemologically more primitive than, say, the theoretical terms of science.


                      Hi walto,

                          Does Hilary try to ground and center (in a accessible world) the entity that has this "vocabulary"? If he does not, ISTM, that his argument is weak. To assume that an entity exists, whose properties cannot be in principle measured, is a red herring.

                      The favorite candidate of positivists was a vocabulary which consists of sensation terms, or, at any rate, terms for what is supposed to be "observable."


                          Ummm, like "what it is like to be a ..." that has those and only those observables? How do we interact with such?

                      If we formulate positivism as a thesis about the truth conditions for sentences rather than as a thesis about the definability of terms, we may say that, as a historical fact, positivists originally insisted that the meaning of a sentence should be given by (or be capable of being given by) a rule which determines in exactly which experiential situations the sentence is assertable.


                          Positivist seem to assume that perfectly coherent communication of concepts is the norm and that all possible witnesses to the contrary cannot exist. This is like assuming that the solutions to the SAT problem just "Happen"... I don't have much use for positivism, nor of the holisim here described. They seem to be built on false premises...


                      "Now, most of twentieth-century philosophy of science consisted in
                      the gradual overthrow of this view. The logical positivists themselves
                      shifted from advocating the view to criticizing it. Basically, what came to be realized (even by the positivists themselves) was that theories cannot be tested sentence by sentence.


                          Matiyasevich might have had something to do with that realization... LOL! But we can 'debug" programs if they are not too big... Run it and see where it breaks.

                      If the sentences of which a theory consists had their own independent experiential meanings or made so many separately testable claims as to what experience will be like, then one could test a scientific theory by testing sentence 1 and testing sentence 2 and testing sentence 3 and so on. But, in fact, the individual postulates of a theory generally have no (or very few) experiential consequences when we consider them in isolation from the other statements of the theory. For example, Newton's Theory of Universal Gravitation (without any added statements specifying boundary conditions) is compatible with any orbits whatsoever. One could even reconcile square orbits with the Theory of Universal Gravitation, by saying, "Well, that means there are nongravitational forces acting on the system." It is only in the presence of a large body of statements that one derives all of its so-called "consequences" from a scientific theory. As Quine puts it, sentences meet the test of experience as a corporate body," and not one by one. (Hence the term "holism.")


                          I am OK with that, jump past the long winded discussion of how the communications between many entities that have such experiences tends to winnow the list. This is where I differ to Jaakko Hintikka's ideas. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hP2xR_ZTx3w

                      "The same thing is true of the language of daily life. If someone tells you, for example, that the thief entered through that window, and there is muddy ground outside the window, you will deduce that there are footprints in the mud. But this is not a logical consequence of the facts stated, for you obviously have made use of an unstated auxiliary hypothesis to the effect that if the thief entered through that window, he walked on the ground to get to the window, and other items of general information as well. If your informant says, "No, he was wearing stilts," then instead of expecting to find shoe prints in the mud you will now expect
                      to find holes of a different shape. What has experiential import is the corporate body of statements, and this import is not the simple sum of the experiential imports of the individual statements."

                      >From Putnam, "Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't be Right" in _Representation and Reality_

                      W


                          Thank you for saving me a huge quantity of reading. ;-)


                      --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@...> wrote:
                      >
                      > Dear Stephen,
                      >
                      > Does that question even deserve a reply? I've heard that there are idiots
                      > who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are
                      > retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)
                      >
                      >
                      > On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...>wrote:
                      >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > Dear Eray,
                      > >
                      > > Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects
                      > > to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that
                      > > could possibly exist?
                      > >
                      > > On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...>wrote:
                      > >
                      > >>
                      > >>
                      > >>
                      > >> I think he sounds like a Platonist,
                      > >>
                      > >>
                      > >> Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
                      > >>
                      > >>
                      > >
                      > > No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence.
                      > > Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent
                      > > objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of
                      > > intelligence.
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > --
                      > > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                      > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                      > > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                      > > <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/post;_ylc=X3oDMTJyZm9lNjZvBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzEwNTk1NDQ4BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTk0ODkyMwRtc2dJZAMxODM3OQRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNycGx5BHN0aW1lAzEzNjg2MzY2MDI-?act=reply&messageNum=18379>
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > --
                      > > Onward!
                      > >
                      > > Stephen
                      > >
                      > > I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                      > > and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > --
                      > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                      > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                      > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                      >


                      -- 
                      Onward!
                      
                      Stephen
                      
                      I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                      and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                    • Stephen P. King
                      More on Hintikka: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-epistemic/ ... -- Onward! Stephen I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post and all
                      Message 10 of 22 , May 15, 2013
                      • 0 Attachment
                        More on Hintikka: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-epistemic/
                        On 5/15/2013 9:33 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
                         


                        On 5/15/2013 7:58 PM, walto wrote:
                         

                        Hilary tries to explain to the uncomprehending Eray why it is his anti-holism that is actually bullshit, not Quine/Duhem:

                        "Holism is...in the first instance, opposed to positivism. The
                        positivist view of language insists that all meaningful descriptive
                        words in our language must have definitions in terms of words in a
                        ''basic'' ,vocabulary, a vocabulary which consists of words which
                        stand for notions which are epistemologically more primitive than, say, the theoretical terms of science.


                        Hi walto,

                            Does Hilary try to ground and center (in a accessible world) the entity that has this "vocabulary"? If he does not, ISTM, that his argument is weak. To assume that an entity exists, whose properties cannot be in principle measured, is a red herring.

                        The favorite candidate of positivists was a vocabulary which consists of sensation terms, or, at any rate, terms for what is supposed to be "observable."


                            Ummm, like "what it is like to be a ..." that has those and only those observables? How do we interact with such?

                        If we formulate positivism as a thesis about the truth conditions for sentences rather than as a thesis about the definability of terms, we may say that, as a historical fact, positivists originally insisted that the meaning of a sentence should be given by (or be capable of being given by) a rule which determines in exactly which experiential situations the sentence is assertable.


                            Positivist seem to assume that perfectly coherent communication of concepts is the norm and that all possible witnesses to the contrary cannot exist. This is like assuming that the solutions to the SAT problem just "Happen"... I don't have much use for positivism, nor of the holisim here described. They seem to be built on false premises...


                        "Now, most of twentieth-century philosophy of science consisted in
                        the gradual overthrow of this view. The logical positivists themselves
                        shifted from advocating the view to criticizing it. Basically, what came to be realized (even by the positivists themselves) was that theories cannot be tested sentence by sentence.


                            Matiyasevich might have had something to do with that realization... LOL! But we can 'debug" programs if they are not too big... Run it and see where it breaks.

                        If the sentences of which a theory consists had their own independent experiential meanings or made so many separately testable claims as to what experience will be like, then one could test a scientific theory by testing sentence 1 and testing sentence 2 and testing sentence 3 and so on. But, in fact, the individual postulates of a theory generally have no (or very few) experiential consequences when we consider them in isolation from the other statements of the theory. For example, Newton's Theory of Universal Gravitation (without any added statements specifying boundary conditions) is compatible with any orbits whatsoever. One could even reconcile square orbits with the Theory of Universal Gravitation, by saying, "Well, that means there are nongravitational forces acting on the system." It is only in the presence of a large body of statements that one derives all of its so-called "consequences" from a scientific theory. As Quine puts it, sentences meet the test of experience as a corporate body," and not one by one. (Hence the term "holism.")


                            I am OK with that, jump past the long winded discussion of how the communications between many entities that have such experiences tends to winnow the list. This is where I differ to Jaakko Hintikka's ideas. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hP2xR_ZTx3w

                        "The same thing is true of the language of daily life. If someone tells you, for example, that the thief entered through that window, and there is muddy ground outside the window, you will deduce that there are footprints in the mud. But this is not a logical consequence of the facts stated, for you obviously have made use of an unstated auxiliary hypothesis to the effect that if the thief entered through that window, he walked on the ground to get to the window, and other items of general information as well. If your informant says, "No, he was wearing stilts," then instead of expecting to find shoe prints in the mud you will now expect
                        to find holes of a different shape. What has experiential import is the corporate body of statements, and this import is not the simple sum of the experiential imports of the individual statements."

                        >From Putnam, "Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't be Right" in _Representation and Reality_

                        W


                            Thank you for saving me a huge quantity of reading. ;-)

                        -- 
                        Onward!
                        
                        Stephen
                        
                        I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                        and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                      • walto
                        ... Hi. ... Putnam is very prolific. He has written about nearly everything that philosophers write about these days (maybe not aesthetics--I m not sure). I
                        Message 11 of 22 , May 16, 2013
                        • 0 Attachment
                          --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, "Stephen P. King" <stephenk1@...> wrote:
                          >
                          >
                          > On 5/15/2013 7:58 PM, walto wrote:
                          > >
                          > >
                          > > Hilary tries to explain to the uncomprehending Eray why it is his
                          > > anti-holism that is actually bullshit, not Quine/Duhem:
                          > >
                          > > "Holism is...in the first instance, opposed to positivism. The
                          > > positivist view of language insists that all meaningful descriptive
                          > > words in our language must have definitions in terms of words in a
                          > > ''basic'' ,vocabulary, a vocabulary which consists of words which
                          > > stand for notions which are epistemologically more primitive than,
                          > > say, the theoretical terms of science.
                          > >
                          >
                          > Hi walto,
                          >

                          Hi.


                          > Does Hilary try to ground and center (in a accessible world) the
                          > entity that has this "vocabulary"? If he does not, ISTM, that his
                          > argument is weak. To assume that an entity exists, whose properties
                          > cannot be in principle measured, is a red herring.
                          >

                          Putnam is very prolific. He has written about nearly everything that philosophers write about these days (maybe not aesthetics--I'm not sure). I don't know what you mean about "grounding and centering"--sounds like something one does with a basketball hoop in one's backyard--but if you're talking about his views about personhood, that's not something he talks about in excerpt I posted which is about verificationism and holism. I was responding to Eray's attack on Quine/Duhem, not stating a philosopher's unified field theorem.




                          > > The favorite candidate of positivists was a vocabulary which consists
                          > > of sensation terms, or, at any rate, terms for what is supposed to be
                          > > "observable."
                          > >
                          >
                          > Ummm, like "what it is like to be a ..." that has those and only
                          > those observables? How do we interact with such?
                          >

                          Again, this issue, while interesting and important has no more to do with my post or Putnam's remarks than a question about the best season of Seinfeld.



                          > > If we formulate positivism as a thesis about the truth conditions for
                          > > sentences rather than as a thesis about the definability of terms, we
                          > > may say that, as a historical fact, positivists originally insisted
                          > > that the meaning of a sentence should be given by (or be capable of
                          > > being given by) a rule which determines in exactly which experiential
                          > > situations the sentence is assertable.
                          > >
                          >
                          > Positivist seem to assume that perfectly coherent communication of
                          > concepts is the norm and that all possible witnesses to the contrary
                          > cannot exist. This is like assuming that the solutions to the SAT
                          > problem just "Happen"... I don't have much use for positivism, nor of
                          > the holisim here described.

                          I see that you have an objection (though not a very coherent one) against positivism above. Not coherent, because you make no case that they hold that "all possible witnesses" view you attribute to them without support. You give no objection at all to holism, however. Nevertheless, you have a right to any view you like, and I congratulate you on spelling it correctly.


                          >They seem to be built on false premises...
                          >

                          Could be. Do you know any of them, or is this just a suscipicion you've had since you were little?


                          > >
                          > > "Now, most of twentieth-century philosophy of science consisted in
                          > > the gradual overthrow of this view. The logical positivists themselves
                          > > shifted from advocating the view to criticizing it. Basically, what
                          > > came to be realized (even by the positivists themselves) was that
                          > > theories cannot be tested sentence by sentence.
                          > >
                          >
                          > Matiyasevich might have had something to do with that realization...
                          > LOL! But we can 'debug" programs if they are not too big... Run it and
                          > see where it breaks.
                          >

                          Here, it is good to see that you are enjoying life. A hearty laugh is good for one's health, I hear.



                          > > If the sentences of which a theory consists had their own independent
                          > > experiential meanings or made so many separately testable claims as to
                          > > what experience will be like, then one could test a scientific theory
                          > > by testing sentence 1 and testing sentence 2 and testing sentence 3
                          > > and so on. But, in fact, the individual postulates of a theory
                          > > generally have no (or very few) experiential consequences when we
                          > > consider them in isolation from the other statements of the theory.
                          > > For example, Newton's Theory of Universal Gravitation (without any
                          > > added statements specifying boundary conditions) is compatible with
                          > > any orbits whatsoever. One could even reconcile square orbits with the
                          > > Theory of Universal Gravitation, by saying, "Well, that means there
                          > > are nongravitational forces acting on the system." It is only in the
                          > > presence of a large body of statements that one derives all of its
                          > > so-called "consequences" from a scientific theory. As Quine puts it,
                          > > sentences meet the test of experience as a corporate body," and not
                          > > one by one. (Hence the term "holism.")
                          > >
                          >
                          > I am OK with that,

                          Glad to hear it, even if it is inconsistent with what you wrote a paragraph or two back.


                          > jump past the long winded discussion of how the
                          > communications between many entities that have such experiences tends to
                          > winnow the list. This is where I differ to Jaakko Hintikka's ideas.
                          > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hP2xR_ZTx3w
                          >

                          I don't know what "differ to" means, but thanks for the link.



                          > > "The same thing is true of the language of daily life. If someone
                          > > tells you, for example, that the thief entered through that window,
                          > > and there is muddy ground outside the window, you will deduce that
                          > > there are footprints in the mud. But this is not a logical consequence
                          > > of the facts stated, for you obviously have made use of an unstated
                          > > auxiliary hypothesis to the effect that if the thief entered through
                          > > that window, he walked on the ground to get to the window, and other
                          > > items of general information as well. If your informant says, "No, he
                          > > was wearing stilts," then instead of expecting to find shoe prints in
                          > > the mud you will now expect
                          > > to find holes of a different shape. What has experiential import is
                          > > the corporate body of statements, and this import is not the simple
                          > > sum of the experiential imports of the individual statements."
                          > >
                          > > >From Putnam, "Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't be Right" in
                          > > _Representation and Reality_
                          > >
                          > > W
                          > >
                          >
                          > Thank you for saving me a huge quantity of reading. ;-)
                          >


                          My pleasure--even if I don't know what reading you're talking about and though whatever it was may have done you some good.

                          W



                          > >
                          > > --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com
                          > > <mailto:ai-philosophy%40yahoogroups.com>, Eray Ozkural <erayo@> wrote:
                          > > >
                          > > > Dear Stephen,
                          > > >
                          > > > Does that question even deserve a reply? I've heard that there are
                          > > idiots
                          > > > who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that
                          > > they are
                          > > > retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@>wrote:
                          > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > > Dear Eray,
                          > > > >
                          > > > > Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects
                          > > > > to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all
                          > > that
                          > > > > could possibly exist?
                          > > > >
                          > > > > On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > > On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@>wrote:
                          > > > >
                          > > > >>
                          > > > >>
                          > > > >>
                          > > > >> I think he sounds like a Platonist,
                          > > > >>
                          > > > >>
                          > > > >> Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
                          > > > >>
                          > > > >>
                          > > > >
                          > > > > No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence.
                          > > > > Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as
                          > > independent
                          > > > > objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of
                          > > > > intelligence.
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > > --
                          > > > > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University,
                          > > Ankara
                          > > > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                          > > > > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                          > > > >
                          > > <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/post;_ylc=X3oDMTJyZm9lNjZvBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzEwNTk1NDQ4BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTk0ODkyMwRtc2dJZAMxODM3OQRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNycGx5BHN0aW1lAzEzNjg2MzY2MDI-?act=reply&messageNum=18379>
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > > --
                          > > > > Onward!
                          > > > >
                          > > > > Stephen
                          > > > >
                          > > > > I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                          > > > > and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > > >
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > --
                          > > > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University,
                          > > Ankara
                          > > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                          > > > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                          > > >
                          > >
                          > >
                          >
                          > --
                          > Onward!
                          >
                          > Stephen
                          >
                          > I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                          > and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                          >
                        • Eray Ozkural
                          All of it is anti-scientific. Holism, non-reductionism, mathematical Platonism. These are essentially creationist ideas. I m still looking for this deep
                          Message 12 of 22 , May 16, 2013
                          • 0 Attachment
                            All of it is anti-scientific. Holism, non-reductionism, mathematical
                            Platonism. These are essentially creationist ideas.

                            I'm still looking for this deep contribution that Quine made, and I
                            still can't find it.

                            On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 2:58 AM, walto <calhorn@...> wrote:
                            > Hilary tries to explain to the uncomprehending Eray why it is his anti-holism that is actually bullshit, not Quine/Duhem:
                            >
                            >
                            > "Holism is...in the first instance, opposed to positivism. The
                            > positivist view of language insists that all meaningful descriptive
                            > words in our language must have definitions in terms of words in a
                            > ''basic'' ,vocabulary, a vocabulary which consists of words which
                            > stand for notions which are epistemologically more primitive than, say, the theoretical terms of science. The favorite candidate of positivists was a vocabulary which consists of sensation terms, or, at any rate, terms for what is supposed to be "observable." If we formulate positivism as a thesis about the truth conditions for sentences rather than as a thesis about the definability of terms, we may say that, as a historical fact, positivists originally insisted that the meaning of a sentence should be given by (or be capable of being given by) a rule which determines in exactly which experiential situations the sentence is assertable.
                            >
                            > "Now, most of twentieth-century philosophy of science consisted in
                            > the gradual overthrow of this view. The logical positivists themselves
                            > shifted from advocating the view to criticizing it. Basically, what came to be realized (even by the positivists themselves) was that theories cannot be tested sentence by sentence. If the sentences of which a theory consists had their own independent experiential meanings or made so many separately testable claims as to what experience will be like, then one could test a scientific theory by testing sentence 1 and testing sentence 2 and testing sentence 3 and so on. But, in fact, the individual postulates of a theory generally have no (or very few) experiential consequences when we consider them in isolation from the other statements of the theory. For example, Newton's Theory of Universal Gravitation (without any added statements specifying boundary conditions) is compatible with any orbits whatsoever. One could even reconcile square orbits with the Theory of Universal Gravitation, by saying, "Well, that means there are nongravitational forces acting on the system." It is o
                            > nly in the presence of a large body of statements that one derives all of its so-called "consequences" from a scientific theory. As Quine puts it, sentences meet the test of experience as a corporate body," and not one by one. (Hence the term "holism.")
                            >
                            > "The same thing is true of the language of daily life. If someone tells you, for example, that the thief entered through that window, and there is muddy ground outside the window, you will deduce that there are footprints in the mud. But this is not a logical consequence of the facts stated, for you obviously have made use of an unstated auxiliary hypothesis to the effect that if the thief entered through that window, he walked on the ground to get to the window, and other items of general information as well. If your informant says, "No, he was wearing stilts," then instead of expecting to find shoe prints in the mud you will now expect
                            > to find holes of a different shape. What has experiential import is the corporate body of statements, and this import is not the simple sum of the experiential imports of the individual statements."
                            >
                            > From Putnam, "Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't be Right" in _Representation and Reality_
                            >
                            > W
                            >
                            > --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@...> wrote:
                            >>
                            >> Dear Stephen,
                            >>
                            >> Does that question even deserve a reply? I've heard that there are idiots
                            >> who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are
                            >> retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)
                            >>
                            >>
                            >> On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...>wrote:
                            >>
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> > Dear Eray,
                            >> >
                            >> > Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects
                            >> > to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that
                            >> > could possibly exist?
                            >> >
                            >> > On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> > On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...>wrote:
                            >> >
                            >> >>
                            >> >>
                            >> >>
                            >> >> I think he sounds like a Platonist,
                            >> >>
                            >> >>
                            >> >> Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
                            >> >>
                            >> >>
                            >> >
                            >> > No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence.
                            >> > Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent
                            >> > objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of
                            >> > intelligence.
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> > --
                            >> > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                            >> > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                            >> > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                            >> > <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/post;_ylc=X3oDMTJyZm9lNjZvBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzEwNTk1NDQ4BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTk0ODkyMwRtc2dJZAMxODM3OQRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNycGx5BHN0aW1lAzEzNjg2MzY2MDI-?act=reply&messageNum=18379>
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> > --
                            >> > Onward!
                            >> >
                            >> > Stephen
                            >> >
                            >> > I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                            >> > and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >> >
                            >>
                            >>
                            >>
                            >>
                            >> --
                            >> Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                            >> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                            >> http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                            >>
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            > ------------------------------------
                            >
                            > Yahoo! Groups Links
                            >
                            >
                            >



                            --
                            Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                            http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                            http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                          • Eray Ozkural
                            For the record, I banned this troll for idiotic statements like this, but also deliberate misrepresentation of my views, in addition to lame attempts to elicit
                            Message 13 of 22 , May 16, 2013
                            • 0 Attachment
                              For the record, I banned this troll for idiotic statements like this, but also deliberate misrepresentation of my views, in addition to lame attempts to elicit emotional responses. I sent him a message or two to let him know how I feel about imbeciles like him.  I consider his behavior to be trolling, and it's written in the group charter that trolls are not welcome.

                              What kind of an idiot does one have to be to think that you don't program a machine learning system?


                              On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 4:15 AM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:



                              On 5/15/2013 7:28 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                               
                              Yeah, keep thinking an AGI is easy to program. :)

                              Silly boy, one does not program an AI. One creates a system that can learn to program itself.




                              On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 12:39 AM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:



                              On 5/15/2013 1:44 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                               
                              Dear Stephen,

                              Does that question even deserve a reply?

                              Hi Eray,

                                  It was you that stipulated by your claim that mathematical objects had to exist 'somewhere'... I submit that there is no such a thing as 'independent objects'. I find Platonism built on a false premise, but my second question below is meant seriously. I am trying to understand your ideas.


                              I've heard that there are idiots who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)

                                  I am not a fan of analytic philosophy expect to gleam ideas from it. Do you mean the 'Quine-Putnam indispensability'. I am not familiar with Durhem's work... Umm, I found this:
                              http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g97814051067955_ss1-158
                              Also called the Quine–Duhem thesis. The view that any single hypothesis or theoretical sentence is not conclusively refuted when predictions derived from it turn out to be false, that is, when it is apparently incompatible with observation. Predictions may also rest upon other hypotheses, which serve as background knowledge. We can always revise this background knowledge to save the hypothesis in question. Empirical tests can only be applied to the whole system of hypotheses, not to single theoretical sentences. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science. The confirmation conditions of a single sentence are determined by the sentence's role in the language or in the theory in which it occurs. This thesis was defended by the French philosopher of science, P. Duhem , and by Quine . This thesis is also called epistemological holism , and is related to Quine's denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. “The Quine/Duhem thesis says that confirmation is holistic; that is, that every statement in a theory partially determines the level of confirmation of every other statement in the theory.”

                                  How is this wrong? Theories can not float free of physical facts, even if the physical facts are only that my brain is paralleling my thoughts of some far out abstract mathematical concept. Your ad hominem is not informative of your thinking other than to indicate that you lack a level of maturity required to debate ideas. One is not required to agree with a theory to parse it out and analyze its implications...

                                  All of that philosophy aside; I am actually researching AGI systems to actually built them and could use some different perspectives on idea surrounding them. Jim Whitescarver thinks that you are smart and so I am am willing to read your arguments. I only ask that you treat me with common courtesy. ;-)



                              On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:


                              Dear Eray,

                                  Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that could possibly exist?

                              On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                               



                              On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@...> wrote:

                               

                              I think he sounds like a Platonist,


                                  Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
                               

                              No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence. Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of intelligence. 


                              --
                              Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                              http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                              http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct





                              -


                              -- 
                              Onward!
                              
                              Stephen
                              
                              I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                              and all of my posts will contain. ;-)





                              --
                              Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                              http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                              http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct

                              -- 
                              Onward!
                              
                              Stephen
                              
                              I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                              and all of my posts will contain. ;-)





                              --
                              Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                              http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                              http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                            • walto
                              ... Lumping all of those together makes no sense to me. How is holism connected to any of the others. In the excerpt I posted, Putnam argues that anti-holism
                              Message 14 of 22 , May 17, 2013
                              • 0 Attachment
                                --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@...> wrote:
                                >
                                > All of it is anti-scientific. Holism, non-reductionism, mathematical
                                > Platonism. These are essentially creationist ideas.
                                >


                                Lumping all of those together makes no sense to me. How is holism connected to any of the others. In the excerpt I posted, Putnam argues that anti-holism is contrary to science, and you give no response to this. Just name-calling some kind of attempt at guilt by association.

                                There is nothing creationist about holism. It is simply the extremely plausible and scientific claim that verification does not take place one proposition at a time. Denials of it, on the other hand, are apparent attempt to ignore the entire history of science. It has not been the scientific who have done this, but rather those who are comfortable with things like creationism.



                                > I'm still looking for this deep contribution that Quine made, and I
                                > still can't find it.
                                >

                                Actually, you are not looking at all. You are simply repeating mantras that you have repeated for years. It was Quine's anti-mentalism and anti-platonism that made him famous. And he convinced your guy Carnap of many things (including, I believe, the substitution of the more scientific concept of stimulus-synonymy for the almost religious traditional concept of synonymy/analyticity.

                                I understand that you don't like his support of the indispensibility thesis. I don't discuss philosophy of math myself--it's out of my area of competence. But, FWIW, I think Quine would have loved to see good arguments against this principle: it seemed a regret of his to have to countenance sets--he simply felt that math and science needed them. He simply couldn't see how to do dump them.

                                You have another approach to such matters, however. You simply shout "creationist" where you have no arguments. That's easy and maybe satisfying, but that was not Quine's way, and IMHO, has never the way of any good philosopher.

                                In any case, none of this has a thing to do with holism--it's all just Erayan hollering.



                                W



                                > On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 2:58 AM, walto <calhorn@...> wrote:
                                > > Hilary tries to explain to the uncomprehending Eray why it is his anti-holism that is actually bullshit, not Quine/Duhem:
                                > >
                                > >
                                > > "Holism is...in the first instance, opposed to positivism. The
                                > > positivist view of language insists that all meaningful descriptive
                                > > words in our language must have definitions in terms of words in a
                                > > ''basic'' ,vocabulary, a vocabulary which consists of words which
                                > > stand for notions which are epistemologically more primitive than, say, the theoretical terms of science. The favorite candidate of positivists was a vocabulary which consists of sensation terms, or, at any rate, terms for what is supposed to be "observable." If we formulate positivism as a thesis about the truth conditions for sentences rather than as a thesis about the definability of terms, we may say that, as a historical fact, positivists originally insisted that the meaning of a sentence should be given by (or be capable of being given by) a rule which determines in exactly which experiential situations the sentence is assertable.
                                > >
                                > > "Now, most of twentieth-century philosophy of science consisted in
                                > > the gradual overthrow of this view. The logical positivists themselves
                                > > shifted from advocating the view to criticizing it. Basically, what came to be realized (even by the positivists themselves) was that theories cannot be tested sentence by sentence. If the sentences of which a theory consists had their own independent experiential meanings or made so many separately testable claims as to what experience will be like, then one could test a scientific theory by testing sentence 1 and testing sentence 2 and testing sentence 3 and so on. But, in fact, the individual postulates of a theory generally have no (or very few) experiential consequences when we consider them in isolation from the other statements of the theory. For example, Newton's Theory of Universal Gravitation (without any added statements specifying boundary conditions) is compatible with any orbits whatsoever. One could even reconcile square orbits with the Theory of Universal Gravitation, by saying, "Well, that means there are nongravitational forces acting on the system." It is o
                                > > nly in the presence of a large body of statements that one derives all of its so-called "consequences" from a scientific theory. As Quine puts it, sentences meet the test of experience as a corporate body," and not one by one. (Hence the term "holism.")
                                > >
                                > > "The same thing is true of the language of daily life. If someone tells you, for example, that the thief entered through that window, and there is muddy ground outside the window, you will deduce that there are footprints in the mud. But this is not a logical consequence of the facts stated, for you obviously have made use of an unstated auxiliary hypothesis to the effect that if the thief entered through that window, he walked on the ground to get to the window, and other items of general information as well. If your informant says, "No, he was wearing stilts," then instead of expecting to find shoe prints in the mud you will now expect
                                > > to find holes of a different shape. What has experiential import is the corporate body of statements, and this import is not the simple sum of the experiential imports of the individual statements."
                                > >
                                > > From Putnam, "Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't be Right" in _Representation and Reality_
                                > >
                                > > W
                                > >
                                > > --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@> wrote:
                                > >>
                                > >> Dear Stephen,
                                > >>
                                > >> Does that question even deserve a reply? I've heard that there are idiots
                                > >> who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are
                                > >> retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)
                                > >>
                                > >>
                                > >> On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@>wrote:
                                > >>
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> > Dear Eray,
                                > >> >
                                > >> > Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects
                                > >> > to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that
                                > >> > could possibly exist?
                                > >> >
                                > >> > On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> > On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@>wrote:
                                > >> >
                                > >> >>
                                > >> >>
                                > >> >>
                                > >> >> I think he sounds like a Platonist,
                                > >> >>
                                > >> >>
                                > >> >> Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
                                > >> >>
                                > >> >>
                                > >> >
                                > >> > No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence.
                                > >> > Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent
                                > >> > objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of
                                > >> > intelligence.
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> > --
                                > >> > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                                > >> > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                                > >> > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                                > >> > <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/post;_ylc=X3oDMTJyZm9lNjZvBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzEwNTk1NDQ4BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTk0ODkyMwRtc2dJZAMxODM3OQRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNycGx5BHN0aW1lAzEzNjg2MzY2MDI-?act=reply&messageNum=18379>
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> > --
                                > >> > Onward!
                                > >> >
                                > >> > Stephen
                                > >> >
                                > >> > I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                                > >> > and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >> >
                                > >>
                                > >>
                                > >>
                                > >>
                                > >> --
                                > >> Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                                > >> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                                > >> http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                                > >>
                                > >
                                > >
                                > >
                                > >
                                > > ------------------------------------
                                > >
                                > > Yahoo! Groups Links
                                > >
                                > >
                                > >
                                >
                                >
                                >
                                > --
                                > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                                > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                                > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                                >
                              • larry_tapper
                                W ...I understand that you don t like his support of the indispensibility thesis. I don t discuss philosophy of math myself--it s out of my area of
                                Message 15 of 22 , May 19, 2013
                                • 0 Attachment
                                  W> ...I understand that you don't like his support of the indispensibility thesis. I don't discuss philosophy of math myself--it's out of my area of competence. But, FWIW, I think Quine would have loved to see good arguments against this principle: it seemed a regret of his to have to countenance sets--he simply felt that math and science needed them. He simply couldn't see how to do dump them.

                                  Eray,

                                  I think W is quite right about this, and you ought to forgive Quine for what you perceive to be his betrayal of nominalism. That's a rather technical side issue in the rarefied field of philosophy of mathematics. But when it comes to the big questions, you and Quine seem to be on the same side more often than not.

                                  W is also right about holism --- there is nothing metaphysical or unscientific about that idea.

                                  Just picture building a general purpose inductive AI along the lines you have emntioned many times. At any given time, we could say loosely that the AI has some set of 'beliefs' --- statements about the world which it considers to be true or inductively probable. A new datum comes along which, if accepted, logically contradicts the set of present beliefs.

                                  The so-called "Quine-Duhem thesis" (actually a somewhat misleading name because Q and D had different theses) just says that if your AI is programmed to try to resolve such contradictions, there will almost always be more than one way to do it. The minimal-change method is often one of the more attractive options, but that is not the only method or necessarily the best.

                                  That has nothing at all to do with creationism or anything else you might think of as superstition. It is just a particular view of scientific methodology, and the main test of it is whether it accords with actual historical examples of scientific practice. Not only Quine but also many others such as Putnam and Lakatos have argued persuasively that it does.

                                  Larry


                                  --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, "walto" <calhorn@...> wrote:
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  > --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@> wrote:
                                  > >
                                  > > All of it is anti-scientific. Holism, non-reductionism, mathematical
                                  > > Platonism. These are essentially creationist ideas.
                                  > >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  > Lumping all of those together makes no sense to me. How is holism connected to any of the others. In the excerpt I posted, Putnam argues that anti-holism is contrary to science, and you give no response to this. Just name-calling some kind of attempt at guilt by association.
                                  >
                                  > There is nothing creationist about holism. It is simply the extremely plausible and scientific claim that verification does not take place one proposition at a time. Denials of it, on the other hand, are apparent attempt to ignore the entire history of science. It has not been the scientific who have done this, but rather those who are comfortable with things like creationism.
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  > > I'm still looking for this deep contribution that Quine made, and I
                                  > > still can't find it.
                                  > >
                                  >
                                  > Actually, you are not looking at all. You are simply repeating mantras that you have repeated for years. It was Quine's anti-mentalism and anti-platonism that made him famous. And he convinced your guy Carnap of many things (including, I believe, the substitution of the more scientific concept of stimulus-synonymy for the almost religious traditional concept of synonymy/analyticity.
                                  >
                                  > I understand that you don't like his support of the indispensibility thesis. I don't discuss philosophy of math myself--it's out of my area of competence. But, FWIW, I think Quine would have loved to see good arguments against this principle: it seemed a regret of his to have to countenance sets--he simply felt that math and science needed them. He simply couldn't see how to do dump them.
                                  >
                                  > You have another approach to such matters, however. You simply shout "creationist" where you have no arguments. That's easy and maybe satisfying, but that was not Quine's way, and IMHO, has never the way of any good philosopher.
                                  >
                                  > In any case, none of this has a thing to do with holism--it's all just Erayan hollering.
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  > W
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  > > On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 2:58 AM, walto <calhorn@> wrote:
                                  > > > Hilary tries to explain to the uncomprehending Eray why it is his anti-holism that is actually bullshit, not Quine/Duhem:
                                  > > >
                                  > > >
                                  > > > "Holism is...in the first instance, opposed to positivism. The
                                  > > > positivist view of language insists that all meaningful descriptive
                                  > > > words in our language must have definitions in terms of words in a
                                  > > > ''basic'' ,vocabulary, a vocabulary which consists of words which
                                  > > > stand for notions which are epistemologically more primitive than, say, the theoretical terms of science. The favorite candidate of positivists was a vocabulary which consists of sensation terms, or, at any rate, terms for what is supposed to be "observable." If we formulate positivism as a thesis about the truth conditions for sentences rather than as a thesis about the definability of terms, we may say that, as a historical fact, positivists originally insisted that the meaning of a sentence should be given by (or be capable of being given by) a rule which determines in exactly which experiential situations the sentence is assertable.
                                  > > >
                                  > > > "Now, most of twentieth-century philosophy of science consisted in
                                  > > > the gradual overthrow of this view. The logical positivists themselves
                                  > > > shifted from advocating the view to criticizing it. Basically, what came to be realized (even by the positivists themselves) was that theories cannot be tested sentence by sentence. If the sentences of which a theory consists had their own independent experiential meanings or made so many separately testable claims as to what experience will be like, then one could test a scientific theory by testing sentence 1 and testing sentence 2 and testing sentence 3 and so on. But, in fact, the individual postulates of a theory generally have no (or very few) experiential consequences when we consider them in isolation from the other statements of the theory. For example, Newton's Theory of Universal Gravitation (without any added statements specifying boundary conditions) is compatible with any orbits whatsoever. One could even reconcile square orbits with the Theory of Universal Gravitation, by saying, "Well, that means there are nongravitational forces acting on the system." It is o
                                  > > > nly in the presence of a large body of statements that one derives all of its so-called "consequences" from a scientific theory. As Quine puts it, sentences meet the test of experience as a corporate body," and not one by one. (Hence the term "holism.")
                                  > > >
                                  > > > "The same thing is true of the language of daily life. If someone tells you, for example, that the thief entered through that window, and there is muddy ground outside the window, you will deduce that there are footprints in the mud. But this is not a logical consequence of the facts stated, for you obviously have made use of an unstated auxiliary hypothesis to the effect that if the thief entered through that window, he walked on the ground to get to the window, and other items of general information as well. If your informant says, "No, he was wearing stilts," then instead of expecting to find shoe prints in the mud you will now expect
                                  > > > to find holes of a different shape. What has experiential import is the corporate body of statements, and this import is not the simple sum of the experiential imports of the individual statements."
                                  > > >
                                  > > > From Putnam, "Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't be Right" in _Representation and Reality_
                                  > > >
                                  > > > W
                                  > > >
                                  > > > --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@> wrote:
                                  > > >>
                                  > > >> Dear Stephen,
                                  > > >>
                                  > > >> Does that question even deserve a reply? I've heard that there are idiots
                                  > > >> who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are
                                  > > >> retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)
                                  > > >>
                                  > > >>
                                  > > >> On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@>wrote:
                                  > > >>
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> > Dear Eray,
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> > Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects
                                  > > >> > to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that
                                  > > >> > could possibly exist?
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> > On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> > On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@>wrote:
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >>
                                  > > >> >>
                                  > > >> >>
                                  > > >> >> I think he sounds like a Platonist,
                                  > > >> >>
                                  > > >> >>
                                  > > >> >> Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
                                  > > >> >>
                                  > > >> >>
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> > No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence.
                                  > > >> > Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent
                                  > > >> > objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of
                                  > > >> > intelligence.
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> > --
                                  > > >> > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                                  > > >> > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                                  > > >> > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                                  > > >> > <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/post;_ylc=X3oDMTJyZm9lNjZvBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzEwNTk1NDQ4BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTk0ODkyMwRtc2dJZAMxODM3OQRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNycGx5BHN0aW1lAzEzNjg2MzY2MDI-?act=reply&messageNum=18379>
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> > --
                                  > > >> > Onward!
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> > Stephen
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> > I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                                  > > >> > and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >> >
                                  > > >>
                                  > > >>
                                  > > >>
                                  > > >>
                                  > > >> --
                                  > > >> Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                                  > > >> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                                  > > >> http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                                  > > >>
                                  > > >
                                  > > >
                                  > > >
                                  > > >
                                  > > > ------------------------------------
                                  > > >
                                  > > > Yahoo! Groups Links
                                  > > >
                                  > > >
                                  > > >
                                  > >
                                  > >
                                  > >
                                  > > --
                                  > > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                                  > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                                  > > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                                  > >
                                  >
                                • walto
                                  ... I agree with all that (unsurprisingly). And it s put better than I did. I d just add that in comparison with Carnap, Quine is a naturalist s naturalist.
                                  Message 16 of 22 , May 20, 2013
                                  • 0 Attachment
                                    --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, "larry_tapper" <larry_tapper@...> wrote:
                                    >
                                    > W> ...I understand that you don't like his support of the indispensibility thesis. I don't discuss philosophy of math myself--it's out of my area of competence. But, FWIW, I think Quine would have loved to see good arguments against this principle: it seemed a regret of his to have to countenance sets--he simply felt that math and science needed them. He simply couldn't see how to do dump them.
                                    >
                                    > Eray,
                                    >
                                    > I think W is quite right about this, and you ought to forgive Quine for what you perceive to be his betrayal of nominalism. That's a rather technical side issue in the rarefied field of philosophy of mathematics. But when it comes to the big questions, you and Quine seem to be on the same side more often than not.
                                    >
                                    > W is also right about holism --- there is nothing metaphysical or unscientific about that idea.
                                    >
                                    > Just picture building a general purpose inductive AI along the lines you have emntioned many times. At any given time, we could say loosely that the AI has some set of 'beliefs' --- statements about the world which it considers to be true or inductively probable. A new datum comes along which, if accepted, logically contradicts the set of present beliefs.
                                    >
                                    > The so-called "Quine-Duhem thesis" (actually a somewhat misleading name because Q and D had different theses) just says that if your AI is programmed to try to resolve such contradictions, there will almost always be more than one way to do it. The minimal-change method is often one of the more attractive options, but that is not the only method or necessarily the best.
                                    >
                                    > That has nothing at all to do with creationism or anything else you might think of as superstition. It is just a particular view of scientific methodology, and the main test of it is whether it accords with actual historical examples of scientific practice. Not only Quine but also many others such as Putnam and Lakatos have argued persuasively that it does.
                                    >
                                    > Larry
                                    >

                                    I agree with all that (unsurprisingly). And it's put better than I did. I'd just add that in comparison with Carnap, Quine is a naturalist's naturalist. He dispenses with meanings and analyticity. Carnap either caved on those and ended up being persuaded by Quine, or he remained to his death what Eray ought to consider a highly superstitious priest, rather than a scientific philosopher. Besides the entities of physics and their behaviors there are.....meanings?!?

                                    W


                                    >
                                    > --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, "walto" <calhorn@> wrote:
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > > --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@> wrote:
                                    > > >
                                    > > > All of it is anti-scientific. Holism, non-reductionism, mathematical
                                    > > > Platonism. These are essentially creationist ideas.
                                    > > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > > Lumping all of those together makes no sense to me. How is holism connected to any of the others. In the excerpt I posted, Putnam argues that anti-holism is contrary to science, and you give no response to this. Just name-calling some kind of attempt at guilt by association.
                                    > >
                                    > > There is nothing creationist about holism. It is simply the extremely plausible and scientific claim that verification does not take place one proposition at a time. Denials of it, on the other hand, are apparent attempt to ignore the entire history of science. It has not been the scientific who have done this, but rather those who are comfortable with things like creationism.
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > > > I'm still looking for this deep contribution that Quine made, and I
                                    > > > still can't find it.
                                    > > >
                                    > >
                                    > > Actually, you are not looking at all. You are simply repeating mantras that you have repeated for years. It was Quine's anti-mentalism and anti-platonism that made him famous. And he convinced your guy Carnap of many things (including, I believe, the substitution of the more scientific concept of stimulus-synonymy for the almost religious traditional concept of synonymy/analyticity.
                                    > >
                                    > > I understand that you don't like his support of the indispensibility thesis. I don't discuss philosophy of math myself--it's out of my area of competence. But, FWIW, I think Quine would have loved to see good arguments against this principle: it seemed a regret of his to have to countenance sets--he simply felt that math and science needed them. He simply couldn't see how to do dump them.
                                    > >
                                    > > You have another approach to such matters, however. You simply shout "creationist" where you have no arguments. That's easy and maybe satisfying, but that was not Quine's way, and IMHO, has never the way of any good philosopher.
                                    > >
                                    > > In any case, none of this has a thing to do with holism--it's all just Erayan hollering.
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > > W
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > > > On Thu, May 16, 2013 at 2:58 AM, walto <calhorn@> wrote:
                                    > > > > Hilary tries to explain to the uncomprehending Eray why it is his anti-holism that is actually bullshit, not Quine/Duhem:
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > > "Holism is...in the first instance, opposed to positivism. The
                                    > > > > positivist view of language insists that all meaningful descriptive
                                    > > > > words in our language must have definitions in terms of words in a
                                    > > > > ''basic'' ,vocabulary, a vocabulary which consists of words which
                                    > > > > stand for notions which are epistemologically more primitive than, say, the theoretical terms of science. The favorite candidate of positivists was a vocabulary which consists of sensation terms, or, at any rate, terms for what is supposed to be "observable." If we formulate positivism as a thesis about the truth conditions for sentences rather than as a thesis about the definability of terms, we may say that, as a historical fact, positivists originally insisted that the meaning of a sentence should be given by (or be capable of being given by) a rule which determines in exactly which experiential situations the sentence is assertable.
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > > "Now, most of twentieth-century philosophy of science consisted in
                                    > > > > the gradual overthrow of this view. The logical positivists themselves
                                    > > > > shifted from advocating the view to criticizing it. Basically, what came to be realized (even by the positivists themselves) was that theories cannot be tested sentence by sentence. If the sentences of which a theory consists had their own independent experiential meanings or made so many separately testable claims as to what experience will be like, then one could test a scientific theory by testing sentence 1 and testing sentence 2 and testing sentence 3 and so on. But, in fact, the individual postulates of a theory generally have no (or very few) experiential consequences when we consider them in isolation from the other statements of the theory. For example, Newton's Theory of Universal Gravitation (without any added statements specifying boundary conditions) is compatible with any orbits whatsoever. One could even reconcile square orbits with the Theory of Universal Gravitation, by saying, "Well, that means there are nongravitational forces acting on the system." It is o
                                    > > > > nly in the presence of a large body of statements that one derives all of its so-called "consequences" from a scientific theory. As Quine puts it, sentences meet the test of experience as a corporate body," and not one by one. (Hence the term "holism.")
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > > "The same thing is true of the language of daily life. If someone tells you, for example, that the thief entered through that window, and there is muddy ground outside the window, you will deduce that there are footprints in the mud. But this is not a logical consequence of the facts stated, for you obviously have made use of an unstated auxiliary hypothesis to the effect that if the thief entered through that window, he walked on the ground to get to the window, and other items of general information as well. If your informant says, "No, he was wearing stilts," then instead of expecting to find shoe prints in the mud you will now expect
                                    > > > > to find holes of a different shape. What has experiential import is the corporate body of statements, and this import is not the simple sum of the experiential imports of the individual statements."
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > > From Putnam, "Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't be Right" in _Representation and Reality_
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > > W
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > > --- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <erayo@> wrote:
                                    > > > >>
                                    > > > >> Dear Stephen,
                                    > > > >>
                                    > > > >> Does that question even deserve a reply? I've heard that there are idiots
                                    > > > >> who take Quine-Durhem indispensability BS seriously. I submit that they are
                                    > > > >> retarded, because Quine is the arch-imbecile of analytic philosophy :)
                                    > > > >>
                                    > > > >>
                                    > > > >> On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:01 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@>wrote:
                                    > > > >>
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> > Dear Eray,
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> > Why does there need to be a "somewhere" for these independent objects
                                    > > > >> > to exist? Is the physical universe that you observe the sum of all that
                                    > > > >> > could possibly exist?
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> > On 5/15/2013 12:50 PM, Eray Ozkural wrote:
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> > On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephenk1@>wrote:
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >>
                                    > > > >> >>
                                    > > > >> >>
                                    > > > >> >> I think he sounds like a Platonist,
                                    > > > >> >>
                                    > > > >> >>
                                    > > > >> >> Most mathematicians are, is that a crime?
                                    > > > >> >>
                                    > > > >> >>
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> > No, it is just an admission of idiocy and philosophical incompetence.
                                    > > > >> > Pure idiocy to think that somewhere sets and numbers exist as independent
                                    > > > >> > objects. Godelian schizophrenia. No more comment. Just lack of
                                    > > > >> > intelligence.
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> > --
                                    > > > >> > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                                    > > > >> > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                                    > > > >> > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                                    > > > >> > <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/post;_ylc=X3oDMTJyZm9lNjZvBF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzEwNTk1NDQ4BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTk0ODkyMwRtc2dJZAMxODM3OQRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNycGx5BHN0aW1lAzEzNjg2MzY2MDI-?act=reply&messageNum=18379>
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> > --
                                    > > > >> > Onward!
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> > Stephen
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> > I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post
                                    > > > >> > and all of my posts will contain. ;-)
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >> >
                                    > > > >>
                                    > > > >>
                                    > > > >>
                                    > > > >>
                                    > > > >> --
                                    > > > >> Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                                    > > > >> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                                    > > > >> http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                                    > > > >>
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > > ------------------------------------
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > > Yahoo! Groups Links
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > >
                                    > > > >
                                    > > >
                                    > > >
                                    > > >
                                    > > > --
                                    > > > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
                                    > > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
                                    > > > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
                                    > > >
                                    > >
                                    >
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