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Re: [ai-philosophy] thought

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  • Glen Sizemore
    Read some Oyama. Developmental Systems Theory.  ... From: Sergio Navega Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought To:
    Message 1 of 29 , Jan 27, 2013
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      Read some Oyama. Developmental Systems Theory. 

      --- On Sat, 1/26/13, Sergio Navega <snavega@...> wrote:

      From: Sergio Navega <snavega@...>
      Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought
      To: ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com
      Date: Saturday, January 26, 2013, 8:12 AM

       

      Uncle Glen, isn't it time for your afternoon tea?
      And don't forget to take your medications, ;-)
       
      Sergio Navega
       
       
       
       
      Sent: Friday, January 25, 2013 7:13 PM
      Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought
       
       

      Both Navega and Scanlon are preformationists but, at least, Navega pays lip-service to the environment. Scanlon doesn't even pay lip-service. His position is laughably naive. Not that Navega's position isn't worth a chuckle or two. For example, if you excise a forelimb bud and transplant it to the hind limp, you get a hind limb. The expression of the genes depends on the local embryological environment. Genes are the same, no? But then, the preformationist says, "Well...yeah...the rules are in the genes but the environment allows the expression of THE rule." Oy Vey! Can you get anymore imbued with "belief"?  Maybe it's "evolution's plan," eh, Ray? But how could you tell? Maybe it's God's plan? But maybe there is no plan. Maybe development at all biological levels involves genes as merely ONE variable in an exceedingly complex dynamic developmental process; sometimes really important (my adopted son looks like a dark-skinned Romanian while my wife and I are blond), sometimes much less important (he speaks English pretty well, like my wife and me, but his Romanian sucks - like my wife's and mine). But then, you can always claim (especially when you refuse to say very much aside from pseudo-profound jabber) that all these plans are in the genes. Again, talk about "beliefs"! Ray is an amusing example of a not-so-well-informed hypocrite. I'm not sure which aspect of his "intellectual" endeavors is more troublesome.  
       
       
      Cordially,
       
      Uncle Glen
       


      --- On Fri, 1/25/13, scanlonray <rscan@...> wrote:

      From: scanlonray <rscan@...>
      Subject: [ai-philosophy] thought
      To: ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com
      Date: Friday, January 25, 2013, 12:48 PM

       

      But here's the thing, Ray: neurons connect to each other
      according to genetic rules, but the expression of these
      rules depend heavily on environmental factors. Stimuli
      received by an animal is what drives the need to create
      or reinforce a particular axon-dendrite connection.
      And this is important: it is the genome that says how this
      creation/reinforcement is made, but it was the stimuli from
      the environment that required it. Therefore brains are a
      function of genomic and environmental interaction.
      Sergio Navega

      This is a straightforward statement of a position that I understand but do no share.
      If you believe in the tabula erasa then all else follows. If instead you are driven by the present day knowledge of the genome than a different scenario presents itself. For this we turn to the brush turkey, A living creature that enters the world with no help from the environment, with nothing but a brain constructed by the genome, a creature that does rather well to meet the environment.

      "Therefore brains are a function of genomic and aenvironmentsl interaction" This is a statement of belief, which is not present in the "brush turkey". What are we to say about `imprinting", when the brush turkey does not imprint, flies without instruction? A bird that eats without instruction? What are we to say about "reinforcement" to a bird that gets none?

    • Sergio Navega
      Glen, you must notice that assumptions and conceptual structures in science in general are eventually subject to rejection and substitution when competing
      Message 2 of 29 , Jan 28, 2013
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        Glen, you must notice that assumptions and conceptual
        structures in science in general are eventually subject to
        rejection and substitution when competing theories appear and
        turns them into outdated material. This has been so since the
        substitution of Ptolemaic by Copernican models of the solar
        system. And cognitive neuroscience is doing just that, and
        today more than ever, because of the strong link with studies
        of the dynamics of populations of neurons. Take a look at
        the table of contents of a first-class journal like "Trends
        in Cognitive Sciences": you'll find lots of articles with
        neuroscience stuff. So the skinnerian "philosophy of behavior
        analysis" is now a topic in the history of science, in the
        same chapter about alchemy ;-)
         
        Sergio Navega
         
         
         
        Sent: Sunday, January 27, 2013 3:16 PM
        Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought
         
         



        --- On Sat, 1/26/13, Sergio Navega <snavega@...> wrote:

        From: Sergio Navega <snavega@...>
        Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought
        To: ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com
        Date: Saturday, January 26, 2013, 8:08 AM

         
        > Anyplace there are concepts and assumptions in a science
        > (i.e., everywhere) philosophy is relevant since concepts and
        > assumptions can only be evaluated via philosophy.
         
        SN: And that's where you show you're wrong. Scientific concepts
        and assumptions are evaluated essentially through experimental
        support, not via philosophy. Of course, they must be logically
        coherent (and this is where philosophy might help), but
        experimental support is a must, and that's what decides if
        the concept is good or just garbage. A case in point (in
        search of empirical corroboration): string theory in Physics.
         
         
        GS: No, this is where you're wrong. Exactly how is an assumption
        validated by experiment? I think that (b) is the most pertinent
        here, no?
         
        5
        a : an assuming that something is true
        b : a fact or statement (as a proposition, axiom, postulate, or notion)
        taken for granted
         
        Pretty much says it all, eh, Sergio?
         
        > Bennett is an accomplished neuroscientist and radical
        > (Skinnerian) behaviorists have always held that it is
        > neuroscience that will provide a reductionistic treatment of
        > the behavioral phenomena elucidated by behavior analysis
         
        SN: And here is where you show that the worldview of behaviorists
        is composed of black and white only. It's the gray stuff that
        matters! Take a specific behavior. Now take the firing of a
        particular neuron. This is the level of analysis that behaviorists
        are proposing. But all the action happens in the middle of these
        two extremes.
         
         
        GS: What in the name of Almighty Yahweh are you talking about?
        Behaviorism makes no claims about the anatomical units
        appropriate to a physiology of behavior. What you claim is
        absurd.  
         
         
        SN: And in the middle, what we find are cognitive neuroscientific
        stuff. And this is not "my opinion": it is the way brain
        science is being made today, by 95% of the researchers in
        the world. So what you're saying is that all these guys are
        wrong, that they are doing "nonsense", creating useless concepts.
        Kinda weird position yours is, don't you think?
         
         
        GS: Why is it that cognitivists always resort to argumentum ad
        populum? But, no, I don't find my position "weird" except in
        the sense that it is a minority position.
         
        > First of all, behaviorism is a philosophy - not a science
         
        SN: Finally! At last! Something we agree entirely ;-)
         
         
        GS: But so is representationalism (the heart of cognitive
        "science")a philosophy.
         
        > but not quite everyone has his or her head up his or her rectum
         
        SN: From that I infer that you're saying that more than 95% of brain
        researchers in the world are, at the moment, performing colonoscopy
        on themselves (which, let's say, is somewhat useful ;-).
        So the world is filled with misguided guys! How nice that
        behaviorists are still here to save us all!
         
         
        GS: Yes, but there is no guarantee that the rescue will be
        successful. Standing in the way is the conceptual error of
        mistaking assumptions for hypotheses or theories.
         
        > I do know that Dennett is a moron, though.
         
        SN: I wouldn't expect more of you, Glen ;-)
         
         
        GS: And you have lived up to all my expectations of you.
         
        > You seem to be making an argument about "unobservables." No?
         
        SN: More than that. When some cognitive scientist talks about
        "short term memory", he/she is creating something that is
        unobservable. But is empirically verifiable!
         
         
        GS: Oh Lord (see, you've forced an atheist to invoke God twice)!
        The only thing that is "verifiable" are the behavioral facts
        said to characterize "STM." It is an assumption that the facts
        are as they are because of some "module" that (miraculously) has
        exactly the character necessary to explain the facts from which
        it is inferred. Amazing! Can you say "dormitive virtue"? As
        Skinner said, "Moliere's audience laughed."   
         
         
         
        SN: And now with
        the help of cognitive neuroscience we're understanding the
        brain areas that execute this fuction, as opposed, for instance
        to long term memory. So this means that something that was
        born as an unobservable concept became empirically corroborable,
        surviving the first treadmill of science, and on it's way to
        be completely explained by reductionist mechanisms. Compare
        that with lots of concepts that were abandoned in the past
        because of lack of empirical support and you get a self-correcting
        way of making science.
         
         
        GS: And how, exactly, would the notion that there is a
        specialized "thing" called STM, that is responsible for the data
        collected under the rubric of "investigation of STM," be
        falsified? No matter what data are collected - even if
        surprising - the characteristics of the "STM module" are simply
        altered to reflect the data! It is ironic that under the guise
        of the Popperian philosophy of science, cognitive "scientists"
        adopt a strategy of modifying, post hoc, the concept allegedly
        "tested."   
         
         
         
        SN: That's the way science progresses, and here I'm not
        talking about cognitive neuroscience only, but ALL scientific
        disciplines, including Physics, Biology, Astrophysics, etc.
         
         
        GS: Your vision of science is laughably sophomoric.
         
         
        > and assumptions are not testable - err...because they're
        > assumptions.
         
        SN: That's not the way it works. Assumptions are indirectly subject
        to empirical scrutiny. Take one assumption. From it you derive
        a series of logically sound consequences. You test those
        consequences and they do not match the predictions. Then
        something is wrong: your deductions or your assumptions!
        Change them and see what you've got. That's how science
        proceeeds.
         
         
        GS: What part of the definition of "assumption" eludes you?
         
         
        > But the cognitivist says
        > that the physiological similarities are "rule induction." But
        > the physiology measured is not "rules" etc. What is measured is
        > action potentials, of synchronized networks, or whatever. But
        > the cognitivist says, "See! I told you there was 'rule
        > induction!'" That is, whatever they find, they interpret it in
        > light of their specious assumptions.
         
        SN: From the idea of "rule induction" cognitive neuroscientists
        start to list the properties that this whole process must possess.
        This is the "filling up with meat" of the skeleton of a concept.
        Each chunk of meat that you put in that concept is something
        that can be empirically tested, and will be rejected if predictions
        fail. And again, this is not specific to cognitive neuroscience,
        this is how all science works. If you doubt this, get a book
        of Organic Chemistry, or Electromagnetism or Geology and see
        how many "conceptual structures" they use.
         
         
        GS: I'm not condemning assumptions and concepts. I am saying that
        there are issues of fact and theory and there are issues that are
        purely conceptual. Mainstream psychology has rejected all but the most
        trivial of conceptual analyses. 
         
        > The assumption is that all behavior results from rule-following.
         
        SN: And this is easily falsifiable, given the level of depth that
        we have today in brain analysis, from the recording of microelectrodes
        to fMRI and other techniques. 
         
        GS: Hardly. Any physiological data are interpreted from within
        the philosophical assumptions that characterize it.
         
         
        SN: Let me give you another example. Few constructs are more "to the
        core" of cognitive science than "short term memory" and "working
        memory". You measure behavioral responses and sees that Miller's
        magical number 7 (plus or minus 2) is a fact. Behaviorists stop
        there. Nothing further is pursued. Cognitive Neuroscientists
        go on, proposing working memory store, long term memory,
        the process of chunking, task switching, etc. And what do we have
        now? Many, many studies relating these concepts to lower level
        (empirically sound) phenomena, advancing our understanding of
        the whole thing. One simple example among many:
         
        Phase-dependent neuronal coding of objects in short-term memory
         
        In my way of seeing things (and in 95% of researchers in the world)
        this is pure science, advancing our knowledge.
         
        Meanwhile, behaviorists are resting in their chairs, telling
        us that all this is nonsense...
         
        Sergio Navega
         
         
        GS: The facts are not nonsense. What behaviorists do, however, is
        to examine the histories necessary for certain behavioral
        phenomena to be observed. Cognitive "science," for the most part
        treats behavioral phenomena as ahistorical. For example, when you
        train animals in delayed match-to-sample, the "forgetting curve"
        is a function of training. If you train animals with a zero
        second delay and then test at longer delays, the curve is quite
        steep. If you give them training with gradually increasing
        delays, the curve becomes less steep until it starts dropping
        off. Whatever "working memory" is, it is learned. Behaviorism
        differs from cognitive "science" too in that behaviorists have
        a limited set of observable behavioral processes (i.e., it is
        parsimonious) and it interprets complex phenomena using these
        concepts. Cognitive "science," on the other hand, invents
        unobservable processes to fit its need. Dormitive virtue. Look
        it up.  
         
        With Affection,
         
        Uncle Glen
         
         
         
         
        Sent: Friday, January 25, 2013 6:10 PM
        Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought
         
         



        --- On Fri, 1/25/13, Sergio Navega <snavega@...> wrote:

        From: Sergio Navega <snavega@...>
        Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought
        To: ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com
        Date: Friday, January 25, 2013, 8:06 AM

         
        SN: Glen, there's a segment of what you say that I agree with
        you. I too am concerned with some things of cognitive science,
        mainly in the segment where this discipline is close to
        philosophy.
         
         
        GS: Anyplace there are concepts and assumptions in a science
        (i.e., everywhere) philosophy is relevant since concepts and
        assumptions can only be evaluated via philosophy. Thus, what
        you say here makes no sense. Sorry...that happens to you a lot.
         
         
         
        SN:There, at that particular junction, we find
        a lot of garbage and nonsense.
         
         
        GS: So much of cognitive "science" and the fields it has
        corrupted is conceptual crap that the field (and those it has
        corrupted) is not even science.
         
        SN: The other extreme is where we find behaviorists (and Bennett
        and Hacker) who act as if humans had no brains.
         
         
        GS: Bennett is an accomplished neuroscientist and radical
        (Skinnerian) behaviorists have always held that it is
        neuroscience that will provide a reductionistic treatment of
        the behavioral phenomena elucidated by behavior analysis.
        Thus, what you say is misguided nonsense. Sorry...that happens
        to you a lot.
         
         
         
        SB: According
        to them, we have only bodies and behaviors, and that's
        what limits their explanatory pursuit. No wonder
        behaviorism is a forgotten scientific endeavor nowadays.
         
         
        GS: First of all, behaviorism is a philosophy - not a science.
        I have already dealt with behaviorism's position on neuroscience.
        And I think you should check into whether or not behavior
        analysis is actually "forgotten." But, you're right in the sense
        that cognitive "science" has corrupted ALMOST everyone whose
        concern involves behavior...but not quite everyone has his or her
        head up his or her rectum.
         
         
        SN: The Mereological fallacy, if applied rigorously to any scientific
        discipline, would undermine most current science.
         
        GS: How so?
         
         
         
        SN: Bennett and Hacker's
        argument can be applied to Physics, Chemistry, Biology,
        Astrophysics and more.
         
        GS: How so?
         
        SN: No such disciplines would be allowed to
        build conceptual (categorical) constructions, even if these
        constructions were empirically justifiable. It would stall
        scientific progress entirely.
         
         
        GS: I'm not convinced you understand the mereological fallacy.
        What you say above seems to make no sense.
         
         
        SN: That's why Bennett and Hacker's
        thoughts are nonsense (as Dennett and Searle pointed out).
         
        GS: I can't say if their arguments are cogent, since you
        have not described them. But, as I said, nothing you have
        said convinces me that you understand the issues. I can't
        speak to Dennett's and Searle's position. I do know that
        Dennett is a moron, though.
         
         
        SN: And in the same way that Physics do today, so does modern cognitive
        neuroscience.
         
         
        GS: You seem to be making an argument about "unobservables." No?
        But the mereological fallacy involves much more than that. It
        involves talking about parts as if they had the properties of
        the whole. It would be like saying that the entropy of a gas
        increases because the entropy of individual molecules is
        increasing. I don't think physics does that. I await further
        exposition on your part.
         
         
        SN: They are building conceptual structures (memory, 
        rule induction, workspace memory, task switching being some examples)
        that are being successfully supported by lower level explanations
        (mainly the binding and/or synchronization of populations
        of neurons).
         
         
        GS: The concepts underlying a science constitute, in part, the
        assumptions of that science (or "science" as the case may be)
        and assumptions are not testable - err...because they're
        assumptions. Take "rule induction." The observation is that,
        for example, an animal (human or otherwise) responds to a novel
        instance of some stimulus as it did to the exemplars by which it
        was trained. Observations of physiology may reveal certain
        similarities between the effects of training exemplars and novel
        exemplars. That is where the facts end. But the cognitivist says
        that the physiological similarities are "rule induction." But
        the physiology measured is not "rules" etc. What is measured is
        action potentials, of synchronized networks, or whatever. But
        the cognitivist says, "See! I told you there was 'rule
        induction!'" That is, whatever they find, they interpret it in
        light of their specious assumptions. 
         
        SN:Take for instance this article, which is currently being published
        in Trends in Cognitive Sciences:
         
         
        This paper relates rule selection (a "cognitive concept") with
        neural synchronization in the prefrontal cortex (a directly
        measurable empirical evidence).
         
         
        GS: But this is not "evidence." There IS no evidence relevant
        to assumptions for assumptions are assumptions. The assumption
        is that all behavior results from rule-following. When some
        regularity is found it is INTERPRETED in terms of the
        assumptions.
         
        SN: This is exactly the very same
        process used in the majority of the hard sciences today (as I said,
        including Physics, Biology, Cosmology, Chemistry, Geology, etc.).
        But not behaviorism. What went wrong? I wonder if it is some
        sort of religious belief, the church of Skinner...
         
        Sergio Navega
         
         
        GS: It is NOT the process used in physics etc. It is the
        assumption that all behavior is "rule-following" that smacks
        of religion. Take the Higgs Boson, for example. It is not an
        assumption, it is an hypothesis that is generated by
        a mathematical theory. The theory predicts that there should
        be a particle that has certain properties. Observation of a
        particle that has these properties is, indeed, a kind of
        evidence. There is a big difference between assumptions and
        hypotheses/theories. Cognitive science muddles this distinction
        and is, thus, junk. Hope this helps.
         
        With magnanimity,
         
        Glen
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
        Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2013 11:48 AM
        Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought
         
         



        --- On Wed, 1/23/13, Sergio Navega mailto:snavega%40gmail.com> wrote:

        From: Sergio Navega mailto:snavega%40gmail.com>
        Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought
        To: mailto:ai-philosophy%40yahoogroups.com
        Date: Wednesday, January 23, 2013, 10:03 AM

         

        SN: Glen, your mentioning of "homunculi" attest that you're
        criticizing something that has been abandoned decades ago.
        GS: The homunculi were always implied - therefore, there was really nothing to EXPLICITLY abandon. Nobody ever EXPLICITLY endorsed homunculi inside the head driving the rest of the body around like a car. And the homunculi are STILL implied. Another name for this conceptual nonsense is the "mereological fallacy" (cf, Bennett and Hacker).

        SN: I'm talking about modern cognitive neuroscience, where theories
        of memory, language, perception, reasoning, categorization,
        rule-induction, etc., are supported by imaging (fMRI, PET, etc.)
        and also by data collection of neural activity (including single
        and multi-neuron electrodes).

        GS: Since the theories are composed of (literally) nonsensical concepts (cf, Bennett and Hacker), you'll excuse me if I'm unimpressed.

        SN: Today's models of the workings of
        populations of neurons are capable of explaining many cognitive
        phenomena.

        GS: Needless to say, I disagree with you. Most of the questions asked by cognitive neuroscience are literal nonsense (cf, Bennett and Hacker). Some of the actual facts are, perhaps, interesting (after divested of the ridiculous assumptions embodied by the concepts), but cognitive neuroscience explains nothing (since its underlying concepts are literal nonsense).
         
        Cordially,
        Glen
         
         

         

        From: Glen Sizemore
        Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2013 9:40 PM
        To: mailto:ai-philosophy%40yahoogroups.com

        Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought
         
         

        --- On Mon, 1/21/13, Sergio
        Navega mailto:snavega%40gmail.com> wrote:

        From: Sergio
        Navega mailto:snavega%40gmail.com>
        Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy]
        thought
        To: mailto:ai-philosophy%40yahoogroups.com
        Date: Monday,
        January 21, 2013, 2:04 PM

         






        SN: Boy, what a surprise to find 2 viewpoints that I disagree
        so much.
         
        GS: Hardly surprising to me since I've known you for many
        years, and you were always duped by cognitive "science."
         
         
        SN:Of course the
        "hardware" of the brain is important (and I agree that
        the hardware is mostly determined by genetic
        constraints).
         
         
        GS: Ah...a preformationist to boot!
         
         
        SN: But let's
        take this analogy one step beyond: it is the "software" that
        makes the
        thing "behave" the way they do. And by software one has to
        concede
        that the fundamental thing are "experiences and
        interactions".
         
         
        GS: And what, precisely, are reinforcement contingencies?
        They determine much of what an animal experiences and they are, by
        definition, interactions between organism and environment. You
        must be one of the many who like to bad-mouth behaviorism but know
        next to nothing about it. Lot of that going around.
         
         
        SN:Which leads us to
        finally arrive at the important neuroscience of
        cognition, which not only has extraordinary explanatory
        success,
        but also has important multidisciplinary consequences.
         
        GS: Too bad it's a conceptual cesspool. Anyway, though, to
        the hopelessly simple, made-up stuff often seems to explain a
        lot.
         
         
         
        SN: All is
        not lost for behaviorism though: it makes a damn good
        psychological
        therapy, with much greater efficacy than the nutcracks of
        the
        psychoanalysts.
         
         
        GS: Yeah...interesting how natural sciences often lead to
        technologies isn't it? But cognitive "science" could lead to a
        technology of behavior - if there was anything to the implied
        homunculi of cognitive "science." Or, put it this way...cognitive
        science might lead to a technology if mercury atoms were "silvery"
        and "slippery." For if that were true, it might also be true that
        there are little homunculi in the brain that intend, and decide
        and read maps and think etc. etc. etc. etc.
         
         
         
         
         
         


         

        From: Glen
        Sizemore
        Sent: Monday, January 21, 2013 4:11 PM
        To: mailto:ai-philosophy%40yahoogroups.com
        Subject: Re: [ai-philosophy] thought
         
         

        It may be true that
        "'Tis a gift to be simple." However, 'tis no gift to
        be simplistic." And that is exactly how I would
        describe your posts that I have been reading now for,
        what, 5 years...10 years? On the other hand, I think
        that there is merit to what you say. But a fleshed-out
        position would integrate reinforcement principles
        which is exactly what you gloss over. As to language
        acquisition, I think that there is no question that
        heard utterances lead to parts of the utterances being
        a strange kind of conditioned reinforcer. When the
        child utters, for example, phonemes that it has heard,
        the hearing of these utterances automatically
        reinforce the behavior that leads to their production.
        This all requires a bunch of neuroanatomical
        structures like the basal ganglia etc. The segment of
        neurobiology concerned with analyzing the
        physiological mediation of operant behavior is an area
        of neuroscience that is relatively uncontaminated by
        the conceptual nonsense that plagues much of
        neuroscience. Of course, many workers in this area
        seem to struggle to obscure the connection to the vast
        literature that constitutes the natural science of
        behavior.

        --- On Sun, 1/20/13, scanlonray
        mailto:rscan%40nycap.rr.com> wrote:

        From:
        scanlonray mailto:rscan%40nycap.rr.com>
        Subject:
        [ai-philosophy] thought
        To:
        mailto:ai-philosophy%40yahoogroups.com
        Date: Sunday,
        January 20, 2013, 11:11 AM

         

        The apparatus for producing speech is constructed
        by the genome More than one hundred pairs of
        orofacial, laryngeal, pharyngeal, and respiratory
        muscles together with all the neural groups that
        drive them.

        A motor neuron arrives at
        striated muscle fiber and terminates on it. When an
        axonal pulse arrives at the terminal the muscle
        fiber contracts. It is apparent that we can separate
        tahe motor neurons from the muscle fibers and view
        them abstractly as a set of terminals connected to a
        computer, and activate the muscles by a computer
        program,

        (Message over 64 KB, truncated)

      • scanlonray
        I thought that a few references to the genome and the brush turkey of Australia ahould be enough to start up s discussion, but I guess not. This is the century
        Message 3 of 29 , Feb 15, 2013
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          I thought that a few references to the genome and the brush turkey of Australia ahould be enough to start up s discussion, but I guess not. This is the century of the genome. And we are given a brain driven organism, completely constructed by the genome so that it is ready to deal with the universe.

          Glen, before you slap on your three-cornered hat and spring to the defense of behaviorism, give a thought to your position as the last leaf upon the tree.
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