Re: [ai-philosophy] Re: What Searle is really guilty of
- On Wed, Apr 1, 2009 at 6:00 AM, iro3isdx <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
> --- In email@example.com, "Joe Legris" <jalegris@...> wrote:Searle confuses subjective experience with consciousness. That's the problem.
>> I can imagine that a suitably structured machine could
>> plausibly claim to have mental states. Searle says in his
>> Q & A that some machines might obtain consciousness
>> or intentional states by duplicating the causes and effects
>> operating in humans, possibly using different chemical
>> processes, but not by the mere manipulation of formal
> But why does this have to be tied to chemical processes?
> It seems to me that a cognitive system is following some
> principles that have to do with information. And any system
> capable of implementing those principles should be capable
> of having mental states. Whether or not those principles are
> purely computational, it seems unlikely that they would be such
> that only chemical implementations are possible.
He does not understand that there can be non-informative subjective
states, for instance.
Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
Research Assistant, Erendiz Supercomputer Inc.
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "Joe Legris" <jalegris@...> wrote:
> I agree that the above seems silly and nitpicking,I can't say what a commitment to computationalism should entail,
> but shouldn't a commitment to computationalism
> include a commitment to some physical properties
> of "mind"
since I don't have such a commitment. I'm committed to following
the evidence wherever that leads, but not to a particular conclusion.
I'm not sure what you mean by "physical properties." If that is
a reference to properties studied by physics, then since physics
does not study consciousness I don't see any certain need for
I see computation, itself, as abstract and non-physical. Of course
we use physical implementations. But generally we don't want details
of the implementation to get in the way of the computation, so it
isn't clear that there should be any particular physical implications
from assuming computationalism.