Re: Stuart K & The Non-Algorithmic Mind
- --- In email@example.com, "jgkjcasey" <jgkjcasey@...> wrote:
> --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "John J. Gagne"
> <john_j_gagne@> wrote:
> Re: Stuart K & The Non-Algorithmic Mind
> > ...If we look at this definition within the context of your
> > comments above, it seems to me, that your use of the terms
> > "observe" and reference to "mathematical notation" force
> > me to conclude you too *ARE* talking about phenomenal
> > consciousness when you say "causal power". After all, it's
> > not like you said "causal chain" so I have to wonder why
> > you choose "causal power" as apposed to "causal chain"?
> Phrases like "causal power" are all word magic and only serve
> to confuse instead of being the intuitive pumps to guide you
> toward a more precise description as to what you are actually
> talking about that could be embodied in an actual machine.
I have to take exception to JC's complaint here. As a complicated
subject is better understood, more details become apparent. The new
understanding of these details will often be crude and ineffectively
integrated into the subject matter at first. This process will tend
to produce some confusion but it is not easily avoidable and it is not
always wise to avoid the complications that different points of view
It would be nice if we could resolve complicated problems and then
express these resolutions in easily comprehensible language, but that
is just not how it works.
My strongest objections are directed toward people who have a great
deal of evidence that they don't understand what another person is
talking about, but act as if they did, and then go on to hurl insults
and irrelevant arguments that are intentionally designed to stir other
people who have similarly misunderstood the other person's point of
(I am not talking about JC or anyone participating in this current
My suggestion is: if you have no idea what a person is talking about
but you have accumulated evidence that he may be trying to explain
something that he has carefully thought about, then ask before you
start dipping into the tantrum rant vat.
(Again I am not talking about JC!)
I have no objections to what JC said in the rest of the message, but
the whole point is that it is easy to recognize the distinction
between the part of JC's message that I objected to and the rest of
his message, which I did not comment on.
- JJG asked:
> >Jim Bromer answered:
> > Is it more like gravity or intentionality?
>Let's try to break down physical relations as either:
> Many physical relations can be measured, and some of them are cause
> and effect.
(MACRO) causal-effect chains
(micro) non-causal events
In this case, Macro causal-chains can be predicted and are measurable.
The measurement problem you imply above I assume is with (micro)
I say you imply because above you said *many* and *some* as apposed to
If we *assume* that some events are (micro) non-causal events then
certainly we rule out *via* the assumption itself predicting and
measuring causes. Each micro-event is a first cause and has no
relation at all to any other event that has ever happened (including
no relation even to the Big Bang which could only also have been a
But, we might also assume that non-causal events are not non-causal at
all but only seem to be non-causal.
> That is, some physical measurements are causallyHere I think we might have some misunderstanding between us.
> related, even though the precise mechanisms may not be completely
> described by the relation or the measurement of the relation.
In my opinion, the act of *measurement* (it is the nature of the
process of measurement itself) excludes knowing "precise mechanisms"
or having "complete descriptions".
This has nothing to do with QM's uncertainty principal because you
have the same problem even if you don't assume non-causal events (in
other words complete determinism has a measurement problem too). In
fact, I think the measurement problem I'm talking about is the more
interesting of the two because it results from the theory of
computation and need not assume what QM assumes.
> Whatever causal powers are, the possible measurement of them may notBut you imply that "whatever causal powers are" they are *NOT-intentions*.
> be as absurd as it first seemed to me. I am not speaking of
Can you give me the criteria for determining the difference between:
I was under the (apparently mistaken) assumption that causal-powers
referred to the idea, concept, belief of ==> intentions.
If this is not the case then I need some way to tell one from the
others in my list above.
> However, there are attempts to measure intentions, but since theI assume that *intent* is fundamentally/analytically (as in, as a
> concept of intent is diffuse any attempt to measure them would be
> defined in more objective terms. However, I believe that some
> specific cases could be measured. That does not mean that I think
> that some kind of general measurement of causal powers or intentions
> would be meaningful.
result of how we have defined measurement and intentions) unmeasurable.