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SACW #1 | 2 Jul 2004

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  • Harsh Kapoor
    South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #1 | 2 July, 2004 via: www.sacw.net [1] Pakistan - India: Next Steps For Nuclear Talks (Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R.
    Message 1 of 1 , Jul 1, 2004
      South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #1 | 2 July, 2004
      via: www.sacw.net

      [1] Pakistan - India: Next Steps For Nuclear
      Talks (Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, M.V.
      [2] Pakistan - India: When early warning is no
      warning (Zia Mian, R. Rajaraman & M.V. Ramana)
      [3] India: Peaceful vehicle Rally against Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
      [4] Massive Protest Rally in Bangalore



      South Asians Against Nukes, July 2, 2004
      URL: www.s-asians-against-nukes.org/nextStepsJune24_2004.html


      by Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, M.V. Ramana

      (The authors are all theoretical physicists - Zia
      Mian is at Princeton University, USA; A.H. Nayyar
      at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; R.
      Rajaraman at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;
      and M. V. Ramana at the Centre for
      Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and
      Development, Bangalore)

      June 24, 2004

      It is talking time again. Pakistani and Indian
      government officials met in New Delhi on June 19
      and 20 to talk. The Foreign Ministers met briefly
      in China on 21 June, the Foreign Secretaries will
      apparently talk sometime in late July, and there
      are suggestions of a possible summit meeting
      between President Pervez Musharraf and India's
      new Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. But while
      talking is better than fighting, it is important
      to remember the fact that India and Pakistan have
      met and talked many times since the 1999 Lahore
      summit, where the Prime Ministers claimed that
      they shared "a vision of peace and stability
      between their countries, and of progress and
      prosperity for their peoples". What followed
      Lahore however was not peace or stability but
      instead the Kargil war, the armed stand-off in
      2002 after jihadis attacked India's parliament,
      spiraling military spending, missile test after
      missile test, and the consolidation of nuclear

      Leaders on both sides seem to recognise that
      their nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles cast
      a dark, potentially fatal shadow over the future
      of both countries. India's new Foreign Minister
      Natwar Singh recently declared "To me personally,
      the most important thing on our agenda should be
      the nuclear dimension". General Musharraf claims
      that "we have been saying let's make South Asia a
      nuclear-free zone". He also suggested that "If
      mutually there is an agreement of reduction of
      nuclear assets, Pakistan would be willing". These
      are hopeful indications. But we have heard such
      words before.

      After the recent meeting on reducing the risks of
      nuclear weapons in the region, the joint
      statement claimed the two states shared a
      "positive framework, aimed at taking the process
      forward, and making them result oriented". Sad to
      say, the aim seemed more to portray themselves as
      'responsible' nuclear weapons states and the
      agreements that were actually announced amounted
      to little more than a step sideways.

      The only new measure is another hotline, this
      time linking the two foreign secretaries, through
      their respective foreign offices, "to prevent
      misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to
      nuclear issues". There are several hotlines
      already. J.N. Dixit, a former Foreign Secretary
      of India and newly appointed as National Security
      Adviser reports in his book "India-Pakistan in
      War and Peace" that in November 1990 Prime
      Ministers Chandra Sekhar and Nawaz Sharif met
      during a SAARC Summit in Male, and "decided to
      establish a direct hotline. They also took a
      decision to activate the hotline between the
      offices of the foreign secretaries and the
      directors of military operations". In Mr. Dixit's
      judgement "hotline conversations between the
      director-generals of military operations remain
      routine and the prime ministerial hotline has
      seldom been used, as has the hotline between the
      two foreign secretaries". The war, near war and
      turmoil in the past five years certainly suggest
      that these lines of communication are not very
      satisfactory in preventing or defusing crises.

      India and Pakistan need to go beyond just finding
      ways and means to talk to each other about the
      risks of nuclear weapons. They need to agree on
      measures that will concretely reduce the nuclear
      danger. A little common sense shows there are
      some obvious things that they could do, if they
      want to do more than just build 'confidence'
      while their nuclear arsenals keep growing.

      Both India and Pakistan have emphasised
      repeatedly that they seek only a "minimum"
      nuclear arsenal. General Musharraf's remarks
      about Pakistan's willingness to consider a
      "reduction of nuclear assets" makes clear that
      this threshold has already been crossed. This
      should be no surprise. Pakistan and India have
      been making the fissile material (the nuclear
      explosive) for their weapons as fast as they can
      for decades. They already have enough for several
      dozen nuclear weapons. The table below shows the
      casualties that would be inflicted if they each
      used only five of these weapons against the
      others cities (assuming each weapon is about the
      same size as those tested in May 1998) A total of
      2.9 million deaths is predicted for these cities
      in India and Pakistan with an additional 1.5
      million severely injured.[r1] The experience of
      death and destruction on this scale would be
      beyond imagination for either country.


      Total population within 5 km of explosion


      Severely Injured


















      New Delhi

























      India and Pakistan can inflict much more than
      this devastation, using only a fraction of the
      nuclear weapons they already have. It is beyond
      any understanding why they continue to produce
      more fissile material for more nuclear weapons.
      The two countries should stop making more fissile
      material. And, no more of the existing fissile
      material stockpile should be turned into nuclear
      weapons. Each weapon could destroy a city.

      It is clear that weapons like those tested in May
      1998 are destructive enough to kill hundreds of
      thousands of people in any major subcontinental
      city on which they were used. This has not been
      enough to stop India and Pakistan continuing with
      research and development on nuclear weapons. Like
      other countries with nuclear weapons, India and
      Pakistan seek to make their nuclear weapons both
      more destructive and more
      compact.<outbind://14/#_msocom_2>[r2] A simple,
      small, step towards nuclear restraint, and
      building confidence, would be for both countries
      to call a halt to the further development of
      these weapons. This would be a clear sign that
      the future can offer something other than the
      paranoid logic of racing to build more and more
      lethal weapons.

      In the recent meeting, India and Pakistan
      repeated their unilateral declarations to conduct
      no further nuclear weapons tests. At the same
      time, neither seems willing to sign the
      Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
      the 1996 international agreement banning
      explosive nuclear weapons tests - which has been
      signed by all the other nuclear weapons states
      (US, Russia, Britain, France and China, as well
      as Israel), and by 166 other countries. India and
      Pakistan's reluctance is hard to understand.
      Their joint statement says each state will
      refrain from nuclear testing "unless, in exercise
      of national sovereignty, it decides that
      extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme
      interests". This conditionality is already there
      in Article 9 of the CTBT, which allows a state to
      withdraw from the Treaty, and by implication
      carry out a nuclear test. Therefore, India and
      Pakistan would lose nothing by signing this

      By formally joining the Treaty, India and
      Pakistan would help ensure that the international
      community is better placed to restrain any
      nuclear weapons state or would-be nuclear state
      from carrying out a nuclear test. This was why
      the idea of a treaty banning all nuclear tests
      was floated in 1954 by Prime Minister Jawaharlal
      Nehru. In the fifty years since then, there have
      been over 2000 nuclear tests conducted around the
      world. These made possible unimaginably
      destructive nuclear arsenals, killed and injured
      uncounted numbers of people through radioactive
      fallout and contaminated the environment for
      centuries to come. It was to stop this that the
      CTBT was created. Now, even though it is a
      signatory to the CTBT, US nuclear weapons
      laboratories and nuclear hawks are seeking new
      nuclear weapons for use against third world
      countries. They want to resume testing, perhaps
      in the next few years. If this is allowed to
      happen, nuclear weaponeers and militaries in
      other nuclear weapons states, including in
      Pakistan and India, will surely push to follow
      the US lead. It is important to prevent a second
      age of nuclear weapons testing.

      The Lahore agreements and the announcement of the
      new hotline recognise that, despite the best laid
      plans and supposedly fool-proof technology,
      accidents do happen. In particular, the two
      governments committed themselves in Lahore to
      "reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized
      use of nuclear weapons". These risks are directly
      linked to the deployment of nuclear weapons;
      deployment might involve for example putting the
      weapons on ballistic missiles or keeping the
      weapons at military airbases close to planes that
      may carry them. If the nuclear weapons are not
      given over to military forces and not kept ready
      to use, there is much less danger of them being
      used by whoever happens to have charge of them at
      that moment, or of them being involved in an
      accident. These are elementary safety measures.
      All India and Pakistan need do, at least as a
      start, is to announce that they will carry out
      these non-deployment measures.

      The two sides also agreed in Lahore "to notify
      each other immediately in the event of any
      accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident
      that could create the risk of a fallout with
      adverse consequences for both sides, or of an
      outbreak of a nuclear war between the two
      countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at
      diminishing the possibility of such actions or
      incidents being misinterpreted by the other." The
      new hotline is meant to address the first part of
      this agreement. The two states should go on and
      agree to draw up together a list of all the
      possible "accidental, unauthorized or
      unexplained" incidents that they would like the
      other side to tell them about. This would lay the
      basis for sharing descriptions of what measures
      each has taken to reduce the risks of possible
      accidents and unauthorized incidents.

      All the steps suggested here are no more than
      commonsense. But this is often in short supply in
      all countries with nuclear weapons. Advice on
      nuclear issues in both India and Pakistan is
      dominated by the nuclear weapons complex, the
      military and the foreign ministries. Because they
      deal with nuclear weapons, this advice is
      shrouded in secrecy. Expert they may well be,
      infallible no one is. And, like all institutions,
      they inevitably have a vested interest in keeping
      their power, influence and funding, and seeking
      more. It is these very agencies that have brought
      us to the point of having to worry about the risk
      of a nuclear war that might kill millions and of
      nuclear accidents. To find a way forward,
      governments in both countries would do well to
      seek out other perspectives, ask for second
      opinions, find people from outside the government
      establishments who can help develop new ideas,
      and encourage an informed and open public debate.

      It will be no easy path from our present
      nuclear-armed confrontation to the "peace and
      stability, progress and prosperity" promised at
      Lahore and so far denied. We must walk it
      together with courage and conviction.



      The Hindu
      July 02, 2004
      Opinion - Leader Page Articles


      By Zia Mian, R. Rajaraman & M.V. Ramana

      Early warning systems in South Asia have no
      significant utility. Rather, they increase the
      danger of inadvertent nuclear war.

      AS A concrete step that would reduce nuclear
      dangers in South Asia, we have suggested that
      both India and Pakistan agree not to install
      nuclear early warning systems (The Hindu, June 4,
      2004). This may seem counter-intuitive in that
      such systems are supposed to give advance notice
      of a nuclear attack; it is often argued that this
      warning time is vital for responsible
      decision-making. For example, in his letter to
      the editor (The Hindu, June 21), S.
      Lakshminarayanan worries that "Without an
      effective early warning system, we will be taken

      The notion of early warning, like the deeply
      flawed notion of deterrence, is a carryover from
      the nuclear confrontation between the United
      States and the Soviet Union. It refers to the use
      of radars and satellites for detecting a nuclear
      missile attack under way. Detecting the missiles
      is only the first stage of an early warning
      system. This has to be followed by an assessment
      of its reliability and significance before
      interpreting it as a real "warning." Once
      confirmed, this `warning' of an imminent nuclear
      attack needs to be conveyed to the appropriate
      military and political authorities. They will
      need time to consider the situation and determine
      their response - this will involve monumental
      judgments about the start of a possible nuclear
      war. Since the target of the incoming missile may
      be the military and political leadership itself,
      all these must happen in the time between the
      detection of the missile and its arrival at the
      target. In the case of the U.S. and the Soviet
      Union, this entire process was forced to fit into
      the 30 minutes their respective missiles would
      take to reach their target.

      We have studied the utility of similar early
      warning systems and decision-making procedures
      for South Asia. Our assessment of the
      effectiveness of such systems was published in
      the journal, Science and Global Security, last
      year. We explain here the results of this
      analysis that showed how the combination of
      missiles travelling many thousands of miles an
      hour and the geography of South Asia allows at
      best a few minutes of warning. We make clear why
      this is no warning at all if there is to be a
      serious effort at verification of incoming
      signals and the time taken for responsible
      decision-making. We also point out that any early
      warning system would inevitably generate both
      genuine signals of incoming attack as well as
      false alarms. In the middle of a crisis, such
      false alarms, combined with the short decision
      time involved, can raise the prospect of
      technological and human error leading to
      inadvertent nuclear war.

      We first estimated the missile flight time
      between different locations in India and
      Pakistan; examples could be a missile launch from
      Sargodha towards New Delhi or from Agra to
      Lahore, a distance of some 600 km. The shortest
      flight times come from sending long-range
      missiles to nearby targets. We found that it
      would take only about five minutes for Pakistan's
      Ghauri and India's Agni missiles to reach a
      target 600 km distant. To protect Delhi or Lahore
      would require an early warning system to work
      within these five minutes.

      The first step is detecting the incoming missile,
      either by radars or special satellites in high
      altitude orbits. Since India has acquired Green
      Pine, a missile detection radar made in Israel,
      we looked at its capabilities. We found that a
      missile fired from Pakistan's Sargodha Air Force
      base towards New Delhi may be detected by such a
      radar, placed for instance at Ambala, around a
      minute and a half after launch.

      This is just the initial detection. Confirming
      the signal is real takes longer. There are many
      sources of false and unpredictable signals that
      radars pick up. In the 2003 U.S. war on Iraq, the
      advanced version of the Patriot system reportedly
      generated many false radar signals. The source of
      the problem can often be mundane. Radar systems,
      for example, have mistaken a flock of birds for a
      missile. Radar signals also bounce off regions of
      the atmosphere where no apparent reflecting
      sources exist. Weather can also affect
      performance. To be reasonably confident that the
      radar is indeed picking up a missile requires
      double-checking the signal. This includes
      tracking the object over a period of time to
      determine its path. All this will take some time.
      In the case of the U.S. and Russia, several
      minutes were allotted for verifying radar signals
      before they were passed on to military
      authorities. Clearly, the five-minute missile
      flights relevant to South Asia permit no time for
      such a comprehensive verification.

      Missile launches can also be detected by special
      satellites with infra-red detectors that detect
      the intense heat from the exhaust plume produced
      by rocket engines. Neither India nor Pakistan has
      such a system - nor for that matter does China or
      the United Kingdom have it, while France is still
      seeking to acquire this capability. Even if they
      did, such satellites have problems of their own.
      The heat radiation from the missile plume is
      absorbed by water vapour and carbon dioxide in
      the lower atmosphere, and scattered by rain and
      dust. Nor does it penetrate clouds. Thus a
      missile can be reliably detected by such a
      satellite only when it emerges above the clouds,
      which typically takes about a minute. In effect,
      a satellite would provide warning no earlier than
      a radar in South Asia. This is markedly different
      from the case of the U.S. and Russia, where
      satellites provided several additional minutes of
      warning. It is clear that India or Pakistan would
      gain little if they acquire or develop early
      warning satellites.

      Both the U.S. and Russia have elaborate
      procedures for nuclear warning assessment and
      decision-making. Technology and operating
      procedures are both fallible and can combine at
      times to create false alerts of early warning
      systems. Typically every year there were about
      2,500 false alarms from U.S. early warning
      systems, due to causes varying from swarms of
      geese to the rising moon. In some cases, the time
      allotted for checking the signal proved
      insufficient to determine that a warning was in
      fact false.

      Though both sides built in time for efforts to
      verify the data from their early warning systems,
      it must be stressed that assessment and
      decision-making were forced to fit into the
      available time before the missiles descended on
      the decision-makers. U.S. procedures left its
      President and senior officials only about 10
      minutes for deciding whether to launch their own
      missiles. Russian procedures left even less:
      their national command authority is allotted
      three minutes to discuss and authorise permission
      to launch Russian missiles. Russia had serious
      concerns that these procedures might not work as
      planned and as a fallback installed a "dead hand"
      that would automatically transmit launch orders.

      Given that missiles can travel between India and
      Pakistan in less than five minutes, of which a
      minute and a half would have been lost before
      they are detected, the information from radars
      (and satellites, if ever available) would need to
      be processed and evaluated, decision-makers
      informed, and action taken within three minutes
      (and at most nine minutes, in the case of very
      distant targets in the region). To put it
      differently, a false signal would need to evade
      identification only for a few minutes before it
      leads to the possible calamity of a nuclear
      response based on a mistake.

      This is an unprecedented constraint on procedures
      for evaluation and confirmation of any electronic
      warning (with all its uncertainties) and for
      decision-making about the retaliatory use of
      nuclear weapons. There would, in fact, be barely
      enough time for the warning to be communicated to
      decision-makers. There would be no time
      whatsoever to consult or deliberate after
      receiving this warning. There would be no
      decision-making in any meaningful sense of the

      The available time would not permit anything more
      than praying before "pressing the button." This
      could only trigger some pre-planned response. It
      could be the launch of one's own nuclear
      missiles. In the event of a false signal, this
      will start a nuclear war where there was none.
      Alternatively, anti-ballistic missiles could be
      launched in an attempt to shoot down what are
      believed to be incoming missiles. Again, a false
      warning could potentially lead to disaster, since
      the other side's early warning system might not
      easily be able to distinguish this response from
      a nuclear attack. Is our faith in the
      infallibility of technology and human judgment so
      strong that we are willing to risk such a

      It is these considerations that persuade us that
      early warning systems in South Asia have no
      significant utility. Rather, they increase the
      danger of inadvertent nuclear war. India and
      Pakistan would do well to agree to abandon the
      pursuit of such systems.

      (The authors are all physicists - Zia Mian is at
      Princeton University, U.S.; R. Rajaraman at
      Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi; and M. V.
      Ramana at the Centre for Interdisciplinary
      Studies in Environment and Development,



      Date : 01-07-04


      Minority Christian Community organizes peaceful
      vehicle Rally against Congress ruled Ahmedabad
      Municipal Corporation for no-action taken in the
      issue of Ranipur Graveyard.


      All India Christian Council's National
      Executive Member & Joint Secretary Mr. Samson C.
      Christian in a statement given before press
      states that in Ranipur village of Ahmedabad.
      Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation authorities had
      demolished the graves in 143 yrs old Christian
      graveyard by running tractors in the graveyard as
      well as dumping & spreading sewage plants'
      wastage in the entire Christian Graveyard & thus
      Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation made the
      Christian graveyard unholy. A.I.C.C. in response
      to this inhumane act organized Dharna programme &
      handed over written representation to Ahmedabad
      Municipal Corporation's Mayor regarding various
      other problems also but when no steps were taken
      in this regard till date compelling the Christian
      minority community to once again come down on
      road to protest and as a part of that today on
      01-07-04 afternoon at 3.00 pm peaceful vehicle
      rally commence from Ranipur village's C.N.I.
      Church & reached Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
      main building at Danapith in which various social
      & religious leaders viz. 2000 had joined the

      In the end of rally Christian leaders shall
      hand over a charter of demands to the Ahmedabad
      Municipal Corporation Commissioner & shall demand
      the resignation of Ahmedabad Municipal
      Corporation Mayor for his negligence towards
      solving the problems faced by the minority
      Christian community and warned that we want
      solution in one week otherwise, the peoples and
      leaders of the village Ranipur will go for
      fast-unto-death agitation, based on Mahatma
      Gandhi front side of Corporation Building. In
      addition to that will make and object of road
      blocking Narol circle to Sewage farm treatment
      plant and all the responsibility will be
      Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.

      Yours Sincerely

      Samson C. Christian

      National Executive Member

      All India Christian Council


      The memorandum has been given to the Municipal
      Commissinor/Mayor in addition to try to destroy
      purposefully the Ranipur Christian graveyard
      which is under the teritory of Ahmedabad city and
      about other Christian communitie's questions.


      Date: 01-07-04.

      The Resp. Municipal Commissioner/Mayor

      Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation



      Resp. Sir/Mayor

      Jay Bharat. It is to state that in Ahmedabad at
      Sarkhej - Narol highwary there is Ranipur village
      where there is 143 yrs. old Christian Graveyard &
      on the direct instructions/orders of Ahmedabad
      Municipal Corporation Pirana Sewage treatment
      plant's incharge officer & Addl. City Engineer
      Shri D.K.Begda & Deputy City Engineer Shri
      B.G.Satani their sub-ordinate staff demolished
      the graves by running tractors on them. Moreover
      the staff also dumped & spread the sewage waste
      of Pirana Sewage treatment plant all over the
      graveyard & thus made the Christian gaveyard
      unholy & hurt the religious sentiments of
      minority Christian community.

      In response to this inhumane act we the
      National level organization of minority Christian
      community had organized a Dharna programme on
      10-05-04 at Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's
      main building at Danapith & further we handed
      over a 11 point written representation by our
      social & religious Christian leaders to the Mayor
      of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation a copy of the
      same is enclosed as Annexure - 'A'.

      After giving a written representation on 10-05-04
      to the Mayor of A.M.C. once again the Christian
      leaders approached to A.M.C.'s Mayor on 25-05-04
      & met him personally & discussed regarding this
      inhumane incident & also invited his attention
      towards problems of other Christian graveyards &
      requested him to take necessary steps in this
      regard but till date no other action except
      clearance of sewage waste from Christian
      graveyard has been carried out. Therefore we the
      A.I.C.C. has organized a peaceful vehicle rally
      from Ranipur C.N.I. Church to A.M.C.'s main
      building at Danapith inorder to focus attention
      towards Christians problems & injustice. And we
      further demand the resignation of A.M.C.'s Mayor
      who has been neglecting such inhumane incidents
      of injustice to the minority Christian Community
      because if you don't work for the public welfare
      then you got no right to remain in power.Finally
      we request you to take a note & solve the
      problems faced by minority Christians on a fast

      Thanking you

      Place: Ahmedabad.

      Rev. Manoj Gohil Saheb
      Samson C. Christian

      National Executive Member &

      C.N.I. Church, Ranipur
      Joint Secretary

      All India Christian Council





      DATE: 02/07/2004 TIME: 10 AM

      PLACE: Chikkalalbagh to Old Central Jail

      We demand the immediate arrest of four Byappanahalli Policemen:

      1. Ashwat Narayana (Inspector of Police),
      2. Krishnappa (Sub-Inspector of Police),
      3. Ramakrishna (Constable), and
      4. Roshan Ali Khan (Constable),

      who have sexually abused and tortured Kokila, a hijra.


      Dear Friends

      Since 23/06/2004, we have been sitting on a
      DHARNA (protest sit-in) in front of the Mahatma
      Gandhi Statue, MG Road, Bangalore, to demand the
      immediate arrest of four Byappanahalli Policemen:
      Ashwathanarayana (Inspector of Police),
      Krishnappa (Sub-Inspector of Police), Ramakrishna
      (Constable) and Roshan Ali Khan (Constable), who
      have tortured and sexually abused Kokila, a hijra
      (transsexual woman), in the Byappanahalli Police
      Station on 18th June, 2004. We have yet to
      receive any response from the government. Using
      goondas, the Policemen involved in the torture
      have been threatening Kokila and Chandini, as
      well as other hijras and human rights activists,
      to intimidate them into withdrawing the
      complaint. They have even threatened to throw
      acid on Kokila and other hijras. We take this
      threat very seriously as many women in Bangalore
      City have been attacked with acid in the recent
      past. From now on, should any hijra in Bangalore
      City be attacked with acid, we will hold Byappana

      halli Police responsible for it.

      Mrs. Philomina Peres, chairperson of the
      Karnataka Commission for Women, recently visited
      our DHARNA site, and has demanded the DGP to
      immediately take drastic action against the four
      policemen. She called it a human rights violation
      against hijra sex-workers, and has promised to
      petition the government for justice for Kokila.
      We welcome the Commission's response, but
      unfortunately, this has been the only government
      agency to respond to Kokila's situation

      The leaders of Janatadal (secular), Mr. T.
      Prabakar (state general secretary), Mr. Srikanta
      Murthy (president, Bangalore City) and Mr. Dr.
      D.C. Prakash (general secretary, Bangalore City)
      have visited the DHARNA site and have promised to
      bring Kokila's perpetrator's to justice. They
      have also promised to work towards government
      recognition of hijras as woman and the
      decriminalization of sex-work.

      Dr. Siddhanagowda Patil, state general secretary
      of the Communist Party of India (CPI), has taken
      part in our DHARNA. In fact, many progressive and
      human rights organisations from Karnataka and all
      over India are participating or supporting the
      DHARNA. Human rights organisations from all over
      the world are putting pressure on the chief
      minister, through email, to take action against
      the four cruel policemen.

      We are organising a MASSIVE PROTEST RALLY to the
      chief minister's residence (Chikkalalbagh to Old
      Central Jail) on 2nd July, 2004, at 10 AM, to
      demand for the immediate arrest of the four
      Byappanahalli Policemen. More than 1,500 people
      will participate in the rally.


      The organizers of this rally include:
      Sangama, Vimochana, Sanchaya Nele, Garment
      Workers' Union, Dalitha RashtriyaAndolane, Social
      Action Committee, Communist Party of India (CPI),
      Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M),
      Karnataka Rajya Ratha Sangha (KRRS), Dalitha
      SangharshaSamithi, Dalitha Sangharsha Samithi
      (Ambedkarvada), Praja Vimochana Chaluvali (PVC),
      Karnataka Janandolana Sanghatane (K. Mariyappa),
      Lankesh Patrike, Karnataka Vimochana Ranga (KVR),
      Madiga Meesalathi Horata Samithi (MRHS),
      Karnataka Kaumusouhardha Vedike, Janadvani Yuva
      Vedike, People's Democratic Forum (PDF), New
      Socialist Alternative, Mahila Jagruthi, Stri
      Jagruthi Samithi, People's Union for Civil
      Liberties - Karnataka (PUCL), Dalitha Matthu
      Mahila Chaluvali (DMC), Dalit Christian
      Federation (DCF), Human Rights Forum for Dalit
      Liberation (HRFDL), SICHREM, Grama Swaraj
      Samithi, Jagruthi Mahila Sangha, Vividha, Swathi
      Mahila Sangha, Samraksha, NESA, Contract
      Paurakarmikas Union, Jathi Vinasha Vedike, Karna

      taka Domestic Workers Union, Bahumuki, Sakya
      Balaga, DISC, Focus India, Pipal Tree, Dalitha
      Hindulidavara Alpasamkyaathara Samithi, FEDINA,
      YDF, Alternative Law Forum Š

      For more information contact:
      Sangama, Flat 13, 3rd Floor, 'Royal Park'
      Apartments, 34 Park Road, Tasker Town, Bangalore
      - 560051, Karnataka, India (behind Hotel
      'Harsha,' near Shivajinagar Bust Stand),
      telephone: 91 80 22868680/91 80 22868121, mobile:
      91 9844013413 fax: 91 8022868161, email:


      Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on
      matters of peace and democratisation in South
      Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
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