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Special Orders 223 and 224

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  • Jim Rosebrock
    I know we shouldn t be indulging in what ifs here but I was reading McClellan s Wartime Papers (Sears) and there are his letters/telegrams of September 6th
    Message 1 of 3 , Jan 26, 2011
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      I know we shouldn't be indulging in what ifs here but I was reading McClellan's Wartime Papers (Sears) and there are his letters/telegrams of September 6th asking Halleck and Lincoln to suspend Special Orders 223 and 224 that relieved Porter (Fifth), Franklin (Sixth) and Griffin from duty and put Reno in at First Corps and Hooker at Fifth Corps.  As we know, Halleck did suspend the orders leaving Porter, Franklin and Griffin (and Reno) in place and awarding Hooker the First Corps.

      McClellan had Joseph Mansfield enroute from Washington to take command of Twelfth Corps.  What if instead, he gave the Sixth Corps to Mansfield?  I know it is more likely, given his preference for West Pointers that Mansfield would probably have stayed at Twelfth Corps to displace Alpheus Williams.  McClellan would not have trusted him with an independent command as important, and one of the conservative West Pointers already there (Slocum, Smith or even Couch) would have been more likely elevated to command Sixth Corps.  But with Mansfield in command, Crampton's Gap would have been a different fight I believe. 

      And just imagine Sep 17.  With Reno at First Corps, there would have still been an aggressive fight there I think.  Joseph Hooker at Fifth Corps and by George McClellan's side might have injected a little more offensive spirit into the center of the line.

      I already have picked this apart as I write it, but on a snowy Western Maryland day here at home, the intellectual exercise is a bit interesting. Anyone else interested in speculating today?

      Jim




      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • G E Mayers
      Larry; I think you will find Harsh s comments regarding that phase of the campaign in TATF to be of interest as bearing upon this counter-factual. Yr. Obt.
      Message 2 of 3 , Jan 26, 2011
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        Larry;

        I think you will find Harsh's comments regarding that phase of the campaign
        in TATF to be of interest as bearing upon this counter-factual.

        Yr. Obt. Svt.
        G E "Gerry" Mayers

        To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even on one's
        mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the Union, a passport to
        any foreign country, and a benediction from the Almighty God. --Anonymous

        -----Original Message-----
        From: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com [mailto:TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com]On
        Behalf Of eighth_conn_inf
        Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2011 12:43 PM
        To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
        Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Special Orders 223 and 224



        Jim,

        Replacing Porter, usually cautious general and close friends with
        McClellan, with Hooker who is generally seen as more aggressive, would have
        made a favorable difference for the AOP. And to make hindsight even more
        fun, Mansfield IMO would have done better than Franklin in any event perhaps
        not only moving more quickly and aggressively at Crampton's Gap but also in
        testing McLaws in Pleasant Valley.

        Franklin's and Couch's performances on the 13th-15th were tepid at best. I
        haven't seen any derogatory comments about Mansfield from McClellan but have
        read those from him re Franklin.

        I believe, unlike others, that the day McClellan dallied after finding
        S.O. 191 was the day which would have saved HF even with Franklin cowed in
        Pleasant Valley since McLaws would not have made a stand there if Miles in
        HF was standing strong. McLaws would have been forced to retreat downriver
        and cross at Point of Rocks or Berlin depriving Lee of this force at
        Sharpsburg. If Lee had known however that HF was not and would not be taken,
        and that McLaws would not be available for at least a couple of days, IMO he
        would have retreated over the Potomac at Boteler's and moved upriver to
        Williamsport to cross. Then the chase up the Cumberland Valley would have
        begun.

        Larry

        --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Jim Rosebrock <pointsalines@...>
        wrote:
        >
        > I know we shouldn't be indulging in what ifs here but I was reading
        McClellan's Wartime Papers (Sears) and there are his letters/telegrams of
        September 6th asking Halleck and Lincoln to suspend Special Orders 223 and
        224 that relieved Porter (Fifth), Franklin (Sixth) and Griffin from duty and
        put Reno in at First Corps and Hooker at Fifth Corps. As we know, Halleck
        did suspend the orders leaving Porter, Franklin and Griffin (and Reno) in
        place and awarding Hooker the First Corps.
        >
        > McClellan had Joseph Mansfield enroute from Washington to take command
        of Twelfth Corps. What if instead, he gave the Sixth Corps to Mansfield? I
        know it is more likely, given his preference for West Pointers that
        Mansfield would probably have stayed at Twelfth Corps to displace Alpheus
        Williams. McClellan would not have trusted him with an independent command
        as important, and one of the conservative West Pointers already there
        (Slocum, Smith or even Couch) would have been more likely elevated to
        command Sixth Corps. But with Mansfield in command, Crampton's Gap would
        have been a different fight I believe.
        >
        > And just imagine Sep 17. With Reno at First Corps, there would have
        still been an aggressive fight there I think. Joseph Hooker at Fifth Corps
        and by George McClellan's side might have injected a little more offensive
        spirit into the center of the line.
        >
        > I already have picked this apart as I write it, but on a snowy Western
        Maryland day here at home, the intellectual exercise is a bit interesting.
        Anyone else interested in speculating today?
        >
        > Jim
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        >






        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • Thomas G. Clemens
        For some reason I saw Gerry s comment, but not Larry s . I disagree with the concept of McClellan dallying about SO 191. He received it approx. 10 -11 in the
        Message 3 of 3 , Jan 26, 2011
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          For some reason I saw Gerry's comment, but not Larry's .

          I disagree with the concept of McClellan dallying about SO 191.
          He received it approx. 10 -11 in the morning, authenticated by Pittman. He already had troops marching that day, but this intell gave him pause, not encouragement. He knew Lee was divided already, columns reported marching noth and south, Halleck's warnings about CS guys crossing the Potomac to attack DC, etc. 191 narrowed that front to Harpers Ferry and Hagerstown. No numbers attached, and talk of "commands" detached but rejoining "the main body at Boonsboro or Hagerstown." This suggests a large army, even though divided, it still has a main body. We know that was small, but McClellan didn't. And please don't get into the psycho-babble Sears "McClellan is timid" crap, I have looked and NOBODY gave Mac a number smaller than 75K. Top figure was 150K. You're only as good as you intell.
          So after receiving 191 and digesting it, McClellan asked Pleasonton to verify it. This was intercepted intell, and SOP is to verify by another source. Pleasonton replied around 6:30 and McClellan issued his orders for attack shortly after. In fact, 2 Ninth Corps division moved into Middletown Valley during the night, refuting the idea that nobody was marching that day, or night.
          Finally, even if McClellan had been imbued with the foresight of a mystic and the combativenes of a Prussian and pushed his corps recklessly forward at noon, Hagan's Gap on Catoctin was held by Reb cavalry & artillery until mid-afternoon, no matter how many troops were moving toward it. With a start from Catoctin at approx. 3:00, no real attack could be launched by darkness at South Mt. I just don't see the dallying.

          ________________________________
          From: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com [TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com] on behalf of G E Mayers [gerry1952@...]
          Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2011 3:42 PM
          To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
          Subject: RE: [TalkAntietam] Re: Special Orders 223 and 224



          Larry;

          I think you will find Harsh's comments regarding that phase of the campaign
          in TATF to be of interest as bearing upon this counter-factual.

          Yr. Obt. Svt.
          G E "Gerry" Mayers

          To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even on one's
          mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the Union, a passport to
          any foreign country, and a benediction from the Almighty God. --Anonymous

          -----Original Message-----
          From: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com<mailto:TalkAntietam%40yahoogroups.com> [mailto:TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com<mailto:TalkAntietam%40yahoogroups.com>]On
          Behalf Of eighth_conn_inf
          Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2011 12:43 PM
          To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com<mailto:TalkAntietam%40yahoogroups.com>
          Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Special Orders 223 and 224

          Jim,

          Replacing Porter, usually cautious general and close friends with
          McClellan, with Hooker who is generally seen as more aggressive, would have
          made a favorable difference for the AOP. And to make hindsight even more
          fun, Mansfield IMO would have done better than Franklin in any event perhaps
          not only moving more quickly and aggressively at Crampton's Gap but also in
          testing McLaws in Pleasant Valley.

          Franklin's and Couch's performances on the 13th-15th were tepid at best. I
          haven't seen any derogatory comments about Mansfield from McClellan but have
          read those from him re Franklin.

          I believe, unlike others, that the day McClellan dallied after finding
          S.O. 191 was the day which would have saved HF even with Franklin cowed in
          Pleasant Valley since McLaws would not have made a stand there if Miles in
          HF was standing strong. McLaws would have been forced to retreat downriver
          and cross at Point of Rocks or Berlin depriving Lee of this force at
          Sharpsburg. If Lee had known however that HF was not and would not be taken,
          and that McLaws would not be available for at least a couple of days, IMO he
          would have retreated over the Potomac at Boteler's and moved upriver to
          Williamsport to cross. Then the chase up the Cumberland Valley would have
          begun.

          Larry

          --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com<mailto:TalkAntietam%40yahoogroups.com>, Jim Rosebrock <pointsalines@...>
          wrote:
          >
          > I know we shouldn't be indulging in what ifs here but I was reading
          McClellan's Wartime Papers (Sears) and there are his letters/telegrams of
          September 6th asking Halleck and Lincoln to suspend Special Orders 223 and
          224 that relieved Porter (Fifth), Franklin (Sixth) and Griffin from duty and
          put Reno in at First Corps and Hooker at Fifth Corps. As we know, Halleck
          did suspend the orders leaving Porter, Franklin and Griffin (and Reno) in
          place and awarding Hooker the First Corps.
          >
          > McClellan had Joseph Mansfield enroute from Washington to take command
          of Twelfth Corps. What if instead, he gave the Sixth Corps to Mansfield? I
          know it is more likely, given his preference for West Pointers that
          Mansfield would probably have stayed at Twelfth Corps to displace Alpheus
          Williams. McClellan would not have trusted him with an independent command
          as important, and one of the conservative West Pointers already there
          (Slocum, Smith or even Couch) would have been more likely elevated to
          command Sixth Corps. But with Mansfield in command, Crampton's Gap would
          have been a different fight I believe.
          >
          > And just imagine Sep 17. With Reno at First Corps, there would have
          still been an aggressive fight there I think. Joseph Hooker at Fifth Corps
          and by George McClellan's side might have injected a little more offensive
          spirit into the center of the line.
          >
          > I already have picked this apart as I write it, but on a snowy Western
          Maryland day here at home, the intellectual exercise is a bit interesting.
          Anyone else interested in speculating today?
          >
          > Jim
          >
          >
          >
          >
          > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          >

          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]





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