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Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition train, 9/15

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  • eighth_conn_inf
    Thanks Tom for that reminder! Here is the correction: Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia.... My HF escape
    Message 1 of 20 , Sep 18, 2009
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      Thanks Tom for that reminder!

      Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia...." My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

      Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements--~13 vice Hill's 17.

      BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

      Larry

      --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
      >
      > Larry,
      > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
      > Tom
      >
      > >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
      > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
      >
      > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
      >
      > Larry F.
      >
      > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
      > >
      > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
      > >
      > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
      > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
      > >
      > >
      > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
      > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
      > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
      > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
      > >
      > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
      > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
      > >
      > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
      > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
      > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
      > >
      > > Dean
      > >
      > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      > >
      >
    • Thomas Clemens
      The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think
      Message 2 of 20 , Sep 18, 2009
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        The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.

        >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 4:16 PM >>>
        Thanks Tom for that reminder!

        Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia...." My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

        Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements--~13 vice Hill's 17.

        BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

        Larry

        --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
        >
        > Larry,
        > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
        > Tom
        >
        > >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
        > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
        >
        > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
        >
        > Larry F.
        >
        > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
        > >
        > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
        > >
        > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
        > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
        > >
        > >
        > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
        > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
        > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
        > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
        > >
        > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
        > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
        > >
        > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
        > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
        > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
        > >
        > > Dean
        > >
        > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        > >
        >
      • Jim Rosebrock
        Looking forward to the tour tomorrow. Will see you at the 2:30 trek Regards Jim ________________________________ From: Thomas Clemens
        Message 3 of 20 , Sep 18, 2009
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          Looking forward to the tour tomorrow. Will see you at the 2:30 trek
          Regards
          Jim




          ________________________________
          From: Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...>
          To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
          Sent: Friday, September 18, 2009 10:11:36 PM
          Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition train, 9/15


          The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.

          >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@yahoo. com> 09/18/09 4:16 PM >>>
          Thanks Tom for that reminder!

          Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia.... " My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

          Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements- -~13 vice Hill's 17.

          BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

          Larry

          --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@.. .> wrote:
          >
          > Larry,
          > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
          > Tom
          >
          > >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
          > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
          >
          > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's
          Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
          >
          > Larry F.
          >
          > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
          > >
          > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
          > >
          > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
          > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
          > >
          > >
          > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
          > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
          > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
          > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
          > >
          > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
          > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
          > >
          > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
          > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
          > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
          > >
          > > Dean
          > >
          > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          > >
          >







          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        • Dean Essig
          Tom, We got 10.9 from the where the Hill route hits US 340 to the stop sign where Trough Road hits River Road at the Ford. Your 14 sounds about right once you
          Message 4 of 20 , Sep 18, 2009
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            Tom,

            We got 10.9 from the where the Hill route hits US 340 to the stop
            sign where Trough Road hits River Road at the Ford.

            Your 14 sounds about right once you add the rest of the way up to the
            southern part of the field and the distance into the center of HF.

            Hill's 17 mile number is either an intentional misrepresentation to
            make his march look better (or at least less inefficient) than it
            really was, or he wrote "12" and the "2" was miss-read as a "7".

            Either way, 17 is way off.

            Dean

            On Sep 18, 2009, at 9:11 PM, Thomas Clemens wrote:

            > The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking
            > forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the
            > 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.



            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          • Thomas Clemens
            Just reading this now. Thanks for coming, it was great to have you along. Thomas G. Clemens D.A. Professor of History Hagerstown Community College ... Looking
            Message 5 of 20 , Sep 20, 2009
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              Just reading this now. Thanks for coming, it was great to have you along.


              Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
              Professor of History
              Hagerstown Community College


              >>> Jim Rosebrock <pointsalines@...> 09/19/09 12:18 AM >>>
              Looking forward to the tour tomorrow. Will see you at the 2:30 trek
              Regards
              Jim




              ________________________________
              From: Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...>
              To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
              Sent: Friday, September 18, 2009 10:11:36 PM
              Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition train, 9/15


              The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.

              >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@yahoo. com> 09/18/09 4:16 PM >>>
              Thanks Tom for that reminder!

              Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia.... " My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

              Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements- -~13 vice Hill's 17.

              BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

              Larry

              --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@.. .> wrote:
              >
              > Larry,
              > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
              > Tom
              >
              > >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
              > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
              >
              > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's
              Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
              >
              > Larry F.
              >
              > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
              > >
              > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
              > >
              > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
              > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
              > >
              > >
              > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
              > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
              > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
              > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
              > >
              > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
              > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
              > >
              > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
              > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
              > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
              > >
              > > Dean
              > >
              > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              > >
              >







              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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