Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.
 

Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition train, 9/15

Expand Messages
  • eighth_conn_inf
    Gerry, You are correct. He was on Longstreet s staff as as an assistant ordnance officer and was placed in charge of Longstreet s ordnance train heading for
    Message 1 of 20 , Sep 7 4:44 PM
      Gerry,

      You are correct. He was on Longstreet's staff as as an assistant ordnance officer and was placed in charge of Longstreet's ordnance train heading for Williamsport when captured. Sarah Morgan wrote "A Confederate Girl's Diary." Dawson served initially in the Conf. States Navy then as a volunteer in Purcell's Battery. After the war, he was a reporter for the Richmond Examiner, then the Dispatch, next the National Express and Transportation Company, then the Charleston Mercury, then the Charleston News. His Reminiscenses include a poem of his, "Only A Private."

      Larry

      --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "G E Mayers" <gerry1952@...> wrote:
      >
      > Larry;
      >
      > You answered my question before I posted it. Dawson was, IIRC,
      > part of Longstreet's staff at the time. What people do not know
      > about him was that his second wife was Sarah Morgan, who left a
      > great diary of life in Baton Rouge during the War. Dawson also
      > wrote some poetry.
      >
      > Yr. Obt. Svt.
      > G E "Gerry" Mayers
      >
      > To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
      > on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
      > Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
      > the Almighty God. --Anonymous
      > ----- Original Message -----
      > From: "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...>
      > To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
      > Sent: Monday, September 07, 2009 10:23 AM
      > Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition
      > train, 9/15
      >
      >
      > Robert,
      >
      > Francis W. Dawson, "Reminiscences of Confederate Service,
      > 1861-1865," (Charleston, SC: The News and Courier Book Presses,
      > 1882; reprint: Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press,
      > 1980), ed. By Bell I. Wiley, 64-66.
      >
      > Larry
      >
    • Thomas Clemens
      Larry, Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery. Tom ... As Dean states and
      Message 2 of 20 , Sep 18 11:32 AM
        Larry,
        Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
        Tom

        >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
        As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.

        The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)

        Larry F.

        --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Dean Essig <d.essig@...> wrote:
        >
        > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@... wrote:
        >
        > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
        > > effected the campaign or SOP.
        >
        >
        > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
        > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
        > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
        > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
        >
        > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
        > was more distributed into divisional trains.
        >
        > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
        > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
        > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
        >
        > Dean
        >
        > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
        >
      • eighth_conn_inf
        Thanks Tom for that reminder! Here is the correction: Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia.... My HF escape
        Message 3 of 20 , Sep 18 1:16 PM
          Thanks Tom for that reminder!

          Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia...." My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

          Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements--~13 vice Hill's 17.

          BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

          Larry

          --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
          >
          > Larry,
          > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
          > Tom
          >
          > >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
          > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
          >
          > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
          >
          > Larry F.
          >
          > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
          > >
          > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
          > >
          > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
          > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
          > >
          > >
          > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
          > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
          > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
          > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
          > >
          > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
          > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
          > >
          > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
          > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
          > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
          > >
          > > Dean
          > >
          > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          > >
          >
        • Thomas Clemens
          The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think
          Message 4 of 20 , Sep 18 7:11 PM
            The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.

            >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 4:16 PM >>>
            Thanks Tom for that reminder!

            Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia...." My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

            Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements--~13 vice Hill's 17.

            BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

            Larry

            --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
            >
            > Larry,
            > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
            > Tom
            >
            > >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
            > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
            >
            > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
            >
            > Larry F.
            >
            > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
            > >
            > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
            > >
            > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
            > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
            > >
            > >
            > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
            > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
            > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
            > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
            > >
            > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
            > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
            > >
            > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
            > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
            > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
            > >
            > > Dean
            > >
            > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            > >
            >
          • Jim Rosebrock
            Looking forward to the tour tomorrow. Will see you at the 2:30 trek Regards Jim ________________________________ From: Thomas Clemens
            Message 5 of 20 , Sep 18 9:18 PM
              Looking forward to the tour tomorrow. Will see you at the 2:30 trek
              Regards
              Jim




              ________________________________
              From: Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...>
              To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
              Sent: Friday, September 18, 2009 10:11:36 PM
              Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition train, 9/15


              The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.

              >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@yahoo. com> 09/18/09 4:16 PM >>>
              Thanks Tom for that reminder!

              Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia.... " My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

              Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements- -~13 vice Hill's 17.

              BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

              Larry

              --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@.. .> wrote:
              >
              > Larry,
              > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
              > Tom
              >
              > >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
              > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
              >
              > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's
              Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
              >
              > Larry F.
              >
              > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
              > >
              > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
              > >
              > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
              > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
              > >
              > >
              > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
              > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
              > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
              > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
              > >
              > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
              > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
              > >
              > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
              > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
              > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
              > >
              > > Dean
              > >
              > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              > >
              >







              [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            • Dean Essig
              Tom, We got 10.9 from the where the Hill route hits US 340 to the stop sign where Trough Road hits River Road at the Ford. Your 14 sounds about right once you
              Message 6 of 20 , Sep 18 10:25 PM
                Tom,

                We got 10.9 from the where the Hill route hits US 340 to the stop
                sign where Trough Road hits River Road at the Ford.

                Your 14 sounds about right once you add the rest of the way up to the
                southern part of the field and the distance into the center of HF.

                Hill's 17 mile number is either an intentional misrepresentation to
                make his march look better (or at least less inefficient) than it
                really was, or he wrote "12" and the "2" was miss-read as a "7".

                Either way, 17 is way off.

                Dean

                On Sep 18, 2009, at 9:11 PM, Thomas Clemens wrote:

                > The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking
                > forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the
                > 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.



                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              • Thomas Clemens
                Just reading this now. Thanks for coming, it was great to have you along. Thomas G. Clemens D.A. Professor of History Hagerstown Community College ... Looking
                Message 7 of 20 , Sep 20 9:40 AM
                  Just reading this now. Thanks for coming, it was great to have you along.


                  Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                  Professor of History
                  Hagerstown Community College


                  >>> Jim Rosebrock <pointsalines@...> 09/19/09 12:18 AM >>>
                  Looking forward to the tour tomorrow. Will see you at the 2:30 trek
                  Regards
                  Jim




                  ________________________________
                  From: Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...>
                  To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
                  Sent: Friday, September 18, 2009 10:11:36 PM
                  Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition train, 9/15


                  The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.

                  >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@yahoo. com> 09/18/09 4:16 PM >>>
                  Thanks Tom for that reminder!

                  Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia.... " My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

                  Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements- -~13 vice Hill's 17.

                  BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

                  Larry

                  --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@.. .> wrote:
                  >
                  > Larry,
                  > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
                  > Tom
                  >
                  > >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
                  > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
                  >
                  > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's
                  Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
                  >
                  > Larry F.
                  >
                  > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
                  > >
                  > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
                  > >
                  > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
                  > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
                  > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
                  > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
                  > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
                  > >
                  > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
                  > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
                  > >
                  > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
                  > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
                  > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
                  > >
                  > > Dean
                  > >
                  > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                  > >
                  >







                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.