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Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition train, 9/15

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  • G E Mayers
    Larry; You answered my question before I posted it. Dawson was, IIRC, part of Longstreet s staff at the time. What people do not know about him was that his
    Message 1 of 20 , Sep 7, 2009
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      Larry;

      You answered my question before I posted it. Dawson was, IIRC,
      part of Longstreet's staff at the time. What people do not know
      about him was that his second wife was Sarah Morgan, who left a
      great diary of life in Baton Rouge during the War. Dawson also
      wrote some poetry.

      Yr. Obt. Svt.
      G E "Gerry" Mayers

      To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
      on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
      Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
      the Almighty God. --Anonymous
      ----- Original Message -----
      From: "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...>
      To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
      Sent: Monday, September 07, 2009 10:23 AM
      Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition
      train, 9/15


      Robert,

      Francis W. Dawson, "Reminiscences of Confederate Service,
      1861-1865," (Charleston, SC: The News and Courier Book Presses,
      1882; reprint: Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press,
      1980), ed. By Bell I. Wiley, 64-66.

      Larry


      --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Robert Moore <cenantua@...>
      wrote:
      >
      > Larry,
      >
      > I forgot to ask... where did you find the quote?
      >
      > Robert
      >
      >
      >
      >
      > ________________________________
      > From: eighth_conn_inf <eighth_conn_inf@...>
      > To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
      > Sent: Monday, September 7, 2009 9:15:54 AM
      > Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition
      > train, 9/15
      >
      > Â
      > The train was captured by the Harpers Ferry escape column which
      > consisted of the following units:
      >
      > Twelfth Illinois Cavalry under Col. Arno Voss which arrived
      > with White from Martinsburg, the Eighth New York Cavalry under
      > Col. Benjamin F. "Grimes" Davis, a squadron of the First
      > Maryland Cavalry commanded by Capt. Charles H. Russell, the
      > Seventh Squadron of Rhode Island Cavalry (a three-month unit)
      > under Maj. Augustus W. Corliss, a squadron of the First
      > Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry (also known as "Cole's
      > Cavalry") led by Maj. Henry A. Cole, and some 20 officers and
      > men from the Loudoun Virginia Rangers commanded by Capt. Samuel
      > C. Means.
      >
      > As dawn was breaking on 15 September, the column halted to rest
      > the horses and tired troopers who had been in their saddles for
      > more than eight hours; they chose a point near the
      > Hagerstown-Williams port Turnpike about two and a half miles
      > from Williamsport to reform. As the column again began its ride
      > north, the sound of many wagon wheels was heard coming from the
      > direction of Hagerstown. Scouts reported a large wagon train
      > heading south and the commanders decided to capture it.
      >
      > The Eighth New York and the Twelfth Illinois were formed in
      > line on north and south sides of the road respectively with the
      > Maryland and Rhode Island cavalry in reserve. With most of the
      > Union troopers hidden from view, Col. B. F. Davis with a small
      > contingent of the Eighth captured the first wagon and sent it
      > quickly over a dirt road to the Greencastle Turnpike, which ran
      > from Williamsport to Greencastle, to the west and sent it
      > speeding north. One wagon at a time suffered this fate until
      > all were sent north or destroyed. The outnumbered Confederate
      > cavalry escort from the First Virginia Cavalry harassed the
      > rear of the retreating train but were not able to inflict any
      > damage despite bringing up two guns due to the efficient screen
      > the Union troopers provided. An articulate British-born
      > Confederate artillery lieutenant with the wagon train described
      > well its capture:
      >
      > "At about ten o'clock at night I started. It was intensely dark
      > and the roads were rough. Towards morning I entered the
      > Hagerstown and Williamsport Turnpike, where I found a cavalry
      > picket. The officer in charge asked me to move the column as
      > quickly as I could, and to keep the trains well closed up. I
      > asked him if the enemy were on the road, and he told me that it
      > was entirely clear, and that he had pickets out in every
      > direction. It was only a few miles now to Williamsport, and I
      > could see the camp-fires of our troops across the riverâ?¦I was
      > forty or fifty yards ahead of the column, when a voice from the
      > roadside called out "halt!"â?¦In a moment it was repeated. I
      > quickly rode to the side of the road in the direction of the
      > voice, and found myself at the entrance of a narrow lane, and
      > there adown it were horses and men in a line that stretched out
      > far beyond my visionâ?¦I said indignantly: "How dare you halt
      > an officer in this manner." The reply was
      > to the point: "Surrender, and dismount! You are my
      > prisoner!"â?¦I was place under guard on the roadside, and as
      > the trains came up they were halted, and the men who were with
      > them were quietly captured. In a short time the column moved
      > off in the direction of the Pennsylvania line. I was allowed to
      > ride my own horse. By the side of each team a Federal soldier
      > rode, and, by dint of cursing the negro drivers and beating the
      > mules with their swords, the cavalrymen contrived to get the
      > jaded animals along at a gallopâ?¦I had a cavalryman on each
      > side of me, and tried vainly to get an opportunity to slip off
      > into the woods. Soon after daylight we reached the little
      > village of Greencastle, Pennsylvania, where the citizens came
      > out to look at the "Rebel" prisoners. They hurrahed for their
      > own men and cursed at us. Even the women joined in the game.
      > Several of them brought their children to the roadside and told
      > them to shake their fists at the "d----d Rebels."
      > Still there were some kind people in Greencastle. Three or
      > four ladies came to us, and, without pretending to have any
      > liking for Confederates, showed their chartable disposition by
      > giving us some bread and a cup of cold water. My horse was
      > taken from me at Greencastle and ridden off by a dirty-looking
      > cavalryman. Then the Confederates, numbering a hundred or more,
      > were packed into the cars, and sent by the railway to
      > Chambersburg. "
      >
      > Included with the Rebel prisoners were six men from Company B
      > of the 9th Virginia Cavalry who had been detached from
      > Fitzhugh's Brigade at Highland on the 13th and, after missing
      > the Brigade wagons, fell in with Longstreet's wagons.
      >
      > Before 10 A.M., the wagon train reached Greencastle,
      > Pennsylvania, with ninety-seven wagons, 600 prisoners, and many
      > beef cattle having burned about 45 wagons. The Confederate
      > wagon train was Longstreet's ordnance train which had left
      > Hagerstown that night on its way to Virginia.
      >
      > Larry F.
      >
      > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, Robert Moore <cenantua@
      > .> wrote:
      > >
      > > Hello all!
      > >
      > > Just wanted to see if anyone knows the particulars behind the
      > > capture of Longstreet's ammunition train on 9/15/62. I know
      > > that Cole's Cavalry (1st PHB/Maryland Vol. Cav.) was the unit
      > > involved in bagging the train.
      > >
      > > Thanks!
      > >
      > > Robert Moore
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      > >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      >
    • eighth_conn_inf
      Gerry, You are correct. He was on Longstreet s staff as as an assistant ordnance officer and was placed in charge of Longstreet s ordnance train heading for
      Message 2 of 20 , Sep 7, 2009
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        Gerry,

        You are correct. He was on Longstreet's staff as as an assistant ordnance officer and was placed in charge of Longstreet's ordnance train heading for Williamsport when captured. Sarah Morgan wrote "A Confederate Girl's Diary." Dawson served initially in the Conf. States Navy then as a volunteer in Purcell's Battery. After the war, he was a reporter for the Richmond Examiner, then the Dispatch, next the National Express and Transportation Company, then the Charleston Mercury, then the Charleston News. His Reminiscenses include a poem of his, "Only A Private."

        Larry

        --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "G E Mayers" <gerry1952@...> wrote:
        >
        > Larry;
        >
        > You answered my question before I posted it. Dawson was, IIRC,
        > part of Longstreet's staff at the time. What people do not know
        > about him was that his second wife was Sarah Morgan, who left a
        > great diary of life in Baton Rouge during the War. Dawson also
        > wrote some poetry.
        >
        > Yr. Obt. Svt.
        > G E "Gerry" Mayers
        >
        > To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
        > on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
        > Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
        > the Almighty God. --Anonymous
        > ----- Original Message -----
        > From: "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...>
        > To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
        > Sent: Monday, September 07, 2009 10:23 AM
        > Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition
        > train, 9/15
        >
        >
        > Robert,
        >
        > Francis W. Dawson, "Reminiscences of Confederate Service,
        > 1861-1865," (Charleston, SC: The News and Courier Book Presses,
        > 1882; reprint: Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press,
        > 1980), ed. By Bell I. Wiley, 64-66.
        >
        > Larry
        >
      • Thomas Clemens
        Larry, Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery. Tom ... As Dean states and
        Message 3 of 20 , Sep 18, 2009
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          Larry,
          Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
          Tom

          >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
          As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.

          The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)

          Larry F.

          --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Dean Essig <d.essig@...> wrote:
          >
          > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@... wrote:
          >
          > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
          > > effected the campaign or SOP.
          >
          >
          > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
          > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
          > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
          > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
          >
          > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
          > was more distributed into divisional trains.
          >
          > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
          > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
          > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
          >
          > Dean
          >
          > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
          >
        • eighth_conn_inf
          Thanks Tom for that reminder! Here is the correction: Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia.... My HF escape
          Message 4 of 20 , Sep 18, 2009
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            Thanks Tom for that reminder!

            Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia...." My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

            Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements--~13 vice Hill's 17.

            BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

            Larry

            --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
            >
            > Larry,
            > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
            > Tom
            >
            > >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
            > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
            >
            > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
            >
            > Larry F.
            >
            > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
            > >
            > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
            > >
            > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
            > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
            > >
            > >
            > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
            > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
            > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
            > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
            > >
            > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
            > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
            > >
            > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
            > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
            > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
            > >
            > > Dean
            > >
            > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
            > >
            >
          • Thomas Clemens
            The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think
            Message 5 of 20 , Sep 18, 2009
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              The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.

              >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 4:16 PM >>>
              Thanks Tom for that reminder!

              Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia...." My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

              Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements--~13 vice Hill's 17.

              BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

              Larry

              --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
              >
              > Larry,
              > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
              > Tom
              >
              > >>> "eighth_conn_inf" <eighth_conn_inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
              > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
              >
              > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
              >
              > Larry F.
              >
              > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
              > >
              > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
              > >
              > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
              > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
              > >
              > >
              > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
              > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
              > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
              > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
              > >
              > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
              > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
              > >
              > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
              > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
              > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
              > >
              > > Dean
              > >
              > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              > >
              >
            • Jim Rosebrock
              Looking forward to the tour tomorrow. Will see you at the 2:30 trek Regards Jim ________________________________ From: Thomas Clemens
              Message 6 of 20 , Sep 18, 2009
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                Looking forward to the tour tomorrow. Will see you at the 2:30 trek
                Regards
                Jim




                ________________________________
                From: Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...>
                To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
                Sent: Friday, September 18, 2009 10:11:36 PM
                Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition train, 9/15


                The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.

                >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@yahoo. com> 09/18/09 4:16 PM >>>
                Thanks Tom for that reminder!

                Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia.... " My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

                Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements- -~13 vice Hill's 17.

                BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

                Larry

                --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@.. .> wrote:
                >
                > Larry,
                > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
                > Tom
                >
                > >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
                > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
                >
                > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's
                Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
                >
                > Larry F.
                >
                > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
                > >
                > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
                > >
                > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
                > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
                > >
                > >
                > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
                > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
                > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
                > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
                > >
                > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
                > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
                > >
                > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
                > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
                > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
                > >
                > > Dean
                > >
                > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                > >
                >







                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              • Dean Essig
                Tom, We got 10.9 from the where the Hill route hits US 340 to the stop sign where Trough Road hits River Road at the Ford. Your 14 sounds about right once you
                Message 7 of 20 , Sep 18, 2009
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                  Tom,

                  We got 10.9 from the where the Hill route hits US 340 to the stop
                  sign where Trough Road hits River Road at the Ford.

                  Your 14 sounds about right once you add the rest of the way up to the
                  southern part of the field and the distance into the center of HF.

                  Hill's 17 mile number is either an intentional misrepresentation to
                  make his march look better (or at least less inefficient) than it
                  really was, or he wrote "12" and the "2" was miss-read as a "7".

                  Either way, 17 is way off.

                  Dean

                  On Sep 18, 2009, at 9:11 PM, Thomas Clemens wrote:

                  > The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking
                  > forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the
                  > 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.



                  [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                • Thomas Clemens
                  Just reading this now. Thanks for coming, it was great to have you along. Thomas G. Clemens D.A. Professor of History Hagerstown Community College ... Looking
                  Message 8 of 20 , Sep 20, 2009
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                    Just reading this now. Thanks for coming, it was great to have you along.


                    Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                    Professor of History
                    Hagerstown Community College


                    >>> Jim Rosebrock <pointsalines@...> 09/19/09 12:18 AM >>>
                    Looking forward to the tour tomorrow. Will see you at the 2:30 trek
                    Regards
                    Jim




                    ________________________________
                    From: Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...>
                    To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
                    Sent: Friday, September 18, 2009 10:11:36 PM
                    Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: Capture of Longstreet's ammunition train, 9/15


                    The 2:30 tour. Just talked to Tom McGrath tonight, he is looking forward to the tour too. Joe Harsh and I could never figure out the 17 mile story. I think we got 14 or so, but it certainly is not 17.

                    >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@yahoo. com> 09/18/09 4:16 PM >>>
                    Thanks Tom for that reminder!

                    Here is the correction: "Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Ordnance for the Army of Northern Virginia.... " My HF escape chapter is nearly completion.

                    Alexander said about this incident in his other book that he and his wagons had to return 13 miles to HF which certainly supports Jim Rosebrock's measurements- -~13 vice Hill's 17.

                    BTW, for tomorrow's fording, are you leading the 2:30 or 3:30 crossing?

                    Larry

                    --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@.. .> wrote:
                    >
                    > Larry,
                    > Great posts lately, just one minor point. Alexander was an Ordnance officer at this time, not yet commanding any artillery.
                    > Tom
                    >
                    > >>> "eighth_conn_ inf" <eighth_conn_ inf@...> 09/18/09 9:33 AM >>>
                    > As Dean states and as Brian has written on AotW, the loss of the ammo for the ANV artillery was important.
                    >
                    > The practical effect of the loss of much ammunition for Lee's artillery meant that there was not ample ammunition for Rebel guns during the battle on the 17th. Edward Porter Alexander in charge of Longstreet's artillery wrote that "when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the surrendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boonsboro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of the 45 loads, burned by the [enemy] cavalry, had been a severe blow at such a distance from our base at Culpeper. I was soon on my way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far from Harper's
                    Ferry." (Alexander, Military Memoirs of A Confederate, 242.)
                    >
                    > Larry F.
                    >
                    > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, Dean Essig <d.essig@> wrote:
                    > >
                    > > On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:41 AM, troyacool@ wrote:
                    > >
                    > > > Is there any idea of the amount of ordinance lost or how it
                    > > > effected the campaign or SOP.
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > Given the paucity of ammo in the army reserve trains (using the 30
                    > > Jun 63 ANVa ordnance receipts in Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg as a
                    > > guide), Longstreet's trains would have represented somewhere between
                    > > 33 and 50% of the army's artillery reserve ammunition.
                    > >
                    > > Far less than that percentage when it comes to small arms ammo, as it
                    > > was more distributed into divisional trains.
                    > >
                    > > Artillery ammunition was frightfully limited for the ANVa at
                    > > Sharpsburg (and that doesn't even address the organizational
                    > > confusion at the army train park at the Grove Farm).
                    > >
                    > > Dean
                    > >
                    > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                    > >
                    >







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