Re: 8th Connecticut Monument
I have never read anything that said that any organized Union troops
got to the Harpers Ferry Road although as you state the 8th CT and
9th NY did get close.
And I agree that if Little Mac had committed Porter and Pleasonton in
mid afternoon at the Middle Bridge in conjunction with Burnside's
attack, Lee would have been pushed out of the cemetery. Of course
posting cavalry on his flanks would have let Mac and Burn know when
Hill arrived but Mac's use of his cavalry was pathetic on 17
--- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Steve" <myness@...> wrote:
> I spent a few hours yesterday hiking the Final Attack Trail with
> detail views of the Carmen-Cope maps for 4:20pm and 5:30pm. The
> trail itself is excellent, and with the aid of the map, I finally
> feel like I have a good grasp of the fighting in the 40 Acre
> Cornfield and vicinity.
> I also visited the monuments for the 9th NY and 8th CT regiments.
> The 8th's marker incription indicated it marks the advanced
> of the unit. The Carmen-Cope maps suggest they advanced a bit
> farther, across the head of a draw immediately West of the
> and within about 100 yards of the Harpers Ferry Rd.
> Does anyone have any insight on this? Perhaps the regiment
> farther, but consolidated its position a bit to the rear to conform
> to the position of Fairchild's Brigade? I am fairly confident I
> oriented the map and read the contours correctly.
> I have always been fascinated with the terrain in this area of the
> field and I learned more using the Carmen-Cope maps than I had on
> previous hikes. The role of the terrain in shaping the fighting
> in the fracture of Harland's Brigade into separate elements is
> clear. The 16th CT and 4th RI deployed in the ravine at the
> end of the cornfield, while the 8th CT deployed to the North of the
> corn. The advance of Fairchild's brigade was almost certainly
> visible to the 8th CT, but not to the other two regiments.
> I am continually working out my ideas on the action between AP
> men and the the IX Corps. As Harland's two regiments
> and with most of Ewing's Brigade deployed to plug the gap created
> Harland's disjointed advance, it seems the IX Corps advance was
> doomed. The 12th OH, which remained in reserve, never advanced
> Otto's Farm Lane, and had they done so, it might not have made any
> I think the real difference may lie with McLellan's decision not to
> commit the V Corps. As the IX Corps was drawn northward toward
> Sharpsburg, it's hard to visualize a scenario where their left
> not have been vulnerable to Hill's slashing attack. Had the V
> crossed the Middle Bridge and supported Burnside/Cox more
> on the right, perhaps the IX's response to Hill's assault would
> been more effective. With so many factors ifluencing the outcome,
> the only thing I am certain of is that I need to study it more.