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  • Joseph Pierro
    some relevant passages from Carman. Hope these help! -- jgp: “Once on the ground, it took Hill but a hasty examination to decide that the gap could only be
    Message 1 of 2 , Feb 3, 2008
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      some relevant passages from Carman. Hope these help! -- jgp:


      �Once on the ground, it took Hill but a hasty examination to decide that the gap could only be held by a force larger than he had at his disposal and was wholly indefensible by a small one. Lee was so informed, and Hill ordered up G. B. Anderson�s Brigade and proceeded to form a defensive line. Considering that the foot of the gap was not the proper place to defend it, he brought Colquitt�s Brigade back near the summit and ordered it in line of battle on either side of the National Road, three regiments on the right and two on the left. Having posted Colquitt across the road, he then rode to the right on a ridge road to reconnoiter and, much to his surprise, found Rosser with the 5th Virginia Cavalry and two guns of Pelham�s Battery guarding Fox�s Gap on the Old Sharpsburg Road. Rosser had been ordered to that point by Stuart, who had not informed Hill of the fact, nor had Rosser been told that he would have infantry support. While here, Hill
      became convinced that there were movements of troops on the mountainside below, screened from view by the forest. At the foot of the mountain, Cox�s men could be seen advancing.
      �This was a menacing condition of affairs, and Hill took measures to meet it. He rode back to the Mountain House and found Garland prepared for action. That gallant and enterprising officer had heard the report of a gun on the right front and the hurtling of a shell and put his brigade under arms. Hill explained the situation to him and ordered him to sweep through the woods on the right to the Old Sharpsburg Road and hold it at all hazards, as the safety of Lee�s large train depended upon its retention. He had already ordered up G. B. Anderson to assist Colquitt and Garland, but was reluctant to order up Ripley or Brigadier General Robert E. Rodes from the important points held by them near Boonsboro until something definite was known of the strength and designs of the Union advance.
      �From the National Road at the Mountain House (where Garland was drawn up), a rough road runs southerly, first on the east slope and then along the crest of the mountain nearly a mile, when it is intersected at right angles by a road diverging
      from the National Road about a mile west of Middletown. (This road was followed by Major General Edward Braddock in his march on Fort Duquesne in 1755 and for many years was known as the Braddock Road; later it became known as the Old Sharpsburg Road.) The point where this road intersects the road on the crest of the mountain is generally known as Fox�s (sometimes as Braddock�s) Gap.
      �About three-quarters of a mile beyond Fox�s Gap, another road reaches the mountaintop and connects with the crest road. This road branches from the Old Sharpsburg Road at the foot of the mountain, runs southerly some distance along
      its base, and reaches the crest by a northwest course. From Fox�s Gap the road runs southerly for a half-mile, then follows the trend of the mountain westerly a quarter of a mile and intersects the road reaching the crest by the northwest course. At the point of this intersection on the crest, several wagon roads and trails lead down the west side of the mountain into the valley south of Boonsboro. West of the crest road there is a slight depression, beyond which are spurs and ridges covered by a dense forest. In front of Fox�s Gap, and between it and the road farther south, is a plateau of open ground. (At the time, some was wheat stubble, some in corn, and some in grass.) The ground sloping eastward from this plateau was open and under cultivation, and heavy stone fences separated many of the fields.� [pp. 145�146]

      �Upon the fall of Garland, the command passed to Colonel McRae. As soon as he saw the condition of affairs and had become convinced of the enemy�s determination to turn both his flanks, he notified D. H. Hill that the force at his disposal was wholly inadequate to hold the position. Very soon thereafter Colonel Charles C. Tew, with the 2d and 4th North Carolina of G. B Anderson�s Brigade, reported to McRae. The units were about to take position on the immediate left of the 13th North Carolina when Tew received an order from Anderson to move off to the left. Hill was advised of this movement and of the wide gap made in the line, and McRae, believing that his division commander would immediately respond by sending troops to fill it, ordered the 13th North Carolina to follow Tew to the left and keep connection with him in anticipation
      of their arrival. McRae then rode to the right, intending (if time allowed) to move the 5th North Carolina to the left and with it fill the vacant space in the line, but found that, under a previous order given by him, this regiment had already been advanced into the field on the right of the 23d North Carolina, and it was then dangerous to withdraw it.� [p. 147]

      �G. B. Anderson, whose movement across Ripley�s front caused the latter�s withdrawal, was not so remiss in duty. After he had moved by the right flank some distance down the Old Sharpsburg Road, he recognized the fact that he was moving
      far away from his enemy and, without prompting, faced to the left and moved up the mountain. He had the 2d, 4th, and 30th North Carolina of his own brigade and the 13th North Carolina of Garland�s. (The 14th North Carolina had become detached earlier in the day and had fallen in with Ripley.) It was an arduous march up a mountainside covered with huge boulders, laurel thickets, and tangled vines. When the top was reached, it was at the crest road and some distance beyond Cox�s left. Finding nothing in his immediate front, he sent the 2d and 4th North Carolina to reconnoiter. Captain Edwin A. Osborne, commanding the skirmishers of the 4th, on coming to the open ground on the left saw Clark�s battery and its infantry support all facing nearly north. He hastened back to his regimental commander and told him that they could deliver a flank fire upon the infantry support before it could change position to meet them. Upon which, the 2d, 4th, and 13th
      North Carolina were marched along the ridge road to the left until they came to a dense cornfield on the right of the road, where they saw the guns and the infantry in support. An instant charge was ordered. The North Carolinians sprang out of the laurel thicket and over the fence into the open�at the moment that the 89th New York, its left in the corn, was just coming into position on the left of its brigade. The 89th New York and the battery opened fire, and the North Carolinians were quickly repulsed with great loss and fell back into the woods, leaving their dead, wounded, thirty prisoners, and 150 stand of arms in the hands of the 89th, which had but one wing engaged and lost two killed and eighteen wounded. The 9th and 103d New York reported no casualties. It was now sunset, and the fighting on the left was over.� [p. 154]

      �The [ANVa�s] train, save the wagons captured by Colonel Davis, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. Later, Colonel Millican, with the 15th and 17th Georgia, came up and took charge of the train and added the 11th Georgia to his command. The rations
      cooked for D. H. Hill�s men near Boonsboro on the night of the fourteenth were given them on the field of Sharpsburg on September 17.� [p. 170]

      �The three brigades of Garland, Ripley, and G. B. Anderson, in the order named, moved on by-roads from the Old Sharpsburg Road to the vicinity of Boonsboro, then followed Rodes on the Boonsboro and Sharpsburg Pike to Keedysville, where they were halted an hour, then, continuing the march, crossed the Antietam between daybreak and sunrise and formed line on the high ground a short mile beyond the stream and north of the Boonsboro Pike. D. H. Hill, who accompanied the three brigades, placed the right of his line (G. B. Anderson) on the Boonsboro Pike, Ripley�s Brigade a short distance to
      the rear, and Garland�s Brigade (now commanded by Colonel McRea of the 5th North Carolina) on the high ground and in the sunken road (now known as Bloody Lane), with its left resting on the lane running north from the sunken road to the Roulette house. Rodes and Colquitt were now brought back from beyond the town and placed on the line, Rodes on a plateau on the right of Garland and at right angles to it. In his immediate rear was the Piper cornfield. �Here,� says Rodes, �subsisting on green corn mainly and under an occasional artillery fire, we lay until the morning of the 17th.� Colquitt took position on Garland�s left in the sunken road, between the mouth of the Roulette lane and the Hagerstown Pike. The brigades of G. B. Anderson, Ripley, and Rodes faced the Antietam and the east.� [pp. 171 � 172]

      ��On the 5th, when crossing the Potomac �, I received a very severe hurt from the kick of a horse, which incapacitated me from active duty, not being able to either walk or ride, but had myself carried in an ambulance in anticipation and hopes of a speedy recovery � On the 14th of September �, I had myself placed upon my horse and took the command of my regiment � Here my horse was killed under me on the mountain and to my own and the surprise of my command I commanded my troops in the battle until nightfall, when I threw myself down to rest by my brigade commander, Gen. G. B. Anderson, who seeing me so exhausted after the excitement of the day, insisted upon my going to the rear, and called up four litter bearers and had me carried to the hospital.� Bryan Grimes, Extracts of Letters of Major-Gen�l Bryan Grimes to His Wife: Written While in Active Service in the Army of Northern Virginia; Together with Some Personal Recollections of the
      War, Written by Him After Its Close, etc., comp. Pulaski Cowper (Raleigh, N.C.: Edwards, Broughton & Co., 1883), 19�20.� [p. 431]


      ----- Original Message ----
      From: G E Mayers <gerry1952@...>
      To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
      Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 8:54:12 PM
      Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

      Dear Jake;

      I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the
      First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we
      are in this group, concentrating on the unit level with the
      Fourth NC (The Bloody Fourth) and then the larger command level
      with Longstreet and Army HQ.

      Where I've run into a little dilemma is knowing where Anderson's
      brigade was positioned _after_ it was on the Old Sharpsburg Road
      to do a grand wheel back UP South Mountain to take the Federals
      in the flank and later, when it was determined to abandon the
      mountain, which route or routes Anderson's Brigade retreated
      towards Sharpsburg.

      Can you search your Carman MS and, under separate email, provide
      whatever information he might have? (Or, post here, if not
      terribly, terribly long and lengthy!)

      Thank you!

      Yr. Obt. Svt.
      G E "Gerry" Mayers

      To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
      on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
      Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
      the Almighty God. --Anonymous
      ----- Original Message -----
      From: "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@ yahoo.com>
      To: <TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com>
      Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 7:09 PM
      Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

      Dean:

      Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
      were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
      Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at
      Sharpsburg.

      from Carman:

      "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14,
      realized
      that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he
      abandoned
      (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the
      North
      into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
      immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
      into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign
      of
      disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in
      failure,
      but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00
      p.m.,
      he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
      "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by
      Sharpsburg
      and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
      your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road
      to
      cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite
      with
      this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward
      officers
      to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac,
      and
      if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave
      Shepherdstown
      Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
      Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take.
      You
      will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
      "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to
      march
      up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
      Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson
      contemplated
      the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these
      had
      so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the
      grasp of
      Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to
      push
      such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
      across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
      battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
      were ordered to move-two battalions by Williamsport into
      Virginia,
      one battalion to Keedysville. "

      It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore
      afterwards
      for so long because the operational and tactical situation
      remained
      in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
      attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th?
      Would
      McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back,
      the
      last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and
      reserve
      artillery clogging the only route of escape.

      Carman again:
      "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
      artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late
      in
      the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek,
      four
      miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
      and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to
      move
      with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
      Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the
      river.
      Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the
      Boonsboro
      and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's
      Cross-Roads,
      where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and
      Sharpsburg
      Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union
      cavalry
      was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in
      position
      commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown
      Pike
      on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to
      Sharpsburg)
      for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a
      band
      of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent
      out
      scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the
      road
      was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
      infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the
      'retiring
      invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
      proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
      Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
      train, and Pendleton-without meeting an enemy or further delay-
      reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
      Virginia.
      "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was
      ordered
      to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
      battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
      Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
      position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile
      below
      town."

      In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
      artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
      again:

      "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
      Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown
      Ford: 'If
      you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which
      you
      can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a
      sufficiency
      of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential
      to
      their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about
      there
      and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns,
      and
      provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent
      up
      but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had
      closed
      that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

      Hope some of that helps.

      --jake
      --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "dean_essig"
      <dean_essig@ ...>
      wrote:
      >
      > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of
      > the
      various artillery units.
      >
      > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the
      > Va
      side, but he hadn't ruled
      > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union
      > right
      wing to Hagerstown.
      >
      > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible,
      > but
      allowing the trains to
      > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of
      > sense.
      >
      > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is
      > breathtakingly
      fearless.
      >
      > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens"
      > <clemenst@>
      wrote:
      > >
      > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was
      > > using
      the river to protect his
      > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport.
      > Even
      after he retreated on the
      > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
      towards Hagerstown.
      > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
      infantry to move quickly. As
      > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford
      > and
      Light's Ford, and
      > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
      > >
      > >
      > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
      > > Professor of History
      > > Hagerstown Community College
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@ > 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
      > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
      > >
      > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the
      > > map.
      > >
      > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I
      > > don't
      recall Reilly (who at least
      > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they
      > > had
      to ford the Potomac
      > to
      > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
      suggests that what stocks
      > they
      > > had available were in the Md side trains.
      > >
      > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across
      > > the
      river.
      > >
      > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections
      > > about
      the rather mundane
      > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
      > >
      > > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens"
      > > <clemenst@>
      wrote:
      > > >
      > > > Dean,
      > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is
      > > > just
      fine. I think you have
      > it
      > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains,
      > > such
      as they were with the loss
      > of
      > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
      think some of it was
      > forwarded
      > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
      resupply. Going from
      > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes
      > > it
      as 1 & 1/4 miles from
      > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on
      > > Mt.
      Airy, the Grove family
      > farm.
      > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and
      > > lots
      of fields to park a
      > wagon
      > > train there.
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
      > > > Professor of History
      > > > Hagerstown Community College
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@ > 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
      > > > Thomas,
      > > >
      > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but
      > > > one
      matter.
      > > >
      > > > What we know:
      > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
      there at various dates.
      > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could
      > > > get
      some food.
      > > >
      > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md
      > > > and
      positioned "2 miles to
      > > the
      > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but
      > > > w/o a
      reference as to rear of
      > > what
      > > > or who).
      > > >
      > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
      > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in
      > > > Virgina?
      Harsh believes so.
      > > >
      > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were
      > > > sent
      back into Md? This is
      > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve
      > > > Trains
      across the river to avoid
      > > > losing artillery ammunition.
      > > >
      > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
      unknowns?
      > > >
      > > > Dean
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens"
      <clemenst@> wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > > Dean,
      > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken
      > > > > at
      the Flood, pp. 338-9
      > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp.
      > > > 193-
      4. Let me know if you
      > > do
      > > > not have access to those books.
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
      > > > > Professor of History
      > > > > Hagerstown Community College
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@ > 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
      > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
      > > > >
      > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean
      > > > > feat),
      if I can impose (and
      > > when
      > > > you
      > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but
      > > > > ammo"
      exception.
      > > > >
      > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by
      > > > > the
      time this project is
      > done
      > > > :-)
      > > > >
      > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll
      > > > > want
      a copy of a product that
      > > has
      > > > your
      > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
      > > > >
      > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens"
      <clemenst@> wrote:
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Dean,
      > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
      understanding that all trains
      > > except
      > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
      food, had to go find his
      > and
      > > > bring
      > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found
      > > > > theirs
      near Sharpsburg.
      > > > Longstreet'
      > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not
      > > > > all
      of his trains.
      > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game?
      > > > > > :-)
      just kidding, I don't have
      > > time
      > > > to
      > > > > play them.
      > > > >
      > > >
      > >
      >





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    • G E Mayers
      Jake; Thanks! The information does expose some gaps in my thinking and some errors. I ve also read the portion from Grimes s letter previously but had
      Message 2 of 2 , Feb 3, 2008
      • 0 Attachment
        Jake;

        Thanks! The information does expose some gaps in my thinking and
        some errors. I've also read the portion from Grimes's letter
        previously but had forgotten Anderson ordered him to leave South
        Mountain the night of the 14th in the Ambulance.

        However, there is also a story that Grimes was in the same large
        wagon train which encountered the other Grimes's Yankee cavalry
        near Sharpsburg. IIRC, Bryan Grimes came very close to being
        captured by the Federals.

        Yr. Obt. Svt.
        G E "Gerry" Mayers

        To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
        on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
        Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
        the Almighty God. --Anonymous
        ----- Original Message -----
        From: "Joseph Pierro" <joseph_pierro@...>
        To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
        Sent: Sunday, February 03, 2008 12:57 PM
        Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: gerry1952@...


        some relevant passages from Carman. Hope these help! -- jgp:


        “Once on the ground, it took Hill but a hasty examination to
        decide that the gap could only be held by a force larger than he
        had at his disposal and was wholly indefensible by a small one.
        Lee was so informed, and Hill ordered up G. B. Anderson’s Brigade
        and proceeded to form a defensive line. Considering that the foot
        of the gap was not the proper place to defend it, he brought
        Colquitt’s Brigade back near the summit and ordered it in line of
        battle on either side of the National Road, three regiments on
        the right and two on the left. Having posted Colquitt across the
        road, he then rode to the right on a ridge road to reconnoiter
        and, much to his surprise, found Rosser with the 5th Virginia
        Cavalry and two guns of Pelham’s Battery guarding Fox’s Gap on
        the Old Sharpsburg Road. Rosser had been ordered to that point by
        Stuart, who had not informed Hill of the fact, nor had Rosser
        been told that he would have infantry support. While here, Hill
        became convinced that there were movements of troops on the
        mountainside below, screened from view by the forest. At the foot
        of the mountain, Cox’s men could be seen advancing.
        “This was a menacing condition of affairs, and Hill
        took measures to meet it. He rode back to the Mountain House and
        found Garland prepared for action. That gallant and enterprising
        officer had heard the report of a gun on the right front and the
        hurtling of a shell and put his brigade under arms. Hill
        explained the situation to him and ordered him to sweep through
        the woods on the right to the Old Sharpsburg Road and hold it at
        all hazards, as the safety of Lee’s large train depended upon its
        retention. He had already ordered up G. B. Anderson to assist
        Colquitt and Garland, but was reluctant to order up Ripley or
        Brigadier General Robert E. Rodes from the important points held
        by them near Boonsboro until something definite was known of the
        strength and designs of the Union advance.
        “From the National Road at the Mountain House (where
        Garland was drawn up), a rough road runs southerly, first on the
        east slope and then along the crest of the mountain nearly a
        mile, when it is intersected at right angles by a road diverging
        from the National Road about a mile west of Middletown. (This
        road was followed by Major General Edward Braddock in his march
        on Fort Duquesne in 1755 and for many years was known as the
        Braddock Road; later it became known as the Old Sharpsburg Road.)
        The point where this road intersects the road on the crest of the
        mountain is generally known as Fox’s (sometimes as Braddock’s)
        Gap.
        “About three-quarters of a mile beyond Fox’s Gap, another road
        reaches the mountaintop and connects with the crest road. This
        road branches from the Old Sharpsburg Road at the foot of the
        mountain, runs southerly some distance along
        its base, and reaches the crest by a northwest course. From Fox’s
        Gap the road runs southerly for a half-mile, then follows the
        trend of the mountain westerly a quarter of a mile and intersects
        the road reaching the crest by the northwest course. At the point
        of this intersection on the crest, several wagon roads and trails
        lead down the west side of the mountain into the valley south of
        Boonsboro. West of the crest road there is a slight depression,
        beyond which are spurs and ridges covered by a dense forest. In
        front of Fox’s Gap, and between it and the road farther south, is
        a plateau of open ground. (At the time, some was wheat stubble,
        some in corn, and some in grass.) The ground sloping eastward
        from this plateau was open and under cultivation, and heavy stone
        fences separated many of the fields.” [pp. 145–146]

        “Upon the fall of Garland, the command passed to Colonel McRae.
        As soon as he saw the condition of affairs and had become
        convinced of the enemy’s determination to turn both his flanks,
        he notified D. H. Hill that the force at his disposal was wholly
        inadequate to hold the position. Very soon thereafter Colonel
        Charles C. Tew, with the 2d and 4th North Carolina of G. B
        Anderson’s Brigade, reported to McRae. The units were about to
        take position on the immediate left of the 13th North Carolina
        when Tew received an order from Anderson to move off to the left.
        Hill was advised of this movement and of the wide gap made in the
        line, and McRae, believing that his division commander would
        immediately respond by sending troops to fill it, ordered the
        13th North Carolina to follow Tew to the left and keep connection
        with him in anticipation
        of their arrival. McRae then rode to the right, intending (if
        time allowed) to move the 5th North Carolina to the left and with
        it fill the vacant space in the line, but found that, under a
        previous order given by him, this regiment had already been
        advanced into the field on the right of the 23d North Carolina,
        and it was then dangerous to withdraw it.” [p. 147]

        “G. B. Anderson, whose movement across Ripley’s front caused the
        latter’s withdrawal, was not so remiss in duty. After he had
        moved by the right flank some distance down the Old Sharpsburg
        Road, he recognized the fact that he was moving
        far away from his enemy and, without prompting, faced to the left
        and moved up the mountain. He had the 2d, 4th, and 30th North
        Carolina of his own brigade and the 13th North Carolina of
        Garland’s. (The 14th North Carolina had become detached earlier
        in the day and had fallen in with Ripley.) It was an arduous
        march up a mountainside covered with huge boulders, laurel
        thickets, and tangled vines. When the top was reached, it was at
        the crest road and some distance beyond Cox’s left. Finding
        nothing in his immediate front, he sent the 2d and 4th North
        Carolina to reconnoiter. Captain Edwin A. Osborne, commanding the
        skirmishers of the 4th, on coming to the open ground on the left
        saw Clark’s battery and its infantry support all facing nearly
        north. He hastened back to his regimental commander and told him
        that they could deliver a flank fire upon the infantry support
        before it could change position to meet them. Upon which, the 2d,
        4th, and 13th
        North Carolina were marched along the ridge road to the left
        until they came to a dense cornfield on the right of the road,
        where they saw the guns and the infantry in support. An instant
        charge was ordered. The North Carolinians sprang out of the
        laurel thicket and over the fence into the open—at the moment
        that the 89th New York, its left in the corn, was just coming
        into position on the left of its brigade. The 89th New York and
        the battery opened fire, and the North Carolinians were quickly
        repulsed with great loss and fell back into the woods, leaving
        their dead, wounded, thirty prisoners, and 150 stand of arms in
        the hands of the 89th, which had but one wing engaged and lost
        two killed and eighteen wounded. The 9th and 103d New York
        reported no casualties. It was now sunset, and the fighting on
        the left was over.” [p. 154]

        “The [ANVa’s] train, save the wagons captured by Colonel Davis,
        crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. Later, Colonel Millican,
        with the 15th and 17th Georgia, came up and took charge of the
        train and added the 11th Georgia to his command. The rations
        cooked for D. H. Hill’s men near Boonsboro on the night of the
        fourteenth were given them on the field of Sharpsburg on
        September 17.” [p. 170]

        “The three brigades of Garland, Ripley, and G. B. Anderson, in
        the order named, moved on by-roads from the Old Sharpsburg Road
        to the vicinity of Boonsboro, then followed Rodes on the
        Boonsboro and Sharpsburg Pike to Keedysville, where they were
        halted an hour, then, continuing the march, crossed the Antietam
        between daybreak and sunrise and formed line on the high ground a
        short mile beyond the stream and north of the Boonsboro Pike. D.
        H. Hill, who accompanied the three brigades, placed the right of
        his line (G. B. Anderson) on the Boonsboro Pike, Ripley’s Brigade
        a short distance to
        the rear, and Garland’s Brigade (now commanded by Colonel McRea
        of the 5th North Carolina) on the high ground and in the sunken
        road (now known as Bloody Lane), with its left resting on the
        lane running north from the sunken road to the Roulette house.
        Rodes and Colquitt were now brought back from beyond the town and
        placed on the line, Rodes on a plateau on the right of Garland
        and at right angles to it. In his immediate rear was the Piper
        cornfield. ‘Here,’ says Rodes, ‘subsisting on green corn mainly
        and under an occasional artillery fire, we lay until the morning
        of the 17th.’ Colquitt took position on Garland’s left in the
        sunken road, between the mouth of the Roulette lane and the
        Hagerstown Pike. The brigades of G. B. Anderson, Ripley, and
        Rodes faced the Antietam and the east.” [pp. 171 – 172]

        “‘On the 5th, when crossing the Potomac …, I received a very
        severe hurt from the kick of a horse, which incapacitated me from
        active duty, not being able to either walk or ride, but had
        myself carried in an ambulance in anticipation and hopes of a
        speedy recovery … On the 14th of September …, I had myself placed
        upon my horse and took the command of my regiment … Here my horse
        was killed under me on the mountain and to my own and the
        surprise of my command I commanded my troops in the battle until
        nightfall, when I threw myself down to rest by my brigade
        commander, Gen. G. B. Anderson, who seeing me so exhausted after
        the excitement of the day, insisted upon my going to the rear,
        and called up four litter bearers and had me carried to the
        hospital.’ Bryan Grimes, Extracts of Letters of Major-Gen’l Bryan
        Grimes to His Wife: Written While in Active Service in the Army
        of Northern Virginia; Together with Some Personal Recollections
        of the
        War, Written by Him After Its Close, etc., comp. Pulaski Cowper
        (Raleigh, N.C.: Edwards, Broughton & Co., 1883), 19–20.” [p. 431]


        ----- Original Message ----
        From: G E Mayers <gerry1952@...>
        To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
        Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 8:54:12 PM
        Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

        Dear Jake;

        I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the
        First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we
        are in this group, concentrating on the unit level with the
        Fourth NC (The Bloody Fourth) and then the larger command level
        with Longstreet and Army HQ.

        Where I've run into a little dilemma is knowing where Anderson's
        brigade was positioned _after_ it was on the Old Sharpsburg Road
        to do a grand wheel back UP South Mountain to take the Federals
        in the flank and later, when it was determined to abandon the
        mountain, which route or routes Anderson's Brigade retreated
        towards Sharpsburg.

        Can you search your Carman MS and, under separate email, provide
        whatever information he might have? (Or, post here, if not
        terribly, terribly long and lengthy!)

        Thank you!

        Yr. Obt. Svt.
        G E "Gerry" Mayers

        To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
        on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
        Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
        the Almighty God. --Anonymous
        ----- Original Message -----
        From: "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@ yahoo.com>
        To: <TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com>
        Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 7:09 PM
        Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

        Dean:

        Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
        were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
        Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at
        Sharpsburg.

        from Carman:

        "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14,
        realized
        that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he
        abandoned
        (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the
        North
        into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
        immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
        into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign
        of
        disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in
        failure,
        but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00
        p.m.,
        he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
        "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by
        Sharpsburg
        and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
        your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road
        to
        cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite
        with
        this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward
        officers
        to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac,
        and
        if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave
        Shepherdstown
        Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
        Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take.
        You
        will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
        "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to
        march
        up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
        Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson
        contemplated
        the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these
        had
        so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the
        grasp of
        Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to
        push
        such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
        across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
        battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
        were ordered to move-two battalions by Williamsport into
        Virginia,
        one battalion to Keedysville. "

        It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore
        afterwards
        for so long because the operational and tactical situation
        remained
        in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
        attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th?
        Would
        McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back,
        the
        last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and
        reserve
        artillery clogging the only route of escape.

        Carman again:
        "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
        artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late
        in
        the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek,
        four
        miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
        and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to
        move
        with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
        Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the
        river.
        Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the
        Boonsboro
        and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's
        Cross-Roads,
        where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and
        Sharpsburg
        Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union
        cavalry
        was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in
        position
        commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown
        Pike
        on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to
        Sharpsburg)
        for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a
        band
        of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent
        out
        scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the
        road
        was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
        infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the
        'retiring
        invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
        proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
        Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
        train, and Pendleton-without meeting an enemy or further delay-
        reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
        Virginia.
        "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was
        ordered
        to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
        battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
        Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
        position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile
        below
        town."

        In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
        artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
        again:

        "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
        Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown
        Ford: 'If
        you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which
        you
        can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a
        sufficiency
        of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential
        to
        their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about
        there
        and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns,
        and
        provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent
        up
        but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had
        closed
        that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

        Hope some of that helps.

        --jake
        --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "dean_essig"
        <dean_essig@ ...>
        wrote:
        >
        > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of
        > the
        various artillery units.
        >
        > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the
        > Va
        side, but he hadn't ruled
        > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union
        > right
        wing to Hagerstown.
        >
        > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible,
        > but
        allowing the trains to
        > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of
        > sense.
        >
        > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is
        > breathtakingly
        fearless.
        >
        > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens"
        > <clemenst@>
        wrote:
        > >
        > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was
        > > using
        the river to protect his
        > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport.
        > Even
        after he retreated on the
        > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
        towards Hagerstown.
        > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
        infantry to move quickly. As
        > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford
        > and
        Light's Ford, and
        > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
        > >
        > >
        > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
        > > Professor of History
        > > Hagerstown Community College
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@ > 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
        > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
        > >
        > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the
        > > map.
        > >
        > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I
        > > don't
        recall Reilly (who at least
        > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they
        > > had
        to ford the Potomac
        > to
        > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
        suggests that what stocks
        > they
        > > had available were in the Md side trains.
        > >
        > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across
        > > the
        river.
        > >
        > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections
        > > about
        the rather mundane
        > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
        > >
        > > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens"
        > > <clemenst@>
        wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Dean,
        > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is
        > > > just
        fine. I think you have
        > it
        > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains,
        > > such
        as they were with the loss
        > of
        > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
        think some of it was
        > forwarded
        > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
        resupply. Going from
        > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes
        > > it
        as 1 & 1/4 miles from
        > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on
        > > Mt.
        Airy, the Grove family
        > farm.
        > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and
        > > lots
        of fields to park a
        > wagon
        > > train there.
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
        > > > Professor of History
        > > > Hagerstown Community College
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@ > 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
        > > > Thomas,
        > > >
        > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but
        > > > one
        matter.
        > > >
        > > > What we know:
        > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
        there at various dates.
        > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could
        > > > get
        some food.
        > > >
        > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md
        > > > and
        positioned "2 miles to
        > > the
        > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but
        > > > w/o a
        reference as to rear of
        > > what
        > > > or who).
        > > >
        > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
        > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in
        > > > Virgina?
        Harsh believes so.
        > > >
        > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were
        > > > sent
        back into Md? This is
        > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve
        > > > Trains
        across the river to avoid
        > > > losing artillery ammunition.
        > > >
        > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
        unknowns?
        > > >
        > > > Dean
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens"
        <clemenst@> wrote:
        > > > >
        > > > > Dean,
        > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken
        > > > > at
        the Flood, pp. 338-9
        > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp.
        > > > 193-
        4. Let me know if you
        > > do
        > > > not have access to those books.
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
        > > > > Professor of History
        > > > > Hagerstown Community College
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@ > 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
        > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
        > > > >
        > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean
        > > > > feat),
        if I can impose (and
        > > when
        > > > you
        > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but
        > > > > ammo"
        exception.
        > > > >
        > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by
        > > > > the
        time this project is
        > done
        > > > :-)
        > > > >
        > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll
        > > > > want
        a copy of a product that
        > > has
        > > > your
        > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
        > > > >
        > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@ yahoogroups. com, "Thomas Clemens"
        <clemenst@> wrote:
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Dean,
        > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
        understanding that all trains
        > > except
        > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
        food, had to go find his
        > and
        > > > bring
        > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found
        > > > > theirs
        near Sharpsburg.
        > > > Longstreet'
        > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not
        > > > > all
        of his trains.
        > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game?
        > > > > > :-)
        just kidding, I don't have
        > > time
        > > > to
        > > > > play them.
        > > > >
        > > >
        > >
        >





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