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Re: ANVa Supply Trains

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  • joseph_pierro
    Dean: Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted) were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at Williamsport even before he
    Message 1 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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      Dean:

      Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
      were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
      Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at Sharpsburg.


      from Carman:

      "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14, realized
      that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he abandoned
      (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the North
      into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
      immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
      into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign of
      disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in failure,
      but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00 p.m.,
      he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
      "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg
      and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
      your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to
      cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with
      this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers
      to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, and
      if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
      Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
      Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take. You
      will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
      "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to march
      up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
      Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson contemplated
      the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these had
      so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the grasp of
      Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to push
      such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
      across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
      battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
      were ordered to move—two battalions by Williamsport into Virginia,
      one battalion to Keedysville."

      It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore afterwards
      for so long because the operational and tactical situation remained
      in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
      attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th? Would
      McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back, the
      last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and reserve
      artillery clogging the only route of escape.

      Carman again:
      "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
      artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late in
      the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek, four
      miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
      and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to move
      with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
      Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the river.
      Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the Boonsboro
      and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's Cross-Roads,
      where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg
      Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union cavalry
      was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in position
      commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown Pike
      on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to Sharpsburg)
      for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a band
      of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent out
      scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the road
      was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
      infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the 'retiring
      invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
      proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
      Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
      train, and Pendleton—without meeting an enemy or further delay—
      reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
      Virginia.
      "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was ordered
      to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
      battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
      Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
      position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile below
      town."

      In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
      artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
      again:

      "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
      Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown Ford: 'If
      you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which you
      can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a sufficiency
      of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential to
      their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about there
      and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns, and
      provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent up
      but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had closed
      that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

      Hope some of that helps.

      --jake
      --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...>
      wrote:
      >
      > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the
      various artillery units.
      >
      > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
      side, but he hadn't ruled
      > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right
      wing to Hagerstown.
      >
      > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but
      allowing the trains to
      > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.
      >
      > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly
      fearless.
      >
      > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
      wrote:
      > >
      > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using
      the river to protect his
      > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
      after he retreated on the
      > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
      towards Hagerstown.
      > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
      infantry to move quickly. As
      > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and
      Light's Ford, and
      > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
      > >
      > >
      > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
      > > Professor of History
      > > Hagerstown Community College
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
      > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
      > >
      > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
      > >
      > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
      recall Reilly (who at least
      > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
      to ford the Potomac
      > to
      > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
      suggests that what stocks
      > they
      > > had available were in the Md side trains.
      > >
      > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
      river.
      > >
      > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
      the rather mundane
      > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
      > >
      > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
      wrote:
      > > >
      > > > Dean,
      > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
      fine. I think you have
      > it
      > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
      as they were with the loss
      > of
      > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
      think some of it was
      > forwarded
      > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
      resupply. Going from
      > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
      as 1 & 1/4 miles from
      > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
      Airy, the Grove family
      > farm.
      > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
      of fields to park a
      > wagon
      > > train there.
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
      > > > Professor of History
      > > > Hagerstown Community College
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
      > > > Thomas,
      > > >
      > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
      matter.
      > > >
      > > > What we know:
      > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
      there at various dates.
      > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
      some food.
      > > >
      > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
      positioned "2 miles to
      > > the
      > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
      reference as to rear of
      > > what
      > > > or who).
      > > >
      > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
      > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
      Harsh believes so.
      > > >
      > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
      back into Md? This is
      > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
      across the river to avoid
      > > > losing artillery ammunition.
      > > >
      > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
      unknowns?
      > > >
      > > > Dean
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
      <clemenst@> wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > > Dean,
      > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
      the Flood, pp. 338-9
      > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-
      4. Let me know if you
      > > do
      > > > not have access to those books.
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
      > > > > Professor of History
      > > > > Hagerstown Community College
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
      > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
      > > > >
      > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
      if I can impose (and
      > > when
      > > > you
      > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
      exception.
      > > > >
      > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
      time this project is
      > done
      > > > :-)
      > > > >
      > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
      a copy of a product that
      > > has
      > > > your
      > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
      > > > >
      > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
      <clemenst@> wrote:
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Dean,
      > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
      understanding that all trains
      > > except
      > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
      food, had to go find his
      > and
      > > > bring
      > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
      near Sharpsburg.
      > > > Longstreet'
      > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
      of his trains.
      > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
      just kidding, I don't have
      > > time
      > > > to
      > > > > play them.
      > > > >
      > > >
      > >
      >
    • dean_essig
      Thanks Jake! That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in
      Message 2 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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        Thanks Jake!

        That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
        maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
        (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.

        As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2 Co,
        Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
        17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.

        Dean

        --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@...> wrote:
        >
        > Dean:
        >
        > Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
        > were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
        > Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at Sharpsburg.
        >
        >
        > from Carman:
        >
        > "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14, realized
        > that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he abandoned
        > (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the North
        > into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
        > immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
        > into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign of
        > disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in failure,
        > but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00 p.m.,
        > he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
        > "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg
        > and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
        > your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to
        > cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with
        > this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers
        > to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, and
        > if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
        > Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
        > Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take. You
        > will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
        > "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to march
        > up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
        > Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson contemplated
        > the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these had
        > so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the grasp of
        > Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to push
        > such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
        > across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
        > battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
        > were ordered to move—two battalions by Williamsport into Virginia,
        > one battalion to Keedysville."
        >
        > It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore afterwards
        > for so long because the operational and tactical situation remained
        > in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
        > attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th? Would
        > McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back, the
        > last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and reserve
        > artillery clogging the only route of escape.
        >
        > Carman again:
        > "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
        > artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late in
        > the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek, four
        > miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
        > and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to move
        > with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
        > Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the river.
        > Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the Boonsboro
        > and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's Cross-Roads,
        > where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg
        > Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union cavalry
        > was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in position
        > commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown Pike
        > on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to Sharpsburg)
        > for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a band
        > of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent out
        > scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the road
        > was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
        > infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the 'retiring
        > invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
        > proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
        > Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
        > train, and Pendleton—without meeting an enemy or further delay—
        > reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
        > Virginia.
        > "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was ordered
        > to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
        > battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
        > Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
        > position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile below
        > town."
        >
        > In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
        > artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
        > again:
        >
        > "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
        > Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown Ford: 'If
        > you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which you
        > can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a sufficiency
        > of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential to
        > their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about there
        > and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns, and
        > provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent up
        > but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had closed
        > that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."
        >
        > Hope some of that helps.
        >
        > --jake
        > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig" <dean_essig@>
        > wrote:
        > >
        > > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the
        > various artillery units.
        > >
        > > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
        > side, but he hadn't ruled
        > > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right
        > wing to Hagerstown.
        > >
        > > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but
        > allowing the trains to
        > > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.
        > >
        > > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly
        > fearless.
        > >
        > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
        > wrote:
        > > >
        > > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using
        > the river to protect his
        > > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
        > after he retreated on the
        > > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
        > towards Hagerstown.
        > > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
        > infantry to move quickly. As
        > > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and
        > Light's Ford, and
        > > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
        > > > Professor of History
        > > > Hagerstown Community College
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
        > > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
        > > >
        > > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
        > > >
        > > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
        > recall Reilly (who at least
        > > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
        > to ford the Potomac
        > > to
        > > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
        > suggests that what stocks
        > > they
        > > > had available were in the Md side trains.
        > > >
        > > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
        > river.
        > > >
        > > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
        > the rather mundane
        > > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
        > > >
        > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
        > wrote:
        > > > >
        > > > > Dean,
        > > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
        > fine. I think you have
        > > it
        > > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
        > as they were with the loss
        > > of
        > > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
        > think some of it was
        > > forwarded
        > > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
        > resupply. Going from
        > > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
        > as 1 & 1/4 miles from
        > > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
        > Airy, the Grove family
        > > farm.
        > > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
        > of fields to park a
        > > wagon
        > > > train there.
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
        > > > > Professor of History
        > > > > Hagerstown Community College
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
        > > > > Thomas,
        > > > >
        > > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
        > matter.
        > > > >
        > > > > What we know:
        > > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
        > there at various dates.
        > > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
        > some food.
        > > > >
        > > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
        > positioned "2 miles to
        > > > the
        > > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
        > reference as to rear of
        > > > what
        > > > > or who).
        > > > >
        > > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
        > > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
        > Harsh believes so.
        > > > >
        > > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
        > back into Md? This is
        > > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
        > across the river to avoid
        > > > > losing artillery ammunition.
        > > > >
        > > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
        > unknowns?
        > > > >
        > > > > Dean
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
        > <clemenst@> wrote:
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Dean,
        > > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
        > the Flood, pp. 338-9
        > > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-
        > 4. Let me know if you
        > > > do
        > > > > not have access to those books.
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
        > > > > > Professor of History
        > > > > > Hagerstown Community College
        > > > > >
        > > > > >
        > > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
        > > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
        > > > > >
        > > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
        > if I can impose (and
        > > > when
        > > > > you
        > > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
        > exception.
        > > > > >
        > > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
        > time this project is
        > > done
        > > > > :-)
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
        > a copy of a product that
        > > > has
        > > > > your
        > > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
        > > > > >
        > > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
        > <clemenst@> wrote:
        > > > > > >
        > > > > > > Dean,
        > > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
        > understanding that all trains
        > > > except
        > > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
        > food, had to go find his
        > > and
        > > > > bring
        > > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
        > near Sharpsburg.
        > > > > Longstreet'
        > > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
        > of his trains.
        > > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
        > just kidding, I don't have
        > > > time
        > > > > to
        > > > > > play them.
        > > > > >
        > > > >
        > > >
        > >
        >
      • Joseph Pierro
        Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered across. Lee s first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the
        Message 3 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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          Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered across. Lee's first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the order to McLaws shows) was to break off the entire campaign and retreat to Md. (After all, in a withdrawal, you send the trains first and keep the infantry in the rear -- the closest proximity to the pursuing enemy -- to conduct a fighting retreat. Recall Lee's similar orders regarding Imboden on the withdrawal from Gettysburg the following year.)

          It was only when he realized that McClellan wasn't pressing the advantage, and when word arrived of the fall of Harper's Ferry, that he decided to hold position with his infantry on the east bank of the Potomac and accept battle.

          As for the rest, given the fact that Pendleton had nearly three days to rest and refit his command, you have to wonder how it was that he managed to contribute next to nothing (no offense to Watson's Battery intended) on the day of the battle.

          In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single instance where Pendleton, as chief of artillery, ever HELPED anyone (other than the Army of the Potomac) on a battlefield.

          --jake
          ----- Original Message ----
          From: dean_essig <dean_essig@...>
          To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
          Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 7:25:52 PM
          Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

          Thanks Jake!

          That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
          maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
          (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.

          As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2 Co,
          Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
          17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.

          Dean

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        • dean_essig
          Excellent post Jake and I agree fully! Pendleton sure does have an interesting relationship with the good functioning of the ANVa. Amazing that Lee put up with
          Message 4 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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            Excellent post Jake and I agree fully!

            Pendleton sure does have an interesting relationship with the good functioning of the
            ANVa. Amazing that Lee put up with it.

            --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Pierro <joseph_pierro@...> wrote:
            >
            > Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered
            across. Lee's first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the order to McLaws
            shows) was to break off the entire campaign and retreat to Md. (After all, in a withdrawal,
            you send the trains first and keep the infantry in the rear -- the closest proximity to the
            pursuing enemy -- to conduct a fighting retreat. Recall Lee's similar orders regarding
            Imboden on the withdrawal from Gettysburg the following year.)
            >
            > It was only when he realized that McClellan wasn't pressing the advantage, and when
            word arrived of the fall of Harper's Ferry, that he decided to hold position with his infantry
            on the east bank of the Potomac and accept battle.
            >
            > As for the rest, given the fact that Pendleton had nearly three days to rest and refit his
            command, you have to wonder how it was that he managed to contribute next to nothing
            (no offense to Watson's Battery intended) on the day of the battle.
            >
            > In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single instance where Pendleton, as chief of
            artillery, ever HELPED anyone (other than the Army of the Potomac) on a battlefield.
            >
            > --jake
            > ----- Original Message ----
            > From: dean_essig <dean_essig@...>
            > To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
            > Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 7:25:52 PM
            > Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains
            >
            > Thanks Jake!
            >
            > That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
            > maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
            > (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.
            >
            > As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2
            Co,
            > Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
            > 17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.
            >
            > Dean
            >
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          • G E Mayers
            Dear Jake; I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we are in this
            Message 5 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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              Dear Jake;

              I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the
              First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we
              are in this group, concentrating on the unit level with the
              Fourth NC (The Bloody Fourth) and then the larger command level
              with Longstreet and Army HQ.

              Where I've run into a little dilemma is knowing where Anderson's
              brigade was positioned _after_ it was on the Old Sharpsburg Road
              to do a grand wheel back UP South Mountain to take the Federals
              in the flank and later, when it was determined to abandon the
              mountain, which route or routes Anderson's Brigade retreated
              towards Sharpsburg.

              Can you search your Carman MS and, under separate email, provide
              whatever information he might have? (Or, post here, if not
              terribly, terribly long and lengthy!)

              Thank you!

              Yr. Obt. Svt.
              G E "Gerry" Mayers

              To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
              on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
              Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
              the Almighty God. --Anonymous
              ----- Original Message -----
              From: "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@...>
              To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
              Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 7:09 PM
              Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains


              Dean:

              Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
              were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
              Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at
              Sharpsburg.


              from Carman:

              "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14,
              realized
              that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he
              abandoned
              (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the
              North
              into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
              immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
              into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign
              of
              disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in
              failure,
              but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00
              p.m.,
              he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
              "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by
              Sharpsburg
              and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
              your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road
              to
              cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite
              with
              this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward
              officers
              to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac,
              and
              if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave
              Shepherdstown
              Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
              Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take.
              You
              will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
              "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to
              march
              up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
              Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson
              contemplated
              the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these
              had
              so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the
              grasp of
              Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to
              push
              such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
              across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
              battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
              were ordered to move-two battalions by Williamsport into
              Virginia,
              one battalion to Keedysville."

              It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore
              afterwards
              for so long because the operational and tactical situation
              remained
              in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
              attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th?
              Would
              McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back,
              the
              last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and
              reserve
              artillery clogging the only route of escape.

              Carman again:
              "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
              artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late
              in
              the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek,
              four
              miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
              and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to
              move
              with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
              Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the
              river.
              Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the
              Boonsboro
              and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's
              Cross-Roads,
              where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and
              Sharpsburg
              Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union
              cavalry
              was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in
              position
              commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown
              Pike
              on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to
              Sharpsburg)
              for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a
              band
              of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent
              out
              scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the
              road
              was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
              infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the
              'retiring
              invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
              proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
              Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
              train, and Pendleton-without meeting an enemy or further delay-
              reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
              Virginia.
              "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was
              ordered
              to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
              battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
              Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
              position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile
              below
              town."

              In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
              artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
              again:

              "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
              Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown
              Ford: 'If
              you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which
              you
              can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a
              sufficiency
              of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential
              to
              their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about
              there
              and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns,
              and
              provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent
              up
              but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had
              closed
              that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

              Hope some of that helps.

              --jake
              --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig"
              <dean_essig@...>
              wrote:
              >
              > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of
              > the
              various artillery units.
              >
              > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the
              > Va
              side, but he hadn't ruled
              > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union
              > right
              wing to Hagerstown.
              >
              > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible,
              > but
              allowing the trains to
              > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of
              > sense.
              >
              > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is
              > breathtakingly
              fearless.
              >
              > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
              > <clemenst@>
              wrote:
              > >
              > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was
              > > using
              the river to protect his
              > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport.
              > Even
              after he retreated on the
              > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
              towards Hagerstown.
              > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
              infantry to move quickly. As
              > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford
              > and
              Light's Ford, and
              > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
              > >
              > >
              > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
              > > Professor of History
              > > Hagerstown Community College
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
              > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
              > >
              > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the
              > > map.
              > >
              > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I
              > > don't
              recall Reilly (who at least
              > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they
              > > had
              to ford the Potomac
              > to
              > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
              suggests that what stocks
              > they
              > > had available were in the Md side trains.
              > >
              > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across
              > > the
              river.
              > >
              > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections
              > > about
              the rather mundane
              > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
              > >
              > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
              > > <clemenst@>
              wrote:
              > > >
              > > > Dean,
              > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is
              > > > just
              fine. I think you have
              > it
              > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains,
              > > such
              as they were with the loss
              > of
              > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
              think some of it was
              > forwarded
              > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
              resupply. Going from
              > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes
              > > it
              as 1 & 1/4 miles from
              > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on
              > > Mt.
              Airy, the Grove family
              > farm.
              > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and
              > > lots
              of fields to park a
              > wagon
              > > train there.
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
              > > > Professor of History
              > > > Hagerstown Community College
              > > >
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
              > > > Thomas,
              > > >
              > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but
              > > > one
              matter.
              > > >
              > > > What we know:
              > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
              there at various dates.
              > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could
              > > > get
              some food.
              > > >
              > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md
              > > > and
              positioned "2 miles to
              > > the
              > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but
              > > > w/o a
              reference as to rear of
              > > what
              > > > or who).
              > > >
              > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
              > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in
              > > > Virgina?
              Harsh believes so.
              > > >
              > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were
              > > > sent
              back into Md? This is
              > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve
              > > > Trains
              across the river to avoid
              > > > losing artillery ammunition.
              > > >
              > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
              unknowns?
              > > >
              > > > Dean
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
              <clemenst@> wrote:
              > > > >
              > > > > Dean,
              > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken
              > > > > at
              the Flood, pp. 338-9
              > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp.
              > > > 193-
              4. Let me know if you
              > > do
              > > > not have access to those books.
              > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
              > > > > Professor of History
              > > > > Hagerstown Community College
              > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
              > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
              > > > >
              > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean
              > > > > feat),
              if I can impose (and
              > > when
              > > > you
              > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but
              > > > > ammo"
              exception.
              > > > >
              > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by
              > > > > the
              time this project is
              > done
              > > > :-)
              > > > >
              > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll
              > > > > want
              a copy of a product that
              > > has
              > > > your
              > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
              > > > >
              > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
              <clemenst@> wrote:
              > > > > >
              > > > > > Dean,
              > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
              understanding that all trains
              > > except
              > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
              food, had to go find his
              > and
              > > > bring
              > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found
              > > > > theirs
              near Sharpsburg.
              > > > Longstreet'
              > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not
              > > > > all
              of his trains.
              > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game?
              > > > > > :-)
              just kidding, I don't have
              > > time
              > > > to
              > > > > play them.
              > > > >
              > > >
              > >
              >
            • Thomas Clemens
              Dean, A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not definitely show any location of the ammunition reserve trains. sorry. Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
              Message 6 of 21 , Feb 2, 2008
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                Dean,
                A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not definitely show any location of the ammunition reserve trains. sorry.

                Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                Professor of History
                Hagerstown Community College


                >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 02/01/08 2:24 PM >>>
                Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!

                Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.

                The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
                mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
                get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks they
                had available were in the Md side trains.

                Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.

                Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
                matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
              • Dean Essig
                Tom, Thanks for looking. It looks like the issue might be moot for me anyway, Mt Airy is off my map area (very similar to the Carmen-Cope maps) to the SW, so
                Message 7 of 21 , Feb 2, 2008
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                  Tom,

                  Thanks for looking. It looks like the issue might be
                  moot for me anyway, Mt Airy is off my map area (very
                  similar to the Carmen-Cope maps) to the SW, so guns
                  looking to reload will have to shoot off the map there
                  (with an explanation of when they come back). Since
                  they are already going off the map, whether the trains
                  are at Mt Airy, Shepherdstown, or Boetler's matters
                  little... it will be a while in real time before they
                  come back.

                  Dean

                  --- Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...> wrote:

                  > Dean,
                  > A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not
                  > definitely show any location of the ammunition
                  > reserve trains. sorry.
                  >
                  > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                  > Professor of History
                  > Hagerstown Community College
                  >
                  >
                  > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 02/01/08
                  > 2:24 PM >>>
                  > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
                  >
                  > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains
                  > on the map.
                  >
                  > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to
                  > resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
                  > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else
                  > suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
                  > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this
                  > indirectly suggests that what stocks they
                  > had available were in the Md side trains.
                  >
                  > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting
                  > across the river.
                  >
                  > Do you know of any other battery commanders
                  > recollections about the rather mundane
                  > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > Yahoo! Groups Links
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >



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