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Re: ANVa Supply Trains

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  • dean_essig
    Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the various artillery units. Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
    Message 1 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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      Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the various artillery units.

      Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va side, but he hadn't ruled
      out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right wing to Hagerstown.

      Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but allowing the trains to
      shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.

      Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly fearless.

      --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
      >
      > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using the river to protect his
      trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even after he retreated on the
      18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move towards Hagerstown.
      Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his infantry to move quickly. As
      you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and Light's Ford, and
      Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
      >
      >
      > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
      > Professor of History
      > Hagerstown Community College
      >
      >
      >
      > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
      > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
      >
      > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
      >
      > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
      > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac
      to
      > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks
      they
      > had available were in the Md side trains.
      >
      > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.
      >
      > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
      > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
      >
      > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
      > >
      > > Dean,
      > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just fine. I think you have
      it
      > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such as they were with the loss
      of
      > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I think some of it was
      forwarded
      > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo resupply. Going from
      > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it as 1 & 1/4 miles from
      > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt. Airy, the Grove family
      farm.
      > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots of fields to park a
      wagon
      > train there.
      > >
      > >
      > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
      > > Professor of History
      > > Hagerstown Community College
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
      > > Thomas,
      > >
      > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one matter.
      > >
      > > What we know:
      > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting there at various dates.
      > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get some food.
      > >
      > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and positioned "2 miles to
      > the
      > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a reference as to rear of
      > what
      > > or who).
      > >
      > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
      > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina? Harsh believes so.
      > >
      > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent back into Md? This is
      > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains across the river to avoid
      > > losing artillery ammunition.
      > >
      > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the unknowns?
      > >
      > > Dean
      > >
      > >
      > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > Dean,
      > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at the Flood, pp. 338-9
      > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-4. Let me know if you
      > do
      > > not have access to those books.
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
      > > > Professor of History
      > > > Hagerstown Community College
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
      > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
      > > >
      > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat), if I can impose (and
      > when
      > > you
      > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo" exception.
      > > >
      > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the time this project is
      done
      > > :-)
      > > >
      > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want a copy of a product that
      > has
      > > your
      > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
      > > >
      > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
      > > > >
      > > > > Dean,
      > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my understanding that all trains
      > except
      > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for food, had to go find his
      and
      > > bring
      > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs near Sharpsburg.
      > > Longstreet'
      > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all of his trains.
      > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-) just kidding, I don't have
      > time
      > > to
      > > > play them.
      > > >
      > >
      >
    • joseph_pierro
      Dean: Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted) were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at Williamsport even before he
      Message 2 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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        Dean:

        Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
        were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
        Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at Sharpsburg.


        from Carman:

        "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14, realized
        that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he abandoned
        (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the North
        into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
        immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
        into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign of
        disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in failure,
        but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00 p.m.,
        he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
        "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg
        and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
        your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to
        cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with
        this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers
        to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, and
        if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
        Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
        Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take. You
        will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
        "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to march
        up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
        Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson contemplated
        the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these had
        so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the grasp of
        Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to push
        such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
        across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
        battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
        were ordered to move—two battalions by Williamsport into Virginia,
        one battalion to Keedysville."

        It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore afterwards
        for so long because the operational and tactical situation remained
        in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
        attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th? Would
        McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back, the
        last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and reserve
        artillery clogging the only route of escape.

        Carman again:
        "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
        artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late in
        the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek, four
        miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
        and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to move
        with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
        Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the river.
        Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the Boonsboro
        and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's Cross-Roads,
        where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg
        Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union cavalry
        was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in position
        commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown Pike
        on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to Sharpsburg)
        for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a band
        of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent out
        scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the road
        was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
        infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the 'retiring
        invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
        proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
        Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
        train, and Pendleton—without meeting an enemy or further delay—
        reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
        Virginia.
        "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was ordered
        to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
        battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
        Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
        position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile below
        town."

        In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
        artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
        again:

        "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
        Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown Ford: 'If
        you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which you
        can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a sufficiency
        of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential to
        their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about there
        and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns, and
        provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent up
        but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had closed
        that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

        Hope some of that helps.

        --jake
        --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...>
        wrote:
        >
        > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the
        various artillery units.
        >
        > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
        side, but he hadn't ruled
        > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right
        wing to Hagerstown.
        >
        > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but
        allowing the trains to
        > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.
        >
        > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly
        fearless.
        >
        > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
        wrote:
        > >
        > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using
        the river to protect his
        > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
        after he retreated on the
        > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
        towards Hagerstown.
        > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
        infantry to move quickly. As
        > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and
        Light's Ford, and
        > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
        > >
        > >
        > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
        > > Professor of History
        > > Hagerstown Community College
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
        > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
        > >
        > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
        > >
        > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
        recall Reilly (who at least
        > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
        to ford the Potomac
        > to
        > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
        suggests that what stocks
        > they
        > > had available were in the Md side trains.
        > >
        > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
        river.
        > >
        > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
        the rather mundane
        > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
        > >
        > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
        wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Dean,
        > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
        fine. I think you have
        > it
        > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
        as they were with the loss
        > of
        > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
        think some of it was
        > forwarded
        > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
        resupply. Going from
        > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
        as 1 & 1/4 miles from
        > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
        Airy, the Grove family
        > farm.
        > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
        of fields to park a
        > wagon
        > > train there.
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
        > > > Professor of History
        > > > Hagerstown Community College
        > > >
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
        > > > Thomas,
        > > >
        > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
        matter.
        > > >
        > > > What we know:
        > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
        there at various dates.
        > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
        some food.
        > > >
        > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
        positioned "2 miles to
        > > the
        > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
        reference as to rear of
        > > what
        > > > or who).
        > > >
        > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
        > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
        Harsh believes so.
        > > >
        > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
        back into Md? This is
        > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
        across the river to avoid
        > > > losing artillery ammunition.
        > > >
        > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
        unknowns?
        > > >
        > > > Dean
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
        <clemenst@> wrote:
        > > > >
        > > > > Dean,
        > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
        the Flood, pp. 338-9
        > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-
        4. Let me know if you
        > > do
        > > > not have access to those books.
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
        > > > > Professor of History
        > > > > Hagerstown Community College
        > > > >
        > > > >
        > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
        > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
        > > > >
        > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
        if I can impose (and
        > > when
        > > > you
        > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
        exception.
        > > > >
        > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
        time this project is
        > done
        > > > :-)
        > > > >
        > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
        a copy of a product that
        > > has
        > > > your
        > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
        > > > >
        > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
        <clemenst@> wrote:
        > > > > >
        > > > > > Dean,
        > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
        understanding that all trains
        > > except
        > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
        food, had to go find his
        > and
        > > > bring
        > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
        near Sharpsburg.
        > > > Longstreet'
        > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
        of his trains.
        > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
        just kidding, I don't have
        > > time
        > > > to
        > > > > play them.
        > > > >
        > > >
        > >
        >
      • dean_essig
        Thanks Jake! That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in
        Message 3 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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          Thanks Jake!

          That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
          maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
          (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.

          As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2 Co,
          Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
          17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.

          Dean

          --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@...> wrote:
          >
          > Dean:
          >
          > Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
          > were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
          > Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at Sharpsburg.
          >
          >
          > from Carman:
          >
          > "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14, realized
          > that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he abandoned
          > (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the North
          > into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
          > immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
          > into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign of
          > disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in failure,
          > but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00 p.m.,
          > he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
          > "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg
          > and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
          > your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to
          > cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with
          > this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers
          > to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, and
          > if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
          > Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
          > Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take. You
          > will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
          > "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to march
          > up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
          > Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson contemplated
          > the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these had
          > so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the grasp of
          > Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to push
          > such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
          > across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
          > battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
          > were ordered to move—two battalions by Williamsport into Virginia,
          > one battalion to Keedysville."
          >
          > It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore afterwards
          > for so long because the operational and tactical situation remained
          > in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
          > attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th? Would
          > McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back, the
          > last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and reserve
          > artillery clogging the only route of escape.
          >
          > Carman again:
          > "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
          > artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late in
          > the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek, four
          > miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
          > and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to move
          > with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
          > Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the river.
          > Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the Boonsboro
          > and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's Cross-Roads,
          > where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg
          > Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union cavalry
          > was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in position
          > commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown Pike
          > on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to Sharpsburg)
          > for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a band
          > of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent out
          > scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the road
          > was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
          > infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the 'retiring
          > invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
          > proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
          > Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
          > train, and Pendleton—without meeting an enemy or further delay—
          > reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
          > Virginia.
          > "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was ordered
          > to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
          > battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
          > Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
          > position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile below
          > town."
          >
          > In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
          > artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
          > again:
          >
          > "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
          > Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown Ford: 'If
          > you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which you
          > can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a sufficiency
          > of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential to
          > their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about there
          > and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns, and
          > provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent up
          > but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had closed
          > that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."
          >
          > Hope some of that helps.
          >
          > --jake
          > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig" <dean_essig@>
          > wrote:
          > >
          > > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the
          > various artillery units.
          > >
          > > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
          > side, but he hadn't ruled
          > > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right
          > wing to Hagerstown.
          > >
          > > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but
          > allowing the trains to
          > > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.
          > >
          > > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly
          > fearless.
          > >
          > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
          > wrote:
          > > >
          > > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using
          > the river to protect his
          > > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
          > after he retreated on the
          > > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
          > towards Hagerstown.
          > > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
          > infantry to move quickly. As
          > > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and
          > Light's Ford, and
          > > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
          > > > Professor of History
          > > > Hagerstown Community College
          > > >
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
          > > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
          > > >
          > > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
          > > >
          > > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
          > recall Reilly (who at least
          > > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
          > to ford the Potomac
          > > to
          > > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
          > suggests that what stocks
          > > they
          > > > had available were in the Md side trains.
          > > >
          > > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
          > river.
          > > >
          > > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
          > the rather mundane
          > > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
          > > >
          > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
          > wrote:
          > > > >
          > > > > Dean,
          > > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
          > fine. I think you have
          > > it
          > > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
          > as they were with the loss
          > > of
          > > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
          > think some of it was
          > > forwarded
          > > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
          > resupply. Going from
          > > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
          > as 1 & 1/4 miles from
          > > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
          > Airy, the Grove family
          > > farm.
          > > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
          > of fields to park a
          > > wagon
          > > > train there.
          > > > >
          > > > >
          > > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
          > > > > Professor of History
          > > > > Hagerstown Community College
          > > > >
          > > > >
          > > > >
          > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
          > > > > Thomas,
          > > > >
          > > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
          > matter.
          > > > >
          > > > > What we know:
          > > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
          > there at various dates.
          > > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
          > some food.
          > > > >
          > > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
          > positioned "2 miles to
          > > > the
          > > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
          > reference as to rear of
          > > > what
          > > > > or who).
          > > > >
          > > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
          > > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
          > Harsh believes so.
          > > > >
          > > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
          > back into Md? This is
          > > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
          > across the river to avoid
          > > > > losing artillery ammunition.
          > > > >
          > > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
          > unknowns?
          > > > >
          > > > > Dean
          > > > >
          > > > >
          > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
          > <clemenst@> wrote:
          > > > > >
          > > > > > Dean,
          > > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
          > the Flood, pp. 338-9
          > > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-
          > 4. Let me know if you
          > > > do
          > > > > not have access to those books.
          > > > > >
          > > > > >
          > > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
          > > > > > Professor of History
          > > > > > Hagerstown Community College
          > > > > >
          > > > > >
          > > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
          > > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
          > > > > >
          > > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
          > if I can impose (and
          > > > when
          > > > > you
          > > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
          > exception.
          > > > > >
          > > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
          > time this project is
          > > done
          > > > > :-)
          > > > > >
          > > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
          > a copy of a product that
          > > > has
          > > > > your
          > > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
          > > > > >
          > > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
          > <clemenst@> wrote:
          > > > > > >
          > > > > > > Dean,
          > > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
          > understanding that all trains
          > > > except
          > > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
          > food, had to go find his
          > > and
          > > > > bring
          > > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
          > near Sharpsburg.
          > > > > Longstreet'
          > > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
          > of his trains.
          > > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
          > just kidding, I don't have
          > > > time
          > > > > to
          > > > > > play them.
          > > > > >
          > > > >
          > > >
          > >
          >
        • Joseph Pierro
          Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered across. Lee s first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the
          Message 4 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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            Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered across. Lee's first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the order to McLaws shows) was to break off the entire campaign and retreat to Md. (After all, in a withdrawal, you send the trains first and keep the infantry in the rear -- the closest proximity to the pursuing enemy -- to conduct a fighting retreat. Recall Lee's similar orders regarding Imboden on the withdrawal from Gettysburg the following year.)

            It was only when he realized that McClellan wasn't pressing the advantage, and when word arrived of the fall of Harper's Ferry, that he decided to hold position with his infantry on the east bank of the Potomac and accept battle.

            As for the rest, given the fact that Pendleton had nearly three days to rest and refit his command, you have to wonder how it was that he managed to contribute next to nothing (no offense to Watson's Battery intended) on the day of the battle.

            In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single instance where Pendleton, as chief of artillery, ever HELPED anyone (other than the Army of the Potomac) on a battlefield.

            --jake
            ----- Original Message ----
            From: dean_essig <dean_essig@...>
            To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
            Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 7:25:52 PM
            Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

            Thanks Jake!

            That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
            maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
            (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.

            As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2 Co,
            Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
            17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.

            Dean

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          • dean_essig
            Excellent post Jake and I agree fully! Pendleton sure does have an interesting relationship with the good functioning of the ANVa. Amazing that Lee put up with
            Message 5 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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              Excellent post Jake and I agree fully!

              Pendleton sure does have an interesting relationship with the good functioning of the
              ANVa. Amazing that Lee put up with it.

              --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Pierro <joseph_pierro@...> wrote:
              >
              > Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered
              across. Lee's first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the order to McLaws
              shows) was to break off the entire campaign and retreat to Md. (After all, in a withdrawal,
              you send the trains first and keep the infantry in the rear -- the closest proximity to the
              pursuing enemy -- to conduct a fighting retreat. Recall Lee's similar orders regarding
              Imboden on the withdrawal from Gettysburg the following year.)
              >
              > It was only when he realized that McClellan wasn't pressing the advantage, and when
              word arrived of the fall of Harper's Ferry, that he decided to hold position with his infantry
              on the east bank of the Potomac and accept battle.
              >
              > As for the rest, given the fact that Pendleton had nearly three days to rest and refit his
              command, you have to wonder how it was that he managed to contribute next to nothing
              (no offense to Watson's Battery intended) on the day of the battle.
              >
              > In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single instance where Pendleton, as chief of
              artillery, ever HELPED anyone (other than the Army of the Potomac) on a battlefield.
              >
              > --jake
              > ----- Original Message ----
              > From: dean_essig <dean_essig@...>
              > To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
              > Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 7:25:52 PM
              > Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains
              >
              > Thanks Jake!
              >
              > That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
              > maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
              > (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.
              >
              > As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2
              Co,
              > Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
              > 17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.
              >
              > Dean
              >
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            • G E Mayers
              Dear Jake; I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we are in this
              Message 6 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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                Dear Jake;

                I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the
                First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we
                are in this group, concentrating on the unit level with the
                Fourth NC (The Bloody Fourth) and then the larger command level
                with Longstreet and Army HQ.

                Where I've run into a little dilemma is knowing where Anderson's
                brigade was positioned _after_ it was on the Old Sharpsburg Road
                to do a grand wheel back UP South Mountain to take the Federals
                in the flank and later, when it was determined to abandon the
                mountain, which route or routes Anderson's Brigade retreated
                towards Sharpsburg.

                Can you search your Carman MS and, under separate email, provide
                whatever information he might have? (Or, post here, if not
                terribly, terribly long and lengthy!)

                Thank you!

                Yr. Obt. Svt.
                G E "Gerry" Mayers

                To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
                on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
                Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
                the Almighty God. --Anonymous
                ----- Original Message -----
                From: "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@...>
                To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 7:09 PM
                Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains


                Dean:

                Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
                were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
                Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at
                Sharpsburg.


                from Carman:

                "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14,
                realized
                that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he
                abandoned
                (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the
                North
                into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
                immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
                into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign
                of
                disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in
                failure,
                but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00
                p.m.,
                he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
                "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by
                Sharpsburg
                and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
                your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road
                to
                cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite
                with
                this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward
                officers
                to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac,
                and
                if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave
                Shepherdstown
                Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
                Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take.
                You
                will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
                "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to
                march
                up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
                Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson
                contemplated
                the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these
                had
                so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the
                grasp of
                Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to
                push
                such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
                across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
                battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
                were ordered to move-two battalions by Williamsport into
                Virginia,
                one battalion to Keedysville."

                It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore
                afterwards
                for so long because the operational and tactical situation
                remained
                in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
                attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th?
                Would
                McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back,
                the
                last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and
                reserve
                artillery clogging the only route of escape.

                Carman again:
                "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
                artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late
                in
                the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek,
                four
                miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
                and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to
                move
                with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
                Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the
                river.
                Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the
                Boonsboro
                and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's
                Cross-Roads,
                where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and
                Sharpsburg
                Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union
                cavalry
                was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in
                position
                commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown
                Pike
                on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to
                Sharpsburg)
                for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a
                band
                of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent
                out
                scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the
                road
                was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
                infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the
                'retiring
                invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
                proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
                Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
                train, and Pendleton-without meeting an enemy or further delay-
                reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
                Virginia.
                "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was
                ordered
                to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
                battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
                Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
                position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile
                below
                town."

                In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
                artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
                again:

                "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
                Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown
                Ford: 'If
                you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which
                you
                can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a
                sufficiency
                of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential
                to
                their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about
                there
                and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns,
                and
                provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent
                up
                but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had
                closed
                that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

                Hope some of that helps.

                --jake
                --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig"
                <dean_essig@...>
                wrote:
                >
                > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of
                > the
                various artillery units.
                >
                > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the
                > Va
                side, but he hadn't ruled
                > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union
                > right
                wing to Hagerstown.
                >
                > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible,
                > but
                allowing the trains to
                > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of
                > sense.
                >
                > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is
                > breathtakingly
                fearless.
                >
                > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                > <clemenst@>
                wrote:
                > >
                > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was
                > > using
                the river to protect his
                > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport.
                > Even
                after he retreated on the
                > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
                towards Hagerstown.
                > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
                infantry to move quickly. As
                > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford
                > and
                Light's Ford, and
                > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
                > >
                > >
                > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
                > > Professor of History
                > > Hagerstown Community College
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
                > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
                > >
                > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the
                > > map.
                > >
                > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I
                > > don't
                recall Reilly (who at least
                > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they
                > > had
                to ford the Potomac
                > to
                > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
                suggests that what stocks
                > they
                > > had available were in the Md side trains.
                > >
                > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across
                > > the
                river.
                > >
                > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections
                > > about
                the rather mundane
                > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                > >
                > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                > > <clemenst@>
                wrote:
                > > >
                > > > Dean,
                > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is
                > > > just
                fine. I think you have
                > it
                > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains,
                > > such
                as they were with the loss
                > of
                > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
                think some of it was
                > forwarded
                > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
                resupply. Going from
                > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes
                > > it
                as 1 & 1/4 miles from
                > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on
                > > Mt.
                Airy, the Grove family
                > farm.
                > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and
                > > lots
                of fields to park a
                > wagon
                > > train there.
                > > >
                > > >
                > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
                > > > Professor of History
                > > > Hagerstown Community College
                > > >
                > > >
                > > >
                > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
                > > > Thomas,
                > > >
                > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but
                > > > one
                matter.
                > > >
                > > > What we know:
                > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
                there at various dates.
                > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could
                > > > get
                some food.
                > > >
                > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md
                > > > and
                positioned "2 miles to
                > > the
                > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but
                > > > w/o a
                reference as to rear of
                > > what
                > > > or who).
                > > >
                > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
                > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in
                > > > Virgina?
                Harsh believes so.
                > > >
                > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were
                > > > sent
                back into Md? This is
                > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve
                > > > Trains
                across the river to avoid
                > > > losing artillery ammunition.
                > > >
                > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
                unknowns?
                > > >
                > > > Dean
                > > >
                > > >
                > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                <clemenst@> wrote:
                > > > >
                > > > > Dean,
                > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken
                > > > > at
                the Flood, pp. 338-9
                > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp.
                > > > 193-
                4. Let me know if you
                > > do
                > > > not have access to those books.
                > > > >
                > > > >
                > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                > > > > Professor of History
                > > > > Hagerstown Community College
                > > > >
                > > > >
                > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
                > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
                > > > >
                > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean
                > > > > feat),
                if I can impose (and
                > > when
                > > > you
                > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but
                > > > > ammo"
                exception.
                > > > >
                > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by
                > > > > the
                time this project is
                > done
                > > > :-)
                > > > >
                > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll
                > > > > want
                a copy of a product that
                > > has
                > > > your
                > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
                > > > >
                > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                <clemenst@> wrote:
                > > > > >
                > > > > > Dean,
                > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
                understanding that all trains
                > > except
                > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
                food, had to go find his
                > and
                > > > bring
                > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found
                > > > > theirs
                near Sharpsburg.
                > > > Longstreet'
                > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not
                > > > > all
                of his trains.
                > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game?
                > > > > > :-)
                just kidding, I don't have
                > > time
                > > > to
                > > > > play them.
                > > > >
                > > >
                > >
                >
              • Thomas Clemens
                Dean, A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not definitely show any location of the ammunition reserve trains. sorry. Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                Message 7 of 21 , Feb 2, 2008
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                  Dean,
                  A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not definitely show any location of the ammunition reserve trains. sorry.

                  Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                  Professor of History
                  Hagerstown Community College


                  >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 02/01/08 2:24 PM >>>
                  Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!

                  Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.

                  The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
                  mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
                  get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks they
                  had available were in the Md side trains.

                  Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.

                  Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
                  matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                • Dean Essig
                  Tom, Thanks for looking. It looks like the issue might be moot for me anyway, Mt Airy is off my map area (very similar to the Carmen-Cope maps) to the SW, so
                  Message 8 of 21 , Feb 2, 2008
                  • 0 Attachment
                    Tom,

                    Thanks for looking. It looks like the issue might be
                    moot for me anyway, Mt Airy is off my map area (very
                    similar to the Carmen-Cope maps) to the SW, so guns
                    looking to reload will have to shoot off the map there
                    (with an explanation of when they come back). Since
                    they are already going off the map, whether the trains
                    are at Mt Airy, Shepherdstown, or Boetler's matters
                    little... it will be a while in real time before they
                    come back.

                    Dean

                    --- Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...> wrote:

                    > Dean,
                    > A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not
                    > definitely show any location of the ammunition
                    > reserve trains. sorry.
                    >
                    > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                    > Professor of History
                    > Hagerstown Community College
                    >
                    >
                    > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 02/01/08
                    > 2:24 PM >>>
                    > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
                    >
                    > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains
                    > on the map.
                    >
                    > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to
                    > resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
                    > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else
                    > suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
                    > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this
                    > indirectly suggests that what stocks they
                    > had available were in the Md side trains.
                    >
                    > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting
                    > across the river.
                    >
                    > Do you know of any other battery commanders
                    > recollections about the rather mundane
                    > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    > Yahoo! Groups Links
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >
                    >



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