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RE: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

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  • bdowney@aotw.org
    Thanks Tom - I was just going to pop on the same theme. I think this is really a key perception most people _do not_ have about the Campaign. As late as the
    Message 1 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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      Thanks Tom - I was just going to pop on the same theme.

      I think this is really a key perception most people _do not_ have about the Campaign. As late as the first week of October Lee was still corresponding with management (Richmond) and elsewhere (Loring, e.g.) to determine the possibility of returning to Maryland. He abandoned the idea only reluctantly, and later than I would have thought rational (in perfect hindsight).

      Much of Pendleton's reserve artillery was scattered on 15-18 Sept covering fords and crossings for that purpose. They gave Lee offensive options, not just a secure back door.

      Cool stuff.

      > -------- Original Message --------
      > Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains
      > From: "G E Mayers" <gerry1952@...>
      > Date: Fri, February 01, 2008 2:29 pm
      > To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
      >
      > Dean;
      >
      > Some of the artillery was left at Williamsport and some was left
      > near Shepherdstown. Shepherdstown also was where the hospitals,
      > etc were.
      >
      > He was also protecting his only retreat route.
      >
      > Yr. Obt. Svt.
      > G E "Gerry" Mayers
      >
    • dean_essig
      Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the various artillery units. Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
      Message 2 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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        Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the various artillery units.

        Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va side, but he hadn't ruled
        out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right wing to Hagerstown.

        Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but allowing the trains to
        shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.

        Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly fearless.

        --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
        >
        > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using the river to protect his
        trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even after he retreated on the
        18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move towards Hagerstown.
        Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his infantry to move quickly. As
        you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and Light's Ford, and
        Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
        >
        >
        > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
        > Professor of History
        > Hagerstown Community College
        >
        >
        >
        > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
        > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
        >
        > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
        >
        > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
        > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac
        to
        > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks
        they
        > had available were in the Md side trains.
        >
        > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.
        >
        > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
        > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
        >
        > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
        > >
        > > Dean,
        > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just fine. I think you have
        it
        > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such as they were with the loss
        of
        > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I think some of it was
        forwarded
        > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo resupply. Going from
        > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it as 1 & 1/4 miles from
        > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt. Airy, the Grove family
        farm.
        > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots of fields to park a
        wagon
        > train there.
        > >
        > >
        > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
        > > Professor of History
        > > Hagerstown Community College
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
        > > Thomas,
        > >
        > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one matter.
        > >
        > > What we know:
        > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting there at various dates.
        > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get some food.
        > >
        > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and positioned "2 miles to
        > the
        > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a reference as to rear of
        > what
        > > or who).
        > >
        > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
        > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina? Harsh believes so.
        > >
        > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent back into Md? This is
        > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains across the river to avoid
        > > losing artillery ammunition.
        > >
        > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the unknowns?
        > >
        > > Dean
        > >
        > >
        > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Dean,
        > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at the Flood, pp. 338-9
        > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-4. Let me know if you
        > do
        > > not have access to those books.
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
        > > > Professor of History
        > > > Hagerstown Community College
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
        > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
        > > >
        > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat), if I can impose (and
        > when
        > > you
        > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo" exception.
        > > >
        > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the time this project is
        done
        > > :-)
        > > >
        > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want a copy of a product that
        > has
        > > your
        > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
        > > >
        > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
        > > > >
        > > > > Dean,
        > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my understanding that all trains
        > except
        > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for food, had to go find his
        and
        > > bring
        > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs near Sharpsburg.
        > > Longstreet'
        > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all of his trains.
        > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-) just kidding, I don't have
        > time
        > > to
        > > > play them.
        > > >
        > >
        >
      • joseph_pierro
        Dean: Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted) were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at Williamsport even before he
        Message 3 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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          Dean:

          Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
          were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
          Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at Sharpsburg.


          from Carman:

          "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14, realized
          that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he abandoned
          (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the North
          into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
          immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
          into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign of
          disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in failure,
          but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00 p.m.,
          he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
          "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg
          and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
          your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to
          cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with
          this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers
          to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, and
          if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
          Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
          Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take. You
          will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
          "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to march
          up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
          Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson contemplated
          the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these had
          so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the grasp of
          Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to push
          such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
          across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
          battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
          were ordered to move—two battalions by Williamsport into Virginia,
          one battalion to Keedysville."

          It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore afterwards
          for so long because the operational and tactical situation remained
          in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
          attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th? Would
          McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back, the
          last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and reserve
          artillery clogging the only route of escape.

          Carman again:
          "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
          artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late in
          the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek, four
          miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
          and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to move
          with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
          Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the river.
          Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the Boonsboro
          and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's Cross-Roads,
          where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg
          Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union cavalry
          was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in position
          commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown Pike
          on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to Sharpsburg)
          for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a band
          of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent out
          scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the road
          was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
          infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the 'retiring
          invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
          proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
          Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
          train, and Pendleton—without meeting an enemy or further delay—
          reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
          Virginia.
          "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was ordered
          to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
          battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
          Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
          position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile below
          town."

          In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
          artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
          again:

          "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
          Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown Ford: 'If
          you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which you
          can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a sufficiency
          of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential to
          their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about there
          and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns, and
          provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent up
          but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had closed
          that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

          Hope some of that helps.

          --jake
          --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...>
          wrote:
          >
          > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the
          various artillery units.
          >
          > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
          side, but he hadn't ruled
          > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right
          wing to Hagerstown.
          >
          > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but
          allowing the trains to
          > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.
          >
          > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly
          fearless.
          >
          > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
          wrote:
          > >
          > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using
          the river to protect his
          > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
          after he retreated on the
          > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
          towards Hagerstown.
          > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
          infantry to move quickly. As
          > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and
          Light's Ford, and
          > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
          > >
          > >
          > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
          > > Professor of History
          > > Hagerstown Community College
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
          > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
          > >
          > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
          > >
          > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
          recall Reilly (who at least
          > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
          to ford the Potomac
          > to
          > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
          suggests that what stocks
          > they
          > > had available were in the Md side trains.
          > >
          > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
          river.
          > >
          > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
          the rather mundane
          > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
          > >
          > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
          wrote:
          > > >
          > > > Dean,
          > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
          fine. I think you have
          > it
          > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
          as they were with the loss
          > of
          > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
          think some of it was
          > forwarded
          > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
          resupply. Going from
          > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
          as 1 & 1/4 miles from
          > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
          Airy, the Grove family
          > farm.
          > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
          of fields to park a
          > wagon
          > > train there.
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
          > > > Professor of History
          > > > Hagerstown Community College
          > > >
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
          > > > Thomas,
          > > >
          > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
          matter.
          > > >
          > > > What we know:
          > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
          there at various dates.
          > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
          some food.
          > > >
          > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
          positioned "2 miles to
          > > the
          > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
          reference as to rear of
          > > what
          > > > or who).
          > > >
          > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
          > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
          Harsh believes so.
          > > >
          > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
          back into Md? This is
          > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
          across the river to avoid
          > > > losing artillery ammunition.
          > > >
          > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
          unknowns?
          > > >
          > > > Dean
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
          <clemenst@> wrote:
          > > > >
          > > > > Dean,
          > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
          the Flood, pp. 338-9
          > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-
          4. Let me know if you
          > > do
          > > > not have access to those books.
          > > > >
          > > > >
          > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
          > > > > Professor of History
          > > > > Hagerstown Community College
          > > > >
          > > > >
          > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
          > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
          > > > >
          > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
          if I can impose (and
          > > when
          > > > you
          > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
          exception.
          > > > >
          > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
          time this project is
          > done
          > > > :-)
          > > > >
          > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
          a copy of a product that
          > > has
          > > > your
          > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
          > > > >
          > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
          <clemenst@> wrote:
          > > > > >
          > > > > > Dean,
          > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
          understanding that all trains
          > > except
          > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
          food, had to go find his
          > and
          > > > bring
          > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
          near Sharpsburg.
          > > > Longstreet'
          > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
          of his trains.
          > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
          just kidding, I don't have
          > > time
          > > > to
          > > > > play them.
          > > > >
          > > >
          > >
          >
        • dean_essig
          Thanks Jake! That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in
          Message 4 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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            Thanks Jake!

            That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
            maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
            (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.

            As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2 Co,
            Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
            17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.

            Dean

            --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@...> wrote:
            >
            > Dean:
            >
            > Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
            > were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
            > Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at Sharpsburg.
            >
            >
            > from Carman:
            >
            > "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14, realized
            > that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he abandoned
            > (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the North
            > into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
            > immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
            > into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign of
            > disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in failure,
            > but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00 p.m.,
            > he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
            > "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg
            > and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
            > your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to
            > cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with
            > this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers
            > to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, and
            > if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
            > Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
            > Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take. You
            > will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
            > "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to march
            > up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
            > Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson contemplated
            > the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these had
            > so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the grasp of
            > Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to push
            > such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
            > across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
            > battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
            > were ordered to move—two battalions by Williamsport into Virginia,
            > one battalion to Keedysville."
            >
            > It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore afterwards
            > for so long because the operational and tactical situation remained
            > in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
            > attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th? Would
            > McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back, the
            > last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and reserve
            > artillery clogging the only route of escape.
            >
            > Carman again:
            > "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
            > artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late in
            > the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek, four
            > miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
            > and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to move
            > with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
            > Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the river.
            > Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the Boonsboro
            > and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's Cross-Roads,
            > where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg
            > Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union cavalry
            > was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in position
            > commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown Pike
            > on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to Sharpsburg)
            > for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a band
            > of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent out
            > scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the road
            > was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
            > infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the 'retiring
            > invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
            > proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
            > Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
            > train, and Pendleton—without meeting an enemy or further delay—
            > reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
            > Virginia.
            > "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was ordered
            > to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
            > battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
            > Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
            > position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile below
            > town."
            >
            > In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
            > artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
            > again:
            >
            > "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
            > Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown Ford: 'If
            > you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which you
            > can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a sufficiency
            > of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential to
            > their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about there
            > and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns, and
            > provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent up
            > but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had closed
            > that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."
            >
            > Hope some of that helps.
            >
            > --jake
            > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig" <dean_essig@>
            > wrote:
            > >
            > > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the
            > various artillery units.
            > >
            > > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
            > side, but he hadn't ruled
            > > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right
            > wing to Hagerstown.
            > >
            > > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but
            > allowing the trains to
            > > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.
            > >
            > > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly
            > fearless.
            > >
            > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
            > wrote:
            > > >
            > > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using
            > the river to protect his
            > > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
            > after he retreated on the
            > > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
            > towards Hagerstown.
            > > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
            > infantry to move quickly. As
            > > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and
            > Light's Ford, and
            > > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
            > > >
            > > >
            > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
            > > > Professor of History
            > > > Hagerstown Community College
            > > >
            > > >
            > > >
            > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
            > > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
            > > >
            > > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
            > > >
            > > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
            > recall Reilly (who at least
            > > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
            > to ford the Potomac
            > > to
            > > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
            > suggests that what stocks
            > > they
            > > > had available were in the Md side trains.
            > > >
            > > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
            > river.
            > > >
            > > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
            > the rather mundane
            > > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
            > > >
            > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
            > wrote:
            > > > >
            > > > > Dean,
            > > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
            > fine. I think you have
            > > it
            > > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
            > as they were with the loss
            > > of
            > > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
            > think some of it was
            > > forwarded
            > > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
            > resupply. Going from
            > > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
            > as 1 & 1/4 miles from
            > > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
            > Airy, the Grove family
            > > farm.
            > > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
            > of fields to park a
            > > wagon
            > > > train there.
            > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
            > > > > Professor of History
            > > > > Hagerstown Community College
            > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
            > > > > Thomas,
            > > > >
            > > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
            > matter.
            > > > >
            > > > > What we know:
            > > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
            > there at various dates.
            > > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
            > some food.
            > > > >
            > > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
            > positioned "2 miles to
            > > > the
            > > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
            > reference as to rear of
            > > > what
            > > > > or who).
            > > > >
            > > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
            > > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
            > Harsh believes so.
            > > > >
            > > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
            > back into Md? This is
            > > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
            > across the river to avoid
            > > > > losing artillery ammunition.
            > > > >
            > > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
            > unknowns?
            > > > >
            > > > > Dean
            > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
            > <clemenst@> wrote:
            > > > > >
            > > > > > Dean,
            > > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
            > the Flood, pp. 338-9
            > > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-
            > 4. Let me know if you
            > > > do
            > > > > not have access to those books.
            > > > > >
            > > > > >
            > > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
            > > > > > Professor of History
            > > > > > Hagerstown Community College
            > > > > >
            > > > > >
            > > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
            > > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
            > > > > >
            > > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
            > if I can impose (and
            > > > when
            > > > > you
            > > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
            > exception.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
            > time this project is
            > > done
            > > > > :-)
            > > > > >
            > > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
            > a copy of a product that
            > > > has
            > > > > your
            > > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
            > > > > >
            > > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
            > <clemenst@> wrote:
            > > > > > >
            > > > > > > Dean,
            > > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
            > understanding that all trains
            > > > except
            > > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
            > food, had to go find his
            > > and
            > > > > bring
            > > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
            > near Sharpsburg.
            > > > > Longstreet'
            > > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
            > of his trains.
            > > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
            > just kidding, I don't have
            > > > time
            > > > > to
            > > > > > play them.
            > > > > >
            > > > >
            > > >
            > >
            >
          • Joseph Pierro
            Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered across. Lee s first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the
            Message 5 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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              Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered across. Lee's first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the order to McLaws shows) was to break off the entire campaign and retreat to Md. (After all, in a withdrawal, you send the trains first and keep the infantry in the rear -- the closest proximity to the pursuing enemy -- to conduct a fighting retreat. Recall Lee's similar orders regarding Imboden on the withdrawal from Gettysburg the following year.)

              It was only when he realized that McClellan wasn't pressing the advantage, and when word arrived of the fall of Harper's Ferry, that he decided to hold position with his infantry on the east bank of the Potomac and accept battle.

              As for the rest, given the fact that Pendleton had nearly three days to rest and refit his command, you have to wonder how it was that he managed to contribute next to nothing (no offense to Watson's Battery intended) on the day of the battle.

              In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single instance where Pendleton, as chief of artillery, ever HELPED anyone (other than the Army of the Potomac) on a battlefield.

              --jake
              ----- Original Message ----
              From: dean_essig <dean_essig@...>
              To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
              Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 7:25:52 PM
              Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

              Thanks Jake!

              That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
              maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
              (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.

              As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2 Co,
              Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
              17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.

              Dean

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            • dean_essig
              Excellent post Jake and I agree fully! Pendleton sure does have an interesting relationship with the good functioning of the ANVa. Amazing that Lee put up with
              Message 6 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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                Excellent post Jake and I agree fully!

                Pendleton sure does have an interesting relationship with the good functioning of the
                ANVa. Amazing that Lee put up with it.

                --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Pierro <joseph_pierro@...> wrote:
                >
                > Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered
                across. Lee's first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the order to McLaws
                shows) was to break off the entire campaign and retreat to Md. (After all, in a withdrawal,
                you send the trains first and keep the infantry in the rear -- the closest proximity to the
                pursuing enemy -- to conduct a fighting retreat. Recall Lee's similar orders regarding
                Imboden on the withdrawal from Gettysburg the following year.)
                >
                > It was only when he realized that McClellan wasn't pressing the advantage, and when
                word arrived of the fall of Harper's Ferry, that he decided to hold position with his infantry
                on the east bank of the Potomac and accept battle.
                >
                > As for the rest, given the fact that Pendleton had nearly three days to rest and refit his
                command, you have to wonder how it was that he managed to contribute next to nothing
                (no offense to Watson's Battery intended) on the day of the battle.
                >
                > In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single instance where Pendleton, as chief of
                artillery, ever HELPED anyone (other than the Army of the Potomac) on a battlefield.
                >
                > --jake
                > ----- Original Message ----
                > From: dean_essig <dean_essig@...>
                > To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
                > Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 7:25:52 PM
                > Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains
                >
                > Thanks Jake!
                >
                > That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
                > maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
                > (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.
                >
                > As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2
                Co,
                > Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
                > 17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.
                >
                > Dean
                >
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              • G E Mayers
                Dear Jake; I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we are in this
                Message 7 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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                  Dear Jake;

                  I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the
                  First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we
                  are in this group, concentrating on the unit level with the
                  Fourth NC (The Bloody Fourth) and then the larger command level
                  with Longstreet and Army HQ.

                  Where I've run into a little dilemma is knowing where Anderson's
                  brigade was positioned _after_ it was on the Old Sharpsburg Road
                  to do a grand wheel back UP South Mountain to take the Federals
                  in the flank and later, when it was determined to abandon the
                  mountain, which route or routes Anderson's Brigade retreated
                  towards Sharpsburg.

                  Can you search your Carman MS and, under separate email, provide
                  whatever information he might have? (Or, post here, if not
                  terribly, terribly long and lengthy!)

                  Thank you!

                  Yr. Obt. Svt.
                  G E "Gerry" Mayers

                  To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
                  on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
                  Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
                  the Almighty God. --Anonymous
                  ----- Original Message -----
                  From: "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@...>
                  To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                  Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 7:09 PM
                  Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains


                  Dean:

                  Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
                  were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
                  Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at
                  Sharpsburg.


                  from Carman:

                  "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14,
                  realized
                  that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he
                  abandoned
                  (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the
                  North
                  into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
                  immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
                  into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign
                  of
                  disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in
                  failure,
                  but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00
                  p.m.,
                  he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
                  "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by
                  Sharpsburg
                  and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
                  your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road
                  to
                  cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite
                  with
                  this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward
                  officers
                  to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac,
                  and
                  if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave
                  Shepherdstown
                  Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
                  Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take.
                  You
                  will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
                  "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to
                  march
                  up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
                  Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson
                  contemplated
                  the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these
                  had
                  so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the
                  grasp of
                  Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to
                  push
                  such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
                  across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
                  battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
                  were ordered to move-two battalions by Williamsport into
                  Virginia,
                  one battalion to Keedysville."

                  It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore
                  afterwards
                  for so long because the operational and tactical situation
                  remained
                  in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
                  attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th?
                  Would
                  McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back,
                  the
                  last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and
                  reserve
                  artillery clogging the only route of escape.

                  Carman again:
                  "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
                  artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late
                  in
                  the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek,
                  four
                  miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
                  and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to
                  move
                  with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
                  Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the
                  river.
                  Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the
                  Boonsboro
                  and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's
                  Cross-Roads,
                  where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and
                  Sharpsburg
                  Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union
                  cavalry
                  was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in
                  position
                  commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown
                  Pike
                  on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to
                  Sharpsburg)
                  for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a
                  band
                  of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent
                  out
                  scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the
                  road
                  was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
                  infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the
                  'retiring
                  invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
                  proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
                  Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
                  train, and Pendleton-without meeting an enemy or further delay-
                  reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
                  Virginia.
                  "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was
                  ordered
                  to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
                  battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
                  Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
                  position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile
                  below
                  town."

                  In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
                  artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
                  again:

                  "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
                  Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown
                  Ford: 'If
                  you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which
                  you
                  can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a
                  sufficiency
                  of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential
                  to
                  their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about
                  there
                  and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns,
                  and
                  provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent
                  up
                  but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had
                  closed
                  that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

                  Hope some of that helps.

                  --jake
                  --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig"
                  <dean_essig@...>
                  wrote:
                  >
                  > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of
                  > the
                  various artillery units.
                  >
                  > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the
                  > Va
                  side, but he hadn't ruled
                  > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union
                  > right
                  wing to Hagerstown.
                  >
                  > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible,
                  > but
                  allowing the trains to
                  > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of
                  > sense.
                  >
                  > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is
                  > breathtakingly
                  fearless.
                  >
                  > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                  > <clemenst@>
                  wrote:
                  > >
                  > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was
                  > > using
                  the river to protect his
                  > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport.
                  > Even
                  after he retreated on the
                  > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
                  towards Hagerstown.
                  > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
                  infantry to move quickly. As
                  > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford
                  > and
                  Light's Ford, and
                  > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
                  > > Professor of History
                  > > Hagerstown Community College
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
                  > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
                  > >
                  > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the
                  > > map.
                  > >
                  > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I
                  > > don't
                  recall Reilly (who at least
                  > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they
                  > > had
                  to ford the Potomac
                  > to
                  > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
                  suggests that what stocks
                  > they
                  > > had available were in the Md side trains.
                  > >
                  > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across
                  > > the
                  river.
                  > >
                  > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections
                  > > about
                  the rather mundane
                  > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                  > >
                  > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                  > > <clemenst@>
                  wrote:
                  > > >
                  > > > Dean,
                  > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is
                  > > > just
                  fine. I think you have
                  > it
                  > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains,
                  > > such
                  as they were with the loss
                  > of
                  > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
                  think some of it was
                  > forwarded
                  > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
                  resupply. Going from
                  > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes
                  > > it
                  as 1 & 1/4 miles from
                  > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on
                  > > Mt.
                  Airy, the Grove family
                  > farm.
                  > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and
                  > > lots
                  of fields to park a
                  > wagon
                  > > train there.
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
                  > > > Professor of History
                  > > > Hagerstown Community College
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
                  > > > Thomas,
                  > > >
                  > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but
                  > > > one
                  matter.
                  > > >
                  > > > What we know:
                  > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
                  there at various dates.
                  > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could
                  > > > get
                  some food.
                  > > >
                  > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md
                  > > > and
                  positioned "2 miles to
                  > > the
                  > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but
                  > > > w/o a
                  reference as to rear of
                  > > what
                  > > > or who).
                  > > >
                  > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
                  > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in
                  > > > Virgina?
                  Harsh believes so.
                  > > >
                  > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were
                  > > > sent
                  back into Md? This is
                  > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve
                  > > > Trains
                  across the river to avoid
                  > > > losing artillery ammunition.
                  > > >
                  > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
                  unknowns?
                  > > >
                  > > > Dean
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                  <clemenst@> wrote:
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Dean,
                  > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken
                  > > > > at
                  the Flood, pp. 338-9
                  > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp.
                  > > > 193-
                  4. Let me know if you
                  > > do
                  > > > not have access to those books.
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                  > > > > Professor of History
                  > > > > Hagerstown Community College
                  > > > >
                  > > > >
                  > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
                  > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
                  > > > >
                  > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean
                  > > > > feat),
                  if I can impose (and
                  > > when
                  > > > you
                  > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but
                  > > > > ammo"
                  exception.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by
                  > > > > the
                  time this project is
                  > done
                  > > > :-)
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll
                  > > > > want
                  a copy of a product that
                  > > has
                  > > > your
                  > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
                  > > > >
                  > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                  <clemenst@> wrote:
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > Dean,
                  > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
                  understanding that all trains
                  > > except
                  > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
                  food, had to go find his
                  > and
                  > > > bring
                  > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found
                  > > > > theirs
                  near Sharpsburg.
                  > > > Longstreet'
                  > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not
                  > > > > all
                  of his trains.
                  > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game?
                  > > > > > :-)
                  just kidding, I don't have
                  > > time
                  > > > to
                  > > > > play them.
                  > > > >
                  > > >
                  > >
                  >
                • Thomas Clemens
                  Dean, A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not definitely show any location of the ammunition reserve trains. sorry. Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                  Message 8 of 21 , Feb 2, 2008
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                    Dean,
                    A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not definitely show any location of the ammunition reserve trains. sorry.

                    Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                    Professor of History
                    Hagerstown Community College


                    >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 02/01/08 2:24 PM >>>
                    Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!

                    Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.

                    The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
                    mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
                    get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks they
                    had available were in the Md side trains.

                    Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.

                    Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
                    matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                  • Dean Essig
                    Tom, Thanks for looking. It looks like the issue might be moot for me anyway, Mt Airy is off my map area (very similar to the Carmen-Cope maps) to the SW, so
                    Message 9 of 21 , Feb 2, 2008
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                      Tom,

                      Thanks for looking. It looks like the issue might be
                      moot for me anyway, Mt Airy is off my map area (very
                      similar to the Carmen-Cope maps) to the SW, so guns
                      looking to reload will have to shoot off the map there
                      (with an explanation of when they come back). Since
                      they are already going off the map, whether the trains
                      are at Mt Airy, Shepherdstown, or Boetler's matters
                      little... it will be a while in real time before they
                      come back.

                      Dean

                      --- Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...> wrote:

                      > Dean,
                      > A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not
                      > definitely show any location of the ammunition
                      > reserve trains. sorry.
                      >
                      > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                      > Professor of History
                      > Hagerstown Community College
                      >
                      >
                      > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 02/01/08
                      > 2:24 PM >>>
                      > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
                      >
                      > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains
                      > on the map.
                      >
                      > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to
                      > resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
                      > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else
                      > suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
                      > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this
                      > indirectly suggests that what stocks they
                      > had available were in the Md side trains.
                      >
                      > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting
                      > across the river.
                      >
                      > Do you know of any other battery commanders
                      > recollections about the rather mundane
                      > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > Yahoo! Groups Links
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >



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