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[TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

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  • Thomas Clemens
    I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using the river to protect his trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
    Message 1 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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      I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using the river to protect his trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even after he retreated on the 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move towards Hagerstown. Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his infantry to move quickly. As you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and Light's Ford, and Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.


      Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
      Professor of History
      Hagerstown Community College



      >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
      Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!

      Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.

      The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
      mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
      get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks they
      had available were in the Md side trains.

      Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.

      Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
      matters of ammunition resupply on that day?

      --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
      >
      > Dean,
      > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just fine. I think you have it
      correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such as they were with the loss of
      many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I think some of it was forwarded
      on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo resupply. Going from
      memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it as 1 & 1/4 miles from
      Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt. Airy, the Grove family farm.
      That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots of fields to park a wagon
      train there.
      >
      >
      > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
      > Professor of History
      > Hagerstown Community College
      >
      >
      >
      > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
      > Thomas,
      >
      > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one matter.
      >
      > What we know:
      > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting there at various dates.
      > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get some food.
      >
      > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and positioned "2 miles to
      the
      > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a reference as to rear of
      what
      > or who).
      >
      > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
      > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina? Harsh believes so.
      >
      > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent back into Md? This is
      > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains across the river to avoid
      > losing artillery ammunition.
      >
      > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the unknowns?
      >
      > Dean
      >
      >
      > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
      > >
      > > Dean,
      > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at the Flood, pp. 338-9
      > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-4. Let me know if you
      do
      > not have access to those books.
      > >
      > >
      > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
      > > Professor of History
      > > Hagerstown Community College
      > >
      > >
      > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
      > > Excellent info, Thomas!
      > >
      > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat), if I can impose (and
      when
      > you
      > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo" exception.
      > >
      > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the time this project is done
      > :-)
      > >
      > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want a copy of a product that
      has
      > your
      > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
      > >
      > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > Dean,
      > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my understanding that all trains
      except
      > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for food, had to go find his and
      > bring
      > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs near Sharpsburg.
      > Longstreet'
      > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all of his trains.
      > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-) just kidding, I don't have
      time
      > to
      > > play them.
      > >
      >
    • bdowney@aotw.org
      Thanks Tom - I was just going to pop on the same theme. I think this is really a key perception most people _do not_ have about the Campaign. As late as the
      Message 2 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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        Thanks Tom - I was just going to pop on the same theme.

        I think this is really a key perception most people _do not_ have about the Campaign. As late as the first week of October Lee was still corresponding with management (Richmond) and elsewhere (Loring, e.g.) to determine the possibility of returning to Maryland. He abandoned the idea only reluctantly, and later than I would have thought rational (in perfect hindsight).

        Much of Pendleton's reserve artillery was scattered on 15-18 Sept covering fords and crossings for that purpose. They gave Lee offensive options, not just a secure back door.

        Cool stuff.

        > -------- Original Message --------
        > Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains
        > From: "G E Mayers" <gerry1952@...>
        > Date: Fri, February 01, 2008 2:29 pm
        > To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
        >
        > Dean;
        >
        > Some of the artillery was left at Williamsport and some was left
        > near Shepherdstown. Shepherdstown also was where the hospitals,
        > etc were.
        >
        > He was also protecting his only retreat route.
        >
        > Yr. Obt. Svt.
        > G E "Gerry" Mayers
        >
      • dean_essig
        Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the various artillery units. Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
        Message 3 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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          Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the various artillery units.

          Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va side, but he hadn't ruled
          out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right wing to Hagerstown.

          Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but allowing the trains to
          shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.

          Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly fearless.

          --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
          >
          > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using the river to protect his
          trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even after he retreated on the
          18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move towards Hagerstown.
          Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his infantry to move quickly. As
          you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and Light's Ford, and
          Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
          >
          >
          > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
          > Professor of History
          > Hagerstown Community College
          >
          >
          >
          > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
          > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
          >
          > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
          >
          > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
          > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac
          to
          > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks
          they
          > had available were in the Md side trains.
          >
          > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.
          >
          > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
          > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
          >
          > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
          > >
          > > Dean,
          > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just fine. I think you have
          it
          > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such as they were with the loss
          of
          > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I think some of it was
          forwarded
          > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo resupply. Going from
          > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it as 1 & 1/4 miles from
          > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt. Airy, the Grove family
          farm.
          > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots of fields to park a
          wagon
          > train there.
          > >
          > >
          > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
          > > Professor of History
          > > Hagerstown Community College
          > >
          > >
          > >
          > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
          > > Thomas,
          > >
          > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one matter.
          > >
          > > What we know:
          > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting there at various dates.
          > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get some food.
          > >
          > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and positioned "2 miles to
          > the
          > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a reference as to rear of
          > what
          > > or who).
          > >
          > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
          > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina? Harsh believes so.
          > >
          > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent back into Md? This is
          > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains across the river to avoid
          > > losing artillery ammunition.
          > >
          > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the unknowns?
          > >
          > > Dean
          > >
          > >
          > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
          > > >
          > > > Dean,
          > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at the Flood, pp. 338-9
          > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-4. Let me know if you
          > do
          > > not have access to those books.
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
          > > > Professor of History
          > > > Hagerstown Community College
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
          > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
          > > >
          > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat), if I can impose (and
          > when
          > > you
          > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo" exception.
          > > >
          > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the time this project is
          done
          > > :-)
          > > >
          > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want a copy of a product that
          > has
          > > your
          > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
          > > >
          > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
          > > > >
          > > > > Dean,
          > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my understanding that all trains
          > except
          > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for food, had to go find his
          and
          > > bring
          > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs near Sharpsburg.
          > > Longstreet'
          > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all of his trains.
          > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-) just kidding, I don't have
          > time
          > > to
          > > > play them.
          > > >
          > >
          >
        • joseph_pierro
          Dean: Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted) were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at Williamsport even before he
          Message 4 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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            Dean:

            Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
            were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
            Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at Sharpsburg.


            from Carman:

            "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14, realized
            that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he abandoned
            (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the North
            into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
            immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
            into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign of
            disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in failure,
            but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00 p.m.,
            he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
            "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg
            and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
            your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to
            cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with
            this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers
            to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, and
            if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
            Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
            Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take. You
            will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
            "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to march
            up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
            Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson contemplated
            the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these had
            so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the grasp of
            Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to push
            such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
            across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
            battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
            were ordered to move—two battalions by Williamsport into Virginia,
            one battalion to Keedysville."

            It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore afterwards
            for so long because the operational and tactical situation remained
            in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
            attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th? Would
            McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back, the
            last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and reserve
            artillery clogging the only route of escape.

            Carman again:
            "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
            artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late in
            the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek, four
            miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
            and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to move
            with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
            Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the river.
            Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the Boonsboro
            and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's Cross-Roads,
            where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg
            Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union cavalry
            was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in position
            commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown Pike
            on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to Sharpsburg)
            for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a band
            of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent out
            scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the road
            was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
            infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the 'retiring
            invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
            proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
            Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
            train, and Pendleton—without meeting an enemy or further delay—
            reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
            Virginia.
            "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was ordered
            to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
            battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
            Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
            position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile below
            town."

            In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
            artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
            again:

            "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
            Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown Ford: 'If
            you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which you
            can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a sufficiency
            of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential to
            their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about there
            and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns, and
            provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent up
            but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had closed
            that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

            Hope some of that helps.

            --jake
            --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...>
            wrote:
            >
            > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the
            various artillery units.
            >
            > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
            side, but he hadn't ruled
            > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right
            wing to Hagerstown.
            >
            > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but
            allowing the trains to
            > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.
            >
            > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly
            fearless.
            >
            > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
            wrote:
            > >
            > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using
            the river to protect his
            > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
            after he retreated on the
            > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
            towards Hagerstown.
            > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
            infantry to move quickly. As
            > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and
            Light's Ford, and
            > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
            > >
            > >
            > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
            > > Professor of History
            > > Hagerstown Community College
            > >
            > >
            > >
            > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
            > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
            > >
            > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
            > >
            > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
            recall Reilly (who at least
            > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
            to ford the Potomac
            > to
            > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
            suggests that what stocks
            > they
            > > had available were in the Md side trains.
            > >
            > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
            river.
            > >
            > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
            the rather mundane
            > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
            > >
            > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
            wrote:
            > > >
            > > > Dean,
            > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
            fine. I think you have
            > it
            > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
            as they were with the loss
            > of
            > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
            think some of it was
            > forwarded
            > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
            resupply. Going from
            > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
            as 1 & 1/4 miles from
            > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
            Airy, the Grove family
            > farm.
            > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
            of fields to park a
            > wagon
            > > train there.
            > > >
            > > >
            > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
            > > > Professor of History
            > > > Hagerstown Community College
            > > >
            > > >
            > > >
            > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
            > > > Thomas,
            > > >
            > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
            matter.
            > > >
            > > > What we know:
            > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
            there at various dates.
            > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
            some food.
            > > >
            > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
            positioned "2 miles to
            > > the
            > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
            reference as to rear of
            > > what
            > > > or who).
            > > >
            > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
            > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
            Harsh believes so.
            > > >
            > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
            back into Md? This is
            > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
            across the river to avoid
            > > > losing artillery ammunition.
            > > >
            > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
            unknowns?
            > > >
            > > > Dean
            > > >
            > > >
            > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
            <clemenst@> wrote:
            > > > >
            > > > > Dean,
            > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
            the Flood, pp. 338-9
            > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-
            4. Let me know if you
            > > do
            > > > not have access to those books.
            > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
            > > > > Professor of History
            > > > > Hagerstown Community College
            > > > >
            > > > >
            > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
            > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
            > > > >
            > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
            if I can impose (and
            > > when
            > > > you
            > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
            exception.
            > > > >
            > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
            time this project is
            > done
            > > > :-)
            > > > >
            > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
            a copy of a product that
            > > has
            > > > your
            > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
            > > > >
            > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
            <clemenst@> wrote:
            > > > > >
            > > > > > Dean,
            > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
            understanding that all trains
            > > except
            > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
            food, had to go find his
            > and
            > > > bring
            > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
            near Sharpsburg.
            > > > Longstreet'
            > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
            of his trains.
            > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
            just kidding, I don't have
            > > time
            > > > to
            > > > > play them.
            > > > >
            > > >
            > >
            >
          • dean_essig
            Thanks Jake! That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in
            Message 5 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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              Thanks Jake!

              That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
              maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
              (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.

              As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2 Co,
              Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
              17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.

              Dean

              --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@...> wrote:
              >
              > Dean:
              >
              > Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
              > were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
              > Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at Sharpsburg.
              >
              >
              > from Carman:
              >
              > "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14, realized
              > that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he abandoned
              > (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the North
              > into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
              > immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
              > into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign of
              > disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in failure,
              > but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00 p.m.,
              > he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
              > "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg
              > and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
              > your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to
              > cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with
              > this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers
              > to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, and
              > if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
              > Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
              > Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take. You
              > will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
              > "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to march
              > up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
              > Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson contemplated
              > the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these had
              > so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the grasp of
              > Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to push
              > such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
              > across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
              > battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
              > were ordered to move—two battalions by Williamsport into Virginia,
              > one battalion to Keedysville."
              >
              > It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore afterwards
              > for so long because the operational and tactical situation remained
              > in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
              > attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th? Would
              > McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back, the
              > last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and reserve
              > artillery clogging the only route of escape.
              >
              > Carman again:
              > "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
              > artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late in
              > the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek, four
              > miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
              > and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to move
              > with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
              > Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the river.
              > Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the Boonsboro
              > and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's Cross-Roads,
              > where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg
              > Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union cavalry
              > was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in position
              > commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown Pike
              > on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to Sharpsburg)
              > for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a band
              > of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent out
              > scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the road
              > was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
              > infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the 'retiring
              > invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
              > proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
              > Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
              > train, and Pendleton—without meeting an enemy or further delay—
              > reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
              > Virginia.
              > "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was ordered
              > to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
              > battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
              > Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
              > position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile below
              > town."
              >
              > In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
              > artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
              > again:
              >
              > "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
              > Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown Ford: 'If
              > you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which you
              > can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a sufficiency
              > of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential to
              > their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about there
              > and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns, and
              > provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent up
              > but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had closed
              > that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."
              >
              > Hope some of that helps.
              >
              > --jake
              > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig" <dean_essig@>
              > wrote:
              > >
              > > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the
              > various artillery units.
              > >
              > > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
              > side, but he hadn't ruled
              > > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right
              > wing to Hagerstown.
              > >
              > > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but
              > allowing the trains to
              > > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.
              > >
              > > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly
              > fearless.
              > >
              > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
              > wrote:
              > > >
              > > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using
              > the river to protect his
              > > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
              > after he retreated on the
              > > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
              > towards Hagerstown.
              > > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
              > infantry to move quickly. As
              > > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and
              > Light's Ford, and
              > > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
              > > > Professor of History
              > > > Hagerstown Community College
              > > >
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
              > > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
              > > >
              > > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
              > > >
              > > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
              > recall Reilly (who at least
              > > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
              > to ford the Potomac
              > > to
              > > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
              > suggests that what stocks
              > > they
              > > > had available were in the Md side trains.
              > > >
              > > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
              > river.
              > > >
              > > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
              > the rather mundane
              > > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
              > > >
              > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
              > wrote:
              > > > >
              > > > > Dean,
              > > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
              > fine. I think you have
              > > it
              > > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
              > as they were with the loss
              > > of
              > > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
              > think some of it was
              > > forwarded
              > > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
              > resupply. Going from
              > > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
              > as 1 & 1/4 miles from
              > > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
              > Airy, the Grove family
              > > farm.
              > > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
              > of fields to park a
              > > wagon
              > > > train there.
              > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
              > > > > Professor of History
              > > > > Hagerstown Community College
              > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
              > > > > Thomas,
              > > > >
              > > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
              > matter.
              > > > >
              > > > > What we know:
              > > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
              > there at various dates.
              > > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
              > some food.
              > > > >
              > > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
              > positioned "2 miles to
              > > > the
              > > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
              > reference as to rear of
              > > > what
              > > > > or who).
              > > > >
              > > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
              > > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
              > Harsh believes so.
              > > > >
              > > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
              > back into Md? This is
              > > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
              > across the river to avoid
              > > > > losing artillery ammunition.
              > > > >
              > > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
              > unknowns?
              > > > >
              > > > > Dean
              > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
              > <clemenst@> wrote:
              > > > > >
              > > > > > Dean,
              > > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
              > the Flood, pp. 338-9
              > > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-
              > 4. Let me know if you
              > > > do
              > > > > not have access to those books.
              > > > > >
              > > > > >
              > > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
              > > > > > Professor of History
              > > > > > Hagerstown Community College
              > > > > >
              > > > > >
              > > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
              > > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
              > > > > >
              > > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
              > if I can impose (and
              > > > when
              > > > > you
              > > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
              > exception.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
              > time this project is
              > > done
              > > > > :-)
              > > > > >
              > > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
              > a copy of a product that
              > > > has
              > > > > your
              > > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
              > > > > >
              > > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
              > <clemenst@> wrote:
              > > > > > >
              > > > > > > Dean,
              > > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
              > understanding that all trains
              > > > except
              > > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
              > food, had to go find his
              > > and
              > > > > bring
              > > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
              > near Sharpsburg.
              > > > > Longstreet'
              > > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
              > of his trains.
              > > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
              > just kidding, I don't have
              > > > time
              > > > > to
              > > > > > play them.
              > > > > >
              > > > >
              > > >
              > >
              >
            • Joseph Pierro
              Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered across. Lee s first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the
              Message 6 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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                Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered across. Lee's first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the order to McLaws shows) was to break off the entire campaign and retreat to Md. (After all, in a withdrawal, you send the trains first and keep the infantry in the rear -- the closest proximity to the pursuing enemy -- to conduct a fighting retreat. Recall Lee's similar orders regarding Imboden on the withdrawal from Gettysburg the following year.)

                It was only when he realized that McClellan wasn't pressing the advantage, and when word arrived of the fall of Harper's Ferry, that he decided to hold position with his infantry on the east bank of the Potomac and accept battle.

                As for the rest, given the fact that Pendleton had nearly three days to rest and refit his command, you have to wonder how it was that he managed to contribute next to nothing (no offense to Watson's Battery intended) on the day of the battle.

                In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single instance where Pendleton, as chief of artillery, ever HELPED anyone (other than the Army of the Potomac) on a battlefield.

                --jake
                ----- Original Message ----
                From: dean_essig <dean_essig@...>
                To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
                Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 7:25:52 PM
                Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

                Thanks Jake!

                That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
                maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
                (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.

                As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2 Co,
                Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
                17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.

                Dean

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              • dean_essig
                Excellent post Jake and I agree fully! Pendleton sure does have an interesting relationship with the good functioning of the ANVa. Amazing that Lee put up with
                Message 7 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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                  Excellent post Jake and I agree fully!

                  Pendleton sure does have an interesting relationship with the good functioning of the
                  ANVa. Amazing that Lee put up with it.

                  --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Pierro <joseph_pierro@...> wrote:
                  >
                  > Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered
                  across. Lee's first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the order to McLaws
                  shows) was to break off the entire campaign and retreat to Md. (After all, in a withdrawal,
                  you send the trains first and keep the infantry in the rear -- the closest proximity to the
                  pursuing enemy -- to conduct a fighting retreat. Recall Lee's similar orders regarding
                  Imboden on the withdrawal from Gettysburg the following year.)
                  >
                  > It was only when he realized that McClellan wasn't pressing the advantage, and when
                  word arrived of the fall of Harper's Ferry, that he decided to hold position with his infantry
                  on the east bank of the Potomac and accept battle.
                  >
                  > As for the rest, given the fact that Pendleton had nearly three days to rest and refit his
                  command, you have to wonder how it was that he managed to contribute next to nothing
                  (no offense to Watson's Battery intended) on the day of the battle.
                  >
                  > In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single instance where Pendleton, as chief of
                  artillery, ever HELPED anyone (other than the Army of the Potomac) on a battlefield.
                  >
                  > --jake
                  > ----- Original Message ----
                  > From: dean_essig <dean_essig@...>
                  > To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
                  > Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 7:25:52 PM
                  > Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains
                  >
                  > Thanks Jake!
                  >
                  > That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
                  > maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
                  > (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.
                  >
                  > As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2
                  Co,
                  > Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
                  > 17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.
                  >
                  > Dean
                  >
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                • G E Mayers
                  Dear Jake; I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we are in this
                  Message 8 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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                    Dear Jake;

                    I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the
                    First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we
                    are in this group, concentrating on the unit level with the
                    Fourth NC (The Bloody Fourth) and then the larger command level
                    with Longstreet and Army HQ.

                    Where I've run into a little dilemma is knowing where Anderson's
                    brigade was positioned _after_ it was on the Old Sharpsburg Road
                    to do a grand wheel back UP South Mountain to take the Federals
                    in the flank and later, when it was determined to abandon the
                    mountain, which route or routes Anderson's Brigade retreated
                    towards Sharpsburg.

                    Can you search your Carman MS and, under separate email, provide
                    whatever information he might have? (Or, post here, if not
                    terribly, terribly long and lengthy!)

                    Thank you!

                    Yr. Obt. Svt.
                    G E "Gerry" Mayers

                    To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
                    on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
                    Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
                    the Almighty God. --Anonymous
                    ----- Original Message -----
                    From: "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@...>
                    To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                    Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 7:09 PM
                    Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains


                    Dean:

                    Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
                    were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
                    Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at
                    Sharpsburg.


                    from Carman:

                    "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14,
                    realized
                    that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he
                    abandoned
                    (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the
                    North
                    into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
                    immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
                    into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign
                    of
                    disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in
                    failure,
                    but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00
                    p.m.,
                    he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
                    "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by
                    Sharpsburg
                    and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
                    your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road
                    to
                    cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite
                    with
                    this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward
                    officers
                    to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac,
                    and
                    if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave
                    Shepherdstown
                    Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
                    Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take.
                    You
                    will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
                    "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to
                    march
                    up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
                    Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson
                    contemplated
                    the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these
                    had
                    so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the
                    grasp of
                    Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to
                    push
                    such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
                    across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
                    battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
                    were ordered to move-two battalions by Williamsport into
                    Virginia,
                    one battalion to Keedysville."

                    It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore
                    afterwards
                    for so long because the operational and tactical situation
                    remained
                    in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
                    attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th?
                    Would
                    McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back,
                    the
                    last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and
                    reserve
                    artillery clogging the only route of escape.

                    Carman again:
                    "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
                    artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late
                    in
                    the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek,
                    four
                    miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
                    and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to
                    move
                    with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
                    Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the
                    river.
                    Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the
                    Boonsboro
                    and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's
                    Cross-Roads,
                    where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and
                    Sharpsburg
                    Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union
                    cavalry
                    was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in
                    position
                    commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown
                    Pike
                    on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to
                    Sharpsburg)
                    for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a
                    band
                    of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent
                    out
                    scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the
                    road
                    was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
                    infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the
                    'retiring
                    invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
                    proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
                    Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
                    train, and Pendleton-without meeting an enemy or further delay-
                    reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
                    Virginia.
                    "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was
                    ordered
                    to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
                    battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
                    Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
                    position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile
                    below
                    town."

                    In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
                    artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
                    again:

                    "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
                    Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown
                    Ford: 'If
                    you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which
                    you
                    can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a
                    sufficiency
                    of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential
                    to
                    their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about
                    there
                    and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns,
                    and
                    provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent
                    up
                    but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had
                    closed
                    that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

                    Hope some of that helps.

                    --jake
                    --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig"
                    <dean_essig@...>
                    wrote:
                    >
                    > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of
                    > the
                    various artillery units.
                    >
                    > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the
                    > Va
                    side, but he hadn't ruled
                    > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union
                    > right
                    wing to Hagerstown.
                    >
                    > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible,
                    > but
                    allowing the trains to
                    > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of
                    > sense.
                    >
                    > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is
                    > breathtakingly
                    fearless.
                    >
                    > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                    > <clemenst@>
                    wrote:
                    > >
                    > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was
                    > > using
                    the river to protect his
                    > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport.
                    > Even
                    after he retreated on the
                    > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
                    towards Hagerstown.
                    > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
                    infantry to move quickly. As
                    > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford
                    > and
                    Light's Ford, and
                    > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
                    > > Professor of History
                    > > Hagerstown Community College
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
                    > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
                    > >
                    > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the
                    > > map.
                    > >
                    > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I
                    > > don't
                    recall Reilly (who at least
                    > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they
                    > > had
                    to ford the Potomac
                    > to
                    > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
                    suggests that what stocks
                    > they
                    > > had available were in the Md side trains.
                    > >
                    > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across
                    > > the
                    river.
                    > >
                    > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections
                    > > about
                    the rather mundane
                    > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                    > >
                    > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                    > > <clemenst@>
                    wrote:
                    > > >
                    > > > Dean,
                    > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is
                    > > > just
                    fine. I think you have
                    > it
                    > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains,
                    > > such
                    as they were with the loss
                    > of
                    > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
                    think some of it was
                    > forwarded
                    > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
                    resupply. Going from
                    > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes
                    > > it
                    as 1 & 1/4 miles from
                    > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on
                    > > Mt.
                    Airy, the Grove family
                    > farm.
                    > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and
                    > > lots
                    of fields to park a
                    > wagon
                    > > train there.
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
                    > > > Professor of History
                    > > > Hagerstown Community College
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
                    > > > Thomas,
                    > > >
                    > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but
                    > > > one
                    matter.
                    > > >
                    > > > What we know:
                    > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
                    there at various dates.
                    > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could
                    > > > get
                    some food.
                    > > >
                    > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md
                    > > > and
                    positioned "2 miles to
                    > > the
                    > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but
                    > > > w/o a
                    reference as to rear of
                    > > what
                    > > > or who).
                    > > >
                    > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
                    > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in
                    > > > Virgina?
                    Harsh believes so.
                    > > >
                    > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were
                    > > > sent
                    back into Md? This is
                    > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve
                    > > > Trains
                    across the river to avoid
                    > > > losing artillery ammunition.
                    > > >
                    > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
                    unknowns?
                    > > >
                    > > > Dean
                    > > >
                    > > >
                    > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                    <clemenst@> wrote:
                    > > > >
                    > > > > Dean,
                    > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken
                    > > > > at
                    the Flood, pp. 338-9
                    > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp.
                    > > > 193-
                    4. Let me know if you
                    > > do
                    > > > not have access to those books.
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                    > > > > Professor of History
                    > > > > Hagerstown Community College
                    > > > >
                    > > > >
                    > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
                    > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
                    > > > >
                    > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean
                    > > > > feat),
                    if I can impose (and
                    > > when
                    > > > you
                    > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but
                    > > > > ammo"
                    exception.
                    > > > >
                    > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by
                    > > > > the
                    time this project is
                    > done
                    > > > :-)
                    > > > >
                    > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll
                    > > > > want
                    a copy of a product that
                    > > has
                    > > > your
                    > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
                    > > > >
                    > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                    <clemenst@> wrote:
                    > > > > >
                    > > > > > Dean,
                    > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
                    understanding that all trains
                    > > except
                    > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
                    food, had to go find his
                    > and
                    > > > bring
                    > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found
                    > > > > theirs
                    near Sharpsburg.
                    > > > Longstreet'
                    > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not
                    > > > > all
                    of his trains.
                    > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game?
                    > > > > > :-)
                    just kidding, I don't have
                    > > time
                    > > > to
                    > > > > play them.
                    > > > >
                    > > >
                    > >
                    >
                  • Thomas Clemens
                    Dean, A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not definitely show any location of the ammunition reserve trains. sorry. Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                    Message 9 of 21 , Feb 2, 2008
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                      Dean,
                      A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not definitely show any location of the ammunition reserve trains. sorry.

                      Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                      Professor of History
                      Hagerstown Community College


                      >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 02/01/08 2:24 PM >>>
                      Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!

                      Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.

                      The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
                      mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
                      get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks they
                      had available were in the Md side trains.

                      Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.

                      Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
                      matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                    • Dean Essig
                      Tom, Thanks for looking. It looks like the issue might be moot for me anyway, Mt Airy is off my map area (very similar to the Carmen-Cope maps) to the SW, so
                      Message 10 of 21 , Feb 2, 2008
                      • 0 Attachment
                        Tom,

                        Thanks for looking. It looks like the issue might be
                        moot for me anyway, Mt Airy is off my map area (very
                        similar to the Carmen-Cope maps) to the SW, so guns
                        looking to reload will have to shoot off the map there
                        (with an explanation of when they come back). Since
                        they are already going off the map, whether the trains
                        are at Mt Airy, Shepherdstown, or Boetler's matters
                        little... it will be a while in real time before they
                        come back.

                        Dean

                        --- Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...> wrote:

                        > Dean,
                        > A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not
                        > definitely show any location of the ammunition
                        > reserve trains. sorry.
                        >
                        > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                        > Professor of History
                        > Hagerstown Community College
                        >
                        >
                        > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 02/01/08
                        > 2:24 PM >>>
                        > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
                        >
                        > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains
                        > on the map.
                        >
                        > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to
                        > resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
                        > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else
                        > suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
                        > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this
                        > indirectly suggests that what stocks they
                        > had available were in the Md side trains.
                        >
                        > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting
                        > across the river.
                        >
                        > Do you know of any other battery commanders
                        > recollections about the rather mundane
                        > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        > Yahoo! Groups Links
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        >



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