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Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

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  • G E Mayers
    Dean; Some of the artillery was left at Williamsport and some was left near Shepherdstown. Shepherdstown also was where the hospitals, etc were. He was also
    Message 1 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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      Dean;

      Some of the artillery was left at Williamsport and some was left
      near Shepherdstown. Shepherdstown also was where the hospitals,
      etc were.

      He was also protecting his only retreat route.

      Yr. Obt. Svt.
      G E "Gerry" Mayers

      To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
      on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
      Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
      the Almighty God. --Anonymous
      ----- Original Message -----
      From: "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...>
      To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
      Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 2:24 PM
      Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains


      Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!

      Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.

      The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
      recall Reilly (who at least
      mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
      to ford the Potomac to
      get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
      suggests that what stocks they
      had available were in the Md side trains.

      Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
      river.

      Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
      the rather mundane
      matters of ammunition resupply on that day?

      --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
      <clemenst@...> wrote:
      >
      > Dean,
      > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
      > fine. I think you have it
      correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
      as they were with the loss of
      many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
      think some of it was forwarded
      on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
      resupply. Going from
      memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
      as 1 & 1/4 miles from
      Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
      Airy, the Grove family farm.
      That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
      of fields to park a wagon
      train there.
      >
      >
      > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
      > Professor of History
      > Hagerstown Community College
      >
      >
      >
      > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
      > Thomas,
      >
      > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
      > matter.
      >
      > What we know:
      > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
      > there at various dates.
      > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
      > some food.
      >
      > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
      > positioned "2 miles to
      the
      > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
      > reference as to rear of
      what
      > or who).
      >
      > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
      > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
      > Harsh believes so.
      >
      > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
      > back into Md? This is
      > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
      > across the river to avoid
      > losing artillery ammunition.
      >
      > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
      > unknowns?
      >
      > Dean
      >
      >
      > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
      > <clemenst@> wrote:
      > >
      > > Dean,
      > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
      > > the Flood, pp. 338-9
      > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-4.
      > Let me know if you
      do
      > not have access to those books.
      > >
      > >
      > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
      > > Professor of History
      > > Hagerstown Community College
      > >
      > >
      > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
      > > Excellent info, Thomas!
      > >
      > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
      > > if I can impose (and
      when
      > you
      > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
      > > exception.
      > >
      > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
      > > time this project is done
      > :-)
      > >
      > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
      > > a copy of a product that
      has
      > your
      > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
      > >
      > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
      > > <clemenst@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > Dean,
      > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
      > > > understanding that all trains
      except
      > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
      > > food, had to go find his and
      > bring
      > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
      > > near Sharpsburg.
      > Longstreet'
      > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
      > > of his trains.
      > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
      > > > just kidding, I don't have
      time
      > to
      > > play them.
      > >
      >
    • Thomas Clemens
      I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using the river to protect his trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
      Message 2 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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        I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using the river to protect his trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even after he retreated on the 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move towards Hagerstown. Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his infantry to move quickly. As you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and Light's Ford, and Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.


        Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
        Professor of History
        Hagerstown Community College



        >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
        Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!

        Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.

        The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
        mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
        get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks they
        had available were in the Md side trains.

        Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.

        Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
        matters of ammunition resupply on that day?

        --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
        >
        > Dean,
        > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just fine. I think you have it
        correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such as they were with the loss of
        many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I think some of it was forwarded
        on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo resupply. Going from
        memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it as 1 & 1/4 miles from
        Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt. Airy, the Grove family farm.
        That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots of fields to park a wagon
        train there.
        >
        >
        > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
        > Professor of History
        > Hagerstown Community College
        >
        >
        >
        > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
        > Thomas,
        >
        > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one matter.
        >
        > What we know:
        > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting there at various dates.
        > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get some food.
        >
        > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and positioned "2 miles to
        the
        > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a reference as to rear of
        what
        > or who).
        >
        > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
        > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina? Harsh believes so.
        >
        > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent back into Md? This is
        > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains across the river to avoid
        > losing artillery ammunition.
        >
        > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the unknowns?
        >
        > Dean
        >
        >
        > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
        > >
        > > Dean,
        > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at the Flood, pp. 338-9
        > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-4. Let me know if you
        do
        > not have access to those books.
        > >
        > >
        > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
        > > Professor of History
        > > Hagerstown Community College
        > >
        > >
        > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
        > > Excellent info, Thomas!
        > >
        > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat), if I can impose (and
        when
        > you
        > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo" exception.
        > >
        > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the time this project is done
        > :-)
        > >
        > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want a copy of a product that
        has
        > your
        > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
        > >
        > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Dean,
        > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my understanding that all trains
        except
        > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for food, had to go find his and
        > bring
        > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs near Sharpsburg.
        > Longstreet'
        > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all of his trains.
        > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-) just kidding, I don't have
        time
        > to
        > > play them.
        > >
        >
      • bdowney@aotw.org
        Thanks Tom - I was just going to pop on the same theme. I think this is really a key perception most people _do not_ have about the Campaign. As late as the
        Message 3 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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          Thanks Tom - I was just going to pop on the same theme.

          I think this is really a key perception most people _do not_ have about the Campaign. As late as the first week of October Lee was still corresponding with management (Richmond) and elsewhere (Loring, e.g.) to determine the possibility of returning to Maryland. He abandoned the idea only reluctantly, and later than I would have thought rational (in perfect hindsight).

          Much of Pendleton's reserve artillery was scattered on 15-18 Sept covering fords and crossings for that purpose. They gave Lee offensive options, not just a secure back door.

          Cool stuff.

          > -------- Original Message --------
          > Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains
          > From: "G E Mayers" <gerry1952@...>
          > Date: Fri, February 01, 2008 2:29 pm
          > To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
          >
          > Dean;
          >
          > Some of the artillery was left at Williamsport and some was left
          > near Shepherdstown. Shepherdstown also was where the hospitals,
          > etc were.
          >
          > He was also protecting his only retreat route.
          >
          > Yr. Obt. Svt.
          > G E "Gerry" Mayers
          >
        • dean_essig
          Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the various artillery units. Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
          Message 4 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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            Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the various artillery units.

            Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va side, but he hadn't ruled
            out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right wing to Hagerstown.

            Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but allowing the trains to
            shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.

            Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly fearless.

            --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@...> wrote:
            >
            > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using the river to protect his
            trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even after he retreated on the
            18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move towards Hagerstown.
            Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his infantry to move quickly. As
            you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and Light's Ford, and
            Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
            >
            >
            > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
            > Professor of History
            > Hagerstown Community College
            >
            >
            >
            > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
            > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
            >
            > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
            >
            > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
            > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac
            to
            > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks
            they
            > had available were in the Md side trains.
            >
            > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.
            >
            > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
            > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
            >
            > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
            > >
            > > Dean,
            > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just fine. I think you have
            it
            > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such as they were with the loss
            of
            > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I think some of it was
            forwarded
            > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo resupply. Going from
            > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it as 1 & 1/4 miles from
            > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt. Airy, the Grove family
            farm.
            > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots of fields to park a
            wagon
            > train there.
            > >
            > >
            > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
            > > Professor of History
            > > Hagerstown Community College
            > >
            > >
            > >
            > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
            > > Thomas,
            > >
            > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one matter.
            > >
            > > What we know:
            > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting there at various dates.
            > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get some food.
            > >
            > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and positioned "2 miles to
            > the
            > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a reference as to rear of
            > what
            > > or who).
            > >
            > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
            > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina? Harsh believes so.
            > >
            > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent back into Md? This is
            > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains across the river to avoid
            > > losing artillery ammunition.
            > >
            > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the unknowns?
            > >
            > > Dean
            > >
            > >
            > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
            > > >
            > > > Dean,
            > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at the Flood, pp. 338-9
            > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-4. Let me know if you
            > do
            > > not have access to those books.
            > > >
            > > >
            > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
            > > > Professor of History
            > > > Hagerstown Community College
            > > >
            > > >
            > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
            > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
            > > >
            > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat), if I can impose (and
            > when
            > > you
            > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo" exception.
            > > >
            > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the time this project is
            done
            > > :-)
            > > >
            > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want a copy of a product that
            > has
            > > your
            > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
            > > >
            > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@> wrote:
            > > > >
            > > > > Dean,
            > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my understanding that all trains
            > except
            > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for food, had to go find his
            and
            > > bring
            > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs near Sharpsburg.
            > > Longstreet'
            > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all of his trains.
            > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-) just kidding, I don't have
            > time
            > > to
            > > > play them.
            > > >
            > >
            >
          • joseph_pierro
            Dean: Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted) were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at Williamsport even before he
            Message 5 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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              Dean:

              Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
              were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
              Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at Sharpsburg.


              from Carman:

              "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14, realized
              that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he abandoned
              (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the North
              into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
              immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
              into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign of
              disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in failure,
              but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00 p.m.,
              he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
              "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg
              and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
              your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to
              cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with
              this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers
              to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, and
              if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
              Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
              Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take. You
              will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
              "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to march
              up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
              Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson contemplated
              the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these had
              so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the grasp of
              Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to push
              such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
              across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
              battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
              were ordered to move—two battalions by Williamsport into Virginia,
              one battalion to Keedysville."

              It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore afterwards
              for so long because the operational and tactical situation remained
              in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
              attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th? Would
              McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back, the
              last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and reserve
              artillery clogging the only route of escape.

              Carman again:
              "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
              artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late in
              the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek, four
              miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
              and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to move
              with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
              Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the river.
              Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the Boonsboro
              and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's Cross-Roads,
              where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg
              Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union cavalry
              was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in position
              commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown Pike
              on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to Sharpsburg)
              for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a band
              of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent out
              scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the road
              was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
              infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the 'retiring
              invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
              proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
              Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
              train, and Pendleton—without meeting an enemy or further delay—
              reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
              Virginia.
              "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was ordered
              to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
              battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
              Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
              position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile below
              town."

              In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
              artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
              again:

              "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
              Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown Ford: 'If
              you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which you
              can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a sufficiency
              of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential to
              their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about there
              and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns, and
              provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent up
              but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had closed
              that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

              Hope some of that helps.

              --jake
              --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...>
              wrote:
              >
              > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the
              various artillery units.
              >
              > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
              side, but he hadn't ruled
              > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right
              wing to Hagerstown.
              >
              > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but
              allowing the trains to
              > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.
              >
              > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly
              fearless.
              >
              > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
              wrote:
              > >
              > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using
              the river to protect his
              > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
              after he retreated on the
              > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
              towards Hagerstown.
              > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
              infantry to move quickly. As
              > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and
              Light's Ford, and
              > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
              > >
              > >
              > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
              > > Professor of History
              > > Hagerstown Community College
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
              > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
              > >
              > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
              > >
              > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
              recall Reilly (who at least
              > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
              to ford the Potomac
              > to
              > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
              suggests that what stocks
              > they
              > > had available were in the Md side trains.
              > >
              > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
              river.
              > >
              > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
              the rather mundane
              > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
              > >
              > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
              wrote:
              > > >
              > > > Dean,
              > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
              fine. I think you have
              > it
              > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
              as they were with the loss
              > of
              > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
              think some of it was
              > forwarded
              > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
              resupply. Going from
              > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
              as 1 & 1/4 miles from
              > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
              Airy, the Grove family
              > farm.
              > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
              of fields to park a
              > wagon
              > > train there.
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
              > > > Professor of History
              > > > Hagerstown Community College
              > > >
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
              > > > Thomas,
              > > >
              > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
              matter.
              > > >
              > > > What we know:
              > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
              there at various dates.
              > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
              some food.
              > > >
              > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
              positioned "2 miles to
              > > the
              > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
              reference as to rear of
              > > what
              > > > or who).
              > > >
              > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
              > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
              Harsh believes so.
              > > >
              > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
              back into Md? This is
              > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
              across the river to avoid
              > > > losing artillery ammunition.
              > > >
              > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
              unknowns?
              > > >
              > > > Dean
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
              <clemenst@> wrote:
              > > > >
              > > > > Dean,
              > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
              the Flood, pp. 338-9
              > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-
              4. Let me know if you
              > > do
              > > > not have access to those books.
              > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
              > > > > Professor of History
              > > > > Hagerstown Community College
              > > > >
              > > > >
              > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
              > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
              > > > >
              > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
              if I can impose (and
              > > when
              > > > you
              > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
              exception.
              > > > >
              > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
              time this project is
              > done
              > > > :-)
              > > > >
              > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
              a copy of a product that
              > > has
              > > > your
              > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
              > > > >
              > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
              <clemenst@> wrote:
              > > > > >
              > > > > > Dean,
              > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
              understanding that all trains
              > > except
              > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
              food, had to go find his
              > and
              > > > bring
              > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
              near Sharpsburg.
              > > > Longstreet'
              > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
              of his trains.
              > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
              just kidding, I don't have
              > > time
              > > > to
              > > > > play them.
              > > > >
              > > >
              > >
              >
            • dean_essig
              Thanks Jake! That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in
              Message 6 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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                Thanks Jake!

                That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
                maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
                (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.

                As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2 Co,
                Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
                17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.

                Dean

                --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@...> wrote:
                >
                > Dean:
                >
                > Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
                > were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
                > Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at Sharpsburg.
                >
                >
                > from Carman:
                >
                > "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14, realized
                > that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he abandoned
                > (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the North
                > into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
                > immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
                > into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign of
                > disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in failure,
                > but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00 p.m.,
                > he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
                > "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg
                > and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
                > your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to
                > cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with
                > this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers
                > to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac, and
                > if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
                > Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
                > Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take. You
                > will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
                > "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to march
                > up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
                > Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson contemplated
                > the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these had
                > so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the grasp of
                > Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to push
                > such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
                > across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
                > battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
                > were ordered to move—two battalions by Williamsport into Virginia,
                > one battalion to Keedysville."
                >
                > It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore afterwards
                > for so long because the operational and tactical situation remained
                > in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
                > attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th? Would
                > McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back, the
                > last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and reserve
                > artillery clogging the only route of escape.
                >
                > Carman again:
                > "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
                > artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late in
                > the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek, four
                > miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
                > and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to move
                > with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
                > Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the river.
                > Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the Boonsboro
                > and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's Cross-Roads,
                > where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg
                > Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union cavalry
                > was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in position
                > commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown Pike
                > on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to Sharpsburg)
                > for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a band
                > of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent out
                > scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the road
                > was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
                > infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the 'retiring
                > invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
                > proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
                > Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
                > train, and Pendleton—without meeting an enemy or further delay—
                > reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
                > Virginia.
                > "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was ordered
                > to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
                > battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
                > Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
                > position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile below
                > town."
                >
                > In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
                > artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
                > again:
                >
                > "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
                > Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown Ford: 'If
                > you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which you
                > can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a sufficiency
                > of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential to
                > their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about there
                > and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns, and
                > provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent up
                > but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had closed
                > that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."
                >
                > Hope some of that helps.
                >
                > --jake
                > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig" <dean_essig@>
                > wrote:
                > >
                > > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of the
                > various artillery units.
                > >
                > > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the Va
                > side, but he hadn't ruled
                > > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union right
                > wing to Hagerstown.
                > >
                > > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible, but
                > allowing the trains to
                > > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of sense.
                > >
                > > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is breathtakingly
                > fearless.
                > >
                > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
                > wrote:
                > > >
                > > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was using
                > the river to protect his
                > > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport. Even
                > after he retreated on the
                > > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
                > towards Hagerstown.
                > > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
                > infantry to move quickly. As
                > > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford and
                > Light's Ford, and
                > > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
                > > >
                > > >
                > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
                > > > Professor of History
                > > > Hagerstown Community College
                > > >
                > > >
                > > >
                > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
                > > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
                > > >
                > > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.
                > > >
                > > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't
                > recall Reilly (who at least
                > > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had
                > to ford the Potomac
                > > to
                > > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
                > suggests that what stocks
                > > they
                > > > had available were in the Md side trains.
                > > >
                > > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the
                > river.
                > > >
                > > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about
                > the rather mundane
                > > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                > > >
                > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens" <clemenst@>
                > wrote:
                > > > >
                > > > > Dean,
                > > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is just
                > fine. I think you have
                > > it
                > > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains, such
                > as they were with the loss
                > > of
                > > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
                > think some of it was
                > > forwarded
                > > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
                > resupply. Going from
                > > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes it
                > as 1 & 1/4 miles from
                > > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on Mt.
                > Airy, the Grove family
                > > farm.
                > > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and lots
                > of fields to park a
                > > wagon
                > > > train there.
                > > > >
                > > > >
                > > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
                > > > > Professor of History
                > > > > Hagerstown Community College
                > > > >
                > > > >
                > > > >
                > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
                > > > > Thomas,
                > > > >
                > > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but one
                > matter.
                > > > >
                > > > > What we know:
                > > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
                > there at various dates.
                > > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could get
                > some food.
                > > > >
                > > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md and
                > positioned "2 miles to
                > > > the
                > > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but w/o a
                > reference as to rear of
                > > > what
                > > > > or who).
                > > > >
                > > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
                > > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in Virgina?
                > Harsh believes so.
                > > > >
                > > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were sent
                > back into Md? This is
                > > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve Trains
                > across the river to avoid
                > > > > losing artillery ammunition.
                > > > >
                > > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
                > unknowns?
                > > > >
                > > > > Dean
                > > > >
                > > > >
                > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                > <clemenst@> wrote:
                > > > > >
                > > > > > Dean,
                > > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken at
                > the Flood, pp. 338-9
                > > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp. 193-
                > 4. Let me know if you
                > > > do
                > > > > not have access to those books.
                > > > > >
                > > > > >
                > > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                > > > > > Professor of History
                > > > > > Hagerstown Community College
                > > > > >
                > > > > >
                > > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
                > > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
                > > > > >
                > > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean feat),
                > if I can impose (and
                > > > when
                > > > > you
                > > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but ammo"
                > exception.
                > > > > >
                > > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by the
                > time this project is
                > > done
                > > > > :-)
                > > > > >
                > > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll want
                > a copy of a product that
                > > > has
                > > > > your
                > > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
                > > > > >
                > > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                > <clemenst@> wrote:
                > > > > > >
                > > > > > > Dean,
                > > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
                > understanding that all trains
                > > > except
                > > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
                > food, had to go find his
                > > and
                > > > > bring
                > > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found theirs
                > near Sharpsburg.
                > > > > Longstreet'
                > > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not all
                > of his trains.
                > > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game? :-)
                > just kidding, I don't have
                > > > time
                > > > > to
                > > > > > play them.
                > > > > >
                > > > >
                > > >
                > >
                >
              • Joseph Pierro
                Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered across. Lee s first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the
                Message 7 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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                  Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered across. Lee's first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the order to McLaws shows) was to break off the entire campaign and retreat to Md. (After all, in a withdrawal, you send the trains first and keep the infantry in the rear -- the closest proximity to the pursuing enemy -- to conduct a fighting retreat. Recall Lee's similar orders regarding Imboden on the withdrawal from Gettysburg the following year.)

                  It was only when he realized that McClellan wasn't pressing the advantage, and when word arrived of the fall of Harper's Ferry, that he decided to hold position with his infantry on the east bank of the Potomac and accept battle.

                  As for the rest, given the fact that Pendleton had nearly three days to rest and refit his command, you have to wonder how it was that he managed to contribute next to nothing (no offense to Watson's Battery intended) on the day of the battle.

                  In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single instance where Pendleton, as chief of artillery, ever HELPED anyone (other than the Army of the Potomac) on a battlefield.

                  --jake
                  ----- Original Message ----
                  From: dean_essig <dean_essig@...>
                  To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
                  Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 7:25:52 PM
                  Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains

                  Thanks Jake!

                  That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
                  maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
                  (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.

                  As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2 Co,
                  Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
                  17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.

                  Dean

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                • dean_essig
                  Excellent post Jake and I agree fully! Pendleton sure does have an interesting relationship with the good functioning of the ANVa. Amazing that Lee put up with
                  Message 8 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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                    Excellent post Jake and I agree fully!

                    Pendleton sure does have an interesting relationship with the good functioning of the
                    ANVa. Amazing that Lee put up with it.

                    --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Pierro <joseph_pierro@...> wrote:
                    >
                    > Well, originally, the trains were ordered across because EVERYONE was being ordered
                    across. Lee's first inclination after losing the So. Mtn. passes (as the order to McLaws
                    shows) was to break off the entire campaign and retreat to Md. (After all, in a withdrawal,
                    you send the trains first and keep the infantry in the rear -- the closest proximity to the
                    pursuing enemy -- to conduct a fighting retreat. Recall Lee's similar orders regarding
                    Imboden on the withdrawal from Gettysburg the following year.)
                    >
                    > It was only when he realized that McClellan wasn't pressing the advantage, and when
                    word arrived of the fall of Harper's Ferry, that he decided to hold position with his infantry
                    on the east bank of the Potomac and accept battle.
                    >
                    > As for the rest, given the fact that Pendleton had nearly three days to rest and refit his
                    command, you have to wonder how it was that he managed to contribute next to nothing
                    (no offense to Watson's Battery intended) on the day of the battle.
                    >
                    > In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single instance where Pendleton, as chief of
                    artillery, ever HELPED anyone (other than the Army of the Potomac) on a battlefield.
                    >
                    > --jake
                    > ----- Original Message ----
                    > From: dean_essig <dean_essig@...>
                    > To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
                    > Sent: Friday, February 1, 2008 7:25:52 PM
                    > Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains
                    >
                    > Thanks Jake!
                    >
                    > That fits well with what Tom and I have been thinking. The trains were ordered across to
                    > maintain freedom of action and then, when battle was in the offing, the ordinance trains
                    > (at least small arms) were brought back across from Shepherdstown.
                    >
                    > As for Pendleton's "exceptional" effort to provide reinforcements to the army, I have 2
                    Co,
                    > Richmond Va Howitzers (3 guns) under Watson arriving from Williamsport late on the
                    > 17th. I assume this is the battery Carmen refers to.
                    >
                    > Dean
                    >
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                  • G E Mayers
                    Dear Jake; I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we are in this
                    Message 9 of 21 , Feb 1, 2008
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                      Dear Jake;

                      I have been working on a fictional novel telling the story of the
                      First Maryland Campaign for reader possibly not as learned as we
                      are in this group, concentrating on the unit level with the
                      Fourth NC (The Bloody Fourth) and then the larger command level
                      with Longstreet and Army HQ.

                      Where I've run into a little dilemma is knowing where Anderson's
                      brigade was positioned _after_ it was on the Old Sharpsburg Road
                      to do a grand wheel back UP South Mountain to take the Federals
                      in the flank and later, when it was determined to abandon the
                      mountain, which route or routes Anderson's Brigade retreated
                      towards Sharpsburg.

                      Can you search your Carman MS and, under separate email, provide
                      whatever information he might have? (Or, post here, if not
                      terribly, terribly long and lengthy!)

                      Thank you!

                      Yr. Obt. Svt.
                      G E "Gerry" Mayers

                      To Be A Virginian, either by birth, marriage, adoption, or even
                      on one's mother's side, is an introduction to any state in the
                      Union, a passport to any foreign country, and a benediction from
                      the Almighty God. --Anonymous
                      ----- Original Message -----
                      From: "joseph_pierro" <joseph_pierro@...>
                      To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                      Sent: Friday, February 01, 2008 7:09 PM
                      Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: ANVa Supply Trains


                      Dean:

                      Most of the trains and reserve artillery (one battalion excepted)
                      were ordered by Lee to cross over to the Virginia side at
                      Williamsport even before he decided to make his stand at
                      Sharpsburg.


                      from Carman:

                      "When Robert E. Lee, after nightfall of September 14,
                      realized
                      that the action at Turner's Gap had gone against him, he
                      abandoned
                      (temporarily, at least) his idea of a further invasion of the
                      North
                      into Pennsylvania, or even of remaining in Maryland, and took
                      immediate measures to reunite with McLaws and recross the Potomac
                      into Virginia. Those who were with Lee say that he gave no sign
                      of
                      disappointment and depression that his campaign had ended in
                      failure,
                      but we can imagine it was with a swelling heart that, at 8:00
                      p.m.,
                      he sent this dispatch to McLaws:
                      "'The day has gone against us and this army will go by
                      Sharpsburg
                      and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon
                      your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road
                      to
                      cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite
                      with
                      this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward
                      officers
                      to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac,
                      and
                      if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave
                      Shepherdstown
                      Ford for this command. Send an officer to report to me on the
                      Sharpsburg road, where you are and what crossing you will take.
                      You
                      will of course bring Anderson's division with you.'
                      "At about the same hour, he sent a dispatch to Jackson to
                      march
                      up from Harper's Ferry and cover his passage of the Potomac at
                      Shepherdstown Ford. (These orders to McLaws and Jackson
                      contemplated
                      the abandonment of operations against Harper's Ferry, but these
                      had
                      so far progressed that the place was then, virtually, in the
                      grasp of
                      Jackson and McLaws.) Longstreet and D. H. Hill were directed to
                      push
                      such of their commands and trains as were at and near Hagerstown
                      across the Potomac at Williamsport. The three reserve artillery
                      battalions at Beaver Creek (four miles north of Boonsboro)
                      were ordered to move-two battalions by Williamsport into
                      Virginia,
                      one battalion to Keedysville."

                      It would appear that Lee then kept them on the Va shore
                      afterwards
                      for so long because the operational and tactical situation
                      remained
                      in such a state of flux for the next few days. (Would McClellan
                      attack on the 15th? The 16th? Would Jackson arrive on the 16th?
                      Would
                      McLaws arrive on the 17th?) With only a single ford at his back,
                      the
                      last thing Lee wanted if his lines broke was his trains and
                      reserve
                      artillery clogging the only route of escape.

                      Carman again:
                      "Late at night [of the 14th] the commander of the reserve
                      artillery, General Pendleton (who with three battalions had, late
                      in
                      the afternoon, taken position on the heights of Beaver Creek,
                      four
                      miles north of Boonsboro) was summoned to Lee's headquarters
                      and directed to send S. D. Lee's Battalion to Keedysville and to
                      move
                      with the battalions of Brown and Nelson by the shortest route to
                      Williamsport and across the Potomac to guard the fords of the
                      river.
                      Pendleton hastened back to his camp, moved promptly to the
                      Boonsboro
                      and Williamsport Road, and by sunrise reached Jones's
                      Cross-Roads,
                      where the Williamsport Road intersects the Hagerstown and
                      Sharpsburg
                      Turnpike. Here he was informed that a large force of Union
                      cavalry
                      was not far ahead of him, upon which he placed some guns in
                      position
                      commanding the road leading to Williamsport and the Hagerstown
                      Pike
                      on either flank, sent to Toombs (who had passed down to
                      Sharpsburg)
                      for a regiment or two of infantry, and set to work collecting a
                      band
                      of armed stragglers to support his guns. Meanwhile, he had sent
                      out
                      scouting parties. These soon returned with information that the
                      road
                      was clear for some two miles, upon which (without waiting for
                      infantry from Toombs) he resumed the road to destroy the
                      'retiring
                      invaders' with his artillery and protect the large wagon train
                      proceeding by the Hagerstown Road through Williamsport. Colonel
                      Davis's cavalry had passed on the road and attacked Longstreet's
                      train, and Pendleton-without meeting an enemy or further delay-
                      reached Williamsport and crossed the Potomac by Light's Ford into
                      Virginia.
                      "Colonel Brown, with his battalion of five batteries, was
                      ordered
                      to guard Light's Ford and a ford two miles below. Major Nelson's
                      battalion of five batteries went down the river road to
                      Shepherdstown, which he reached on the sixteenth, and took
                      position on the heights commanding Shepherdstown Ford a mile
                      below
                      town."

                      In typical Pendleton fashion, once the battle was joined and the
                      artillery needed, he failed to rise to the emergency. Carman yet
                      again:

                      "About mid-day [of the 17th] Lee had sent this message to
                      Pendleton, commanding the reserve artillery at Shepherdstown
                      Ford: 'If
                      you have fifteen or twenty guns, suitable for our purpose, which
                      you
                      can spare, the general desires you to send them, with a
                      sufficiency
                      of ammunition. You must not take them from the fords if essential
                      to
                      their safety. Send up the stragglers. Take any cavalry about
                      there
                      and send up at the point of the sword. We want ammunition, guns,
                      and
                      provisions.' Pendleton could not collect the stragglers, he sent
                      up
                      but little ammunition, and it was not until the engagement had
                      closed
                      that one battery arrived at Sharpsburg."

                      Hope some of that helps.

                      --jake
                      --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "dean_essig"
                      <dean_essig@...>
                      wrote:
                      >
                      > Yes, I agree and have the infomation regarding the location of
                      > the
                      various artillery units.
                      >
                      > Not only was Lee still thinking about re-entering Md from the
                      > Va
                      side, but he hadn't ruled
                      > out an "attacking withdrawal" to the north, through the Union
                      > right
                      wing to Hagerstown.
                      >
                      > Trying to do that with the trains in tow would be impossible,
                      > but
                      allowing the trains to
                      > shadow the army on the Va side of the river makes a lot of
                      > sense.
                      >
                      > Given the situation, this kind of decision making is
                      > breathtakingly
                      fearless.
                      >
                      > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                      > <clemenst@>
                      wrote:
                      > >
                      > > I will look and see what else I can find. I think Lee was
                      > > using
                      the river to protect his
                      > trains preparatory to re-entering Maryland at Williamsport.
                      > Even
                      after he retreated on the
                      > 18th/19th his intent was to re-cross the river there and move
                      towards Hagerstown.
                      > Giving the wagons a head start would open the roads for his
                      infantry to move quickly. As
                      > you know, he had artillery detached to guard Shepherdstown Ford
                      > and
                      Light's Ford, and
                      > Stuart did go to Williamsport on the 19th to lead the way.
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
                      > > Professor of History
                      > > Hagerstown Community College
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 2:24 PM >>>
                      > > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
                      > >
                      > > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the
                      > > map.
                      > >
                      > > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I
                      > > don't
                      recall Reilly (who at least
                      > > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they
                      > > had
                      to ford the Potomac
                      > to
                      > > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly
                      suggests that what stocks
                      > they
                      > > had available were in the Md side trains.
                      > >
                      > > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across
                      > > the
                      river.
                      > >
                      > > Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections
                      > > about
                      the rather mundane
                      > > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                      > >
                      > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                      > > <clemenst@>
                      wrote:
                      > > >
                      > > > Dean,
                      > > > I keep meaning to tell you, nobody calls me Thomas, Tom is
                      > > > just
                      fine. I think you have
                      > it
                      > > correctly stated. Location of the Artillery Reserve trains,
                      > > such
                      as they were with the loss
                      > of
                      > > many near Williamsport, is likely across the river, however I
                      think some of it was
                      > forwarded
                      > > on the 18th as Lee called for gathering stragglers and ammo
                      resupply. Going from
                      > > memory, but in Lee's comments about his HQ tent he describes
                      > > it
                      as 1 & 1/4 miles from
                      > > Cemetery Hill, (I think) making the two miles just about on
                      > > Mt.
                      Airy, the Grove family
                      > farm.
                      > > That would also be logical for there was access to water and
                      > > lots
                      of fields to park a
                      > wagon
                      > > train there.
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > Dr. Thomas G. Clemens
                      > > > Professor of History
                      > > > Hagerstown Community College
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 2/1/2008 1:55 PM >>>
                      > > > Thomas,
                      > > >
                      > > > Reviewed the cited sections. All seems to be resolved but
                      > > > one
                      matter.
                      > > >
                      > > > What we know:
                      > > > 1) The non-Ammunition trains are in Shepherdstown. Getting
                      there at various dates.
                      > > > Hood's were escorted to his division so the Texans could
                      > > > get
                      some food.
                      > > >
                      > > > 2) Small arms ammuntion trains were ordered back into Md
                      > > > and
                      positioned "2 miles to
                      > > the
                      > > > rear" (that distance is mentioned in several places, but
                      > > > w/o a
                      reference as to rear of
                      > > what
                      > > > or who).
                      > > >
                      > > > The one thing (two parts) that we don't know is:
                      > > > 1a) Were the Army Reserve Ammunition trains still in
                      > > > Virgina?
                      Harsh believes so.
                      > > >
                      > > > 1b) Was there artillery ammunition in the trains that were
                      > > > sent
                      back into Md? This is
                      > > > interesting because it seems that Lee kept the Reserve
                      > > > Trains
                      across the river to avoid
                      > > > losing artillery ammunition.
                      > > >
                      > > > Am I off on any of the above and is there any answer to the
                      unknowns?
                      > > >
                      > > > Dean
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                      <clemenst@> wrote:
                      > > > >
                      > > > > Dean,
                      > > > > The info on the trains is mentioned in Chapter 8 of Taken
                      > > > > at
                      the Flood, pp. 338-9
                      > > > footnotes 34 & 37 and also in Sounding the Shallows, pp.
                      > > > 193-
                      4. Let me know if you
                      > > do
                      > > > not have access to those books.
                      > > > >
                      > > > >
                      > > > > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                      > > > > Professor of History
                      > > > > Hagerstown Community College
                      > > > >
                      > > > >
                      > > > > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@> 01/30/08 11:18 AM >>>
                      > > > > Excellent info, Thomas!
                      > > > >
                      > > > > That would bring all the loose ends together (no mean
                      > > > > feat),
                      if I can impose (and
                      > > when
                      > > > you
                      > > > > get a chance) please dig out some sources on the "but
                      > > > > ammo"
                      exception.
                      > > > >
                      > > > > You may not have earned a free game yet, but you will by
                      > > > > the
                      time this project is
                      > done
                      > > > :-)
                      > > > >
                      > > > > Doesn't matter if you don't have time to play it, you'll
                      > > > > want
                      a copy of a product that
                      > > has
                      > > > your
                      > > > > name in the research credits I would think. ;-)
                      > > > >
                      > > > > --- In TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com, "Thomas Clemens"
                      <clemenst@> wrote:
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > Dean,
                      > > > > > I am at work and away from sources, but it is my
                      understanding that all trains
                      > > except
                      > > > > ammo were sent across the river. Thus Hood, looking for
                      food, had to go find his
                      > and
                      > > > bring
                      > > > > them forward, while Reilly etc. looking for ammo found
                      > > > > theirs
                      near Sharpsburg.
                      > > > Longstreet'
                      > > > > loss was the Reserve Artillery ammo for his command, not
                      > > > > all
                      of his trains.
                      > > > > > Hope this helps. Do I get a free copy of the game?
                      > > > > > :-)
                      just kidding, I don't have
                      > > time
                      > > > to
                      > > > > play them.
                      > > > >
                      > > >
                      > >
                      >
                    • Thomas Clemens
                      Dean, A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not definitely show any location of the ammunition reserve trains. sorry. Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                      Message 10 of 21 , Feb 2, 2008
                      • 0 Attachment
                        Dean,
                        A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not definitely show any location of the ammunition reserve trains. sorry.

                        Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                        Professor of History
                        Hagerstown Community College


                        >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 02/01/08 2:24 PM >>>
                        Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!

                        Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains on the map.

                        The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
                        mentioned going back to look) or anyone else suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
                        get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this indirectly suggests that what stocks they
                        had available were in the Md side trains.

                        Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting across the river.

                        Do you know of any other battery commanders recollections about the rather mundane
                        matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                      • Dean Essig
                        Tom, Thanks for looking. It looks like the issue might be moot for me anyway, Mt Airy is off my map area (very similar to the Carmen-Cope maps) to the SW, so
                        Message 11 of 21 , Feb 2, 2008
                        • 0 Attachment
                          Tom,

                          Thanks for looking. It looks like the issue might be
                          moot for me anyway, Mt Airy is off my map area (very
                          similar to the Carmen-Cope maps) to the SW, so guns
                          looking to reload will have to shoot off the map there
                          (with an explanation of when they come back). Since
                          they are already going off the map, whether the trains
                          are at Mt Airy, Shepherdstown, or Boetler's matters
                          little... it will be a while in real time before they
                          come back.

                          Dean

                          --- Thomas Clemens <clemenst@...> wrote:

                          > Dean,
                          > A quick check of CS artillery memoirs, etc does not
                          > definitely show any location of the ammunition
                          > reserve trains. sorry.
                          >
                          > Thomas G. Clemens D.A.
                          > Professor of History
                          > Hagerstown Community College
                          >
                          >
                          > >>> "dean_essig" <dean_essig@...> 02/01/08
                          > 2:24 PM >>>
                          > Tom it is... glad to meet you, sir!
                          >
                          > Excellent information, that helps me spot the trains
                          > on the map.
                          >
                          > The artillery problem is an issue I'll need to
                          > resolve. I don't recall Reilly (who at least
                          > mentioned going back to look) or anyone else
                          > suggesting they had to ford the Potomac to
                          > get a re-supply of artillery ammunition. So, this
                          > indirectly suggests that what stocks they
                          > had available were in the Md side trains.
                          >
                          > Leaving me wondering what it was Lee was protecting
                          > across the river.
                          >
                          > Do you know of any other battery commanders
                          > recollections about the rather mundane
                          > matters of ammunition resupply on that day?
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          > Yahoo! Groups Links
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >



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