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Article about Hoods Texans

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  • NJ Rebel
    Group: This is going to be a long post, but I think the message should be able to handle it. Comments are welcomed, as this group has been very very sleepy
    Message 1 of 27 , Aug 21, 2001
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      Group:

      This is going to be a long post, but I think the message should
      be able to handle it.

      Comments are welcomed, as this group has been very very sleepy
      lately!

      Your humble servant,
      Gerry Mayers
      Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
      Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

      "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
      on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
      Edward Lee

      +++++++++++++++++++++++++++

      The First Maryland Campaign and Hood's Texans
      © Gerard Mayers, TalkAntietam Member


      The month of September is a special one for students of the
      regiments comprising Hood's Texas Brigade. While Hood's Texans
      won fame and renown on other fields of battle, the brigade
      immortalized itself in Civil War history by its participation in
      the counter-attack into The Cornfield during the Battle of
      Sharpsburg, September 17, 1862.
      The Battle of Sharpsburg was the culmination of a move by Robert
      E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia into Maryland in a
      three-pronged effort to: first, keep the tactical and strategic
      initiative (so illustriously won during the Seven Days Battles
      and the just-concluded Second Manassas campaign) on the side of
      the Southern Confederacy ; secondly, to draw Federal forces out
      of northern Virginia and the Valley of Virginia in order to allow
      for the gathering-in of vitally needed crops and foodstuffs;
      thirdly, to operate sufficiently north of the Potomac to give
      Maryland an opportunity to officially join the Confederacy and
      possibly also take the war into Northern territory (i.e.
      Pennsylvania).
      Advancing into Maryland as part of the Wing of the Army of
      Northern Virginia commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, Hood's
      Division encamped from September 7 to September 11 (approximate
      dates) in the general area between the Monocacy Junction railway
      bridge/aqueduct and the town of Frederick. While there, the
      Texans had a chance to wash their clothes and bathe, oftentimes
      in the same operation, and rest from the ardors of the previous
      weeks. Leaving Frederick on September 11 in accordance with its
      operational orders received as part of Special Order No. 191, the
      command marched from Frederick to Boonsboro along the National
      Turnpike, passing through Middletown en route. The macadamized
      surface of the road and undulating nature of the terrain caused
      much suffering among the Confederates, as many had worn out their
      brogans from all the marching and fighting of the previous weeks.
      Following an overnight rest at Boonsboro, Longstreet (with Lee
      accompanying) reached the Hagerstown area on September 13 after a
      forced march of thirteen miles.
      In the meantime, Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, entrusted with the
      rear guard of the Army of Northern Virginia, held his division
      around Boonsboro and the passes through South Mountain. An
      unlucky accident of the discovery of a copy of Special Order No.
      191 gave Union general George B. McClellan (commanding the
      Federal force comprised of units from the Army of the Potomac,
      the former Army of Virginia which Lee defeated at 2nd Manassas,
      the Ninth Army Corps under Ambrose Burnside from North Carolina
      and the Kanawha Division from the western portion of Virginia) a
      fairly good idea of the location of the scattered elements of Lee
      's army. About two-thirds of the Army of Northern Virginia had
      gone with Stonewall Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry and secure
      Lee's communications and supply lines through the Valley to
      Winchester. With SO 191 in his hands, McClellan ordered an
      energetic advance against the Confederates on the South Mountain
      passes and a relief column composed of William Franklin's wing of
      the Federal army to raise the Confederate siege of Harpers Ferry.
      As he stood on a prominence not far from his headquarters at the
      Old Mountain House in Turner's Gap (through which the National
      Turnpike passed), D H Hill saw two entire Federal Corps advancing
      against his small command holding not only Turner's Gap but also
      Fox's Gap to the south. Hill later commented that he had never
      understood the passage in the Old Testament about an army being
      terrible in battle array until that morning. Hill knew what he
      had to do and fast! A heavy Federal column was advancing against
      Fox's Gap and another column was heading straight for Turner's
      Gap. It was Fox's Gap that gave Hill the most concern. Loss of
      that pass through South Mountain would give the Federals the
      ability to not only flank him off the mountain but also seriously
      endanger the reserve artillery train and supply trains of the
      Army of Northern Virginia. Both trains were parked around
      Boonsboro.
      Orders went to George Anderson's Carolina brigade on the road
      from Boonsboro to Hagerstown to advance quickly to the top of the
      mountain at Turner's Gap and take the wood road to link up with
      the small brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland holding
      Fox's Gap along with portions of Bondurant's and Carter's
      Artillery batteries. A message went from Hill to Lee explaining
      the situation at hand, and stating the urgent need for
      re-enforcements. When Anderson's brigade (half commanded by Col.
      C C Tew of the Second North Carolina and the other half commanded
      by Anderson himself) reached Fox's Gap, it found a scene of total
      chaos for Confederate arms. Not only had Bondurant and Carter
      been forced back from their artillery positions, but also the
      brigade commanded by Garland had been routed and its commander
      mortally wounded. (Garland would essentially bleed to death on
      the porch of the Old Mountain House at Turner's Gap.) Though they
      did not know it at the time, elements of the Federal Ninth Corps
      succeeded in turning Hill's flank! The North Carolinians pitched
      in and restored the situation somewhat in favor of the
      Confederates. A nasty and see-saw battle erupted which basically
      left the Federals squarely on the eastern (or southwestern) part
      of the gap but unable to advance. But the Confederate hold on Fox
      's Gap was tenuous at best; a determined Federal push would leave
      no option but retreat.
      Hill's urgent message to Lee pleading for re-enforcements had
      its effect. Lee ordered Longstreet to turn around and march
      immediately for Boonsboro and the crisis on the mountain. Along
      with others in Longstreet's Wing, Hood's division marched toward
      the fighting. As members of the Texas Brigade marched through the
      little village (named for a brother of Daniel Boone of Kentucky
      fame during the Revolutionary War period), they encountered Lee
      who had reached Boonsboro in advance of them to assess the
      situation and confer with Hill. The Texans loudly shouted, "Give
      us Hood! Give us Hood!" Hood, marching in the rear of his
      division and under arrest as a result of a squabble with Gen.
      Nathan "Shanks" Evans over some ambulances captured by the Texas
      and others of his division during 2nd Manassas, was asked by Lee
      to forget about his claim to the ambulances and the matter would
      be dropped. Hood, on point of honor, refused to back down from
      his position. Owing to the desperateness of the moment, Lee
      restored Hood to command of his division after extracting a
      promise for Hood to return to his position of arrest once the
      emergency had passed. (The matter of Hood's arrest seems to have
      been forgotten by Lee; the matter was never again brought up
      owing to the Confederate fight for survival at Sharpsburg and
      Hood's later promotion to Major General late in October.) To the
      echo of cheers and shouts, Hood's Texans willingly resumed their
      rapid march with Hood again in the lead. Arriving atop Fox's Gap
      after the grueling and dusty forced march from Hagerstown, Hood's
      division helped stabilize the state of affairs and hold off
      further Federal advances on that front. At Turner's Gap, the
      Confederates had, by nightfall, stopped Federal advances on both
      sides of the Turnpike. North of Turner's Gap, Federal advances up
      the mountain had been successful but darkness put an end to the
      fighting.
      The Confederate resistance at South Mountain had not held back
      Federal assaults without price. At Crampton's Gap, Federal units
      under Franklin forced the Gap after pushing the Confederates from
      just outside Burkettsville. The Confederate defeat there enabled
      a Federal advance into Pleasant Valley at the northern side of
      the mountain. At Fox's Gap and Turner's Gap, the fighting had
      been savage, confusing and deadly. One of the few completely
      successful bayonet charges of the entire War occurred during the
      Turner's Gap fight. It was during this engagement that John
      Gibbon's brigade of Wisconsin and Indiana regiments was given the
      "Iron Brigade" nickname.
      Late in the night of September 14 and early morning of September
      15, the Confederates at Fox's Gap and Turner's Gap retreated en
      haste down South Mountain, leaving their many wounded and dead
      comrades for the victorious Federals to deal with. With the
      chaos, confusion and very dark night, some Confederates became
      separated from their units and left to their own devices to
      return to Virginia. A member of Co. E, Fourth Texas, deserted and
      went over to the enemy during this period. (A large Confederate
      field hospital at Boonsboro also was left to the Federals in the
      retreat towards Keedysville and Sharpsburg.) As the Army of
      Northern Virginia retreated, the Confederates were not only
      hungry; they were exhausted. The combination of the forced
      marches, the weather (it had been warm and humid) and the lack of
      sleep created a situation where straggling became excessive. Many
      soldiers simply concluded the campaign was over and Lee's army
      was in retreat back to Virginia; there they headed. Lee was
      indeed considering retreating back to Virginia and admitting his
      Maryland campaign a failure. But, as he moved his army closer to
      the Potomac and encountered the Sharpsburg Ridge, he realized the
      defensive possibilities of the terrain. He also knew that, while
      the Potomac made a large bend directly behind Sharpsburg, any
      engagement with McClellan's army meant fighting with one's back
      against the wall. A Confederate defeat anywhere near Sharpsburg
      would mean disaster!
      As he pondered his options, Lee ordered his weary veterans into
      defensive positions enabling them to watch the three bridges
      crossing The Antietam Creek on the highest possible terrain
      features available. (The northern, or upper, of the three gave
      access to the area north of Sharpsburg near the North and East
      Woods. The middle bridge gave direct access from Boonsboro to the
      little village of Sharpsburg along the Boonsboro Turnpike after
      climbing the Sharpsburg Ridge. The lower bridge, soon to be known
      forever as Burnside's Bridge, provided access to the village from
      the south.) At almost the same time, Lee received a note from
      Stonewall Jackson of the successful reduction and surrender of
      the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry. This Federal surrender was
      the largest of U. S. Army troops until the fall of Bataan and
      Corrigedor in The Philippines during the Second World War.) With
      this good piece of news, Lee decided to make a stand at
      Sharpsburg and ordered Stonewall to return with his portion of
      the Army of Northern Virginia. The stage was now being set for
      what would be the bloodiest single day of any military action in
      American history.
      In the late afternoon of Tuesday, September 16th, the First U.S
      Corps under command of Maj. Gen. Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker
      began its crossing of The Antietam Creek at Pry's Mill into the
      sector of the North and East Woods. During the same afternoon,
      Hood's Division held position in the fields east of the Dunkard
      Church (called by many Confederates as "St. Mumma's Church") and
      the Hagerstown Turnpike. At the approach of Hooker's Corps, Army
      of the Potomac, the division moved to the left and formed a line
      of battle. Resting its left on the Hagerstown Turnpike, the
      division extended along the south edge of D. R. Miller's
      cornfield ("The Cornfield") and anchored its right flank in the
      East Woods. The Fourth Texas, Wofford's Brigade, sent forward
      about a half mile as skirmishers, encountered the division of
      Pennsylvanians under Maj. Gen. George G. Meade and, with heavy
      fighting, were forced back from the North Woods. Re-enforced,
      however, on the right by the Fifth Texas and receiving support
      from Law's Brigade, the Fourth held the East Woods until darkness
      concluded the engagement. In this pre-cursor of things to come,
      the Confederate infantry received assistance from Lane's battery
      of Georgia Artillery, two guns of Rhett's South Carolina battery
      located between the Mumma house and Smoketown Road, one gun of
      Cutt's Artillery Battalion to the west near the Hagerstown
      Turnpike and Poague's Rockbridge (Va.) Battery of Jackson's
      Division about thirty yards west of the Hagerstown Turnpike. All
      the Confederate artillery elements engaged Union artillery
      deployed on the high ground to the north and east of D. R. Miller
      's. During the engagement, Col. Liddell, Eleventh Mississippi,
      Law's Brigade, received a mortal wound. At about 10 pm, Hood's
      division was withdrawn to the woods west of the Dunkard Church
      after being relieved by Lawton's and Trimble's brigades of Ewell'
      s division.
      At the time of its being relieved from the line, Hood's division
      had been promised by its commander to be held available to be
      called upon by Stonewall Jackson in event of any emergency. (It
      was the only way Hood could persuade Jackson to allow the men to
      come off the line.) Hood's men had had little sleep; they were
      starving. The weary men bedded down to get whatever sleep they
      could whilst awaiting their first hot meal in days.
      At about 5.30 am on the morning of Wednesday, September 17th,
      Hooker advanced his Corps from the North Woods area and the
      Joseph Poffenberger farm due south on both sides of the
      Hagerstown Turnpike with its objective the high ground
      immediately around the white-walled Dunkard Church.
      (Interestingly enough, the Federals thought the Dunkard Church to
      be a schoolhouse.) The church's location in a little cul-de-sac
      along the West Woods made it stand out prominently in the early
      morning mist. With this action, the Battle of Sharpsburg
      (Antietam) began. Almost immediately, the air was alive with the
      shriek and noise of mortal combat. Artillery from both sides
      began to rend the air with all sorts of sound and explosions.
      Confederate artillery began to take out members of Federal units
      within moments of the beginning of the advance; particularly as
      they passed alongside and around D. R. Miller's farm astride both
      sides of the Turnpike.
      It did not take long for the fighting to become desperate and
      reach a level of severity unequalled in the War to date.
      Confederate units belonging to Stonewall Jackson's Wing entered
      the fray and, within minutes, be compelled to fall back to or
      beyond their original positions due to the lead filling the air
      and horrific casualties. Lee and Jackson, along with the
      cooperation of Longstreet, kept finding fresh units and shuttling
      them to where they would help hold the line. Federal units also
      would enter the fight and be compelled to retire to their rear
      from battle fatigue and casualties. The fighting often occurred
      at practically point-blank rank in the area from D.R. Miller's
      down to the southern edge of Miller's Cornfield. Already, Miller'
      s Cornfield had become a piece of real estate bitterly contested
      with repeated Federal and Confederate attacks and
      counter-attacks. Hooker's men, while taking horrendous
      casualties, had effectively put Lawton's and Trbmle's troops out
      of action.
      Federal units at the southern edge of The Cornfield included the
      Fourteenth Brooklyn, a Zouave-type unit as well the Second and
      Sixth Wisconsin of Gibbon's brigade and the Second US
      Sharpshooters. Remember these units, as they will appear again in
      the story. The time is now approximately 6.50 a.m. Word had come
      to Hood that his division was needed desperately to help hold off
      Federal attacks that were stretching Jackson's hold on the left
      of the Army of Northern Virginia to the breaking-point. Hood's
      men had begun receiving their first rations of salt pork or beef
      and flour at about day-break when commissary wagons reached them.
      As they began to cook their first hot meal in days, Federal
      artillery commenced firing into their position, irritating them.
      The receipt of the order to advance and support Jackson meant an
      angry, hungry group. The combination of the interrupted breakfast
      and the dire nature of the military situation soon would
      immortalize Hood's Texans!
      Forming up line of battle west of the Dunkard Church at
      approximately 7 a.m. with only five minutes notice, the division
      marched toward deafening sounds of battle and the fog of war. The
      two brigades comprising Hood's division numbered about 850 to 900
      men. The Fourth Texas had an effective strength of about 200, led
      by their Lt. Colonel, Benjamin F. Carter. Company B, "Tom Green
      Rifles", mustered about twenty-two men. (Col. Key, colonel
      commanding of the regiment, was absent sick.) As it advanced past
      the Dunkard Church and toward the Smoketown Road, the division
      was aligned in its usual arrangement. Evander Law's brigade was
      on the division's right with the Texas (Wofford's) Brigade on the
      left, covering a quarter-mile wide front. The Texas Brigade was
      ordered, left to right, with the left-most unit anchoring on the
      Hagerstown Turnpike as Hampton's Legion (Gary), Eighteenth
      Georgia (Ruff), First Texas (Work), Fourth Texas (Carter), Fifth
      Texas (Turner). Hampton's Legion was the regiment of direction.
      Moving toward "the corn" and the East Woods (over much of the
      ground covered the previous afternoon), the division shortly
      encountered fierce Federal resistance. The shock of contact was
      so sudden and so fierce that a surviving Federal soldier compared
      it to an attack by a bunch of angry hornets! Hampton's Legion
      came under severe fire from the Federal divisions of
      Doubleday/Ricketts and the Federal batteries of Matthews and
      Thompson.
      As the rest of the division advanced, it poured a destructive
      fire into the Second and Sixth Wisconsin (with survivors of the
      Fourteenth Brooklyn) and the Second U.S. Sharpshooters. Compelled
      to retire by this sudden assault, the Federals rapidly moved back
      toward and into the Miller Cornfield. (Miller's Cornfield
      occupied the area from the western edge of the East Woods to the
      Hagerstown Turnpike just below D. R. Miller's farm buildings.)
      Following the retreating Federals, the Texans advanced to the
      base of a small plateau, about 300 yards from their starting
      position. While making this movement, the right flank of the
      Texas Brigade overlapped the left flank of Law. Hood ordered the
      Fifth Texas to move to the right of Law's men, in the direction
      of the East Woods. The Fourth Texas, however, found itself unable
      to return fire or see the enemy owing to the troops in their
      front and the dense battle smoke. Carter ordered his men to lie
      down after coming up on the rear of the Eleventh Mississippi of
      Law's brigade and receiving word from Capt. Sellers of Hood's
      staff to halt. The regiment did so, but its two right companies
      did not hear the order and continued to advance toward the East
      Woods with the Fifth Texas. At the same time, Hampton's Legion
      and the Eighteenth Georgia found themselves in trouble due to
      Federal fire from across the Hagerstown Turnpike and Federal
      artillery. The Federal units successfully were able to pour
      enfilade fire into the left flank of the division! Almost
      immediately after ordering the Fourth Texas to lie down, Carter
      received a positive order from Gen. Hood to move by the left to
      support the left-most regiments of the Texas Brigade. Wofford and
      Hood also ordered the First Texas to shift line toward the
      direction of the Hagerstown Pike.
      The Fourth Texas charged near to the fence on the eastern side
      of the Hagerstown Turnpike, resting its left on the crest of the
      plateau. There it supported the surviving members of Hampton's
      Legion and the Eighteenth Georgia. The regiment not only
      contended against Federals belonging to the Seventh Wisconsin,
      the Nineteenth Indiana and Patrick's Brigade but also suffered
      from the artillery fire of Campbell's battery located on and just
      to the west of the Turnpike. (A visitor to the area today would,
      if he stood in the corner of South Cornfield Avenue and the
      Hagerstown Turnpike, be approximately in the position occupied by
      the Fourth Texas during Hood's counter-attack into "the corn".)
      The First Texas, on the other hand, drove through the Cornfield
      to its north-eastern end, far outdistancing the other regiments.
      It managed to hold its advanced position in the
      Cornfield/Turnpike area until approximately 9 am when, after
      suffering truly horrific casualties, was forced to fall back. All
      the color bearers of the First Texas were killed or wounded; the
      flag of the regiment fell into Federal hands after being pried
      loose from the death grip of the captain of Company E.
      During the fight in the corn, Candy, the little fox terrier "war
      dog" of Co. B, became separated and was captured by the Federals.
      A wounded Corporal George Robertson, while laying in a Federal
      field hospital, saw Candy being triumphantly paraded around the
      Federal camp as the littlest prisoner they had captured during
      the battle. Candy was never seen or heard from again by the
      Texans. (Interestingly, Candy was well taken care of by all
      members of the Texas Brigade, never missing a meal. When the
      Texas crossed a river or stream, Candy was taken care of and
      carried across by the nearest available Texan.) The fighting took
      its toll on the members of the Fourth Texas. The little limestone
      ledges on the field, to which the wounded of the unit crawled for
      shelter, became instead new sources of terror. The screams of the
      wounded as they were struck by repeated ricochets form the stone
      outcroppings were a common occurrence.
      By 9 a.m., Hood had to withdraw his battered and decimated
      division from the field back toward the fields to the west and
      below the Dunkard Church. The fresh division of Lafayette McLaws
      relieved that of Hood. The human cost had been staggering after
      about two hours of mortal combat. As mentioned before, the Fourth
      Texas took about 200 men into battle, leaving 107 killed or
      wounded on the field as it withdrew. (Company B suffered losses
      of five killed, twelve wounded and six missing in
      action/captured.) Ike Turner's Fifth Texas lost 86 out of 185.
      Martin Gary, the commander of the Hampton Legion, reported a loss
      of 53 out of a total of 76, including four color bearers. S. Z
      Ruff, commanding colonel of the Eighteenth Georgia, suffered a
      loss of 101 out of 176. P. A Work, of the First Texas, reported
      losing 186 killed and wounded out of 226, the highest regimental
      loss of any Civil War regiment in battle (82.3%). Besides losing
      nine colors bearers, the First Texas had a company (Company F)
      completely wiped out; Company A with a sole survivor; 2 survivors
      in Company C and 3 in Company E (the highest battle loss of any
      company of the entire war). Eleven survivors, the most in the
      First Texas, answered roll call the following morning. Amazingly
      or perhaps miraculously enough, not a single one of the senior
      regimental commanders in the Texas Brigade received as much as a
      scratch! This is in stark contrast with Law's Brigade, where
      almost every senior regimental commander was either killed or
      wounded.
      As the survivors filtered back into the West Woods around the
      Dunkard Church, Hood met with Gen. Nathan Evans of South
      Carolina. Evans asked Hood, who was eating an apple for
      breakfast, where his division was. "Dead on the field," was the
      terse response. Moving some distance to the rear, the division
      was posted in the shape of a rough V, with orders to collect all
      stragglers-heedless of division or brigade or regiment---down to
      the point of the V. Within a space of two or three hours, about
      5,000 Confederate had been collected. The men were then formed
      into companies, regiments and brigades. It was a situation
      completely unknown in the Confederate army up to that point. No
      enlisted man knew the officer over him, or his file closer, or
      perhaps the man to his right or left. The normal surroundings
      which gave the Civil War soldier his greatest confidence and
      efficiency was thus removed. The unit received orders to "fall
      in" to advance at approximately mid-afternoon and marched in
      column of four by the right flank. As the head of the advancing
      column approached an apple tree close to its route of march, it
      encountered General Lee. Standing there with one arm still
      bandaged from a fall suffered at the conclusion of the Battle of
      2nd Manassas and holding his hat in his other hand, Lee said, in
      a voice loud enough to be heard by several companies at a time:
      "Men, I want you to go back on the line, and show that the
      stragglers of the Army of Northern Virginia, are better than the
      best troops of the enemy." The effect of this was, of course,
      electrifying. Had they been called into action that afternoon by
      their chieftain, the "Straggler's Brigade" would have won further
      glory for the Army of Northern Virginia. But, when dusk fell, men
      fell out and returned to their commands until only the men
      belonging to Hood's division were left.
      Hood's Texans would go on to win other laurels on other fields,
      including the Second Day at Gettysburg. But their sacrifice at
      Sharpsburg is recalled with reverence by all students of the
      Texas Brigade and of the actions of the Army of Northern Virginia
      at Sharpsburg. In a letter written to General Wigfall only one
      day after the Army of Northern Virginia returned across the
      Potomac on September 20, General Lee paid the Texans perhaps the
      greatest compliment ever: "General, I have not heard from you
      with regard to the new Texas regiments, which you promised to
      raise for the army. I need them very much. I rely upon those we
      have in all our tight places, and fear I have to call upon them
      too often. They have fought grandly and nobly, and we must have
      more of them. Please make every possible exertion to get them on
      for me. You must help us in this matter. With a few more
      regiments such as Hood now has, as an example of daring and
      bravery, I could feel more confident of the campaign."
      (The author is grateful to the Antietam National Battlefield
      Park for its help in gathering material for this article, as well
      as to fellow Civil War buffs Mark Voss of Houston, Tex. and John
      Furey, of Binghamton, N.Y. for their contributions. Some material
      was also located in Vols. VIII and XXIX of the Southern
      Historical Society Papers.)
    • David Lutton
      Gerry, I have one question concerning the account of Hood s troops at Antietam. In it Hampton s Legion and the 18th Georgia began to take fire on their left
      Message 2 of 27 , Aug 22, 2001
      • 0 Attachment
        Gerry,

        I have one question concerning the account of Hood's troops at Antietam. In
        it Hampton's Legion and the 18th Georgia began to take fire on their left
        flank causing them to change front to the west along the pike fence. But
        the nearest Union troops (that I am aware of) were situated along the"ledge"
        area. If you go to the ledge area today and look east you cannot see
        anything beyond the turnpike fence. I am not aware of any physical changes
        to the landscape in that area since the war so how could fire from it be so
        severe as to cause a change in front of a moving line???

        David Lutton
        ----- Original Message -----
        From: NJ Rebel <gerry1952@...>
        To: TalkAntietam <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
        Sent: Tuesday, August 21, 2001 7:33 PM
        Subject: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans


        > Group:
        >
        > This is going to be a long post, but I think the message should
        > be able to handle it.
        >
        > Comments are welcomed, as this group has been very very sleepy
        > lately!
        >
        > Your humble servant,
        > Gerry Mayers
        > Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
        > Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry
        >
        > "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
        > on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
        > Edward Lee
        >
        > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
        >
        > The First Maryland Campaign and Hood's Texans
        > © Gerard Mayers, TalkAntietam Member
        >
        >
        > The month of September is a special one for students of the
        > regiments comprising Hood's Texas Brigade. While Hood's Texans
        > won fame and renown on other fields of battle, the brigade
        > immortalized itself in Civil War history by its participation in
        > the counter-attack into The Cornfield during the Battle of
        > Sharpsburg, September 17, 1862.
        > The Battle of Sharpsburg was the culmination of a move by Robert
        > E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia into Maryland in a
        > three-pronged effort to: first, keep the tactical and strategic
        > initiative (so illustriously won during the Seven Days Battles
        > and the just-concluded Second Manassas campaign) on the side of
        > the Southern Confederacy ; secondly, to draw Federal forces out
        > of northern Virginia and the Valley of Virginia in order to allow
        > for the gathering-in of vitally needed crops and foodstuffs;
        > thirdly, to operate sufficiently north of the Potomac to give
        > Maryland an opportunity to officially join the Confederacy and
        > possibly also take the war into Northern territory (i.e.
        > Pennsylvania).
        > Advancing into Maryland as part of the Wing of the Army of
        > Northern Virginia commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, Hood's
        > Division encamped from September 7 to September 11 (approximate
        > dates) in the general area between the Monocacy Junction railway
        > bridge/aqueduct and the town of Frederick. While there, the
        > Texans had a chance to wash their clothes and bathe, oftentimes
        > in the same operation, and rest from the ardors of the previous
        > weeks. Leaving Frederick on September 11 in accordance with its
        > operational orders received as part of Special Order No. 191, the
        > command marched from Frederick to Boonsboro along the National
        > Turnpike, passing through Middletown en route. The macadamized
        > surface of the road and undulating nature of the terrain caused
        > much suffering among the Confederates, as many had worn out their
        > brogans from all the marching and fighting of the previous weeks.
        > Following an overnight rest at Boonsboro, Longstreet (with Lee
        > accompanying) reached the Hagerstown area on September 13 after a
        > forced march of thirteen miles.
        > In the meantime, Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, entrusted with the
        > rear guard of the Army of Northern Virginia, held his division
        > around Boonsboro and the passes through South Mountain. An
        > unlucky accident of the discovery of a copy of Special Order No.
        > 191 gave Union general George B. McClellan (commanding the
        > Federal force comprised of units from the Army of the Potomac,
        > the former Army of Virginia which Lee defeated at 2nd Manassas,
        > the Ninth Army Corps under Ambrose Burnside from North Carolina
        > and the Kanawha Division from the western portion of Virginia) a
        > fairly good idea of the location of the scattered elements of Lee
        > 's army. About two-thirds of the Army of Northern Virginia had
        > gone with Stonewall Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry and secure
        > Lee's communications and supply lines through the Valley to
        > Winchester. With SO 191 in his hands, McClellan ordered an
        > energetic advance against the Confederates on the South Mountain
        > passes and a relief column composed of William Franklin's wing of
        > the Federal army to raise the Confederate siege of Harpers Ferry.
        > As he stood on a prominence not far from his headquarters at the
        > Old Mountain House in Turner's Gap (through which the National
        > Turnpike passed), D H Hill saw two entire Federal Corps advancing
        > against his small command holding not only Turner's Gap but also
        > Fox's Gap to the south. Hill later commented that he had never
        > understood the passage in the Old Testament about an army being
        > terrible in battle array until that morning. Hill knew what he
        > had to do and fast! A heavy Federal column was advancing against
        > Fox's Gap and another column was heading straight for Turner's
        > Gap. It was Fox's Gap that gave Hill the most concern. Loss of
        > that pass through South Mountain would give the Federals the
        > ability to not only flank him off the mountain but also seriously
        > endanger the reserve artillery train and supply trains of the
        > Army of Northern Virginia. Both trains were parked around
        > Boonsboro.
        > Orders went to George Anderson's Carolina brigade on the road
        > from Boonsboro to Hagerstown to advance quickly to the top of the
        > mountain at Turner's Gap and take the wood road to link up with
        > the small brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland holding
        > Fox's Gap along with portions of Bondurant's and Carter's
        > Artillery batteries. A message went from Hill to Lee explaining
        > the situation at hand, and stating the urgent need for
        > re-enforcements. When Anderson's brigade (half commanded by Col.
        > C C Tew of the Second North Carolina and the other half commanded
        > by Anderson himself) reached Fox's Gap, it found a scene of total
        > chaos for Confederate arms. Not only had Bondurant and Carter
        > been forced back from their artillery positions, but also the
        > brigade commanded by Garland had been routed and its commander
        > mortally wounded. (Garland would essentially bleed to death on
        > the porch of the Old Mountain House at Turner's Gap.) Though they
        > did not know it at the time, elements of the Federal Ninth Corps
        > succeeded in turning Hill's flank! The North Carolinians pitched
        > in and restored the situation somewhat in favor of the
        > Confederates. A nasty and see-saw battle erupted which basically
        > left the Federals squarely on the eastern (or southwestern) part
        > of the gap but unable to advance. But the Confederate hold on Fox
        > 's Gap was tenuous at best; a determined Federal push would leave
        > no option but retreat.
        > Hill's urgent message to Lee pleading for re-enforcements had
        > its effect. Lee ordered Longstreet to turn around and march
        > immediately for Boonsboro and the crisis on the mountain. Along
        > with others in Longstreet's Wing, Hood's division marched toward
        > the fighting. As members of the Texas Brigade marched through the
        > little village (named for a brother of Daniel Boone of Kentucky
        > fame during the Revolutionary War period), they encountered Lee
        > who had reached Boonsboro in advance of them to assess the
        > situation and confer with Hill. The Texans loudly shouted, "Give
        > us Hood! Give us Hood!" Hood, marching in the rear of his
        > division and under arrest as a result of a squabble with Gen.
        > Nathan "Shanks" Evans over some ambulances captured by the Texas
        > and others of his division during 2nd Manassas, was asked by Lee
        > to forget about his claim to the ambulances and the matter would
        > be dropped. Hood, on point of honor, refused to back down from
        > his position. Owing to the desperateness of the moment, Lee
        > restored Hood to command of his division after extracting a
        > promise for Hood to return to his position of arrest once the
        > emergency had passed. (The matter of Hood's arrest seems to have
        > been forgotten by Lee; the matter was never again brought up
        > owing to the Confederate fight for survival at Sharpsburg and
        > Hood's later promotion to Major General late in October.) To the
        > echo of cheers and shouts, Hood's Texans willingly resumed their
        > rapid march with Hood again in the lead. Arriving atop Fox's Gap
        > after the grueling and dusty forced march from Hagerstown, Hood's
        > division helped stabilize the state of affairs and hold off
        > further Federal advances on that front. At Turner's Gap, the
        > Confederates had, by nightfall, stopped Federal advances on both
        > sides of the Turnpike. North of Turner's Gap, Federal advances up
        > the mountain had been successful but darkness put an end to the
        > fighting.
        > The Confederate resistance at South Mountain had not held back
        > Federal assaults without price. At Crampton's Gap, Federal units
        > under Franklin forced the Gap after pushing the Confederates from
        > just outside Burkettsville. The Confederate defeat there enabled
        > a Federal advance into Pleasant Valley at the northern side of
        > the mountain. At Fox's Gap and Turner's Gap, the fighting had
        > been savage, confusing and deadly. One of the few completely
        > successful bayonet charges of the entire War occurred during the
        > Turner's Gap fight. It was during this engagement that John
        > Gibbon's brigade of Wisconsin and Indiana regiments was given the
        > "Iron Brigade" nickname.
        > Late in the night of September 14 and early morning of September
        > 15, the Confederates at Fox's Gap and Turner's Gap retreated en
        > haste down South Mountain, leaving their many wounded and dead
        > comrades for the victorious Federals to deal with. With the
        > chaos, confusion and very dark night, some Confederates became
        > separated from their units and left to their own devices to
        > return to Virginia. A member of Co. E, Fourth Texas, deserted and
        > went over to the enemy during this period. (A large Confederate
        > field hospital at Boonsboro also was left to the Federals in the
        > retreat towards Keedysville and Sharpsburg.) As the Army of
        > Northern Virginia retreated, the Confederates were not only
        > hungry; they were exhausted. The combination of the forced
        > marches, the weather (it had been warm and humid) and the lack of
        > sleep created a situation where straggling became excessive. Many
        > soldiers simply concluded the campaign was over and Lee's army
        > was in retreat back to Virginia; there they headed. Lee was
        > indeed considering retreating back to Virginia and admitting his
        > Maryland campaign a failure. But, as he moved his army closer to
        > the Potomac and encountered the Sharpsburg Ridge, he realized the
        > defensive possibilities of the terrain. He also knew that, while
        > the Potomac made a large bend directly behind Sharpsburg, any
        > engagement with McClellan's army meant fighting with one's back
        > against the wall. A Confederate defeat anywhere near Sharpsburg
        > would mean disaster!
        > As he pondered his options, Lee ordered his weary veterans into
        > defensive positions enabling them to watch the three bridges
        > crossing The Antietam Creek on the highest possible terrain
        > features available. (The northern, or upper, of the three gave
        > access to the area north of Sharpsburg near the North and East
        > Woods. The middle bridge gave direct access from Boonsboro to the
        > little village of Sharpsburg along the Boonsboro Turnpike after
        > climbing the Sharpsburg Ridge. The lower bridge, soon to be known
        > forever as Burnside's Bridge, provided access to the village from
        > the south.) At almost the same time, Lee received a note from
        > Stonewall Jackson of the successful reduction and surrender of
        > the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry. This Federal surrender was
        > the largest of U. S. Army troops until the fall of Bataan and
        > Corrigedor in The Philippines during the Second World War.) With
        > this good piece of news, Lee decided to make a stand at
        > Sharpsburg and ordered Stonewall to return with his portion of
        > the Army of Northern Virginia. The stage was now being set for
        > what would be the bloodiest single day of any military action in
        > American history.
        > In the late afternoon of Tuesday, September 16th, the First U.S
        > Corps under command of Maj. Gen. Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker
        > began its crossing of The Antietam Creek at Pry's Mill into the
        > sector of the North and East Woods. During the same afternoon,
        > Hood's Division held position in the fields east of the Dunkard
        > Church (called by many Confederates as "St. Mumma's Church") and
        > the Hagerstown Turnpike. At the approach of Hooker's Corps, Army
        > of the Potomac, the division moved to the left and formed a line
        > of battle. Resting its left on the Hagerstown Turnpike, the
        > division extended along the south edge of D. R. Miller's
        > cornfield ("The Cornfield") and anchored its right flank in the
        > East Woods. The Fourth Texas, Wofford's Brigade, sent forward
        > about a half mile as skirmishers, encountered the division of
        > Pennsylvanians under Maj. Gen. George G. Meade and, with heavy
        > fighting, were forced back from the North Woods. Re-enforced,
        > however, on the right by the Fifth Texas and receiving support
        > from Law's Brigade, the Fourth held the East Woods until darkness
        > concluded the engagement. In this pre-cursor of things to come,
        > the Confederate infantry received assistance from Lane's battery
        > of Georgia Artillery, two guns of Rhett's South Carolina battery
        > located between the Mumma house and Smoketown Road, one gun of
        > Cutt's Artillery Battalion to the west near the Hagerstown
        > Turnpike and Poague's Rockbridge (Va.) Battery of Jackson's
        > Division about thirty yards west of the Hagerstown Turnpike. All
        > the Confederate artillery elements engaged Union artillery
        > deployed on the high ground to the north and east of D. R. Miller
        > 's. During the engagement, Col. Liddell, Eleventh Mississippi,
        > Law's Brigade, received a mortal wound. At about 10 pm, Hood's
        > division was withdrawn to the woods west of the Dunkard Church
        > after being relieved by Lawton's and Trimble's brigades of Ewell'
        > s division.
        > At the time of its being relieved from the line, Hood's division
        > had been promised by its commander to be held available to be
        > called upon by Stonewall Jackson in event of any emergency. (It
        > was the only way Hood could persuade Jackson to allow the men to
        > come off the line.) Hood's men had had little sleep; they were
        > starving. The weary men bedded down to get whatever sleep they
        > could whilst awaiting their first hot meal in days.
        > At about 5.30 am on the morning of Wednesday, September 17th,
        > Hooker advanced his Corps from the North Woods area and the
        > Joseph Poffenberger farm due south on both sides of the
        > Hagerstown Turnpike with its objective the high ground
        > immediately around the white-walled Dunkard Church.
        > (Interestingly enough, the Federals thought the Dunkard Church to
        > be a schoolhouse.) The church's location in a little cul-de-sac
        > along the West Woods made it stand out prominently in the early
        > morning mist. With this action, the Battle of Sharpsburg
        > (Antietam) began. Almost immediately, the air was alive with the
        > shriek and noise of mortal combat. Artillery from both sides
        > began to rend the air with all sorts of sound and explosions.
        > Confederate artillery began to take out members of Federal units
        > within moments of the beginning of the advance; particularly as
        > they passed alongside and around D. R. Miller's farm astride both
        > sides of the Turnpike.
        > It did not take long for the fighting to become desperate and
        > reach a level of severity unequalled in the War to date.
        > Confederate units belonging to Stonewall Jackson's Wing entered
        > the fray and, within minutes, be compelled to fall back to or
        > beyond their original positions due to the lead filling the air
        > and horrific casualties. Lee and Jackson, along with the
        > cooperation of Longstreet, kept finding fresh units and shuttling
        > them to where they would help hold the line. Federal units also
        > would enter the fight and be compelled to retire to their rear
        > from battle fatigue and casualties. The fighting often occurred
        > at practically point-blank rank in the area from D.R. Miller's
        > down to the southern edge of Miller's Cornfield. Already, Miller'
        > s Cornfield had become a piece of real estate bitterly contested
        > with repeated Federal and Confederate attacks and
        > counter-attacks. Hooker's men, while taking horrendous
        > casualties, had effectively put Lawton's and Trbmle's troops out
        > of action.
        > Federal units at the southern edge of The Cornfield included the
        > Fourteenth Brooklyn, a Zouave-type unit as well the Second and
        > Sixth Wisconsin of Gibbon's brigade and the Second US
        > Sharpshooters. Remember these units, as they will appear again in
        > the story. The time is now approximately 6.50 a.m. Word had come
        > to Hood that his division was needed desperately to help hold off
        > Federal attacks that were stretching Jackson's hold on the left
        > of the Army of Northern Virginia to the breaking-point. Hood's
        > men had begun receiving their first rations of salt pork or beef
        > and flour at about day-break when commissary wagons reached them.
        > As they began to cook their first hot meal in days, Federal
        > artillery commenced firing into their position, irritating them.
        > The receipt of the order to advance and support Jackson meant an
        > angry, hungry group. The combination of the interrupted breakfast
        > and the dire nature of the military situation soon would
        > immortalize Hood's Texans!
        > Forming up line of battle west of the Dunkard Church at
        > approximately 7 a.m. with only five minutes notice, the division
        > marched toward deafening sounds of battle and the fog of war. The
        > two brigades comprising Hood's division numbered about 850 to 900
        > men. The Fourth Texas had an effective strength of about 200, led
        > by their Lt. Colonel, Benjamin F. Carter. Company B, "Tom Green
        > Rifles", mustered about twenty-two men. (Col. Key, colonel
        > commanding of the regiment, was absent sick.) As it advanced past
        > the Dunkard Church and toward the Smoketown Road, the division
        > was aligned in its usual arrangement. Evander Law's brigade was
        > on the division's right with the Texas (Wofford's) Brigade on the
        > left, covering a quarter-mile wide front. The Texas Brigade was
        > ordered, left to right, with the left-most unit anchoring on the
        > Hagerstown Turnpike as Hampton's Legion (Gary), Eighteenth
        > Georgia (Ruff), First Texas (Work), Fourth Texas (Carter), Fifth
        > Texas (Turner). Hampton's Legion was the regiment of direction.
        > Moving toward "the corn" and the East Woods (over much of the
        > ground covered the previous afternoon), the division shortly
        > encountered fierce Federal resistance. The shock of contact was
        > so sudden and so fierce that a surviving Federal soldier compared
        > it to an attack by a bunch of angry hornets! Hampton's Legion
        > came under severe fire from the Federal divisions of
        > Doubleday/Ricketts and the Federal batteries of Matthews and
        > Thompson.
        > As the rest of the division advanced, it poured a destructive
        > fire into the Second and Sixth Wisconsin (with survivors of the
        > Fourteenth Brooklyn) and the Second U.S. Sharpshooters. Compelled
        > to retire by this sudden assault, the Federals rapidly moved back
        > toward and into the Miller Cornfield. (Miller's Cornfield
        > occupied the area from the western edge of the East Woods to the
        > Hagerstown Turnpike just below D. R. Miller's farm buildings.)
        > Following the retreating Federals, the Texans advanced to the
        > base of a small plateau, about 300 yards from their starting
        > position. While making this movement, the right flank of the
        > Texas Brigade overlapped the left flank of Law. Hood ordered the
        > Fifth Texas to move to the right of Law's men, in the direction
        > of the East Woods. The Fourth Texas, however, found itself unable
        > to return fire or see the enemy owing to the troops in their
        > front and the dense battle smoke. Carter ordered his men to lie
        > down after coming up on the rear of the Eleventh Mississippi of
        > Law's brigade and receiving word from Capt. Sellers of Hood's
        > staff to halt. The regiment did so, but its two right companies
        > did not hear the order and continued to advance toward the East
        > Woods with the Fifth Texas. At the same time, Hampton's Legion
        > and the Eighteenth Georgia found themselves in trouble due to
        > Federal fire from across the Hagerstown Turnpike and Federal
        > artillery. The Federal units successfully were able to pour
        > enfilade fire into the left flank of the division! Almost
        > immediately after ordering the Fourth Texas to lie down, Carter
        > received a positive order from Gen. Hood to move by the left to
        > support the left-most regiments of the Texas Brigade. Wofford and
        > Hood also ordered the First Texas to shift line toward the
        > direction of the Hagerstown Pike.
        > The Fourth Texas charged near to the fence on the eastern side
        > of the Hagerstown Turnpike, resting its left on the crest of the
        > plateau. There it supported the surviving members of Hampton's
        > Legion and the Eighteenth Georgia. The regiment not only
        > contended against Federals belonging to the Seventh Wisconsin,
        > the Nineteenth Indiana and Patrick's Brigade but also suffered
        > from the artillery fire of Campbell's battery located on and just
        > to the west of the Turnpike. (A visitor to the area today would,
        > if he stood in the corner of South Cornfield Avenue and the
        > Hagerstown Turnpike, be approximately in the position occupied by
        > the Fourth Texas during Hood's counter-attack into "the corn".)
        > The First Texas, on the other hand, drove through the Cornfield
        > to its north-eastern end, far outdistancing the other regiments.
        > It managed to hold its advanced position in the
        > Cornfield/Turnpike area until approximately 9 am when, after
        > suffering truly horrific casualties, was forced to fall back. All
        > the color bearers of the First Texas were killed or wounded; the
        > flag of the regiment fell into Federal hands after being pried
        > loose from the death grip of the captain of Company E.
        > During the fight in the corn, Candy, the little fox terrier "war
        > dog" of Co. B, became separated and was captured by the Federals.
        > A wounded Corporal George Robertson, while laying in a Federal
        > field hospital, saw Candy being triumphantly paraded around the
        > Federal camp as the littlest prisoner they had captured during
        > the battle. Candy was never seen or heard from again by the
        > Texans. (Interestingly, Candy was well taken care of by all
        > members of the Texas Brigade, never missing a meal. When the
        > Texas crossed a river or stream, Candy was taken care of and
        > carried across by the nearest available Texan.) The fighting took
        > its toll on the members of the Fourth Texas. The little limestone
        > ledges on the field, to which the wounded of the unit crawled for
        > shelter, became instead new sources of terror. The screams of the
        > wounded as they were struck by repeated ricochets form the stone
        > outcroppings were a common occurrence.
        > By 9 a.m., Hood had to withdraw his battered and decimated
        > division from the field back toward the fields to the west and
        > below the Dunkard Church. The fresh division of Lafayette McLaws
        > relieved that of Hood. The human cost had been staggering after
        > about two hours of mortal combat. As mentioned before, the Fourth
        > Texas took about 200 men into battle, leaving 107 killed or
        > wounded on the field as it withdrew. (Company B suffered losses
        > of five killed, twelve wounded and six missing in
        > action/captured.) Ike Turner's Fifth Texas lost 86 out of 185.
        > Martin Gary, the commander of the Hampton Legion, reported a loss
        > of 53 out of a total of 76, including four color bearers. S. Z
        > Ruff, commanding colonel of the Eighteenth Georgia, suffered a
        > loss of 101 out of 176. P. A Work, of the First Texas, reported
        > losing 186 killed and wounded out of 226, the highest regimental
        > loss of any Civil War regiment in battle (82.3%). Besides losing
        > nine colors bearers, the First Texas had a company (Company F)
        > completely wiped out; Company A with a sole survivor; 2 survivors
        > in Company C and 3 in Company E (the highest battle loss of any
        > company of the entire war). Eleven survivors, the most in the
        > First Texas, answered roll call the following morning. Amazingly
        > or perhaps miraculously enough, not a single one of the senior
        > regimental commanders in the Texas Brigade received as much as a
        > scratch! This is in stark contrast with Law's Brigade, where
        > almost every senior regimental commander was either killed or
        > wounded.
        > As the survivors filtered back into the West Woods around the
        > Dunkard Church, Hood met with Gen. Nathan Evans of South
        > Carolina. Evans asked Hood, who was eating an apple for
        > breakfast, where his division was. "Dead on the field," was the
        > terse response. Moving some distance to the rear, the division
        > was posted in the shape of a rough V, with orders to collect all
        > stragglers-heedless of division or brigade or regiment---down to
        > the point of the V. Within a space of two or three hours, about
        > 5,000 Confederate had been collected. The men were then formed
        > into companies, regiments and brigades. It was a situation
        > completely unknown in the Confederate army up to that point. No
        > enlisted man knew the officer over him, or his file closer, or
        > perhaps the man to his right or left. The normal surroundings
        > which gave the Civil War soldier his greatest confidence and
        > efficiency was thus removed. The unit received orders to "fall
        > in" to advance at approximately mid-afternoon and marched in
        > column of four by the right flank. As the head of the advancing
        > column approached an apple tree close to its route of march, it
        > encountered General Lee. Standing there with one arm still
        > bandaged from a fall suffered at the conclusion of the Battle of
        > 2nd Manassas and holding his hat in his other hand, Lee said, in
        > a voice loud enough to be heard by several companies at a time:
        > "Men, I want you to go back on the line, and show that the
        > stragglers of the Army of Northern Virginia, are better than the
        > best troops of the enemy." The effect of this was, of course,
        > electrifying. Had they been called into action that afternoon by
        > their chieftain, the "Straggler's Brigade" would have won further
        > glory for the Army of Northern Virginia. But, when dusk fell, men
        > fell out and returned to their commands until only the men
        > belonging to Hood's division were left.
        > Hood's Texans would go on to win other laurels on other fields,
        > including the Second Day at Gettysburg. But their sacrifice at
        > Sharpsburg is recalled with reverence by all students of the
        > Texas Brigade and of the actions of the Army of Northern Virginia
        > at Sharpsburg. In a letter written to General Wigfall only one
        > day after the Army of Northern Virginia returned across the
        > Potomac on September 20, General Lee paid the Texans perhaps the
        > greatest compliment ever: "General, I have not heard from you
        > with regard to the new Texas regiments, which you promised to
        > raise for the army. I need them very much. I rely upon those we
        > have in all our tight places, and fear I have to call upon them
        > too often. They have fought grandly and nobly, and we must have
        > more of them. Please make every possible exertion to get them on
        > for me. You must help us in this matter. With a few more
        > regiments such as Hood now has, as an example of daring and
        > bravery, I could feel more confident of the campaign."
        > (The author is grateful to the Antietam National Battlefield
        > Park for its help in gathering material for this article, as well
        > as to fellow Civil War buffs Mark Voss of Houston, Tex. and John
        > Furey, of Binghamton, N.Y. for their contributions. Some material
        > was also located in Vols. VIII and XXIX of the Southern
        > Historical Society Papers.)
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
        >
        >
      • NJ Rebel
        David, That is a good question indeed. However, the information I have read speaks of a slight plateau along with the left wing of the Texas Brigade had
        Message 3 of 27 , Aug 22, 2001
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          David,

          That is a good question indeed. However, the information I have
          read speaks of a slight plateau along with the left wing of the
          Texas Brigade had anchored itself. Perhaps this was how the
          Federal troops near the Turnpike on the western side were able to
          fire into the Hampton Legion and the Eighteenth Georgia. Also,
          remember the two units began to take battery fire from Campbell's
          battery. Perhaps member Todd Livesy can assist with the
          typographical features of the area and explain whether such
          Federal action was possible or not;

          Hope this helps!

          Your humble servant,
          Gerry Mayers
          Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
          Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

          "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
          on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
          Edward Lee


          ----- Original Message -----
          From: "David Lutton" <dunkerch@...>
          To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
          Sent: Wednesday, August 22, 2001 7:41 PM
          Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans


          Gerry,

          I have one question concerning the account of Hood's troops at
          Antietam. In
          it Hampton's Legion and the 18th Georgia began to take fire on
          their left
          flank causing them to change front to the west along the pike
          fence. But
          the nearest Union troops (that I am aware of) were situated along
          the"ledge"
          area. If you go to the ledge area today and look east you
          cannot see
          anything beyond the turnpike fence. I am not aware of any
          physical changes
          to the landscape in that area since the war so how could fire
          from it be so
          severe as to cause a change in front of a moving line???

          David Lutton
        • Mark A. Pflum
          ... Howdy Gerry! Excellent article, Sir! I do, however, have two comments that border on nit-pickin . ;-) First off, you say: Union general George B.
          Message 4 of 27 , Aug 22, 2001
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            --- In TalkAntietam@y..., "NJ Rebel" <gerry1952@e...> wrote:
            > Group:
            >
            > This is going to be a long post, but I think the message should
            > be able to handle it.
            >
            > Comments are welcomed, as this group has been very very sleepy
            > lately!
            >
            > Your humble servant,
            > Gerry Mayers
            > Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
            > Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry


            Howdy Gerry!

            Excellent article, Sir! I do, however, have two comments that border
            on nit-pickin'. ;-)

            First off, you say:

            "Union general George B. McClellan (commanding the Federal force
            comprised of units from the Army of the Potomac, the former Army of
            Virginia which Lee defeated at 2nd Manassas, the Ninth Army Corps
            under Ambrose Burnside from North Carolina and the Kanawha Division
            from the western portion of Virginia)"

            The Ninth Army Corps was formed just before 2nd Bull Run and saw its
            first action under that name in that fight. They were, I believe,
            part of the Army Of Virginia that you mentioned earlier in the quote.

            Secondly, and this one hits even closer to my home (literally):

            "<Snip> named for a brother of Daniel Boone of Kentucky fame during
            the Revolutionary War period <snip>"

            I know you are simply saying Dan'l was of Kentucky fame, but it may
            give the missinformed the impression that he was actually FROM
            Kentucky. We all know, of course, he was born and raised near
            Reading, Pennsylvania and his folks were friends of the ancestors of
            a guy named Abraham Lincoln. ;-)

            Elsewise a very informative piece of work, my greyback friend!

            Mark A. Pflum
            Just fighting for two entities that I care deeply about! :-)
          • TR Livesey
            Gerry, Good question. I have provided links to two images. Image 1 (http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl1.gif) shows the elevation in the region of interest. I
            Message 5 of 27 , Aug 22, 2001
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              Gerry,

              Good question.

              I have provided links to two images.

              Image 1 (http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl1.gif) shows
              the elevation in the region of interest. I have also
              drawn the approximate location of Union troops (7 WI/19 IND)
              and Confederate troops (18 GA,H.L.,4 TX) as according to
              plate 4 of the Antietam Battlefield Atlas.

              Image 2 (http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl2.gif) shows
              an analytical estimation of what each point from the Union
              position can see of the Confederate position. Each point in
              the Union position is color coded as to what percentage of
              the Confederate position is visible (red - highest visibility,
              blue, green, yellow worst). This chart summarizes the numbers:

              |---------------------------------------------------------|
              | Category Information | % |
              | #|description | cover|
              |---------------------------------------------------------|
              | 0|no data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 3.82|
              | 1| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 27.42|
              | 2| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.01|
              | 3| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.36|
              | 4| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.61|
              | 5| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.57|
              | 6| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.70|
              | 7| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.35|
              | 8| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.31|
              | 9| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.59|
              |10| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.52|
              |11| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.41|
              |12| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.31|
              |13| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.17|
              |14| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.69|
              |15| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.48|
              |16| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.64|
              |17| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.34|
              |18| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.58|
              |19| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.41|
              |20| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 3.28|
              |21| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.34|
              |22| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.81|
              |23| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.64|
              |24| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.70|
              |25| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.06|
              |26| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.11|
              |27| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.58|
              |28| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.17|
              |29| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.64|
              |30| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.59|
              |31| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.17|
              |32| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.87|
              |33| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.31|
              |34| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 3.51|
              |35| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.99|
              |36| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.29|
              |37| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.36|
              |38| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.07|
              |39| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.12|
              |40| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.80|
              |41| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.47|
              |42| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.23|
              |43| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.23|
              |45| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.13|
              |48| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.23|
              |---------------------------------------------------------|
              |TOTAL |100.00|
              +---------------------------------------------------------+

              What this chart says is that 3.82% of the Union position can
              see nothing of the Confederate position. 27.42% of the Union
              position can see greater than 0% but no more than 1% of the
              Confederate position. 2.01% of the Union position can see
              more than 1% but no more than 2% of the Confederate
              position, etc. Note that the best spot on the Union position
              can see about 48% of the Confederate position, which is really
              quite good. In all, almost 60% of the Union troops can see 10%
              or more of the Confederate position.

              In all, I think it is safe to conclude that Union troops at
              'the ledge' can fire into Confederate troops east of the
              turnpike.

              Hope that helps.

              Regards,
              Todd Livesey
              westwood@...

              NJ Rebel wrote:
              >
              > David,
              >
              > That is a good question indeed. However, the information I have
              > read speaks of a slight plateau along with the left wing of the
              > Texas Brigade had anchored itself. Perhaps this was how the
              > Federal troops near the Turnpike on the western side were able to
              > fire into the Hampton Legion and the Eighteenth Georgia. Also,
              > remember the two units began to take battery fire from Campbell's
              > battery. Perhaps member Todd Livesy can assist with the
              > typographical features of the area and explain whether such
              > Federal action was possible or not;
              >
              > Hope this helps!
              >
              > Your humble servant,
              > Gerry Mayers
              > Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
              > Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry
              >
              > "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
              > on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
              > Edward Lee
              >
              > ----- Original Message -----
              > From: "David Lutton" <dunkerch@...>
              > To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
              > Sent: Wednesday, August 22, 2001 7:41 PM
              > Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans
              >
              > Gerry,
              >
              > I have one question concerning the account of Hood's troops at
              > Antietam. In
              > it Hampton's Legion and the 18th Georgia began to take fire on
              > their left
              > flank causing them to change front to the west along the pike
              > fence. But
              > the nearest Union troops (that I am aware of) were situated along
              > the"ledge"
              > area. If you go to the ledge area today and look east you
              > cannot see
              > anything beyond the turnpike fence. I am not aware of any
              > physical changes
              > to the landscape in that area since the war so how could fire
              > from it be so
              > severe as to cause a change in front of a moving line???
              >
              > David Lutton
              >
              >
              >
              > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
            • NJ Rebel
              Mark; Thank you for the two additional sidebar comments. I just want to tell you that I had no intention of disparaging old Daniel, but wanted to not write a
              Message 6 of 27 , Aug 23, 2001
              • 0 Attachment
                Mark;

                Thank you for the two additional sidebar comments. I just want to
                tell you that I had no intention of disparaging old Daniel, but
                wanted to not write a complete subparagraph of about where Daniel
                was really from....your comment handled that quite nicely!

                Hope to be able to see you again soon.
                "Or when I breast the cannon's blaze and bemoan my comrades
                dead..."

                Let's see if you can pick up which song that line belongs to!!!
                :=)

                Your humble servant,
                Gerry Mayers
                Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
                Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

                "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
                on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
                Edward Lee


                ----- Original Message -----
                From: "Mark A. Pflum" <ringgold_redleg@...>
                To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2001 12:45 AM
                Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Article about Hoods Texans


                > --- In TalkAntietam@y..., "NJ Rebel" <gerry1952@e...> wrote:
                > > Group:
                > >
                > > This is going to be a long post, but I think the message
                should
                > > be able to handle it.
                > >
                > > Comments are welcomed, as this group has been very very
                sleepy
                > > lately!
                > >
                > > Your humble servant,
                > > Gerry Mayers
                > > Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
                > > Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry
                >
                >
                > Howdy Gerry!
                >
                > Excellent article, Sir! I do, however, have two comments that
                border
                > on nit-pickin'. ;-)
                >
                > First off, you say:
                >
                > "Union general George B. McClellan (commanding the Federal
                force
                > comprised of units from the Army of the Potomac, the former
                Army of
                > Virginia which Lee defeated at 2nd Manassas, the Ninth Army
                Corps
                > under Ambrose Burnside from North Carolina and the Kanawha
                Division
                > from the western portion of Virginia)"
                >
                > The Ninth Army Corps was formed just before 2nd Bull Run and
                saw its
                > first action under that name in that fight. They were, I
                believe,
                > part of the Army Of Virginia that you mentioned earlier in the
                quote.
                >
                > Secondly, and this one hits even closer to my home (literally):
                >
                > "<Snip> named for a brother of Daniel Boone of Kentucky fame
                during
                > the Revolutionary War period <snip>"
                >
                > I know you are simply saying Dan'l was of Kentucky fame, but it
                may
                > give the missinformed the impression that he was actually FROM
                > Kentucky. We all know, of course, he was born and raised near
                > Reading, Pennsylvania and his folks were friends of the
                ancestors of
                > a guy named Abraham Lincoln. ;-)
                >
                > Elsewise a very informative piece of work, my greyback friend!
                >
                > Mark A. Pflum
                > Just fighting for two entities that I care deeply about! :-)
                >
                >
                > Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
                > ADVERTISEMENT
                >
                >
                >
                >
                >
                >
                >
                > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
                Service.
                >
                >
              • David Lutton
                Todd, Thanks for the information concerning the ledge area of the field. I do have one question though. On both of your terrain maps I believe you are
                Message 7 of 27 , Aug 25, 2001
                • 0 Attachment
                  Todd,

                  Thanks for the information concerning the ledge area of the field. I do
                  have one question though. On both of your terrain maps I believe you are
                  showing the Texas Brigade position as it ultimately became, that is on the
                  eastern side of the turnpike fence facing west returning fire from the ledge
                  and Battery B.

                  But their original movement was of course north with their left flank
                  anchored on the turnpike fence. Could Patrick's and Gibbon's men see
                  anything east of the turnpike fence? Or am I mistaked and your calculation
                  is based on what they could see of the movement of the Texas Brigade as it
                  moved in a northerly direction?

                  The reason I even asked the question was that I had walked most of the ledge
                  area and I really could not see anything past the post and rail fence as I
                  looked east. I was under the impression that some of Starke's troops moving
                  on the west side of the turnpike fence accompanying the Texans on their
                  northward advance were the troops that Patrick and Gibbon's troops
                  targeted. But I cannot recall where I got that information.

                  I'll have to trek that area again sometime during the Anniversary Days next
                  month. Thanks again, Todd.

                  David Lutton
                  ----- Original Message -----
                  From: TR Livesey <westwood@...>
                  To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                  Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2001 1:09 AM
                  Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans


                  > Gerry,
                  >
                  > Good question.
                  >
                  > I have provided links to two images.
                  >
                  > Image 1 (http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl1.gif) shows
                  > the elevation in the region of interest. I have also
                  > drawn the approximate location of Union troops (7 WI/19 IND)
                  > and Confederate troops (18 GA,H.L.,4 TX) as according to
                  > plate 4 of the Antietam Battlefield Atlas.
                  >
                  > Image 2 (http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl2.gif) shows
                  > an analytical estimation of what each point from the Union
                  > position can see of the Confederate position. Each point in
                  > the Union position is color coded as to what percentage of
                  > the Confederate position is visible (red - highest visibility,
                  > blue, green, yellow worst). This chart summarizes the numbers:
                  >
                  > |---------------------------------------------------------|
                  > | Category Information | % |
                  > | #|description | cover|
                  > |---------------------------------------------------------|
                  > | 0|no data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 3.82|
                  > | 1| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 27.42|
                  > | 2| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.01|
                  > | 3| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.36|
                  > | 4| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.61|
                  > | 5| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.57|
                  > | 6| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.70|
                  > | 7| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.35|
                  > | 8| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.31|
                  > | 9| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.59|
                  > |10| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.52|
                  > |11| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.41|
                  > |12| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.31|
                  > |13| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.17|
                  > |14| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.69|
                  > |15| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.48|
                  > |16| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.64|
                  > |17| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.34|
                  > |18| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.58|
                  > |19| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.41|
                  > |20| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 3.28|
                  > |21| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.34|
                  > |22| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.81|
                  > |23| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.64|
                  > |24| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.70|
                  > |25| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.06|
                  > |26| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.11|
                  > |27| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.58|
                  > |28| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.17|
                  > |29| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.64|
                  > |30| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.59|
                  > |31| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.17|
                  > |32| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.87|
                  > |33| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.31|
                  > |34| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 3.51|
                  > |35| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.99|
                  > |36| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 2.29|
                  > |37| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.36|
                  > |38| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.07|
                  > |39| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.12|
                  > |40| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.80|
                  > |41| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.47|
                  > |42| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.23|
                  > |43| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.23|
                  > |45| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1.13|
                  > |48| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 0.23|
                  > |---------------------------------------------------------|
                  > |TOTAL |100.00|
                  > +---------------------------------------------------------+
                  >
                  > What this chart says is that 3.82% of the Union position can
                  > see nothing of the Confederate position. 27.42% of the Union
                  > position can see greater than 0% but no more than 1% of the
                  > Confederate position. 2.01% of the Union position can see
                  > more than 1% but no more than 2% of the Confederate
                  > position, etc. Note that the best spot on the Union position
                  > can see about 48% of the Confederate position, which is really
                  > quite good. In all, almost 60% of the Union troops can see 10%
                  > or more of the Confederate position.
                  >
                  > In all, I think it is safe to conclude that Union troops at
                  > 'the ledge' can fire into Confederate troops east of the
                  > turnpike.
                  >
                  > Hope that helps.
                  >
                  > Regards,
                  > Todd Livesey
                  > westwood@...
                  >
                  > NJ Rebel wrote:
                  > >
                  > > David,
                  > >
                  > > That is a good question indeed. However, the information I have
                  > > read speaks of a slight plateau along with the left wing of the
                  > > Texas Brigade had anchored itself. Perhaps this was how the
                  > > Federal troops near the Turnpike on the western side were able to
                  > > fire into the Hampton Legion and the Eighteenth Georgia. Also,
                  > > remember the two units began to take battery fire from Campbell's
                  > > battery. Perhaps member Todd Livesy can assist with the
                  > > typographical features of the area and explain whether such
                  > > Federal action was possible or not;
                  > >
                  > > Hope this helps!
                  > >
                  > > Your humble servant,
                  > > Gerry Mayers
                  > > Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
                  > > Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry
                  > >
                  > > "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
                  > > on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
                  > > Edward Lee
                  > >
                  > > ----- Original Message -----
                  > > From: "David Lutton" <dunkerch@...>
                  > > To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                  > > Sent: Wednesday, August 22, 2001 7:41 PM
                  > > Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans
                  > >
                  > > Gerry,
                  > >
                  > > I have one question concerning the account of Hood's troops at
                  > > Antietam. In
                  > > it Hampton's Legion and the 18th Georgia began to take fire on
                  > > their left
                  > > flank causing them to change front to the west along the pike
                  > > fence. But
                  > > the nearest Union troops (that I am aware of) were situated along
                  > > the"ledge"
                  > > area. If you go to the ledge area today and look east you
                  > > cannot see
                  > > anything beyond the turnpike fence. I am not aware of any
                  > > physical changes
                  > > to the landscape in that area since the war so how could fire
                  > > from it be so
                  > > severe as to cause a change in front of a moving line???
                  > >
                  > > David Lutton
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                  http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                  >
                  >
                • rotbaron@aol.com
                  Message 8 of 27 , Aug 25, 2001
                  • 0 Attachment
                    <<The reason I even asked the question was that I had walked most of the ledge area and I really could not see anything past the post and rail fence as I looked east. >>

                    David,
                    While walking the ledge with a Ranger, I too felt that it certainly didn't seem to offer much of a "killing zone" for the Union infantry. But I stated, to his amusement, (joking of course) that those Texans were noted for being rather tall.

                    Tom Shay
                  • David Lutton
                    Tom, Them fellas weren t that tall! Again the events that occurred after the movement to the fence are understandable. But what caused its necessity? David
                    Message 9 of 27 , Aug 26, 2001
                    • 0 Attachment
                      Tom,

                      Them fellas weren't that tall!
                      Again the events that occurred after the movement to the fence are
                      understandable. But what caused its necessity?

                      David Lutton
                      ----- Original Message -----
                      From: <rotbaron@...>
                      To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                      Sent: Sunday, August 26, 2001 12:16 AM
                      Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans


                      > <<The reason I even asked the question was that I had walked most of the
                      ledge area and I really could not see anything past the post and rail fence
                      as I looked east. >>
                      >
                      > David,
                      > While walking the ledge with a Ranger, I too felt that it certainly didn't
                      seem to offer much of a "killing zone" for the Union infantry. But I stated,
                      to his amusement, (joking of course) that those Texans were noted for being
                      rather tall.
                      >
                      > Tom Shay
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                      >
                      >
                    • TR Livesey
                      David, Yes, I am showing Hoods troops after they had turned to meet union troops on their left. As for what could be seen, there are a variety of ways to try
                      Message 10 of 27 , Aug 26, 2001
                      • 0 Attachment
                        David,

                        Yes, I am showing Hoods troops after they had turned to meet union
                        troops
                        on their left.

                        As for what could be seen, there are a variety of ways to try to
                        visualize that.

                        I have created a 3rd map

                        http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl4.gif

                        which shows the region of interest with a blue zone of Union troops and
                        a red zone of potential Confederate troops. A (grossly exaggerated)
                        profile
                        map is inset on the lower left. I have shown a yellow line in the main
                        image to indicate the alignment of the profile. I have assumed that
                        both the Union and Confederate troops have an 'eye level' of 5 feet
                        above the ground. In the profile, you can see the discontinuity
                        of the red and blue zones - this is the 5 foot vantage point.

                        If you place a straight edge on the profile, you should be able to see
                        that you can touch the blue zone and the red zone without cutting
                        through any intervening ground - that demonstrates a line of sight
                        between the two zones along this line. Furthermore, if you hold
                        the straight edge at the peak of the blue zone, and at the level
                        of the clover where the clover meets the red zone, you can see the
                        line cuts fairly deeply into the red zone, certainly to about the
                        peak of the high ground south of the cornfield, demonstrating that
                        you should be able to see somewhat into the red zone from the
                        blue zone (along this line).

                        Of course, a field expedition should be used to back these predictions
                        up, but the evidence suggests that troops in these positions should
                        be able to see one another.

                        TRL
                        -------------------------------------------------
                        David Lutton wrote:
                        Todd,

                        Thanks for the information concerning the ledge area of the field. I do
                        have one question though. On both of your terrain maps I believe you
                        are
                        showing the Texas Brigade position as it ultimately became, that is on
                        the
                        eastern side of the turnpike fence facing west returning fire from the
                        ledge
                        and Battery B.

                        But their original movement was of course north with their left flank
                        anchored on the turnpike fence. Could Patrick's and Gibbon's men see
                        anything east of the turnpike fence? Or am I mistaked and your
                        calculation
                        is based on what they could see of the movement of the Texas Brigade as
                        it
                        moved in a northerly direction?

                        The reason I even asked the question was that I had walked most of the
                        ledge
                        area and I really could not see anything past the post and rail fence as
                        I
                        looked east. I was under the impression that some of Starke's troops
                        moving
                        on the west side of the turnpike fence accompanying the Texans on their
                        northward advance were the troops that Patrick and Gibbon's troops
                        targeted. But I cannot recall where I got that information.

                        I'll have to trek that area again sometime during the Anniversary Days
                        next
                        month. Thanks again, Todd.

                        David Lutton
                      • David Lutton
                        Todd, Again many thanks for your analysis and expertise. I am always willing to make a field study in Sharpsburg, even when there really isn t anything to
                        Message 11 of 27 , Aug 26, 2001
                        • 0 Attachment
                          Todd,

                          Again many thanks for your analysis and expertise. I am always willing to
                          make a field study in Sharpsburg, even when there really isn't anything to
                          study! Just another good excuse to make that 2 hour drive down Route 70!!
                          Your map 3 does intrigue me though. When viewing the ground from the ledge,
                          I was always looking directly east. Perhaps a view to the southeast would
                          be instructive. I will let you know of the results.

                          David Lutton

                          ----- Original Message -----
                          From: TR Livesey <westwood@...>
                          To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                          Sent: Sunday, August 26, 2001 6:54 PM
                          Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans


                          > David,
                          >
                          > Yes, I am showing Hoods troops after they had turned to meet union
                          > troops
                          > on their left.
                          >
                          > As for what could be seen, there are a variety of ways to try to
                          > visualize that.
                          >
                          > I have created a 3rd map
                          >
                          > http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl4.gif
                          >
                          > which shows the region of interest with a blue zone of Union troops and
                          > a red zone of potential Confederate troops. A (grossly exaggerated)
                          > profile
                          > map is inset on the lower left. I have shown a yellow line in the main
                          > image to indicate the alignment of the profile. I have assumed that
                          > both the Union and Confederate troops have an 'eye level' of 5 feet
                          > above the ground. In the profile, you can see the discontinuity
                          > of the red and blue zones - this is the 5 foot vantage point.
                          >
                          > If you place a straight edge on the profile, you should be able to see
                          > that you can touch the blue zone and the red zone without cutting
                          > through any intervening ground - that demonstrates a line of sight
                          > between the two zones along this line. Furthermore, if you hold
                          > the straight edge at the peak of the blue zone, and at the level
                          > of the clover where the clover meets the red zone, you can see the
                          > line cuts fairly deeply into the red zone, certainly to about the
                          > peak of the high ground south of the cornfield, demonstrating that
                          > you should be able to see somewhat into the red zone from the
                          > blue zone (along this line).
                          >
                          > Of course, a field expedition should be used to back these predictions
                          > up, but the evidence suggests that troops in these positions should
                          > be able to see one another.
                          >
                          > TRL
                          > -------------------------------------------------
                          > David Lutton wrote:
                          > Todd,
                          >
                          > Thanks for the information concerning the ledge area of the field. I do
                          > have one question though. On both of your terrain maps I believe you
                          > are
                          > showing the Texas Brigade position as it ultimately became, that is on
                          > the
                          > eastern side of the turnpike fence facing west returning fire from the
                          > ledge
                          > and Battery B.
                          >
                          > But their original movement was of course north with their left flank
                          > anchored on the turnpike fence. Could Patrick's and Gibbon's men see
                          > anything east of the turnpike fence? Or am I mistaked and your
                          > calculation
                          > is based on what they could see of the movement of the Texas Brigade as
                          > it
                          > moved in a northerly direction?
                          >
                          > The reason I even asked the question was that I had walked most of the
                          > ledge
                          > area and I really could not see anything past the post and rail fence as
                          > I
                          > looked east. I was under the impression that some of Starke's troops
                          > moving
                          > on the west side of the turnpike fence accompanying the Texans on their
                          > northward advance were the troops that Patrick and Gibbon's troops
                          > targeted. But I cannot recall where I got that information.
                          >
                          > I'll have to trek that area again sometime during the Anniversary Days
                          > next
                          > month. Thanks again, Todd.
                          >
                          > David Lutton
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          >
                          > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                          >
                          >
                        • TR Livesey
                          David, If you look directly east, you get into a different situation: corn. The question arises about how concealing corn will be. The corn was certainly
                          Message 12 of 27 , Aug 26, 2001
                          • 0 Attachment
                            David,

                            If you look directly east, you get into a different situation: corn.
                            The question arises about how concealing corn will be. The corn was
                            certainly taller than troops, so it is possible for it to conceal
                            troops within it. If you look at a modern cornfield, it is very
                            concealing, largely because the stalks are planted so densely.
                            Corn planting patterns were different in 1862, not nearly as
                            dense, with rows being wide enough for a horse to move between.
                            This would imply that the corn will have different degrees of
                            concealment, depending on what angle you are looking at it -
                            if you are looking straight down a row, you may be able to see
                            into the corn field, but if you look obliquely you would be
                            able to see less. For simplicity, I usually assume corn is
                            concealing.

                            I have provided anther map, showing an eastern profile. I assume
                            corn is 8' tall.

                            http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl5.gif

                            If corn is concealing, then you should not be able to see Confederate
                            troops in it, otherwise, Confederate troops should be visible.
                            One must also consider how trampled down the corn would be at
                            this time.

                            When you did your investigation last time, did you have someone
                            standing in the Confederate area to judge if they could be seen?
                            If not, then perhaps that is why it would appear that there would
                            not be line of sight.

                            TRL

                            David Lutton wrote:
                            >
                            > Todd,
                            >
                            > Again many thanks for your analysis and expertise. I am always willing to
                            > make a field study in Sharpsburg, even when there really isn't anything to
                            > study! Just another good excuse to make that 2 hour drive down Route 70!!
                            > Your map 3 does intrigue me though. When viewing the ground from the ledge,
                            > I was always looking directly east. Perhaps a view to the southeast would
                            > be instructive. I will let you know of the results.
                            >
                            > David Lutton
                            >
                            > ----- Original Message -----
                            > From: TR Livesey <westwood@...>
                            > To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                            > Sent: Sunday, August 26, 2001 6:54 PM
                            > Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans
                            >
                            > > David,
                            > >
                            > > Yes, I am showing Hoods troops after they had turned to meet union
                            > > troops
                            > > on their left.
                            > >
                            > > As for what could be seen, there are a variety of ways to try to
                            > > visualize that.
                            > >
                            > > I have created a 3rd map
                            > >
                            > > http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl4.gif
                            > >
                            > > which shows the region of interest with a blue zone of Union troops and
                            > > a red zone of potential Confederate troops. A (grossly exaggerated)
                            > > profile
                            > > map is inset on the lower left. I have shown a yellow line in the main
                            > > image to indicate the alignment of the profile. I have assumed that
                            > > both the Union and Confederate troops have an 'eye level' of 5 feet
                            > > above the ground. In the profile, you can see the discontinuity
                            > > of the red and blue zones - this is the 5 foot vantage point.
                            > >
                            > > If you place a straight edge on the profile, you should be able to see
                            > > that you can touch the blue zone and the red zone without cutting
                            > > through any intervening ground - that demonstrates a line of sight
                            > > between the two zones along this line. Furthermore, if you hold
                            > > the straight edge at the peak of the blue zone, and at the level
                            > > of the clover where the clover meets the red zone, you can see the
                            > > line cuts fairly deeply into the red zone, certainly to about the
                            > > peak of the high ground south of the cornfield, demonstrating that
                            > > you should be able to see somewhat into the red zone from the
                            > > blue zone (along this line).
                            > >
                            > > Of course, a field expedition should be used to back these predictions
                            > > up, but the evidence suggests that troops in these positions should
                            > > be able to see one another.
                            > >
                            > > TRL
                            > > -------------------------------------------------
                            > > David Lutton wrote:
                            > > Todd,
                            > >
                            > > Thanks for the information concerning the ledge area of the field. I do
                            > > have one question though. On both of your terrain maps I believe you
                            > > are
                            > > showing the Texas Brigade position as it ultimately became, that is on
                            > > the
                            > > eastern side of the turnpike fence facing west returning fire from the
                            > > ledge
                            > > and Battery B.
                            > >
                            > > But their original movement was of course north with their left flank
                            > > anchored on the turnpike fence. Could Patrick's and Gibbon's men see
                            > > anything east of the turnpike fence? Or am I mistaked and your
                            > > calculation
                            > > is based on what they could see of the movement of the Texas Brigade as
                            > > it
                            > > moved in a northerly direction?
                            > >
                            > > The reason I even asked the question was that I had walked most of the
                            > > ledge
                            > > area and I really could not see anything past the post and rail fence as
                            > > I
                            > > looked east. I was under the impression that some of Starke's troops
                            > > moving
                            > > on the west side of the turnpike fence accompanying the Texans on their
                            > > northward advance were the troops that Patrick and Gibbon's troops
                            > > targeted. But I cannot recall where I got that information.
                            > >
                            > > I'll have to trek that area again sometime during the Anniversary Days
                            > > next
                            > > month. Thanks again, Todd.
                            > >
                            > > David Lutton
                            > >
                            > >
                            > >
                            > >
                            > >
                            > >
                            > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                            > >
                            > >
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                          • David Lutton
                            Todd, Actually, I walked the ledge area south of the cornfield. I understood that the order to protect the left flank was given about 200 yards south of the
                            Message 13 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
                            • 0 Attachment
                              Todd,

                              Actually, I walked the ledge area south of the cornfield. I understood that
                              the order to protect the left flank was given about 200 yards south of the
                              cornfield. Hence the destructive fire must have hit Hood's troops in the
                              area south of present day Starke Ave. The 4th Texas being the first
                              regiment to change front to the pike fence. I agree as you move north along
                              the ledge from Starke Ave. you can see further into the area east of the
                              pike.

                              Also I will take you advise and commandeer someone to walk the area of the
                              advance of Hood's men while I observe from the Ledge!

                              Do I need a life or what?!!!!

                              David Lutton l
                              ----- Original Message -----
                              From: TR Livesey <westwood@...>
                              To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                              Sent: Sunday, August 26, 2001 11:14 PM
                              Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans


                              > David,
                              >
                              > If you look directly east, you get into a different situation: corn.
                              > The question arises about how concealing corn will be. The corn was
                              > certainly taller than troops, so it is possible for it to conceal
                              > troops within it. If you look at a modern cornfield, it is very
                              > concealing, largely because the stalks are planted so densely.
                              > Corn planting patterns were different in 1862, not nearly as
                              > dense, with rows being wide enough for a horse to move between.
                              > This would imply that the corn will have different degrees of
                              > concealment, depending on what angle you are looking at it -
                              > if you are looking straight down a row, you may be able to see
                              > into the corn field, but if you look obliquely you would be
                              > able to see less. For simplicity, I usually assume corn is
                              > concealing.
                              >
                              > I have provided anther map, showing an eastern profile. I assume
                              > corn is 8' tall.
                              >
                              > http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl5.gif
                              >
                              > If corn is concealing, then you should not be able to see Confederate
                              > troops in it, otherwise, Confederate troops should be visible.
                              > One must also consider how trampled down the corn would be at
                              > this time.
                              >
                              > When you did your investigation last time, did you have someone
                              > standing in the Confederate area to judge if they could be seen?
                              > If not, then perhaps that is why it would appear that there would
                              > not be line of sight.
                              >
                              > TRL
                              >
                              > David Lutton wrote:
                              > >
                              > > Todd,
                              > >
                              > > Again many thanks for your analysis and expertise. I am always willing
                              to
                              > > make a field study in Sharpsburg, even when there really isn't anything
                              to
                              > > study! Just another good excuse to make that 2 hour drive down Route
                              70!!
                              > > Your map 3 does intrigue me though. When viewing the ground from the
                              ledge,
                              > > I was always looking directly east. Perhaps a view to the southeast
                              would
                              > > be instructive. I will let you know of the results.
                              > >
                              > > David Lutton
                              > >
                              > > ----- Original Message -----
                              > > From: TR Livesey <westwood@...>
                              > > To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                              > > Sent: Sunday, August 26, 2001 6:54 PM
                              > > Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans
                              > >
                              > > > David,
                              > > >
                              > > > Yes, I am showing Hoods troops after they had turned to meet union
                              > > > troops
                              > > > on their left.
                              > > >
                              > > > As for what could be seen, there are a variety of ways to try to
                              > > > visualize that.
                              > > >
                              > > > I have created a 3rd map
                              > > >
                              > > > http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/hl4.gif
                              > > >
                              > > > which shows the region of interest with a blue zone of Union troops
                              and
                              > > > a red zone of potential Confederate troops. A (grossly exaggerated)
                              > > > profile
                              > > > map is inset on the lower left. I have shown a yellow line in the main
                              > > > image to indicate the alignment of the profile. I have assumed that
                              > > > both the Union and Confederate troops have an 'eye level' of 5 feet
                              > > > above the ground. In the profile, you can see the discontinuity
                              > > > of the red and blue zones - this is the 5 foot vantage point.
                              > > >
                              > > > If you place a straight edge on the profile, you should be able to see
                              > > > that you can touch the blue zone and the red zone without cutting
                              > > > through any intervening ground - that demonstrates a line of sight
                              > > > between the two zones along this line. Furthermore, if you hold
                              > > > the straight edge at the peak of the blue zone, and at the level
                              > > > of the clover where the clover meets the red zone, you can see the
                              > > > line cuts fairly deeply into the red zone, certainly to about the
                              > > > peak of the high ground south of the cornfield, demonstrating that
                              > > > you should be able to see somewhat into the red zone from the
                              > > > blue zone (along this line).
                              > > >
                              > > > Of course, a field expedition should be used to back these predictions
                              > > > up, but the evidence suggests that troops in these positions should
                              > > > be able to see one another.
                              > > >
                              > > > TRL
                              > > > -------------------------------------------------
                              > > > David Lutton wrote:
                              > > > Todd,
                              > > >
                              > > > Thanks for the information concerning the ledge area of the field. I
                              do
                              > > > have one question though. On both of your terrain maps I believe you
                              > > > are
                              > > > showing the Texas Brigade position as it ultimately became, that is on
                              > > > the
                              > > > eastern side of the turnpike fence facing west returning fire from the
                              > > > ledge
                              > > > and Battery B.
                              > > >
                              > > > But their original movement was of course north with their left flank
                              > > > anchored on the turnpike fence. Could Patrick's and Gibbon's men see
                              > > > anything east of the turnpike fence? Or am I mistaked and your
                              > > > calculation
                              > > > is based on what they could see of the movement of the Texas Brigade
                              as
                              > > > it
                              > > > moved in a northerly direction?
                              > > >
                              > > > The reason I even asked the question was that I had walked most of the
                              > > > ledge
                              > > > area and I really could not see anything past the post and rail fence
                              as
                              > > > I
                              > > > looked east. I was under the impression that some of Starke's troops
                              > > > moving
                              > > > on the west side of the turnpike fence accompanying the Texans on
                              their
                              > > > northward advance were the troops that Patrick and Gibbon's troops
                              > > > targeted. But I cannot recall where I got that information.
                              > > >
                              > > > I'll have to trek that area again sometime during the Anniversary Days
                              > > > next
                              > > > month. Thanks again, Todd.
                              > > >
                              > > > David Lutton
                              > > >
                              > > >
                              > > >
                              > > >
                              > > >
                              > > >
                              > > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                              http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                              > > >
                              > > >
                              > >
                              > >
                              > >
                              > >
                              > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                              http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                              >
                              >
                              >
                              >
                              >
                              >
                              > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                              >
                              >
                            • oliverg25@hotmail.com
                              ... Not So! Once the corn is planted a horse never goes into the field. Plowing and planting is usually done with a team of horses, not one. after planting
                              Message 14 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
                              • 0 Attachment
                                --- In TalkAntietam@y..., TR Livesey <westwood@e...> wrote:
                                > David,
                                >
                                > > Corn planting patterns were different in 1862, not nearly as
                                > dense, with rows being wide enough for a horse to move between.
                                > This would imply that the corn will have different degrees of
                                > concealment,

                                Not So!
                                Once the corn is planted a horse never goes into the field. Plowing
                                and planting is usually done with a team of horses, not one. after
                                planting there is no need for a horse to go back into the field. Also
                                a horse does not damage the top soil as much as a tractor wheel

                                Amish farmers in PA still use horses and mules and their rows are
                                tighter than those of farmers using tractors. Their fields are so
                                tight you can not look down a row.

                                This might come through twice when Hotmail gets its act together.

                                O.G.
                              • TR Livesey
                                O.G., I am going to immediately admit that I am not an expert in this field (heh-heh). My statements were based on questions I have put to general historians,
                                Message 15 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
                                • 0 Attachment
                                  O.G.,

                                  I am going to immediately admit that I am not an expert
                                  in this field (heh-heh). My statements were based
                                  on questions I have put to general historians, none of
                                  whom claimed to be agricultural experts.

                                  I would not, however, base any conclusions on practices
                                  of modern, albeit primitive, farmers. Just because they
                                  don't use tractors does not mean that they do it the
                                  same way as was done 100 years ago.

                                  When you look at a modern cornfield, it is so dense
                                  that it provides excellent concealment.

                                  Although I'm not certain how a 19th century cornfield
                                  would look, but, as I stated, I assume that it also
                                  provides a certain degree of concealment as well.

                                  Do you have any source particular to 19th century
                                  corn farming? I would very much like to hear an
                                  authoritative source on the subject.

                                  Thanks for your comment -

                                  TRL
                                  oliverg25@... wrote:
                                  >
                                  > --- In TalkAntietam@y..., TR Livesey <westwood@e...> wrote:
                                  > > David,
                                  > >
                                  > > > Corn planting patterns were different in 1862, not nearly as
                                  > > dense, with rows being wide enough for a horse to move between.
                                  > > This would imply that the corn will have different degrees of
                                  > > concealment,
                                  >
                                  > Not So!
                                  > Once the corn is planted a horse never goes into the field. Plowing
                                  > and planting is usually done with a team of horses, not one. after
                                  > planting there is no need for a horse to go back into the field. Also
                                  > a horse does not damage the top soil as much as a tractor wheel
                                  >
                                  > Amish farmers in PA still use horses and mules and their rows are
                                  > tighter than those of farmers using tractors. Their fields are so
                                  > tight you can not look down a row.
                                  >
                                  > This might come through twice when Hotmail gets its act together.
                                  >
                                  > O.G.
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  >
                                  > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                                • NJ Rebel
                                  Todd; If you ask Tom Shay about the videos from one of the Antietam anniversary ranger tours, there is a tape he has in which Keith Snyder talks about how
                                  Message 16 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
                                  • 0 Attachment
                                    Todd;

                                    If you ask Tom Shay about the videos from one of the Antietam
                                    anniversary ranger tours, there is a tape he has in which Keith
                                    Snyder talks about how cornfields were planted in the mid-19th
                                    Century.

                                    Hope this helps.

                                    Your humble servant,
                                    Gerry Mayers
                                    Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
                                    Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

                                    "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
                                    on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
                                    Edward Lee


                                    ----- Original Message -----
                                    From: "TR Livesey" <westwood@...>
                                    To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                                    Sent: Monday, August 27, 2001 8:49 PM
                                    Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: Article about Hoods Texans


                                    > O.G.,
                                    >
                                    > I am going to immediately admit that I am not an expert
                                    > in this field (heh-heh). My statements were based
                                    > on questions I have put to general historians, none of
                                    > whom claimed to be agricultural experts.
                                    >
                                    > I would not, however, base any conclusions on practices
                                    > of modern, albeit primitive, farmers. Just because they
                                    > don't use tractors does not mean that they do it the
                                    > same way as was done 100 years ago.
                                    >
                                    > When you look at a modern cornfield, it is so dense
                                    > that it provides excellent concealment.
                                    >
                                    > Although I'm not certain how a 19th century cornfield
                                    > would look, but, as I stated, I assume that it also
                                    > provides a certain degree of concealment as well.
                                    >
                                    > Do you have any source particular to 19th century
                                    > corn farming? I would very much like to hear an
                                    > authoritative source on the subject.
                                    >
                                    > Thanks for your comment -
                                    >
                                    > TRL
                                    > oliverg25@... wrote:
                                    > >
                                    > > --- In TalkAntietam@y..., TR Livesey <westwood@e...> wrote:
                                    > > > David,
                                    > > >
                                    > > > > Corn planting patterns were different in 1862, not nearly
                                    as
                                    > > > dense, with rows being wide enough for a horse to move
                                    between.
                                    > > > This would imply that the corn will have different degrees
                                    of
                                    > > > concealment,
                                    > >
                                    > > Not So!
                                    > > Once the corn is planted a horse never goes into the field.
                                    Plowing
                                    > > and planting is usually done with a team of horses, not one.
                                    after
                                    > > planting there is no need for a horse to go back into the
                                    field. Also
                                    > > a horse does not damage the top soil as much as a tractor
                                    wheel
                                    > >
                                    > > Amish farmers in PA still use horses and mules and their rows
                                    are
                                    > > tighter than those of farmers using tractors. Their fields
                                    are so
                                    > > tight you can not look down a row.
                                    > >
                                    > > This might come through twice when Hotmail gets its act
                                    together.
                                    > >
                                    > > O.G.
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > >
                                    > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                                    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                                    >
                                    > Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
                                    > ADVERTISEMENT
                                    >
                                    >
                                    >
                                    >
                                    >
                                    >
                                    >
                                    > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
                                    Service.
                                    >
                                    >
                                  • David Lutton
                                    GO In your opinion then the corn would have been more tense than today? But we must remember that before Hood s troops stepped off roughly a hour after the
                                    Message 17 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
                                    • 0 Attachment
                                      GO
                                      In your opinion then the corn would have been more tense than today? But
                                      we must remember that before Hood's troops stepped off roughly a hour after
                                      the battle started what would this area look like to Hood's troops?. What
                                      would be the effect of 1 hour of combat be to this relatively small area?
                                      Hooker's often quoted remark comes to mind.

                                      If the original command to protect the flank came south of the cornfield,
                                      what was happening to Hood's troops started south of the cornfield? What do
                                      you think?

                                      David Litton
                                      ----- Original Message -----
                                      From: <oliverg25@...>
                                      To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                                      Sent: Monday, August 27, 2001 8:18 PM
                                      Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Article about Hoods Texans


                                      > --- In TalkAntietam@y..., TR Livesey <westwood@e...> wrote:
                                      > > David,
                                      > >
                                      > > > Corn planting patterns were different in 1862, not nearly as
                                      > > dense, with rows being wide enough for a horse to move between.
                                      > > This would imply that the corn will have different degrees of
                                      > > concealment,
                                      >
                                      > Not So!
                                      > Once the corn is planted a horse never goes into the field. Plowing
                                      > and planting is usually done with a team of horses, not one. after
                                      > planting there is no need for a horse to go back into the field. Also
                                      > a horse does not damage the top soil as much as a tractor wheel
                                      >
                                      > Amish farmers in PA still use horses and mules and their rows are
                                      > tighter than those of farmers using tractors. Their fields are so
                                      > tight you can not look down a row.
                                      >
                                      > This might come through twice when Hotmail gets its act together.
                                      >
                                      > O.G.
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                                      >
                                      >
                                    • NJ Rebel
                                      David, If you have read Mike Priest s book on the battle, IIRC, the area of The Cornfield has already been trampled down due to the attacks and counter attacks
                                      Message 18 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
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                                        David,

                                        If you have read Mike Priest's book on the battle, IIRC, the area
                                        of The Cornfield has already been trampled down due to the
                                        attacks and counter attacks back and forth through "the corn".
                                        There probably would have been some areas in which more of the
                                        corn would have been standing than others. The famous painting
                                        about the charge of the First Texas in The Cornfield done by
                                        Troiani comes to mind. Perhaps that might give you an idea, as
                                        Don Troiani is very meticulous about the details in his
                                        paintings.

                                        Your humble servant,
                                        Gerry Mayers
                                        Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
                                        Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

                                        "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
                                        on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
                                        Edward Lee


                                        ----- Original Message -----
                                        From: "David Lutton" <dunkerch@...>
                                        To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                                        Sent: Monday, August 27, 2001 9:00 PM
                                        Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: Article about Hoods Texans


                                        > GO
                                        > In your opinion then the corn would have been more tense than
                                        today? But
                                        > we must remember that before Hood's troops stepped off roughly
                                        a hour after
                                        > the battle started what would this area look like to Hood's
                                        troops?. What
                                        > would be the effect of 1 hour of combat be to this relatively
                                        small area?
                                        > Hooker's often quoted remark comes to mind.
                                        >
                                        > If the original command to protect the flank came south of the
                                        cornfield,
                                        > what was happening to Hood's troops started south of the
                                        cornfield? What do
                                        > you think?
                                        >
                                        > David Litton
                                        > ----- Original Message -----
                                        > From: <oliverg25@...>
                                        > To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                                        > Sent: Monday, August 27, 2001 8:18 PM
                                        > Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Article about Hoods Texans
                                        >
                                        >
                                        > > --- In TalkAntietam@y..., TR Livesey <westwood@e...> wrote:
                                        > > > David,
                                        > > >
                                        > > > > Corn planting patterns were different in 1862, not nearly
                                        as
                                        > > > dense, with rows being wide enough for a horse to move
                                        between.
                                        > > > This would imply that the corn will have different degrees
                                        of
                                        > > > concealment,
                                        > >
                                        > > Not So!
                                        > > Once the corn is planted a horse never goes into the field.
                                        Plowing
                                        > > and planting is usually done with a team of horses, not one.
                                        after
                                        > > planting there is no need for a horse to go back into the
                                        field. Also
                                        > > a horse does not damage the top soil as much as a tractor
                                        wheel
                                        > >
                                        > > Amish farmers in PA still use horses and mules and their rows
                                        are
                                        > > tighter than those of farmers using tractors. Their fields
                                        are so
                                        > > tight you can not look down a row.
                                        > >
                                        > > This might come through twice when Hotmail gets its act
                                        together.
                                        > >
                                        > > O.G.
                                        > >
                                        > >
                                        > >
                                        > >
                                        > >
                                        > >
                                        > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                                        http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                                        > >
                                        > >
                                        >
                                        >
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                                        > ADVERTISEMENT
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                                        Service.
                                        >
                                        >
                                      • NJ Rebel
                                        ... saw its ... believe, ... quote. ... Mark, did not the Ninth Army Corps comprise the bulk of the Federal expeditionary force that attacked and captured New
                                        Message 19 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
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                                          Mark Plfum wrote earlier:
                                          > The Ninth Army Corps was formed just before 2nd Bull Run and
                                          saw its
                                          > first action under that name in that fight. They were, I
                                          believe,
                                          > part of the Army Of Virginia that you mentioned earlier in the
                                          quote.
                                          >

                                          Mark, did not the Ninth Army Corps comprise the bulk of the
                                          Federal expeditionary force that attacked and captured New Burn
                                          in North Carolina after landing near Cape Hatteras? I seem to
                                          recall reading somewhere that this was pretty much the case, as
                                          old Burnside was the commander of that amphibious expedition.

                                          > I know you are simply saying Dan'l was of Kentucky fame, but it
                                          may
                                          > give the missinformed the impression that he was actually FROM
                                          > Kentucky. We all know, of course, he was born and raised near
                                          > Reading, Pennsylvania and his folks were friends of the
                                          ancestors of
                                          > a guy named Abraham Lincoln. ;-)
                                          >
                                          Your comment about Dan'l Boone is well taken. BTW, what was the
                                          name of Dan'l's brother?

                                          Your humble servant,
                                          Gerry Mayers
                                          Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
                                          Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

                                          "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
                                          on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
                                          Edward Lee
                                        • oliverg25@hotmail.com
                                          ... Neither am I. I live in Harrisburg. Not too many farms in this city. ... The tractor has evolved over the years. The last time I looked horses were still
                                          Message 20 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
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                                            --- In TalkAntietam@y..., TR Livesey <westwood@e...> wrote:
                                            > O.G.,
                                            >
                                            > I am going to immediately admit that I am not an expert
                                            > in this field (heh-heh). My statements were based
                                            > on questions I have put to general historians, none of
                                            > whom claimed to be agricultural experts.
                                            >

                                            Neither am I. I live in Harrisburg. Not too many farms in this city.

                                            > I would not, however, base any conclusions on practices
                                            > of modern, albeit primitive, farmers. Just because they
                                            > don't use tractors does not mean that they do it the
                                            > same way as was done 100 years ago.
                                            >

                                            The tractor has evolved over the years. The last time I looked horses
                                            were still the smae as the original model. I don't know any Amish
                                            farmers personlly but I fail to see where they could possible be any
                                            different in their farming practices than those of the 19th Century.
                                            Considering they are using the same equipment.

                                            >
                                            > Do you have any source particular to 19th century
                                            > corn farming? I would very much like to hear an
                                            > authoritative source on the subject.

                                            You want me to reincarnate a 19th Century farmer or go knocking on
                                            doors in South-Central PA?

                                            One thing you seem to have forgotten is that Hooker ordered the
                                            cornfield to be raked with canister before any assult began. I don't
                                            think there was much cover left by the time th texans got there

                                            Ollie
                                          • David Lutton
                                            Ollie, Exactly my point. At this point of the battle the cornfield would have been defestated. Hence the corn would have been a non factor. David Lutton ...
                                            Message 21 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
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                                              Ollie,

                                              Exactly my point. At this point of the battle the cornfield would have been
                                              defestated. Hence the corn would have been a non factor.

                                              David Lutton
                                              ----- Original Message -----
                                              From: <oliverg25@...>
                                              To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                                              Sent: Monday, August 27, 2001 9:16 PM
                                              Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Article about Hoods Texans


                                              > --- In TalkAntietam@y..., TR Livesey <westwood@e...> wrote:
                                              > > O.G.,
                                              > >
                                              > > I am going to immediately admit that I am not an expert
                                              > > in this field (heh-heh). My statements were based
                                              > > on questions I have put to general historians, none of
                                              > > whom claimed to be agricultural experts.
                                              > >
                                              >
                                              > Neither am I. I live in Harrisburg. Not too many farms in this city.
                                              >
                                              > > I would not, however, base any conclusions on practices
                                              > > of modern, albeit primitive, farmers. Just because they
                                              > > don't use tractors does not mean that they do it the
                                              > > same way as was done 100 years ago.
                                              > >
                                              >
                                              > The tractor has evolved over the years. The last time I looked horses
                                              > were still the smae as the original model. I don't know any Amish
                                              > farmers personlly but I fail to see where they could possible be any
                                              > different in their farming practices than those of the 19th Century.
                                              > Considering they are using the same equipment.
                                              >
                                              > >
                                              > > Do you have any source particular to 19th century
                                              > > corn farming? I would very much like to hear an
                                              > > authoritative source on the subject.
                                              >
                                              > You want me to reincarnate a 19th Century farmer or go knocking on
                                              > doors in South-Central PA?
                                              >
                                              > One thing you seem to have forgotten is that Hooker ordered the
                                              > cornfield to be raked with canister before any assult began. I don't
                                              > think there was much cover left by the time th texans got there
                                              >
                                              > Ollie
                                              >
                                              >
                                              >
                                              >
                                              >
                                              >
                                              > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                                              >
                                              >
                                            • oliverg25@hotmail.com
                                              ... have been ... David; Precisely! I think someone else also said the cornfield had been trampled before Hood got there. So the corn, or what remained,
                                              Message 22 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
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                                                --- In TalkAntietam@y..., "David Lutton" <dunkerch@c...> wrote:
                                                > Ollie,
                                                >
                                                > Exactly my point. At this point of the battle the cornfield would
                                                have been
                                                > defestated. Hence the corn would have been a non factor.
                                                >
                                                > David Lutton

                                                David;

                                                Precisely!

                                                I think someone else also said the cornfield had been trampled before
                                                Hood got there. So the corn, or what remained, provided very little
                                                cover.

                                                Ollie
                                              • TR Livesey
                                                Ollie, oliverg25@hotmail.com wrote: ... Hooker s account is unreliable. He makes it sound like he mowed down a whole regiment waiting hidden in
                                                Message 23 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
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                                                  Ollie,

                                                  oliverg25@... wrote:
                                                  <general snip>
                                                  >
                                                  > One thing you seem to have forgotten is that Hooker ordered the
                                                  > cornfield to be raked with canister before any assult began. I don't
                                                  > think there was much cover left by the time th texans got there
                                                  >
                                                  > Ollie

                                                  Hooker's account is unreliable. He makes it sound like he mowed down
                                                  a whole regiment waiting hidden in the cornfield. In fact, when
                                                  the I corps moved out, there were no significant Confederates in
                                                  the corn, they were in line south of it.

                                                  Furthermore, I doubt that Hooker could have possibly irradicated an
                                                  entire 30 acre cornfield, no matter how much canister he used.
                                                  Anyway, we are interested here in the southern end of it.

                                                  TRL
                                                • Oliver Gamble
                                                  ... From: TR Livesey To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 26, 2001 11:14 PM Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans David, Corn
                                                  Message 24 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
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                                                    ----- Original Message -----
                                                    Sent: Sunday, August 26, 2001 11:14 PM
                                                    Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Article about Hoods Texans

                                                    David,

                                                    Corn planting patterns were different in 1862, not nearly as
                                                    dense, with rows being wide enough for a horse to move between.
                                                     
                                                    Not So!
                                                    Once the corn is planted a horse never goes into the field. Plowing and planting is usually done with a team of horses, not one.
                                                     
                                                    Amish farmers in PA still use horses and mules and their rows are tighter than those of farmers using tractors.
                                                     
                                                     O.G.
                                                  • Tom Clemens
                                                    In the 19th Century, they used hills of corn, and check-row pattern allowed a lot of traffic in the cornfields. Think of it and a checkerboard where every
                                                    Message 25 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
                                                    • 0 Attachment
                                                      In the 19th Century, they used hills of corn, and check-row pattern allowed a
                                                      lot of traffic in the cornfields. Think of it and a checkerboard where every
                                                      corner is a hill of corn. It was usually hand planted, not with horses and
                                                      machine planters. Bill Christen knows much about it than I do, ask him.


                                                      oliverg25@... wrote:

                                                      > --- In TalkAntietam@y..., TR Livesey <westwood@e...> wrote:
                                                      > > David,
                                                      > >
                                                      > > > Corn planting patterns were different in 1862, not nearly as
                                                      > > dense, with rows being wide enough for a horse to move between.
                                                      > > This would imply that the corn will have different degrees of
                                                      > > concealment,
                                                      >
                                                      > Not So!
                                                      > Once the corn is planted a horse never goes into the field. Plowing
                                                      > and planting is usually done with a team of horses, not one. after
                                                      > planting there is no need for a horse to go back into the field. Also
                                                      > a horse does not damage the top soil as much as a tractor wheel
                                                      >
                                                      > Amish farmers in PA still use horses and mules and their rows are
                                                      > tighter than those of farmers using tractors. Their fields are so
                                                      > tight you can not look down a row.
                                                      >
                                                      > This might come through twice when Hotmail gets its act together.
                                                      >
                                                      > O.G.
                                                      >
                                                      >
                                                      >
                                                      >
                                                      > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                                                    • Tom Clemens
                                                      Squire Boone.
                                                      Message 26 of 27 , Aug 27, 2001
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                                                        Squire Boone.

                                                        NJ Rebel wrote:

                                                        > Your comment about Dan'l Boone is well taken. BTW, what was the
                                                        > name of Dan'l's brother?
                                                        >
                                                        > Your humble servant,
                                                        > Gerry Mayers
                                                        > Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
                                                        > Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry
                                                        >
                                                        > "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
                                                        > on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
                                                        > Edward Lee
                                                        >
                                                        >
                                                        >
                                                        >
                                                        > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                                                      • NJ Rebel
                                                        Group; If you have a Preview option on your email program, I recommend you use it. It will allow you to see what attachments are attached before you open the
                                                        Message 27 of 27 , Apr 28, 2002
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                                                          Group;

                                                          If you have a Preview option on your email program, I recommend
                                                          you use it. It will allow you to see what attachments are
                                                          attached before you open the email! If you see anything ending
                                                          with .pif or .bat as an attachment or .exe, DELETE it
                                                          immediately! (Many viruses come with either of the three
                                                          extensions.)

                                                          Also, run Trend Micro Antivirus web based scanning, Norton Anti
                                                          Virus or any similar program to locate any virus infections you
                                                          might have and then clean.

                                                          The KLEZ-G variant worm virus has been running amuck in this
                                                          group, and already caused one member to have his account delisted
                                                          by the moderator.

                                                          Your humble servant,
                                                          Gerry Mayers
                                                          Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
                                                          Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

                                                          A Proud American by Birth, Southern by Choice!

                                                          "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
                                                          on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
                                                          Edward Lee


                                                          ----- Original Message -----
                                                          From: <oliverg25@...>
                                                          To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
                                                          Sent: Monday, August 27, 2001 8:18 PM
                                                          Subject: [TalkAntietam] Re: Article about Hoods Texans


                                                          > --- In TalkAntietam@y..., TR Livesey <westwood@e...> wrote:
                                                          > > David,
                                                          > >
                                                          > > > Corn planting patterns were different in 1862, not nearly
                                                          as
                                                          > > dense, with rows being wide enough for a horse to move
                                                          between.
                                                          > > This would imply that the corn will have different degrees of
                                                          > > concealment,
                                                          >
                                                          > Not So!
                                                          > Once the corn is planted a horse never goes into the field.
                                                          Plowing
                                                          > and planting is usually done with a team of horses, not one.
                                                          after
                                                          > planting there is no need for a horse to go back into the
                                                          field. Also
                                                          > a horse does not damage the top soil as much as a tractor wheel
                                                          >
                                                          > Amish farmers in PA still use horses and mules and their rows
                                                          are
                                                          > tighter than those of farmers using tractors. Their fields are
                                                          so
                                                          > tight you can not look down a row.
                                                          >
                                                          > This might come through twice when Hotmail gets its act
                                                          together.
                                                          >
                                                          > O.G.
                                                          >
                                                          >
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                                                          Service.
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