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US Civil War Factbook

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  • Pa128th@aol.com
    In a message dated 6/9/01 8:54:47 PM Eastern Daylight Time, awturner@midtel.net writes:
    Message 1 of 30 , Jun 10, 2001
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      In a message dated 6/9/01 8:54:47 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
      awturner@... writes:

      << Hartwig writes of the AoP: "The field army had an effective strength of
      approximately 60,000 men. On September 6-7, McClellan assigned
      twenty-four new regiments to his field army, distributing them equally
      among his corps, with the Second, Ninth, and Twelfth recieving the
      largest number. Only eighteen regiments, numbering about 15,000-16,000
      men, actually accompanied the army, the others being unable to join
      their assigned brigades before the army moved. In addition, several
      thousand volunteers who had been recruited for veteran regiments joined
      their assigned brigades before the army marched, raising the number of
      recruits in the field to approximately 20,000. This meant nearly
      one-quarter of McClellan's infantry had undergone little or no
      training."
      >>
      Just to give you an example, one brigade of Alpheus Williams division in the
      the X!! corps had 6 regiments, The 124th, the 125th and the 128th Pa were
      just about full strength but were green troops and never in combat, the XII
      corps missed South Mt, arriving there the night of the 14th. The other 3
      regiments, the 10th Ct, 46th Pa and 28th NY were veterans, but had strengths
      of about company size, if that.

      Paula
    • John Priest
      I ascertained that 27 of the Federal regiments at Antietam were green - being in the service less than six weeks. Regiments like the 8th Ohio, had been in
      Message 2 of 30 , Jun 10, 2001
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        I ascertained that 27 of the Federal regiments at Antietam were "green" -
        being in the service less than six weeks. Regiments like the 8th Ohio, had
        been in actions of some sort but not on the scale of Antietam. Antietam was
        the first real battle of a large portion of the A of P. It was a very
        terrible taste of on the job training.

        Mike Priest


        -----Original Message-----
        From: James Rose <eodrose@...>
        To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
        Date: Saturday, June 09, 2001 10:29 PM
        Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: US Civil War Factbook


        >I don't think that our numbers are really very different. It just takes
        >some explaining. You might call my research the quick and dirty kind.
        >Hartwig was talking about the men, while I was simply talking about
        >regiments without reference to how many men were present for duty from
        >each regiment. It stands to reason that the unblooded regiments will
        >have more men present than the veteran units. I would not be surprised
        >if a full 25% of the men at Antietam were under one month service. The
        >following is how I came up with my numbers.
        >
        >I had to do the research on this by myself. Harsh did a good job with
        >the ANV, but he has yet to do the AotP. So I did my research using the
        >criteria in "Sounding the Shallows" for what constitutes major battles.
        >What I did was use the table in "Gleam of Bayonets" for my list of what
        >regiments were in the AotP at the time (from what I understand it is not
        >a perfect list, but it was the best I had). Then using that list I went
        >through Dyer's and created a spreadsheet of the 217 infantry regiments
        >(that is what I was concerned with at the time). The tables were:
        >branch (all infantry), state, regiment #, muster in date, terms of
        >service, corps assign, division assign, brigade assign, previous combat
        >(I included skirmishes for this), and major battles (using Harsh's
        >definitions). It took a really long time to put all this information
        >together, so I wouldn't be surprised if I made any mistakes.
        >
        >Of the 217 regiments in the AotP at this time there were 23 absent from
        >Antietam (Forth corps and Humphrey's division). Of the 194 remaining,
        >17 were mustered in less than one month before (8.8%); 26 had no
        >previous combat experience (13.4%); 40 had never fought a major battle
        >(20.6%); 35 had fought one major battle (18%); 92 had fought two major
        >battles (47.4%); 25 had fought three major battles (12.9%); and 2 had
        >fought 4 major battles (1%).
        >
        >Note that I did not put numbers of men to each regiment. That was
        >beyond the scope of the research I was doing at the time (not to mention
        >that would probably take a year, and I only had a few days). I will say
        >that the absolute most that the new men could make up would be about 22%
        >of the total men in the army in the "effectives" group. It was probably
        >fairly close to this percentage.
        >
        >Jim Rose
        >
        >Anthony W. Turner wrote:
        >
        >>
        >> Your 13% figure differs, Jim, from the "one quarter" (or 25%) D. Scott
        >> Hartwig uses in his essay, "Who Would Not Be a Soldier?" within Gary
        >> Gallagher's _The Antietam Campaign_. I'm not the scholar here, and not
        >> about to dispute either figure, but feel two such disparate numbers
        >> deserve further discussion.
        >>
        >> Hartwig writes of the AoP: "The field army had an effective strength of
        >> approximately 60,000 men. On September 6-7, McClellan assigned
        >> twenty-four new regiments to his field army, distributing them equally
        >> among his corps, with the Second, Ninth, and Twelfth recieving the
        >> largest number. Only eighteen regiments, numbering about 15,000-16,000
        >> men, actually accompanied the army, the others being unable to join
        >> their assigned brigades before the army moved. In addition, several
        >> thousand volunteers who had been recruited for veteran regiments joined
        >> their assigned brigades before the army marched, raising the number of
        >> recruits in the field to approximately 20,000. This meant nearly
        >> one-quarter of McClellan's infantry had undergone little or no
        >> training."
        >>
        >> Comments, Jim and others?
        >>
        >> Tony Turner
        >>
        >>
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
        >
        >
        >
      • James Rose
        ... If you count Humphrey s division and Forth corps the number of Green regiments jumps to 27 on my table. I didn t count them because they were not at
        Message 3 of 30 , Jun 10, 2001
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          John Priest wrote:

          > I ascertained that 27 of the Federal regiments at Antietam were "green" -
          > being in the service less than six weeks. Regiments like the 8th Ohio, had
          > been in actions of some sort but not on the scale of Antietam. Antietam was
          > the first real battle of a large portion of the A of P. It was a very
          > terrible taste of on the job training.


          If you count Humphrey's division and Forth corps the number of "Green"
          regiments jumps to 27 on my table. I didn't count them because they
          were not at Antietam on the 17th.

          Jim Rose
        • Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine)
          I don t think everyone believes McClellan would automatically destroy Lee. But with an advantage in manpower, and facing an opponent that had been whacked
          Message 4 of 30 , Jun 11, 2001
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            I don't think everyone believes McClellan would "automatically" destroy Lee.
            But with an advantage in manpower, and facing an opponent that had been
            whacked pretty good the day before (and Mac should know this, since _he_ was
            whacked pretty thoroughly too), and with his back against a river and
            nothing but catastrophe awaiting him should the day go against him, was it
            _at least_ worth a try?

            I would think even you would have to consider that as a valid choice.

            -----Original Message-----
            From: James Rose [mailto:eodrose@...]
            Sent: Saturday, June 09, 2001 9:10 AM
            To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
            Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: US Civil War Factbook




            Curt wrote:

            > I would suggest:
            >
            > Mill Springs (A/D 1:1)
            >
            > Brice's Cross Roads (A/D 0.4/1.0)

            I don't have much information on those two battles, but what I do have
            does not equate to "battles of annihilation".

            At Mills Springs the forces were US 4,000 to CS 4,000. Casualties were
            US 262 to CS 529. Crittenden abandoned most of his equipment in the
            retreat. True it was a resounding victory for the US forces, but it
            stops well short of annihilation. I would like to point out two extra
            things about this battle. One, the scale of operations is significantly
            much smaller than I was thinking about (when I say army I generally
            refer to at least 20,000 men). Scale of operations does make a
            difference. Two, if what I read about many of Crittenden's men having
            weapons that didn't work is correct, then the odds change. A man cannot
            be considered a fighting effective if his weapon doesn't work.

            Brice's Cross Roads is a much better example (although the problem of
            scale is still there). The forces were US 8,100 to CS 3,500
            (interestingly at 2.3:1 this is close to the superiority that many
            people believe McClellan had over Lee). Casualties were US 2,612 to CS
            493. It was a rout, massive one sided victory (question are there any
            victories that were more one sided during the war), and just an all
            round good day for Forrest. However, Sturgis still made it to safety
            with the bulk of his army. I would like to point out one thing about
            this battle. The CS had Forrest. McClellan was many things, but a
            tactical genius was not one of them.

            I was looking up Nashville (yes it was the benchmark), and one
            conclusion jumps out at me. The difference between being routed and
            annihilation has a lot to do with the support structure of the army in
            question. As near as I can tell the only reason why Hood's army was
            "destroyed" was because the South could no longer recover from a massive
            defeat. This was not the situation in 1862.

            > As I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere, in discussion of the
            > purported 3-1 rule, there is no real correlation of raw numbers of
            > personnel to success in battle.

            If this is true (which in general I agree) then why do people
            automatically assume that McClellan would defeat and destroy Lee? From
            every account I have read and heard Lee is considered a much better
            tactical commander than McClellan. I don't deny that McClellan might
            have been able to destroy the ANV. What I deny is that it is a given
            that had McClellan attacked on the 18th he would have destroyed the
            ANV. If anything Brice's Cross Roads shows that it could have gone the
            other way.

            In the Maryland campaign McClellan had two things going for him: numbers
            (which he was unaware of his advantage), and supply (his supply
            situation was far better than Lee's). He had five things going against
            him: strategic defense (i.e. he was reacting to Lee), tactical offense
            (if 3-1 isn't an official axiom, it is still better to be in a strong
            defensive position when fighting), morale (his army had just been
            routed), combat veterans (13% had never been in combat, and many of
            those who had been in only one major campaign got their experience at
            2nd Manassas), and tactical command ( the Lee/Longstreet/Jackson team is
            considered far better than the McClellan/Burnside/Porter team). The
            situation was reversed for Lee except that it is even worse for
            McClellan in the morale and combat veterans department. For morale the
            ANV had come off of a summer of victories capped with routing the
            federal army. For veterans, everyone in the ANV had been in at least
            one major campaign (the highest percentage being in 3 major battles).

            For the life of me I can't see what people base the assumption that it
            is axiomatic that the AotP would destroy the ANV if McClellan had
            attacked on the 18th. Possible, yes; probable, maybe (I thinks that's
            pushing it); a given, no way.

            Jim Rose






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          • James Rose
            Perhaps saying everyone was a bit strong, but overall that is my impression of how most people judge McClellan s actions during the Maryland campaign. The
            Message 5 of 30 , Jun 11, 2001
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              Perhaps saying "everyone" was a bit strong, but overall that is my
              impression of how most people judge McClellan's actions during the
              Maryland campaign. The seize on their vision of what might have been,
              and lose sight of what McClellan did accomplish.

              As to the specifics of your question (which was phrased quite
              differently than I normally see it), I agree that it would have been
              worth a try. That is speaking from the position of hindsight, and
              knowing what I know, attacking on the 18th probably would have been a
              good idea. While admitting that attacking might have been the best
              course of action, that does not mean that I believe what McClellan did
              do was wrong. I think that Harsh goes into the best detail of how the
              situation looked to McClellan after the battle in TATF (Murfin does
              little more than try to show that McClellan was little more than a
              whinny boy, and Sears is not much better).

              Looking at the situation on the evening of the 17th as it appeared to
              McClellan his decision is not unreasonable. In the first place
              McClellan did intend to attack on the 18th, but circumstances delayed it
              for 24 hours. McClellan was unaware of his advantage in manpower. All
              of the intelligence reports put the ANV at having a 25% advantage in
              men, and nothing that happened during the 17th could have changed that
              opinion downward. The AotP was repulsed at every point with 25-33%
              losses (it was worse among the green troops). The ANV's line was never
              broken fully open anywhere. The ANV was "wacked", but so was the AotP.
              Any attack on the 18th could only be done with the Fifth and Sixth
              corps'. The other corps' were unable to conduct offensive operations
              (at least that is what the corps' commanders told McClellan). Of those
              two corps' around 25% of the men had less than one month in service.
              Then there is the ammo situation. Small arms ammo was critically short,
              and the AotP was completely out of Parrot ammo. Because of the
              destruction of the B&O bridge the AotP would not be resupplied until the
              evening of the 18th. Finally any attack would again give Lee the
              advantage of defense. At best I don't see how McClellan could have
              believed that any attack on the 18th would be more than a toss up as to
              who would win.

              So the question becomes: should McClellan have taken that gamble and
              attacked on the 18th? Considering what McClellan believe his duty to be
              I would say that he was unjustified in taking the gamble that it
              appeared to be. McClellan's first duty was the protection of
              Washington, and the second was to end the invasion of Maryland (down
              around the end of the list is the destruction of the ANV). By standing
              fast on the 18th, and preparing to attack on the 19th McClellan served
              both those duties. Lee had three options. He could attack, stand, or
              leave. McClellan was ready for any counterattack, he would attack on
              the 19th if Lee stood, and the only place for Lee to go was back to
              Virginia. On the other hand if McClellan had attacked and lost, then
              Lee might have been able to revive his invasion (unlikely in hindsight
              no matter the outcome of the battle). That would mean a failure of both
              the primary and secondary missions. Quite simply if McClellan had
              attacked on the 18th he would have risked everything for the possibility
              of gaining relatively little.

              Jim Rose

              Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine) wrote:

              > I don't think everyone believes McClellan would "automatically" destroy Lee.
              > But with an advantage in manpower, and facing an opponent that had been
              > whacked pretty good the day before (and Mac should know this, since _he_ was
              > whacked pretty thoroughly too), and with his back against a river and
              > nothing but catastrophe awaiting him should the day go against him, was it
              > _at least_ worth a try?
              >
              > I would think even you would have to consider that as a valid choice.
            • Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine)
              Not to entirely rehash this ever-so-familiar topic, but a couple of points: 1. You carefully explain all the reasons Mac had for not attacking on the 18th, yet
              Message 6 of 30 , Jun 11, 2001
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                Not to entirely rehash this ever-so-familiar topic, but a couple of points:

                1. You carefully explain all the reasons Mac had for not attacking on the
                18th, yet state that he intended on attacking anyway. Huh?

                2. Why did the reasons for not attacking on the 18th not apply to the 17th
                as well?

                -----Original Message-----
                From: James Rose [mailto:eodrose@...]
                Sent: Monday, June 11, 2001 2:19 PM
                To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
                Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: US Civil War Factbook


                Perhaps saying "everyone" was a bit strong, but overall that is my
                impression of how most people judge McClellan's actions during the
                Maryland campaign. The seize on their vision of what might have been,
                and lose sight of what McClellan did accomplish.

                As to the specifics of your question (which was phrased quite
                differently than I normally see it), I agree that it would have been
                worth a try. That is speaking from the position of hindsight, and
                knowing what I know, attacking on the 18th probably would have been a
                good idea. While admitting that attacking might have been the best
                course of action, that does not mean that I believe what McClellan did
                do was wrong. I think that Harsh goes into the best detail of how the
                situation looked to McClellan after the battle in TATF (Murfin does
                little more than try to show that McClellan was little more than a
                whinny boy, and Sears is not much better).

                Looking at the situation on the evening of the 17th as it appeared to
                McClellan his decision is not unreasonable. In the first place
                McClellan did intend to attack on the 18th, but circumstances delayed it
                for 24 hours. McClellan was unaware of his advantage in manpower. All
                of the intelligence reports put the ANV at having a 25% advantage in
                men, and nothing that happened during the 17th could have changed that
                opinion downward. The AotP was repulsed at every point with 25-33%
                losses (it was worse among the green troops). The ANV's line was never
                broken fully open anywhere. The ANV was "wacked", but so was the AotP.
                Any attack on the 18th could only be done with the Fifth and Sixth
                corps'. The other corps' were unable to conduct offensive operations
                (at least that is what the corps' commanders told McClellan). Of those
                two corps' around 25% of the men had less than one month in service.
                Then there is the ammo situation. Small arms ammo was critically short,
                and the AotP was completely out of Parrot ammo. Because of the
                destruction of the B&O bridge the AotP would not be resupplied until the
                evening of the 18th. Finally any attack would again give Lee the
                advantage of defense. At best I don't see how McClellan could have
                believed that any attack on the 18th would be more than a toss up as to
                who would win.

                So the question becomes: should McClellan have taken that gamble and
                attacked on the 18th? Considering what McClellan believe his duty to be
                I would say that he was unjustified in taking the gamble that it
                appeared to be. McClellan's first duty was the protection of
                Washington, and the second was to end the invasion of Maryland (down
                around the end of the list is the destruction of the ANV). By standing
                fast on the 18th, and preparing to attack on the 19th McClellan served
                both those duties. Lee had three options. He could attack, stand, or
                leave. McClellan was ready for any counterattack, he would attack on
                the 19th if Lee stood, and the only place for Lee to go was back to
                Virginia. On the other hand if McClellan had attacked and lost, then
                Lee might have been able to revive his invasion (unlikely in hindsight
                no matter the outcome of the battle). That would mean a failure of both
                the primary and secondary missions. Quite simply if McClellan had
                attacked on the 18th he would have risked everything for the possibility
                of gaining relatively little.

                Jim Rose

                Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine) wrote:

                > I don't think everyone believes McClellan would "automatically" destroy
                Lee.
                > But with an advantage in manpower, and facing an opponent that had been
                > whacked pretty good the day before (and Mac should know this, since _he_
                was
                > whacked pretty thoroughly too), and with his back against a river and
                > nothing but catastrophe awaiting him should the day go against him, was it
                > _at least_ worth a try?
                >
                > I would think even you would have to consider that as a valid choice.






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              • James Rose
                ... Is there a problem with there being a disparity between what McClellan wanted to do and what he felt he was capable of doing? During the evening of the
                Message 7 of 30 , Jun 11, 2001
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                  Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine) wrote:

                  > Not to entirely rehash this ever-so-familiar topic, but a couple of points:
                  >
                  > 1. You carefully explain all the reasons Mac had for not attacking on the
                  > 18th, yet state that he intended on attacking anyway. Huh?

                  Is there a problem with there being a disparity between what McClellan
                  wanted to do and what he felt he was capable of doing? During the
                  evening of the 17th McClellan had determined to attack the following
                  day. The decision not to attack was an evolution of thinking that came
                  with the information he had. The situation didn't change, but
                  McClellan's understanding of it did. After thinking it through he
                  determined to postpone the attack until the 19th. Its called "changing
                  your mind", and people do it from time to time.

                  >
                  > 2. Why did the reasons for not attacking on the 18th not apply to the 17th
                  > as well?

                  I would imagine that two important things looked different on the
                  morning of the 18th then they did on the evening of the 17th. First, I
                  don't think that McClellan was aware that the ammunition would be
                  delayed until the morning of the 18th. Second, McClellan probably
                  thought that after marching all night Humphrey's and Couch's men would
                  not be in very good condition to conduct an offensive. Since they
                  constituted close to half of McClellan's available force for the attack,
                  the thought of using them right then may have looked a bit different
                  than in the abstract.

                  Jim Rose
                • Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine)
                  ... Well, yeah. On the face of it, you give very good reasons for not pursuing offensive actions -- in fact, with the lack of ammo, staying put might not even
                  Message 8 of 30 , Jun 11, 2001
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                    >Is there a problem with there being a disparity between what McClellan
                    >wanted to do and what he felt he was capable of doing?

                    Well, yeah. On the face of it, you give very good reasons for not pursuing
                    offensive actions -- in fact, with the lack of ammo, staying put might not
                    even have been such a good idea. With said reasons, he shouldn't even have
                    been considering it under any circumstances. But he was, and it comes
                    closely to sounding like you want to play it both ways: He doesn't fight,
                    but deserves credit for at least thinking about it.

                    >I would imagine that two important things looked different on the
                    >morning of the 18th then they did on the evening of the 17th.

                    I was talking about the morning of the 17th -- if it was a good time to
                    attack then, what changed overnight other than slightly delayed ammo? If
                    there were reasons not to attack on the 18th, I would think they'd apply to
                    the 17th even more.
                  • NJ Rebel
                    Jim-- I cut your most excellent post to shorten the bandwith for this message but, in essence, I am in agreement with you on your statements. However, I
                    Message 9 of 30 , Jun 11, 2001
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                      Jim--

                      I cut your most excellent post to shorten the bandwith for this
                      message but, in essence, I am in agreement with you on your
                      statements.

                      However, I believe there is one very valuable thing that Mac did
                      with respects to Lee that most historians either overlook or
                      simply did not take the time to consider. Harsh goes over this
                      from the viewpoint of what Lee could or could not have done on
                      September 18th in TATF. Essentially, by remaining "in place"
                      where he was on September 18th, Mac effectively shut the door for
                      Lee to continue his Maryland campaign. Hence a large part of the
                      reason for the ANV retreat to Shepherdstown.

                      I wonder, too, if Carman says anything about Mac not attacking on
                      September 18th vis Lee and any plans Lee might have had. IIRC,
                      Lee was all for attacking on September 18th, but his main
                      subordinate commanders were unanimously against it.

                      Hope this helps.

                      Your humble servant,
                      Gerry Mayers
                      Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
                      Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

                      "I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
                      on which he has nobly laid down his life." --General Robert
                      Edward Lee
                    • James Rose
                      ... McClellan had to stay put. It was absolutely imperative that Lee not be allowed to revive the campaign. As for the ammo situation, if I understand it
                      Message 10 of 30 , Jun 11, 2001
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                        Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine) wrote:

                        >
                        > Well, yeah. On the face of it, you give very good reasons for not pursuing
                        > offensive actions -- in fact, with the lack of ammo, staying put might not
                        > even have been such a good idea. With said reasons, he shouldn't even have
                        > been considering it under any circumstances. But he was, and it comes
                        > closely to sounding like you want to play it both ways: He doesn't fight,
                        > but deserves credit for at least thinking about it.

                        McClellan had to stay put. It was absolutely imperative that Lee not be
                        allowed to revive the campaign. As for the ammo situation, if I
                        understand it correctly McClellan thought (on the 17th) that he would be
                        resupplied in time for the attack on the 18th. That didn't happen, and
                        the shipment was delayed until the evening. If you don't want to give
                        McClellan credit for intending to attack on the 18th that's fine. It
                        doesn't actually matter to me. I personally think that McClellan
                        answered the questions about moral cowardice, timidity, and
                        unwillingness to fight on the 17th. The fact that McClellan thought
                        about attacking on the 18th and then changed his mind doesn't mean
                        anything other than he changed his mind.

                        >
                        > I was talking about the morning of the 17th -- if it was a good time to
                        > attack then, what changed overnight other than slightly delayed ammo? If
                        > there were reasons not to attack on the 18th, I would think they'd apply to
                        > the 17th even more.
                        >
                        Let me see. What changed during the day of the 17th. Let's start with
                        10,000 casualties and go from there. On the morning of the 17th the
                        AotP had 6 intact corps' that were capable of offensive operations. By
                        evening McClellan was reduced to two corps' capable of offensive
                        operations. In the morning there was a full load-out of ammo. By
                        evening there were critical shortages (heavy fighting tends to use up ammo).

                        There were many reasons not to attack on the 17th. I can think of
                        several with straining myself. However, not fighting Lee was out of the
                        question. If McClellan did not bring Lee to battle in Maryland it would
                        have been as damaging, or even more so, than actually losing the AotP.
                        McClellan had to fight Lee at some point, and thanks in part to S.O. 191
                        McClellan thought that the ANV was still separated (at least somewhat).
                        That means that on the 17th McClellan thought that the odds were
                        probably as good as they were going to get. Therefore, he attacked.
                        There were many reasons not to attack, but more overriding ones to
                        attack on the 17th. By evening those overriding reasons had been muted
                        by the battle (i.e. a bloodied ANV leaving Maryland is very different
                        than an unscratched ANV leaving Maryland).

                        Jim Rose
                      • Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine)
                        ... Let me see. I guess all the Yankee bullets missed their marks. Where was this paralyzing lack of ammo in all of our other discussions? Has Dr. Harsh
                        Message 11 of 30 , Jun 12, 2001
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                          >Let me see. What changed during the day of the 17th. Let's start with
                          >10,000 casualties and go from there.

                          Let me see. I guess all the Yankee bullets missed their marks.

                          Where was this paralyzing lack of ammo in all of our other discussions? Has
                          Dr. Harsh written another book?
                        • James Rose
                          ... You do realize that McClellan had no real idea of how badly the Confederates were hurt during the battle. He could make an educated guess, but that is it.
                          Message 12 of 30 , Jun 12, 2001
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                            Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine) wrote:
                            Let me see.  What changed during the day of the 17th.  Let's start with
                            10,000 casualties and go from there.

                            Let me see. I guess all the Yankee bullets missed their marks.
                            You do realize that McClellan had no real idea of how badly the Confederates were hurt during the battle.  He could make an educated guess, but that is it.  Basically what you are saying sounds like a paraphrase from a famous politician that goes something like this "Yes your troops are hurt, but so are they.  You are all hurt together."  McClellan understood something that apparently a lot of people miss.  It is easier to defend than it is to attack.  So on the 18th McClellan would only be able to attack with part of his army, but Lee would be able to defend with his entire army.


                            Where was this paralyzing lack of ammo in all of our other discussions? Has
                            Dr. Harsh written another book?

                            Have you read "Taken at the Flood" yet?  As for our other discussions, this is the first time I've been on these groups that I have joined in on a discussion of why McClellan didn't attack on the 18th.  That is why I've never mentioned it.  I've also never said that the ammo situation was "paralyzing".  That word has connotations that do not fit in this instance.  I said that he was critically short of ammo.  Sears acknowledges that lack of Parrot rounds even as he dismisses it as meaningless.  I think that the loss of the 20lb Parrots is far from meaningless.  They represented over 10% of the artillery pieces, and as the largest caliber they probably represented a higher percentage in actual combat power.  Considering that artillery is the one branch that McClellan knows is superior in all respects to the Confederates, such a loss is far from trivial.

                            Jim Rose


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