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195Re: US Civil War Factbook

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  • Anthony W. Turner
    Jun 9 2:57 PM
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      Jim Rose wrote:
      << In the Maryland campaign McClellan had two things going for him:
      numbers (which he was unaware of his advantage), and supply (his supply
      situation was far better than Lee's). He had five things going against
      him: strategic defense (i.e. he was reacting to Lee), tactical offense
      (if 3-1 isn't an official axiom, it is still better to be in a strong
      defensive position when fighting), morale (his army had just been
      routed), combat veterans (13% had never been in combat...) >>

      Your 13% figure differs, Jim, from the "one quarter" (or 25%) D. Scott
      Hartwig uses in his essay, "Who Would Not Be a Soldier?" within Gary
      Gallagher's _The Antietam Campaign_. I'm not the scholar here, and not
      about to dispute either figure, but feel two such disparate numbers
      deserve further discussion.

      Hartwig writes of the AoP: "The field army had an effective strength of
      approximately 60,000 men. On September 6-7, McClellan assigned
      twenty-four new regiments to his field army, distributing them equally
      among his corps, with the Second, Ninth, and Twelfth recieving the
      largest number. Only eighteen regiments, numbering about 15,000-16,000
      men, actually accompanied the army, the others being unable to join
      their assigned brigades before the army moved. In addition, several
      thousand volunteers who had been recruited for veteran regiments joined
      their assigned brigades before the army marched, raising the number of
      recruits in the field to approximately 20,000. This meant nearly
      one-quarter of McClellan's infantry had undergone little or no
      training."

      Comments, Jim and others?

      Tony Turner
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