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Re: [Sun_Tzu] Re: Three random questions

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  • Wil
    I haven t read the material you are referring to below but, I believe the decision to concentrate or disperse is based on the scenario you are faced with.  If
    Message 1 of 7 , Feb 1, 2009
      I haven't read the material you are referring to below but, I believe the decision to concentrate or disperse is based on the scenario you are faced with.  If for all intents and purposes the general army in its positions are ineffective in dealing with the enemy, I would consider concentrating those elements that show some promise in the hopes of creating a useful tool in the war.  If my time horizon is relatively long I may disperse the effective elements throughout the army and try and raise the level of effectiveness for the entire army. During times of relative peace I would concentrate elate forces in order to maintain a high level of readiness with the elites and reduce the cost of maintaining the browder general army.
       
      The Japanese during WWII kept their ace pilots in the field, perhaps under the mistaken belief that decisive action to settle the war was close.  The US dispersed their ace pilots back to the states where they trained new pilots. It seems to me that under the Bushido code and mistaken beliefs in superiority, the mistake wasn't realized by the Japanese until it was far to late.  Towards the end of the war they had no planes for the carriers and new recruits only had a week or two of training if that.
       
      I know of no book that talks about the "demise" of air mobility, perhaps it is not so much that the concepts in air mobility have failed, but that the advategous obtained when dispersing with other forces has risen.
       
      Wil


      From: Douglas Henderson <kueikutzu@...>
      To: Sun_Tzu@yahoogroups.com
      Sent: Sunday, February 1, 2009 12:17:04 AM
      Subject: [Sun_Tzu] Re: Three random questions

      Thanks for the replies. However, does anyone know of any books or such
      that discuss how, insitutionally, the Army abandoned the airmobile
      division concept?

      Also regarding Gus's point: While I see where you are coming from, in
      terms of team play, if you take all the risk takers out of the main
      team is it a matter that you have one very effective force that can
      carry the combat, but doesn't that mean that your mainstream forced is
      good for nothing? Dpn't the aggressive hard chargers mixed in with the
      others tend to bring the quality of the base units up?

      Of course you can try for a SunBin horse race where you pit your third
      best againsthis first best, first best against his second best and your
      second best against his third best, but that always assumed that each
      of your forces were comperable and that while the enemy had a roman
      legion,a macedonian phalanx, and a mongol horde, you were not
      confronting them with the WWII Italian leg infantry division, the
      Lesbian Citizen militia and the Lichtenstein army <grin>

      Also, one problem with elites is that historically they tended to get
      worn out because they were used for all contingenies, Chindits,
      Rangers, 5307 provisional, etc until they were bled dry.

      Regards
      Doug

      --- In Sun_Tzu@yahoogroups .com, billr54619@. .. wrote:
      >
      > While airmobility has not lived up to the hype with which it was
      > introduced, the basic concept is sound.
      > Richard Simpkin stated in "Human Factors in Mechanized Warfare" that
      > "rotor is to track as track is to boot"
      > Operationally speaking, the tactical range of attack helicopters and
      > airmobile infantry is unparalleled - but both must
      > be combined with light, airtransportable armored vehicles and the
      > ability to provide logistics support to realize the concept's
      > promise. Helicopters may be vulnerable, but they are also quite
      lethal.
      >
      > Bill R.
      >


    • billr54619@aol.com
      In terms of the ROAD division structure, the Army never abandoned the Airmobile (or Air Assault) division. The 101st participated in Desert Storm, and for
      Message 2 of 7 , Feb 1, 2009
        In terms of the ROAD division structure, the Army never "abandoned"
        the Airmobile (or Air Assault) division. The 101st participated in
        Desert Storm, and for all practical purposes, the 82d Airborne acted as
        an airmobile division in that conflict. So you had an entire corps -
        the XVIII Airborne Corps - that consisted of two air assault divisions
        and a mechanized infantry division - also the French 6th Light Armored
        Division - that operated the far west flank and contained some
        airmobile assets.

        Now, the US Army did experiment with something called he "Tricap"
        (Triple Capability) division during the 1970s - this was a hybrid
        airmobile and armor/mechanized division structure that was never
        adopted in the force structure. But it should be noted that there was a
        vestige of the concept
        in the Division 86 structure which added an aviation brigade to each
        army division. Attack helicopter squadrons as well as medium (e.g.
        UH-60) lift
        assets were therefore intrinsic to both the division and corps
        structures.

        The current army being brigade-centric, the current force structure
        offers more flexibility in task organizing army aviation assets into
        operational formations. The net effect is something more reminiscent of
        Marine Corps formations. The Army has regarded the aviation brigades as
        maneuver
        units rather than combat support and combat service support, so it will
        be interesting to see how this evolved.

        Bill R.

        --
        ---Original Message-----
        From: Douglas Henderson <kueikutzu@...>
        To: Sun_Tzu@yahoogroups.com
        Sent: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 12:17 am
        Subject: [Sun_Tzu] Re: Three random questions



        Thanks for the replies. However, does anyone know of any books or such

        that discuss how, insitutionally, the Army abandoned the airmobile

        division concept?



        Also regarding Gus's point: While I see where you are coming from, in

        terms of team play, if you take all the risk takers out of the main

        team is it a matter that you have one very effective force that can

        carry the combat, but doesn't that mean that your mainstream forced is

        good for nothing? Dpn't the aggressive hard chargers mixed in with the

        others tend to bring the quality of the base units up?



        Of course you can try for a SunBin horse race where you pit your third

        best againsthis first best, first best against his second best and your

        second best against his third best, but that always assumed that each

        of your forces were comperable and that while the enemy had a roman

        legion,a macedonian phalanx, and a mongol horde, you were not

        confronting them with the WWII Italian leg infantry division, the

        Lesbian Citizen militia and the Lichtenstein army <grin>



        Also, one problem with elites is that historically they tended to get

        worn out because they were used for all contingenies, Chindits,

        Rangers, 530720provisional, etc until they were bled dry.



        Regards

        Doug



        --- In Sun_Tzu@yahoogroups.com, billr54619@... wrote:

        >

        > While airmobility has not lived up to the hype with which it was

        > introduced, the basic concept is sound.

        > Richard Simpkin stated in "Human Factors in Mechanized Warfare"
        that

        > "rotor is to track as track is to boot"

        > Operationally speaking, the tactical range of attack helicopters
        and

        > airmobile infantry is unparalleled - but both must

        > be combined with light, airtransportable armored vehicles and the

        > ability to provide logistics support to realize the concept's

        > promise. Helicopters may be vulnerable, but they are also quite

        lethal.

        >

        > Bill R.

        >
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