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Husserl

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  • scarey1917
    ibuick wrote:
    Message 1 of 16 , Dec 30, 2004
      "ibuick" <ibuick@b...> wrote: <<<<<<<<<It seems to me, however, that
      there is a confusion between Sartre's and Husserl's (and perhaps even
      Kant's)methods. It was Husserl who bracketed existence not Sartre. For
      him existence was not the key issue; the aim was to describe any
      phenomenon. This method as Steve rightly asserts is an idealistic
      philosophy....I think both Steve and Tommy are confusing Sartre's
      phenomenological method with Husserl's.>>>>>>>>>>>


      I think I was sloppy in my remarks; yes, of course there is a
      difference. I don't claim to be a Husserl expert, but it seems clear
      that for him all senses of "being" are CONSTITUTED senses. The
      activity of the Transcendental Ego (which is uncovered via the
      phenomenological epoche) is prior to ontological positings. I'm
      presently re-reading Husserl's "Cartesian Meditations", and he claims
      that it is within the framwork of the transcendental "monad" that
      regional ontologies arise. On the other hand both Heidegger and Sartre
      see the constituting subject not primarily in terms of an
      epistemological subject but rather in terms of a practical engagement
      that has an irreducible being (Dasein; For-Itself). By the way, it's
      funny (or sad) to see Husserl struggle in the last meditation of the
      book to explain the constituting of the Other Subject from out of his
      transcendental solipsism.

      -Steve
    • Tommy Beavitt
      ... Perhaps I was over-wordy in my last email. And I apologise if I parodied inappropriately. But this is the nub of the argument: I don t believe that
      Message 2 of 16 , Dec 30, 2004
        On 29 Dec 2004, at 21:36, decker150 wrote:

        > Existentialism grew up
        > out of phenomenology, which deals only with visible phenomenon

        Perhaps I was over-wordy in my last email. And I apologise if I
        parodied inappropriately. But this is the nub of the argument: I don't
        believe that "visible" is in any way what is at stake here.

        If a phenomenon can be sensed by one being-for-itself it can be (in
        principle) sensed by another. It is not as if phenomenology claims that
        for Stevie Wonder a visual spectacle doesn't exist. He is perfectly
        empowered to ask his minder what the spectacle looks like and following
        the description that he receives to constitute an impression of the
        phenomenon in his mind that is just as "real" or corresponds as
        accurately as that of the able-sighted minder.

        Again, we could quibble about "visible" because as far as our sensory
        appreciation of phenomena goes, it could just as easily be audible or
        olfactory.

        I don't think either that we need to quibble about whether a phenomenon
        is directly apprehended by any sense. Direct or indirect, that is not
        the question that phenomenology seeks to formulate.

        It has to be admitted that I am a little shaky on the distinction
        between phenomenology and empiricism. I haven't read Cartesian
        Meditations, so if anyone who has can throw any light on this matter I
        would be grateful.

        Tommy
      • decker150
        Tommy wrote: ... this is the nub of the argument: I don t ... Joe: Well, what is? Sartre described his essays as Phenomenological essays on Ontology.
        Message 3 of 16 , Dec 30, 2004
          Tommy wrote: "... this is the nub of the argument: I don't
          > believe that "visible" is in any way what is at stake here."

          Joe: Well, what is? Sartre described his essays as
          Phenomenological essays on Ontology. Phenomenology does not operate
          in a non experiencial / nonsensate vacuum. I understand that Sartre
          not only dealt with the concrete material world, but had to confront
          the condition of human consciousness since it is the central
          unavoidable recepient of all observation. There is no Phenomenology
          without the prerequisite condition of human sensibility, that is,
          sensation of the visible world. So if the visible, seen world is
          not "in any way" what is at stake, then I would be glad to know what
          is? I am not saying that there are not related ramification within
          the world we detect, so I am eager to learn from you what is at
          stake?

          Joe

          >
          > If a phenomenon can be sensed by one being-for-itself it can be
          (in
          > principle) sensed by another. It is not as if phenomenology claims
          that
          > for Stevie Wonder a visual spectacle doesn't exist. He is
          perfectly
          > empowered to ask his minder what the spectacle looks like and
          following
          > the description that he receives to constitute an impression of
          the
          > phenomenon in his mind that is just as "real" or corresponds as
          > accurately as that of the able-sighted minder.
          >
          > Again, we could quibble about "visible" because as far as our
          sensory
          > appreciation of phenomena goes, it could just as easily be audible
          or
          > olfactory.
          >
          > I don't think either that we need to quibble about whether a
          phenomenon
          > is directly apprehended by any sense. Direct or indirect, that is
          not
          > the question that phenomenology seeks to formulate.
          >
          > It has to be admitted that I am a little shaky on the distinction
          > between phenomenology and empiricism. I haven't read Cartesian
          > Meditations, so if anyone who has can throw any light on this
          matter I
          > would be grateful.
          >
          > Tommy
        • Tommy Beavitt
          ... I think that we have to separate the concept of sense and the concept of experience . The link that you sent http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology
          Message 4 of 16 , Dec 31, 2004
            On 31 Dec 2004, at 03:24, decker150 wrote:

            > Tommy wrote: "... this is the nub of the argument: I don't
            >> believe that "visible" is in any way what is at stake here."
            >
            > Joe: Well, what is? Sartre described his essays as
            > Phenomenological essays on Ontology. Phenomenology does not operate
            > in a non experiencial / nonsensate vacuum. I understand that Sartre
            > not only dealt with the concrete material world, but had to confront
            > the condition of human consciousness since it is the central
            > unavoidable recepient of all observation. There is no Phenomenology
            > without the prerequisite condition of human sensibility, that is,
            > sensation of the visible world. So if the visible, seen world is
            > not "in any way" what is at stake, then I would be glad to know what
            > is? I am not saying that there are not related ramification within
            > the world we detect, so I am eager to learn from you what is at
            > stake?

            I think that we have to separate the concept of "sense" and the concept
            of "experience". The link that you sent
            http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology doesn't mention sensation.

            A phenomenon that hasn't been experienced is not a phenomenon. At
            least, it may be, but we have no way of knowing.

            The dreams which you described in a subsequent post are phenomena. They
            are, it is true, a particular class of phenomena in that it would
            appear that they are generated by your imagination.

            One can explore their meaning I suppose and it is true that Jung and
            other thinkers have provided frameworks by which the meaning of the
            phenomenon of dreams can be explored.

            But for me, who isn't the dreamer of your dreams (indeed, I very rarely
            dream nowadays) it makes little sense to explore the meaning of Joe's
            dreams other than that they are a phenomenon the meaning of which is
            produced by Joe. If I was Joe's psychotherapist then it might be more
            relevant because to explore the meaning of Joe's dreams would be part
            of my projects.

            It occurs to me that, with reference to Sartre's phenomenology, one
            might be at risk of being in bad faith in believing that the meaning of
            dreams is greater than or external to the meaning with which one
            supplies them.

            I return to the concept of communication which is not a concept that
            Sartre finds especially significant but which, for me, arises from
            Sartre's thought.

            The definition and meaning of a phenomenon is only of interest when it
            is being communicated. A phenomenon that is not capable of being
            communicated is not a phenomenon. At least, it may be, but we have no
            way of knowing.

            Tommy
          • decker150
            Tommy wrote: I think that we have to separate the concept of sense and the concept of experience . Joe: OK. In the Buddhist concept called Khandas, there
            Message 5 of 16 , Dec 31, 2004
              Tommy wrote: I think that we have to separate the concept of "sense"
              and the concept of "experience".

              Joe: OK. In the Buddhist concept called Khandas, there is a break
              down on a grouping of 5, mayby 6 variables that are interconnected. I
              believe it begins with the external object, the source of our
              sensation. Each variable is link or connected to the the next one in
              a causation chain, processing one 'impression' along its way toward
              consciousness, through the organ of sight, placing a transitory image
              in the brain, ending up as a fleeting mental entity within
              consciousness, but is not itself consciousness. All of these
              demonstrate the nature of human experience, which is total group known
              as the khandas (made possible by the total group). I would agree that
              experience is different than 'sense', just as one might make the
              distinction between the eyeball and the brain. Experience seems to be
              derive from this totality, whereas 'sense' itself is one phasee of the
              complete causation chain.

              Tommy wrote: A phenomenon that hasn't been experienced is not a
              phenomenon. At least, it may be, but we have no way of knowing.

              Joe: Does this allude to the old question "if a tree falls in the
              forest and no one was there to witness it, did it really happen?"
              IMO, it actually does happen, but does not human registered within
              experience. Also, lightwaves from the sun shines upon unsensed /
              unregistered events. IMO, an object shows/reveals itself as itself,
              basking in the sunlight, but needs no one to detect these events. And
              you are right, we have no way of knowing. Sartre referred to this
              void within phenomena as a desert world.

              Tommy: "The dreams which you described in a subsequent post are
              phenomena. They are, it is true, a particular class of phenomena in
              that it would appear that they are generated by your imagination."

              Joe: When you define this class of phenomena as "generated by . . .
              [my] . . . imagination," you are apophantically imposing an 'as'
              structure to the event, which denies the mystery of the event and
              replaces that mystery with one convenient 'label'. Many
              intellectually astute people are guilty of glibbly naming psychic
              processes, narrowizing the phenomena to succinct names, such as the
              'imagination'.

              Tommy: One can explore their meaning I suppose and it is true that
              Jung and other thinkers have provided frameworks by which the meaning
              of the phenomenon of dreams can be explored.

              Joe: I am not so sure that it is a 'describable meaning' in any
              defined sense. Intellectuals like to circumscribe events through the
              use of language descriptions, totally avoiding the amazing fact that
              'something mysterious' has occured. As I understand existentialism,
              it is not what happens or why, but rather that-things-exist or occur
              and this may be referred to as absurd by those who lack reverence, in
              a sense of gloom and derision; but felt to be pure 'mystery' by those
              who express reverence, by those who wish to avoid making final
              determinations, since it is, afterall, still a mystery, not something
              that our intellectual pride allows us to label 'as' ridiculous or
              absurd. It is the rush to labeling that I feel is false. To label
              something as absurd is to have one's mind already madeup in a grand
              narrative style, and on such a cosmic scale, is a kind of presumptuous
              that one has enough information to label 'everything' absurd. Sartre
              was not 'in touch' with everything. I do not think we have the
              adequate intelligence to conclude, without utter pride of mind, and
              grand narrations. Too much is yet unknown to make such a final
              characterization of Being, especially since human beings only have
              finite, sense-limited outlooks, grounded as we are to mere human
              detection. Really, I just feel that Sartre was a little too smug in
              his finalistic remarks. And the description that everything is
              absurd, indicates an overall lack of acknowledgement toward an
              inpenetrable mystery, as if Sartre thought himself intellectually
              sufficient enough to draw such ultimate conclusions. Hubris.

              Tommy: "I very rarely dream nowadays"

              Joe: . . .hummm?

              Tommy: "with reference to Sartre's phenomenology, one might be at
              risk of being in bad faith in believing that the meaning of
              > dreams is greater than or external to the meaning with which one
              > supplies them."

              Joe: Yeah, right! As if 99% of the human race isn't already overcome
              with badfaith. :-) Self-deception abounds and it's name is 'myriad'.

              Thanks for your thought - Joe
            • fredwelfare@aol.com
              In a message dated 12/31/2004 6:57:10 AM Eastern Standard Time, Sartre@yahoogroups.com writes: As I understand it, for Sartre existence is the key factor.
              Message 6 of 16 , Dec 31, 2004
                In a message dated 12/31/2004 6:57:10 AM Eastern Standard Time,
                Sartre@yahoogroups.com writes:

                As I understand it, for Sartre existence is the key factor. Being-in-
                itself - brute existence, exists independent of our consciousness,
                and the phenomenon we experience is really out there and comes to us
                directly without us supplying the attributes. Our pre-reflective
                consciousness goes out to (intends) to the object and grasps it
                directly.
                I think that this aspect of metaphysics, the definition of being and its
                sensibility to humans, deals merely with existence, and not with reality.
                Reality includes not only historical knowledge but the effects of reflection upon
                our temporality and actions. I am concerned that phenomenology deals with
                existence and not with reality.

                FredW








                [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
              • olivia_sloan
                Hi Fred, I think that this aspect of metaphysics, the definition of being and its sensibility to humans, deals merely with existence, and not with reality.
                Message 7 of 16 , Jan 2, 2005
                  Hi Fred,

                  "I think that this aspect of metaphysics, the definition of being and
                  its sensibility to humans, deals merely with existence, and not with
                  reality. Reality includes not only historical knowledge but the
                  effects of reflection upon our temporality and actions. I am
                  concerned that phenomenology deals with existence and not with
                  reality".

                  hmmmm....Do you know, would Sartre say that we have access to reality
                  outside of positional and non-positional consciousness?

                  I personally can see us being bound by "reality" but the only way
                  that I think that we could know it we found "reality" is if it worked
                  somehow in relation to others things and this would still entail
                  perception. Even though human experience should never become
                  irrelevant, I see the hope in trying to discover this kind of
                  knowledge...
                • olivia_sloan
                  ...did you ever hear about what Descartes did to dogs, because he was so sure that what he had reasoned about was so right??? lol. I guess this is why I feel a
                  Message 8 of 16 , Jan 2, 2005
                    ...did you ever hear about what Descartes did to dogs, because he was
                    so sure that what he had reasoned about was so right??? lol. I guess
                    this is why I feel a little defensive about the "reality" vs "human
                    experience" way of going about things...
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